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Abstract 
Although the study of ‘the state’ as a policy actor has diminished in the shift from 
international to global health, states remain critical to the creation and implementation of 
policies to improve health. However, assessments and understanding of why states engage 
(their motives), how states engage (their approaches), and where states engage (which fora 
and policy processes) remain limited. This study analyses the role of the state, with case 
studies of Japan and Indonesia, in terms of why, how and where they engage in global health, 
focusing on the process to conceptualize the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goal for 
health (SDG3). Constructivism provides the conceptual foundation to understand why states 
engaged, and Barnett and Duvall’s power framework is applied to understand how and 
where states engaged. The thesis demonstrates that states construct their engagement in 
global health as part of their foreign policy efforts; both case studies highlight how critical 
the construction of a narrative, and the process to do so, is to motivate and shape state 
engagement. This has implications for how and where states engage. Both Japan and 
Indonesia state actors engaged in the post-2015 process exerting institutional, productive 
and structural power to advance domestic political interests. Most notably, Japan’s 
government exerted institutional power leveraging its relationships within both the World 
Bank and the World Health Organisation; Indonesia’s government exerted structural power 
with its President co-chairing the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel. While power 
frameworks do not explain all global health policymaking outcomes, they do help illuminate 
how and where actors engage and exert power in policymaking processes. Indeed, applying 
analytical frameworks focused on power in global health helps deepen understanding and 
insight into how and where different state (and non-state actors) coordinate, collaborate and 
contest policy priorities. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Background: Applying International Relations 
Theory and Power Analysis to Understand Why, How and Where 
States Engage in (and Ultimately Shape) Global Health1 
 
Key Points: 
• Globalisation continues to transform international relations, global governance and 
global health. Globalisation is causing state actors to adapt why, how and where they 
engage each other as well as interact with other actors in global health. State actors’ 
engagement exerts power and contributes to the conceptualisation of global health. 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of these key concepts. 
• State actors play and continue to play a critical role in conceptualizing global health 
and determining policies and priorities. Yet research explicitly analysing state actors’ 
roles in the era of globalisation is limited. State actors deserve further study to 
understand why they engage (meaning motives and objectives), how they engage 
(meaning their approaches and tools) and where they engage (which fora and policy 
processes).  
• This thesis applies international relations theory, and specifically an analysis of 
power, to better understand state motivations and how states engage within global 
health. The aim is to contribute to new interpretations and understandings of global 
health in the current era of globalisation and suggest areas for improved engagement 
by states in global governance and, ultimately, the achievement of global health goals.  
 
Conceptual Introduction and Background 
The rise of new actors, mechanisms and processes is changing how state actors interact, and 
how state actors engage explicitly and implicitly in global health. This matters for why, how 
and where state actors engage in and exert power in global health. State actors play and 
continue to play a critical role in conceptualizing global health and determining policies and 
priorities. For example, states played a decisive role in determining and conceptualizing the 
post-2015, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For global health to mature as a field, 
there needs to be greater attention to the importance of state actors and their roles within 
the field.1 Without explicitly recognizing the critical role of states, future understandings of 
global health will remain limited. States’ roles, both explicit and implicit, deserve additional 
 
1 This chapter builds upon two previously published comment articles: Marten, Robert. “Global Health Warning: Definitions Wield Power.” International 
Journal of Health Policy and Management 5, no. 3 (December 25, 2015): 207–9. https://doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2015.213 and Marten, Robert, and 
Richard D. Smith. “State Support: A Prerequisite for Global Health Network Effectiveness; Comment on ‘Four Challenges That Global Health Networks 
Face.’” International Journal of Health Policy and Management 0, no. 0 (July 24, 2017). http://www.ijhpm.com/article_3394.html. These are also 
included in Annex III. 
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research to understand why they engage (meaning motives and objectives), how they engage 
(meaning their approaches and tools), and where they engage (which fora and policy 
processes). To better and more deeply understand global health, there is a need to stop 
overlooking the role of states, and better appreciate states as actors.   
For example, Japan is hosting the 2019 G20 Summit and will seek to position global 
health prominently on the agenda. Japan will likely deploy non-material resources using this 
G20 platform in an effort to shape and influence the global health agenda advancing its own 
global health interests. But how exactly will Japan seek to set the agenda, and which tools 
will it use? Moreover, why is Japan seeking to leverage the G20 agenda, a forum which is 
relatively new for global governance and until now has not had much focus on global health? 
Could the G20 play a similar role for the SDGs as the G7 did in advancing the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) framework? Or will other fora influence or shape the adoption or 
non-adoption of the SDGs? And what implications will this have for other states, and the 
future of global health?  
To understand and appreciate why state actors engage in global health, it is useful to 
contextualize the state, globalisation and global governance and consider international 
relations theories, particularly constructivism. Building on this understanding of why state 
actors engage in global health, power is a useful framework for understanding how states 
engage. Applying power could help illuminate how and why different actors engage. It could 
also identify previously unrecognised efforts or strategies that different actors use to shape 
and set priorities within global health policymaking. Reconsidering why and how state 
actors engage using a combination of constructivism and power analysis could provide fresh 
insights into global health and contribute to deeper, more nuanced understandings of global 
health politics, policy and practice.  
This thesis does this. It tests a framework which uses constructivism to understand 
why state actors engage and applies power analysis to understand how and where states 
engage in the negotiation of global health policies. More specifically, it focuses on two states, 
Japan and Indonesia, and a specific process, the conceptualisation and negotiation of the 
post-2015, SDG for health (SDG3). This introductory chapter reviews global health, 
international relations and governance and power analysis and presents an overview of this 
thesis.  
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Global Health 
Conceptualized in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the field of “global health” itself is 
relatively new, and remains heavily contested.2,3 There is no agreement on what is meant by 
“global health”, or about how progress should be measured.4 This definition matters because 
how global health is understood shapes the quantity, allocation and distribution of 
resources, influences how different actors interact with each other as well as determines the 
creation of new (or reform of existing) policy initiatives.5  
For example, conceptualized during the same period as the field of “global health”, the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) became the dominant paradigm for global 
development. Health was a major part of the MDGs. Three out of the eight MDGs related 
directly to health (Goal 4: reduce child mortality; Goal 5: improve maternal health; and Goal 
6: combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) and the other five MDGs focused on critical 
determinants of health. Agreed upon by all countries at the United Nations in September 
2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflected a significant enlargement for the 
development agenda, especially for health, and presented an opportunity to expand the 
ambition of existing GHG. The SDG for health (SDG3) incorporates and builds upon the MDGs. 
SDG3 also includes addressing non-communicable diseases (Target 3.4) along with drugs 
and alcohol (3.5), halving the number of deaths and injuries from road traffic injuries (3.6), 
ensuring access to sexual and reproductive health care services (3.7), achieving universal 
health coverage (3.8) and reducing the number of deaths and illness from pollution (3.9). 
SDG3 also includes four “means of implementation” on the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (3.A), support for research and development for neglected diseases (3.B), 
improvements in the financing and recruitment of human resources for health (3.C) and 
strengthening the implementation of the International Health Regulations (3.D). In addition 
to SDG3, there are additional indicators related to health throughout the other sixteen SDGs. 
The Agenda 2030 positions health as a broad development issue being both a means and an 
end to many of the SDGs. 
Fukuda-Parr and Hulme argue that the MDGs represented a new ‘super norm’ 
dominating the global development agenda.6 This also had implications for the emergent 
field of global health. The MDGs’ influence in development meant that the MDGs contributed 
towards a ‘normative global health agenda’. These new norms for the emergent field of global 
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health in the early 2000s continue to shape the field of global health today. The MDGs 
reflected an emerging definition of global health and contributed to advancing this 
conceptualisation of global health. This MDG-inspired understanding of global health exerts 
power in shaping the global health agenda and influencing global health institutions’ 
mandates. How, or if, the SDGs, conceptualised and negotiated between 2012-2015, will 
continue this role of influencing policies and priorities within global health has yet to be seen, 
and is currently being contested. 
Like global governance (described below), global health initially focused on moving 
beyond the state and did not focus on the role of states. Most analysis around the creation of 
the MDGs also downplays the role of state actors.7 One commonly referred to definition of 
global health from Koplan and colleagues explains global health as “an area for study, 
research, and practice that places a priority on improving health and achieving equity in 
health for all people worldwide. Global health emphasizes transnational health issues, 
determinants, and solutions; involves many disciplines within and beyond the health 
sciences and promotes interdisciplinary collaboration.”8 In practice, however, this definition 
is aspirational. As one commentator stated, global health is “more a bunch of problems than 
a discipline.”9 Critics argue that global health is “a foreign policy instrument of hyper-rich 
nations […and/or…] a vehicle for already strong universities to burnish their brand, 
reputation, and revenues still further.”10 
Despite the fact that a consensus global health definition remains disputed between 
practitioners and policymakers as well as public health and social science academics, certain 
themes dominate.11 Building on globalisation12 and global governance13, global health 
scholars broadly overlook the role of the state and emphasize the decline of sovereignty, 
borders and state power. They identify a landscape with an explosion of new actors so 
fragmented that state actors appear to no longer control policymaking.14 Scholars appear to 
focus on two broad competing and contrasting definitional approaches to global health.  
One early approach inspired by the HIV/AIDS emergency experience15 sees global 
health, as defined by Brown, Cueto and Fee, defined as the “consideration of the health needs 
of the people of the whole planet above the concern of particular nations.”16 In practice, this 
form of “global health” often appears to be an extension of foreign aid and focuses on new 
actors, like global health partnerships or new foundations, providing assistance on certain 
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health issues to specific populations in developing countries. In the same way that global 
governance builds on international relations, this approach to global health builds on the 
field of international health.17   
A second or later approach to global health is Koplan and colleagues’ earlier 
definition, which is a more academic, interdisciplinary and aspirational approach to global 
health considering transnational issues and how they affect population health. This 
approach focuses on challenges transcending national focus; this includes topics like cross-
border issues (eg outbreaks), issues of the commons (eg antimicrobial resistance), shared 
problems (eg obesity) and broader planetary health issues (eg climate change). Some 
scholars have subsequently argued global health still needs to incorporate the implications 
of globalisation and be further “globalised” meaning global health “should not be viewed as 
foreign health, but rather as the health of the global population” and that global health 
“should be understood as the product of health interdependence, a process that has arisen 
in parallel with economic and geopolitical interdependence.”18  
The practice and study of global health continues to evolve. As Horton argues, global 
health is “biomedicine, epidemiology, demography, public health, anthropology, economics, 
political science, law, engineering, geography, informatics, even philosophy” and “at present, 
the gestation of Global Health involves the chaotic tumbling, rumbling and knocking together 
of ideas and aspirations.”19 Global health is also at different times both descriptive and 
prescriptive.20 These approaches are sometimes conflated leading to confusion as well as 
conceptual and normative clashes.  As Ooms argues, “[w]hile public health (at the national 
level) is based on a widely accepted normative starting point – namely, that it is the 
responsibility of the state to improve people’s health – there is no widely accepted normative 
starting point for international health or global health.”21 This, as Ooms argues elsewhere, 
has the potential to “stymie debate on the role of the powerhouses of global health, their 
normative premises, and the rights and wrongs of these premises.”22  
Global health literature, regarding how actors (both new and established) are 
adapting and engaging in the era of globalisation and global governance, is still emergent. 
When global health considers states, it tends to focus on how global governance and 
globalisation affects state efforts to improve health.23 For example, a 2014 Lancet-University 
of Oslo Commission brought greater attention to how some global governance mechanisms 
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shape national health policies.24 Despite a deepening understanding for and continued focus 
on how global policy processes affect states’ abilities to deliver and ensure health, this is only 
half of what might be considered a “global health policy loop”. The other half of the loop is 
how state actors can affect and shape global health, including both global health governance 
and global governance for health and the contours and shape of the broader field of global 
health. This other half of the loop is often overlooked. Understanding how states exert power 
as well as affect and shape global health is largely underappreciated. International relations 
(IR) scholars study the effects of globalisation on why, how and where states engage, exert 
power and pursue their interests. 
 
International Relations and Governance 
A central focus in IR is thus the role of the state. With the publication of a 1992 book, 
Governance without Government25, along with the creation of a new academic journal, Global 
Governance, and a prominent Global Commission both in 1995, the emergent concept of 
“global governance” dominated much of the international relations discourse at the end of 
the Twentieth Century, and by 2005, Barnett and Duvall wrote that “the idea of global 
governance […] attained near-celebrity status. In little more than a decade the concept has 
gone from the ranks of the unknown to [be…] the central orienting theme.”26 Weiss defined 
“global governance” as “collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide 
problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve; it reflects the capacity 
[…] to provide government-like services in the absence of world government.”27 Critically, 
global governance focuses on moving “beyond the state.” 
While Zuern argued that global governance is “amorphous”28, academic literature 
emphases new actors and mechanisms, how they shift and shape “global governance” and 
how this affects states. For example, Krahmann highlights how analysis on political authority 
shifted away from the state and moved towards more local bodies, international 
organisations as well as private and voluntary actors.29 In contrast, there has been 
comparatively less focus on states and their continuing abilities to exert power and influence 
globalisation and global governance and how this in turn affects domestic policies.30 This is 
particularly true in the field of global health. There are studies examining how global health 
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affects states, but analysis explicitly examining why and how state actors engage, affect 
global health and exert power are limited.  
 
Power Analysis 
Power profoundly shapes how we conceptualize global health with implications for policy 
and practice. As scholars have acknowledged, power is deeply embedded in the field of 
international relations.31Power analysis is potentially critical as an approach because it 
could help create a deeper and more robust understanding of how actors create, manage and 
exploit disparities to serve their interests in global policymaking processes. Power analysis 
brings a more nuanced and structured framework to analyse how actors build alliances and 
influence others seeking to advance their interests and achieve their goals ultimately 
affecting and shaping global health policies. Power analysis also helps identify previously 
unrecognized ways in which actors engage. Illuminating these efforts and showing how 
different actors shape policymaking has the potential to accelerate efforts to assess different 
strategies, and ultimately improve how actors engage. Studying power should also 
contribute towards increasing and improving actor effectiveness. This will also expand 
emergent literature on how ideational and normative exertions of power shape policies. 
Applying power could also add to understanding how the designs of certain processes 
determine some policies with implications for implementation. A better understanding of 
and application of power analysis enables contributions to the design of processes and 
policies to redress disparities creating more legitimate and fair policy processes with greater 
engagement and ultimately improved or better outcomes.  
 
Thesis and Research Questions 
The negotiation of the post-2015, Sustainable Development Goals agenda was arguably one 
of the most inclusive and participatory global policy processes in history, and states played 
a critical and decisive role. Engaging for various reasons including the previous importance 
of the MDGs in shaping the global development agenda, states exerted institutional, 
structural and productive power throughout this process. As states determined the process 
(including ensuring that they would have the final word), the conceptualisation and 
negotiation of the post-2015 SDG agenda for health showcases the often-underappreciated 
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role of states in shaping global health. State engagement in this process also illuminates how 
power analysis could help showcase how actors engage in global health. This research helps 
identify insights into ideational factors or non-material efforts which are useful for achieving 
results in global health.  
This research focuses on understanding why and how the health SDG was developed, 
and examines how states, particularly Japan and Indonesia, developed their national 
positions and exerted power in the process to conceptualize the SDG for health. From the 
early 2000s, the government of Japan increasingly engaged on the issue of health within the 
field of global health as part of its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Japan, as an 
OECD or “developed” country, was also involved in the creation and conceptualisation of the 
MDGs. Leveraging its role within the G7 and its relationships with both the World Bank and 
the World Health Organization, Japan’s government sought to play a similar role in the 
creation of the SDGs. It engaged heavily in the contestation of the SDG for health focusing on 
universal health coverage (UHC) as part of the Japanese Government’s 2013 Global Health 
Diplomacy Strategy, which was part of Prime Minister’s “Abenomics” economy policy and 
revitalized global diplomatic engagement.32 Examining the case of Japan showcases how a 
comparatively experienced state engages in global health diplomacy and seeks to advance 
its positions and exert power.  
In contrast, Indonesia demonstrates an emergent state increasingly engaging in 
global health policymaking. In the early 2000s, Indonesia was largely a recipient of the MDGs’ 
influence; however, by July 2012, recognizing Indonesia’s rising global influence and status 
as an emerging economy, the United Nations’ Secretary-General asked Indonesia’s President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to co-chair, along with Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (President of 
Liberia) and David Cameron (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom), the Secretary-
General's High-Level Panel (HLP) of eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda. SBY established a high-level national committee to advise him in this role. This 
committee, and the HLP’s report following its final meeting in Bali, largely shaped 
Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015, SDG process as a response to Indonesia’s 
experience with the MDGs and as part of the President’s broader efforts to reposition 
Indonesia as both a regional and global “middle” power leader. 
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This could contribute to understanding how process can determine outcomes and 
how outcomes impact future global health processes. This empirical research could 
contribute to new interpretations and understandings of global health as a case study of state 
engagement in global health in the current era of globalisation. This might also contribute to 
improving state engagement in global governance as well as the achievement of global health 
goals.  
This research is structured around three research questions (RQs), namely 
understanding why and how states engage in global health (diplomacy) (RQ1 and RQ2), and 
then where states engage in global health, specifically focused on the creation of the SDG for 
health (RQ3). To answer these questions, this researcher reviewed published literature, 
unpublished policy documents and conducted interviewers with policymakers (described in 
more detail in chapter 3). Specifically, the first research question (RQ1) is: Why do states 
engage in global health, and particularly why did states engage in the conceptualisation and 
negotiation of the post-2015, SDG agenda? This includes additional sub-questions. What are 
the factors for assessing the determinants of why a state engages in a given global health 
policy process? Do states seek to influence global health agenda setting for altruistic reasons, 
or to advance their own interests? In other words, what are states “really” pursuing? Is global 
health a tool to advance other interests? What do states seek to achieve and what constitutes 
success?  
The second research question (RQ2) is: How did states engage, ie: exert power, in 
global health, and particularly in shaping the SDGs? This includes the following sub-questions. 
How do states construct national global health (diplomacy) efforts or more broadly a global 
health policy or strategy, ie: who are the relevant actors within governments (ministries, 
agencies and parastatals) and beyond states (NGOs, international institutions, other 
governments) and how do they engage in the process? What is the relationship between 
these actors, ie: what drives them to engage, and what are their relevant capacities and 
limitations? Which of these actors are considered most powerful, and according to which 
measures of power? What are the lessons for others seeking to influence and exert power in 
global health, and what does this mean for the future of global health? What are the 
implications of the SDGs, in terms of who drives agendas and how, for global health 
governance?  
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The third and final research question is: Where do states engage in global health, 
specifically where, how and why did states engage in the process to create SDG 3 for health? 
This includes the following sub-questions. How does the process and the conceptualisation 
of (global) health within the SDGs compare to the MDGs? What was the context and process 
for the creation of the SDGs? Why and how did states engage? Did the design of the process 
shape (benefit or limit) how and why certain states or actors engaged? To answer these 
questions and build on this conceptual introduction, this next section presents a chapter by 
chapter introduction to this thesis. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter Two examines the existing global health literature to understand why and how state 
actors engage in global health. This chapter begins with a review of the state, globalisation 
and global governance in relation to the field of global health. It also provides an introduction 
to the concept of power and reviews the literature on how power has been conceptualized 
and applied within the existing global health literature.  
Building on Chapter Two’s literature review, Chapter Three analyses the 
conceptualisation and negotiation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It explores and examines why state actors engaged 
in these processes and how they exerted power to shape both the process and the eventual 
MDG framework. Chapter Four highlights the need for additional empirical research on state 
engagement in global health. It presents the study framework using constructivism from 
international relations to understand why states engage and applies power analysis to 
understand how states engage in global health policymaking. It also shares the methodology 
for this research, the collection of data and analysis. 
Chapter Five applies this framework for a case study on Japan, and Chapter Six applies 
this framework for a case study on Indonesia. Chapter Seven compares these two case 
studies, and Chapter Eight concludes this study.   
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Chapter Two 
Understated but still Powerful: Reviewing State Engagement and 
Power in the Global Health Literature 
 
Key Points: 
• While the terminology remains contested and profoundly political, globalisation 
continues to transform the fields of international relations, global governance and 
global health.  
• The role of state actors in global health is understated and often overlooked. 
Compared to their importance and influence, there are comparably few studies 
reviewing state engagement in global health. State actors’ roles, both explicit and 
implicit, deserve greater attention and analysis; however, assessments and 
understanding of why states engage (meaning their motives and objectives), how 
states engage (meaning their approaches and tools), and where states engage (which 
fora and policy processes) are still limited. There are now some initial frameworks 
for understanding why state actors engage in global health; however, these only 
loosely apply international relations theory, which is underused as an approach in the 
field of global health. 
• The role of power in determining global health policy remains underappreciated, 
seldom studied and little understood in global health. This is especially significant as 
many of the global level policy processes have increasingly recognized implications 
for national health systems. Power is rarely explicitly used as a framework for 
analysis at the global level in health policy processes. 
 
Introduction 
Building on the discussion of global health in the previous chapter, there is sometimes an 
unspoken sense that “global health” is dominated by powerful states33, current global health 
scholarship underestimates state actors’ roles in determining what constitutes global health 
and underrates the power of state actors in conceptualizing and contesting global health.34 
For example, when Japanese government policymakers promote “universal health coverage” 
as Japan’s top priority in global health in a special Lancet Series on Japan, they promote and 
advance a particular approach to conceptualizing global health, which exerts power within 
the field.35 While appreciating the growing importance of new (non-state) actors and their 
engagement in global health, it is critical to recognize that global health policy processes 
remain largely supported, enabled and ultimately sanctioned by state actors. As the bodies 
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which continue to negotiate and sign international agreements, and are responsible for 
financing, implementing and prioritizing most global health initiatives, states remain the 
preeminent actors within global health. Global health is largely implemented by states and 
is state sanctioned. To understand global health, it is thus necessary to describe and analyse 
the ways in which states are adapting, exerting different forms of power, and working with 
partners. Section One will discuss more about the definition of states, but this work will use 
the term “state” interchangeably with government and consider the “unified set of actors” 
described below acting in global health to represent states despite recognising that state 
actors within one government are not always aligned or unified.  
In the new era of globalisation and global governance, state actors have changed and 
are continuing to redefine how they engage, how they interact with new and established 
actors as well as how they exert power. Similarly, in the transition from international to 
global health, states’ roles, particularly vis-à-vis other actors, evolved. The role of actors from 
civil society and the private sector increased, and the number of public-private partnerships 
in global health also increased as neoliberal ideologies and perceived financial necessities 
influenced donors to look beyond the state for new partnerships to implement projects.36 
This transition has implications for why, how and where state actors engage in global health. 
Yet the analysis on the role of states, and how their role has evolved is understated and 
underdeveloped. As Ricci wrote in 2009, “[e]ven as state sovereignty may be diminished in 
this globalised era, […the state] still remains the main actor with its absolute and relative 
power to dictate global health policy far from confined.”34 States played (and continue to 
play) a critical role in defining and shaping global health. For example, a 2015 study found 
that, emerging economies are “utilizing the World Health Assembly to set the global health 
agenda.”37 Where states are engaging also matters; in this case, for example, why are 
emerging economies engaging in the World Health Assembly, instead of other fora? State 
actors’ roles, both explicit and implicit, deserve greater attention and analysis; however, 
assessments and understanding of why they engage (meaning their motives and objectives), 
how they engage (meaning their approaches and tools), and where they engage (which fora 
and policy processes) remain limited and underappreciated.   
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For example, commentators in 2013 heralded Indonesia’s arrival on the “global 
health diplomacy stage.”38 Why is Indonesia increasing its engagement in global health? How 
does it engage, and how should these efforts be assessed, or compared to other states? Is this 
consistent with Indonesia’s engagement on other issues, or is there something which 
distinguishes Indonesia’s engagement in health? In summary, what does Indonesia’s 
engagement as a state actor mean and what are the implications for global health as well as 
health in Indonesia? In the same way that globalisation, global governance and global health 
affect Indonesia, Indonesia can (and does) affect global health, global governance and 
globalisation. While recognizing that every state could affect global health policies, not every 
state always does, or is able to shape global health with the same results. States have varying 
levels of power within global health.  
To better understand the existing literature and how future research might 
contribute and help answer these questions, this chapter first reviews the existing literature 
on states in global health and second reviews the literature on power in global health. The 
first section presents a conceptual review of states in the era of globalisation in the fields of 
international relations and global governance, and then considers the implications for the 
field of global health. It then reviews the existing global health literature which considers 
states in global health. The second section does the same for power: it starts with a 
conceptual review of power, and then reviews how power has been applied within the field 
of global health. This chapter then concludes by summarizing the identified gaps within the 
literature.    
 
Section One: The State in the era of Globalisation and what that means for Global 
Health 
The role of the state remains central to international relations. As Stirk argues, “few concepts 
in international relations are as controversial and enduring – yet as neglected and under-
theorized – as the concept of the state.”39 As Dryzek and Dunleavey argue, “the idea of ‘the 
state’ rests on the notion that there should be a single, unified source of political authority 
for a territory, drawing upon the undivided loyalties of its population, operating in a well-
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organized and permanent way, and directed towards the interests of the whole of society.”40 
Berki argued that “everybody agrees that the modern state is a rather baffling 
phenomenon.”41 Nevertheless, there is now “substantial agreement among different 
analysts” on seven defining characteristics of the state, namely that “the state is 1) a unified 
set of institutions; 2) controlling a given territory and distinct society; 3) making and 
enforcing collectively binding decisions; 4) monopolizing the legitimate use of force; 5) 
seeking sovereignty; 6) operating in a distinct public realm; and 7) deciding citizenship and 
controlling entry.”42 While a certain level of abstraction maybe required to see, for example, 
a “unified set of institutions” across government agencies, as state actors and non-state 
actors might contest or seek to influence state authority in some of the area, states, and no 
other actors, possess all seven of these characteristics. 
Traditionally the study of international relations is the study of how states interact 
with each other to protect their interests. Yet in the 1990s, many scholars were quick to 
proclaim the decline or even the end of the state. Ohmae argued in 1995, “nation states have 
already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today’s 
borderless world. The nation state is increasingly a nostalgic fiction.”43 In 1996, Strange 
proclaimed “heads of governments may be the last to recognize that they and their ministers 
have lost the authority over national societies and economies that they used to have.”44 In 
1997, Reinicke argued states no longer had an effective monopoly of legitimate power over 
their territory.45 In the same year, Mathews found that “nation-states may simply no longer 
be the natural problem-solving unit.”46 Stephen Walt concluded in 1998 that “the view that 
states are of decreasing relevance is surprisingly common among academics, journalists, and 
policy wonks.”47 
While these perspectives were common in the 1990s, they remain contested today. 
Indeed, current and ongoing political events deeply challenge these views and foretell a 
resurgent state re-asserting sovereignty. But these commentators were responding to 
transformational shifts in the 1990s, particularly the Cold War’s end as well as a period of 
growing globalisation. Steger defines globalisation as “a multidimensional set of social 
processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies 
and exchanges [across economic, political, cultural, and ecological dimensions] while at the 
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same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the 
local and the distant.”48 Globalisation had occurred previously, particularly in the 1910s and 
the 1970s, but as Held argued the “sheer magnitude, complexity and speed distinguish[ed] 
contemporary globalisation from earlier periods”.49 The below reviews and summarizes 
how the predominant international relations theories – realism, liberal institutionalism and 
constructivism (each heavily contested and with multiple sub-theories) – interpret 
globalisation and consider its effect on states.50 (This is important background as these 
theories shape and informed some of the early global health literature.) This next section 
also considers the particular relevance of constructivism for why, how and where states 
engage in global health policymaking.  
 
International Relations Theories and States 
The dominant theories in international relations are realism, liberal institutionalism and 
constructivism. Founded on the thinking of Carr, Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer, 
realism sees states competing for power and security in a world of anarchy, behaving 
similarly irrespective of their government type. For realists, geopolitics are critical to 
understand state interaction. Realists observes states using military and diplomatic force to 
achieve their interests; international institutions are tools to be used as convenient. The 
balance of power is an important realist construct, and according to realists, the most 
powerful states dominate international policymaking. Realists believe that the present world 
order is primarily a product of US global hegemony as US structural power is reflected in the 
conceptualization of global institutions. 
Liberal institutionalism, grounded in the thinking of former US President Wilson and 
promoted notably by Keohane and Ikenberry, focuses on the spread of democracy and 
interdependent economic relations. Liberal institutionalism sees the proliferation of 
democratic states and economic interdependence strengthened and amplified through 
international institutions, like the WHO, which act to modify and mitigate state behaviour. 
While states remain the dominant actors (though their type or form of government matters), 
international organizations are increasingly active in an international system governed by 
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international law. Both realism and liberal institutionalism consider the state as a unitary 
actor; however, this conceptualization of the state is challenged by scholars highlighting how 
different government ministries or political parties can compete and contest state interests.  
Constructivism, developed by Wendt and Ruggie amongst others, and explored most 
notably by Sikkink, Barnett and Finnemore, focuses on the creation of ideas, values and social 
identities. For constructivists, policy entrepreneurs and networks, including civil society 
organisations, are the primary actors promoting ideas and values through social interactions 
and institutions. Constructivists recognize states, but do not necessarily see them as 
dominant or unitary actors. Instead, they see state interests as “constructed”. Constructivism 
is a particularly promising approach for a global health audience. The next section reviews 
some of the central issues in constructivism and explores how these might be applied to 
understanding why, how and where states engage in global health.  
Constructivism 
Constructivism is the newest of the three international relations theories mentioned earlier. 
It emerged in the 1990s challenging both realism and liberal institutionalism. Constructivism 
considers the meanings of ideas, institutions and objects and how these meanings are 
created, change and evolve, and the implications of this on state interests and behaviour. In 
other words, constructivism is the study of how social construction shapes state behaviour 
as well as the construction of state interests. As Martha Finnemore argued, “states are 
embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape 
their perceptions of the world and their role in that world. States are socialized to want 
certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them live.”51 The 
same could be said for how state actors understand the field of global health. Divergent 
identities, norms and framings shape how states understand their interests, engage in global 
health policymaking and subsequently exert power within the field of global health.    
 As Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein argue, “cultural environments affect not only 
the incentives for different kinds of state behaviour but also the basic character of states.”52 
This is what they refer to as “identity”. National identities are contested; yet these identities 
can also change and evolve. For example, in the cases of Japan and Germany, both states, in 
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the wake of World War II profoundly shifted their understandings of their national military 
forces with implications for how these states viewed and pursued national security interests. 
As Berger highlights, this shift confounds both neorealism and neoliberalism which would 
have predicted a larger military role for both states given changes “in their security 
environments and steady growth in their relative power.”53 However, this did not happen in 
either case. As Berger contends, “Germany and Japan, as a result of their historical 
experiences and the way in which those experiences were interpreted by domestic political 
actors, have developed beliefs and values that make them peculiarly reluctant to resort to 
the use of military force.”53 The role of state identity also affects global health policymaking. 
For example, the Chinese state was reluctant to acknowledge SARS as it feared how this 
might change others’ understandings of the government’s ability to govern.54 This ability to 
shift national identities in relation to global health policymaking has profound implications 
for where and how states engage; this is why understanding national identity is contested.  
International norms also affect  where and how states engage in global health policymaking. 
As Florini argued, international norms are standards of behaviour that are considered or 
seen to be legitimate in the global policy space.55 Finnemore and Sikkink argued that there 
is a norm life cycle (norm emergence, norm cascade and internalisation).56 This starts with 
norm emergence; norm entrepreneurs attempt to persuade a critical mass of states to 
become norm leaders and embrace new norms. If a tipping point happens and enough states 
embrace the new norm, a second stage of norm cascading occurs. If the cascade goes far 
enough, the process concludes with norm internalisation. Once norms are internalised, they 
become taken for granted and are no longer a matter of debate. For global health, Fukuda-
Parr and Hulme6 argue that the MDGs represented a new ‘super norm’ dominating the global 
development agenda with effects on state behaviour, and implications for how states 
engaged in the process to create the MDG’s successor, the SDGs. (This is also considered in 
Chapter Three). Of course, international norms can be shifted and created depending on how 
they are framed and perceived. 
 Klotz and Lynch explain, “as analysts trying to understand why people do what they 
do, and whether they succeed in what they hope to achieve, constructivists explore the use 
of discourses and the diverse effects of actions.”57 To do this, constructivists study and 
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analyse “the production of discourse through content analysis of specific frames. Then they 
evaluate the impacts of these frames on actions.”57 There are numerous examples of how 
framing can shift actions in public health. For example, reframing discussions on tobacco 
control to consider the effects of second-hand smoke (away from a focus on smokers’ rights 
to smoke) or reframing the need for and use of seatbelts on children’s safety (away from a 
discussion of industry regulation) have led to progress in improving public health. The next 
section builds on this section to highlight why constructivism is most useful for 
understanding why states engage in global health policymaking.  
Constructivist Theory to Understand Why States Engage in Global Health Policymaking 
Given that global health diplomacy strategies are still an emergent practice (as discussed 
more below), policymakers are still working on developing these justifications for why, how 
and where their governments should engage more in these efforts. Constructivist analysis 
offers critical insight to better understand and analyse how this is happening. Identities, 
norms and framings influence how states develop and create their policies and their 
strategies to exert power within the field of global health.   
For example, in terms of identity, since the end of World War II, Japan’s foreign policy 
has remained largely pacifist and the concept of human security developed in the 1990s 
reflects this shift away from a focus on the military. Accordingly, any potential global health 
policy which Japan would advance would thus need to be aligned with and build upon human 
security. For norms, the global policy norm of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
means different things to different states. For example, states like Japan or Indonesia 
perceive and understand the MDGs (or the SDGs) differently to each other, and accordingly 
react and behave in different ways in response to these global norms. In another example, 
the way UNICEF or the World Health Organisation is appreciated or regarded differs 
between Tokyo and Jakarta given these states’ political histories and unique relationships 
with these institutions. These two UN agencies mean different things in different states, and 
are thus perceived and received in different ways in different states. (This will be explained 
in more details in Chapters Five and Six.) The way that issues are framed or understood can 
also affect how and where states engage in global health policymaking. Indeed, Shiffmann 
  
 
24 
 
argued that attention to global health issues is largely a result of how policymakers frame 
the challenge and is not connected to evidence on mortality or morbidity or cost.58 
 
These three theories (constructivism, liberal institutionalism and realism) from 
international relations also  influenced some early frameworks for analysing and 
understanding how global health scholars consider why and how state actors engaged in 
global health. While each of these theories have slightly different interpretations of states, 
none of these international relations theories provides a coherent narrative for globalisation. 
To help understand why, how and where states are engaging in global health, it is critical to 
reflect upon how international relations theories see states evolving in response to 
globalisation. The next section shares one important framework for how scholars view 
globalisation affecting states. 
States and Globalisation 
The implications of globalisation remain contested within academic literature; as recent US 
and UK elections indicate, the effects of globalisation are also broadly contested within 
national electorates and specifically within the field of global health. In 1999, Held and 
colleagues devised a framework to distinguish between three different approaches scholars 
have taken to analysing globalisation, namely: 1) hyperglobalism; 2) scepticism; and 3) 
transformationalism.49 These perspectives do not align with the three IR theories outlined 
above; however, each approach contains strands of the different IR theories. The below 
summarizes these three contrasting approaches, their interpretations of globalisation and 
implications for states. 
Hyperglobalists, like Ohmae and Guehenno, argue globalisation is accelerating the 
arrival of a new epoch in human history. Hyperglobalists believe economic globalisation is 
transforming and denationalizing economies creating transnational networks of production, 
trade and finance. According to hyperglobalists, global governance institutions erode states’ 
abilities to determine policy and accelerate state decline. Hyperglobalists argue, according 
to Held, “economic globalisation is constructing new forms of social organization that are 
  
 
25 
 
supplanting, or that will eventually supplant, traditional nation-states as the primary 
economic and political units of world society.”49  
Sceptics, by contrast, contest the hyperglobalist perspective and globalisation thesis. 
Scholars like Hirst, Krasner and Thompson invoke historical data on economic integration to 
argue globalisation is not unprecedented. They argue most interactions are between 
national economies and highlight regional blocs. Sceptics argue hyperglobalists vastly 
underestimate state power to regulate international economic activity. Sceptics dispute the 
idea that governments are the primary architects of internationalisation. Instead, sceptics 
generally consider the conceptualization and construction of both “globalisation” and “global 
governance” as primarily Western projects to sustain the West’s primacy. 
Transformationalists, like Giddens or Ruggie, believe globalisation is driving a rapid 
reshaping of the world order. While the ultimate outcome of globalisation remains unclear, 
economic, military, technological, ecological, cultural and political changes are profound and 
unprecedented. Transformationalists believe globalisation is “re-engineering the power, 
functions and authority of national governments.”49 Given this new reality, 
transformationalists identify states adapting and evolving to engage new globalized realities. 
They recognize a more activist state. In Rosenau’s words, a state whose power and function 
are “reconstituted and restructured in response” to protect the state’s interests from 
globalisation.59  
As Keohane and Nye write, “what is striking about the last half of the twentieth 
century is the relative effectiveness of efforts by states to respond to globalisation.”60 In the 
end, state functions might simply be adapting instead of weakening, thus reinforcing the 
transformationalist thesis.61 Keohane and Nye continue “governance will remain centred in 
the nation state. State power will remain crucially important, as will the distribution of 
power among states. […] However, the image of the “state” may become increasingly 
misleading as […] states are linked in networks to private and third sector actors.” In other 
words, states remain dominant actors, but are now working with other actors in innovative 
ways to exert their power and adapt to globalisation. For example, Keck and Sikkink 
identified transnational advocacy networks (TANs) playing an increased role in 
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international politics to leverage national governments through the so-called boomerang 
effect; at the time in 1998, Keck and Sikkink imagined TANs leveraging states.62 One could 
now imagine a scenario where states leverage civil society or TANs to achieve their interests 
vis-à-vis another state, or a scenario in which the two have shared goals and cooperate to 
achieve their objectives.  
Since the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars continue to grapple with the new realities 
of globalisation and global governance and what it means for states. Hyperglobalists see 
globalisation as the end of the state, sceptics see globalisation as dependent on state support 
and transformationalists see globalisation transforming state power. While globalisation is 
a powerful force, the state appears to be a resilient actor. In 2019, this thesis and analysis 
believes that the transformationalist hypothesis seems to be the most accurate 
interpretation of the current situation. Yet, as described below, this transformationalist 
viewpoint is not often the starting point for most global health literature. The global health 
literature largely starts from a hyperglobalist perspective. But before getting to this, it is also 
important to review the interface between globalisation, international relations theory and 
global health. 
 
Globalisation, IR Theory and Global Health  
Similar to the field of global governance, globalisation’s impact within global health is 
contested. It was the subject of bitter debate in the early 2000s, and the discussion remains 
unresolved. Critics argued globalisation was essentially neo-colonialism exploiting 
Africans.63 They argued globalisation was economic neoliberalism with serious negative 
effects for health.64 Feachem countered, “[t]he risks and adverse consequences of 
globalisation must be confronted, but they must not be allowed to obscure its overall positive 
impact on health and development.”65 Dollar added that while globalisation could have 
adverse effects, smart policies could mitigate any potential negative implications.66 Others 
noted that the health implications were different across countries with select countries like 
China, Costa Rica, Vietnam and East Asian “tiger economies” doing well and benefitting 
from globalisation while for the majority of countries in Africa, Latin America and Eastern 
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Europe globalisation has not (yet) led to improved health.67 As Lee and colleagues 
summarized in 2002, “[c]onclusions range from globalisation being essentially positive for 
health, albeit with a need to smooth out some rough edges, to one of utter condemnation, 
with adverse effects on the majority of the world's population.”68 By 2008, there was a 
growing sense based on experience that economic growth accelerated by globalisation 
could benefit poor populations, but this required strong and smart policymaking to ensure 
that these benefits were well distributed.69   
Thinking about the impact of globalisation on health in some ways reflects the 
maturation of the field of global health originating as an extension of international health 
and evolving into a much more nuanced analysis of the interdependent nature of global 
health. 69 In the early days of discussions on globalisation and health, much of the focus was 
on specific diseases and the dangers of disease outbreaks, like SARS.70 This grew out of an 
initial overlap between global health and IR which focused on state security.71 IR theory was 
applied to understand health challenges, such as HIV72 from a security perspective, rather 
than a focus on the state.73 For example, Fidler argues like a hyperglobalist that the SARS 
challenge ushered in a post-Westphalian era which moved beyond state sovereignty. This 
debate shifted in the mid to late 2000s when scholars began to consider more complex 
considerations of globalisation and its effects on health, for example, how globalisation was 
affecting trade and health.74,75 
While this discussion continues to evolve, it remains clear globalisation is leading to 
spatial, temporal and cognitive changes with specific implications for health which continue 
to be explored.76 This is also increasingly linked to climate change77 and an emerging focus 
on planetary health.78 To understand the health impacts of globalisation, global health 
scholars developed multiple frameworks.79,80 Building on international relations theory 
and global governance discussions in the era of globalisation, global health scholars also 
developed and contested new conceptual terms to describe and analyse emerging policy 
processes like global health governance (GHG) and global health diplomacy (GHD).  
Global Health Governance (GHG) and Global Health Diplomacy (GHD) 
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Similar to global health, GHG as a subtheme is still evolving. The concept remains contested 
and is simultaneously shaped by both academics and policymakers. Dodgson and 
colleagues defined GHG as the rules by which collective action is taken to achieve agreed 
goals that protect and promote health within a global context.81 In 2011, Ng and Ruger 
reviewed GHG literature and found “major themes and issues” included: “1) persistent GHG 
problems; 2) different approaches to tackling health challenges (vertical, horizontal, and 
diagonal); 3) health’s multi-sectoral connections; 4) neoliberalism and the global economy; 
5) the framing of health (e.g. as a security issue, as a foreign policy issue, as a human rights 
issue, and as a global public good); 6) global health inequalities; 7) local and country 
ownership and capacity; 8) international law in GHG; and 9) research gaps in GHG.”82 In 
other words, GHG considers a wide range of issues. Later in 2014, Lee and Kamradt-Scott 
reviewed over 1,000 works published on GHG, and found, “there is considerable variation in 
how the term is defined and applied, generating confusion as to the boundaries of the subject, 
the perceived problems in practice, and the goals to be achieved through institutional 
reform.”83 Conceptual clarity is still emerging; however, Frenk and Moon helpfully 
distinguish GHG (global entities and processes focused on specific health issues) from wider 
“global governance for health” concerned with policy processes outside the health sector 
with health implications.84 
Like global governance and global health, the term global health diplomacy (GHD) 
came into usage in the early 2000s. Health professionals, academics and policymakers all 
refer to GHD. Again, conceptual clarity is elusive. No dominant, consistent or widely-used 
definition of GHD exists. Definitional questions and knowledge gaps inhibit research. Lee and 
Smith suggest “policy-shaping processes through which state, non-state and other 
institutional actors negotiate responses to health challenges, or utilize health concepts or 
mechanisms in policy-shaping and negotiation strategies, to achieve other political, 
economic or social objectives.”85 Assuming a state border is crossed, this definition captures 
the relationship between global health and foreign policy; but the breadth of actors included 
and objectives considered causes the definition to encompass most activities in (global) 
health.  
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For example, what about the efforts of a small American NGO to combat HIV/AIDS in 
Zambia? While this NGO might be coordinating its efforts with other international NGOs, 
and/or the Zambian government (or not), it seems this might be beyond the focus of this 
definition. Non-state actors are important and critical to understanding how policy is 
constructed in global health, but compared to other actors, states are the actors with the 
greatest authority, legitimacy and power. It could be that this NGO was largely funded by the 
US government which took an explicit policy decision to fund health service provision 
through NGOs instead of via a national government.  
Another example isthe Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Gates Foundation has 
been called an “8,000 pound gorilla” and is considered to be “perhaps the most influential 
player in global health.”86 A review of its grant making programme for global health in 2009 
categorized it as a “a major contributor to global health” and noted that “its influence on 
international health policy and the design of global health programmes and initiatives is 
profound.”87 Yet a recent study by Mahajan on the Gates Foundation’s work in India found 
that, while it “initially circumvented the government, […the foundation] then moved on to a 
discourse of partnership and acknowledgment of the centrality of the nation-state in 
delivering public health services.”88 The point here being that what Mahajan called the 
“marginalization of the government vis-à-vis global philanthropic actors”, which is often 
taken as a given within global health literature, is overstated. 
In the new era of global governance, scholars are right to identify the growing 
importance of new actors including the private sector or nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs); however, as Slaughter argues, “a gain in power by non-state actors does not 
necessarily translate into a loss of power for the state. On the contrary, many of these [NGOs] 
network with their foreign counterparts to apply additional pressure on traditional levers of 
domestic politics.”89 NGOs, international institutions clearly play an important and 
sometimes crucial role in global health; however, state actors are and remain decisive. While 
states are influenced and their positions are shaped by a multitude of internal and external 
interests and actors, state actors are often the final arbiters in global health. State actors 
participate in UN agencies like the World Health Organization and international institutions 
like the World Bank. For example, in her study on how WHO responded to member state 
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ideological pressures in the 1970s and 1980s, Chorev found that member states set the limits 
within which policy options and choices could be considered.90 States, obviously with 
varying levels of success, ability and resources, can also regulate and review any non-state 
actors, including the private sector or NGOs, and authorize or limit their activities.  
Ruckert and colleagues recently reviewed the GHD literature. They found a lack of 
conceptual clarity within the field, and that, “there is little academic work that has 
comprehensively examined and synthesized the theorization of global health diplomacy, nor 
looked at why specific health concerns enter into foreign policy discussion and agendas.”91 
Their review also finds GHD broadly equates states and NGOs in their efforts to coordinate 
and improve global health. They reviewed forty-nine articles and when they looked at how 
each article conceptualized the “driving force of global health diplomacy” only five articles 
argued states alone were the driving force. States were mentioned in combination with other 
actors, eg international organizations, civil society organizations, social movements and/or 
philanthropic foundations, in another twenty-five cases. This means that states were 
mentioned as the sole driver or in combination with others in thirty out of forty-nine articles. 
States’ roles within global health are not sufficiently recognized within the academic 
literature. This is also the case within the policy literature. While some countries are now 
developing global health strategies, there is little consensus on why this is happening, or 
what motivates states to engage.  
For all of these terms – global health, global health governance and global health 
diplomacy – the absence of clear conceptual definitions and frameworks continues to limit 
research, which inhibits understanding and the ability to assess and improve the policy. Part 
of the reason for this abstraction is that the field lacks empirical analyses or case studies 
which apply or test these models against real experiences. Expanding and deepening the 
empirical basis is critical to the understanding of why and how states engage in global health. 
Ng and Ruger’s global health governance literature review recognizes the “ultimate 
responsibility of nation-states in health governance, national and global”; however, states’ 
continued dominance and evolving role have not been fully acknowledged or adequately 
analysed. Instead, states are often simply equated (and implicitly downplayed) with other 
emerging actors92, or are no longer viewed as the primary actor. For example, Dodgson and 
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Lee argued like IR hyperglobalists in 2002 that it is necessary to “de-territorialize health … by 
going beyond the primary focus on the state.”93 Others argue like hyperglobalists that the 
state is relinquishing its role as the dominant actor within global health.94  
There is little global health analysis which starts from the transformationalist 
perspective. One anomaly from this disinterest in the role of the state is Reich’s 2002 article, 
Reshaping the state from above, from within, from below: implications for public health.95 As 
the title suggests, Reich argues like an IR transformationalist that the state “is being reshaped 
by multiple forces acting simultaneously” at the various levels by international agencies and 
multinational corporations, by political ideology and corruption as well as by “the expansion 
of decentralization and by the rising influence of nongovernmental organizations.” Without 
explicitly acknowledging globalisation, Reich recognizes that different actors and networks 
of actors are acting across these three dimensions to influence state behaviour. However, 
since the publication of this piece, there has not been a re-examination of the role of the state 
within global health at a conceptual level (aside from a few specific case studies reviewed in 
the next section). One exception to this is Ricci’s 2009 article, Global Health Governance and 
the State: Premature Claims of a Post-International Framework, in the journal Global Health 
Governance.34 Like an globalisation skeptic, Ricci argues that the global health literature has 
“overemphasized globalisation and its ability to wrest health authority away from the state 
and diffuse it to a range of competing and interacting actors.” One more most recent 
contribution to the literature is a chapter in the 2018 Oxford Handbook of Global Health 
Politics which confirms that the state has been neglected in the existing global health 
literature arguing that, “[a]lthough global health researchers and practitioners routinely 
interact with state agencies, the research literature contains little theorizing or critical 
reflection on the role of the state.”96 
 
Literature Review on States in Global Health 
For the purpose of this chapter and to provide background and context on how the state is 
understood within global health, a literature review was conducted using the terms “global 
health” and “state” in the PubMed database. This returned 4,076 results in August 2017. After 
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reviewing these results for relevance and sorting out irrelevant articles (removing articles 
concerning the “state of” or references to sub-national states in federal countries like India 
or Nigeria), 103 articles remained. Another search included the terms “global health” and 
“country” returned 3,953 results. After reviewing these articles for relevance, 161 articles 
remained. Searches for “global health diplomacy” (76 results with 71 articles selected) as 
well as “global health” and “influence” (which returned 2386 with 46 results) were also 
conducted. After combining these selections and removing duplicates as well as excluding 
articles not relevant, not in English and articles before 2000, 158 articles remained. These 
searches were repeated for the period between August 2017 and January 2019 with 
additional articles being added to the discussion below. 
These 158 articles were reviewed more closely and sorted into two categories: 1) 
articles which consider how global health affects states and 2) articles which consider how 
states affect global health. The vast majority of these articles (112 out of 158) are in the first 
category considering how global health affects states, while less than a third of the articles 
(46 out of 158) consider how states affect global health. This chapter focuses on the second 
category, ie how states affect global health. These articles are classified into three different 
themes: 1) articles synthesizing lessons learned from national experiences for global health 
(6 articles); 2) studies considering how states’ global health policy was integrated into or 
aligned with its national foreign policy (11 articles); and 3) analyses of individual or groups 
of states’ roles within global health (29 articles).  
One of the ways in which states can affect global health is by showcasing an 
experience. For example, papers summarize lessons for developing responsive and resilient 
health systems in Fukushima, Japan97, or implications from Nigeria’s experience controlling 
an outbreak of Ebola.98 These articles are usually more about a discrete national experience 
rather than about how states can influence global health. More recently, there have been 
some early studies considering why, how and where states engage in global health. First, 
there is literature within the nascent field of global health diplomacy examining the 
relationship between a state’s global health policy and its foreign policy and why states 
engage. Second, there are now a few articles considering specific states or a group of states 
within global health and how and where they engage. 
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This overlap between global health and foreign policy was highlighted by the Foreign 
Ministers of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand who 
declared in the Oslo Ministerial Declaration, “[w]e believe that health as a foreign policy issue 
needs a stronger strategic focus on the international agenda. We have therefore agreed to 
make impact on health a point of departure and a defining lens that each of our countries 
will use to examine key elements of foreign policy and development strategies.”99 Around 
the same time as this declaration, more states and their foreign ministries, inspired by the 
Declaration, began to consider global health; however, as discussed above, states’ 
understandings of what is or how they define “global health” matter as this shapes and 
determines why, how and where states engage. For example, as one comparison of Norway 
and Switzerland’s global health policies concluded, “designs contribute to constructing the 
global health governance system by identifying it as a policy target.”100  
As states began to develop these policies, academics began to document and assess 
these efforts. One study examined the barriers to integrating health into Canada’s foreign 
policy. It found a lack of knowledge and expertise from both health experts and diplomats; it 
also highlighted “the limited ways in which health has become framed as a foreign policy 
issue” as well as a “lack of cross-sectoral policy coordination and coherence.”101 This 
situation is replicated in other countries, like Malaysia,102 where Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
have not yet established a health division and are instead working through ad hoc 
coordination with the Ministry of Health. In countries with limited resources, these 
capabilities are also constrained, except in some states like Thailand, which is committed to 
achieve greater GHD coherence, particularly on trade.103 A recent article from Indonesia104 
noted the importance and need for capacity building in global health diplomacy in low- and 
middle-income countries, and another article reported on WHO’s efforts in Pakistan to 
develop global health diplomacy capacity.105 
One study documented how external developments like the Oslo Declaration and the 
post-2015 development agenda debate, plus domestic research and advocates, created a 
German global health policy process.106 Shortly thereafter academics analysed Germany’s 
policy and called for the government to develop a more comprehensive strategy.107 A similar 
study sought to understand how and why health was integrated into the UK’s foreign policy, 
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and found that the UK, following a realist interpretation, decided to “focus more on global 
health […] to protect national and international security and economic interests.”108 Another 
considered how domestic health policy, building on domestic and global civil society 
commitments, was integrated into South Africa’s foreign policy.109 The German and South 
African case studies adapt and combine the Walt and Gilson policy analysis framework 
(context, process and actors) with the Kingdon model which is the same approach Gagnon 
and Labonte used for the UK case study. While scholars are continuing to build on this work 
with new case studies and even early frameworks to understand how states develop national 
global health policies110, the question of why states engage remains.  
 
Why States Engage in Global Health 
Some of the early frameworks for why states engage broadly mirror those of the IR theories 
realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism. In the realist tradition, Feldbaum and 
Michaud argue simply that, “[f]oreign policy priorities often determine political priority and 
funding for global health issues.”111 In a more liberal institutionalist tradition, Kickbusch 
argues that “health is on the radar of foreign policy because it is integral to three global 
agendas” namely: 1) security, encompassing fear of pandemics or biosecurity concerns as 
well as health risks in the wake of humanitarian or natural disasters; 2) economic, 
encompassing the economic implications of health risks to the global market as well as the 
growing economic opportunities related to health; and 3) social justice, meaning supporting 
the recognition of health as a human right and social value reinforced through both the MDGs 
(and now SDGs) as well as calling for wealthier states to invest in global health initiatives.112 
Alternatively, Labonte argues that six different policy frames help motivate decisions on how 
to integrate health into states’ foreign policy: 1) security; 2) development; 3) global public 
goods; 4) trade; 5) human rights; and 6) ethical/moral reasoning.113  
Watt and colleagues tested Kickbusch’s framework (focused on security, economic 
and social justice) to explore the tension between health and foreign policy interests and 
analyse what motivated (and explained the differential levels of engagement of) the BRICS 
to engage on access to medicines questions within global health.114 She and colleagues found 
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that “none of the three dimensions […] used are enough in their own right to explain all of a 
country’s behaviour.” Watt and colleagues also argued that there are “soft power” concerns 
(soft power as a concept is discussed in Section Two below), which need to be considered in 
terms of aligning or reconciling states’ interests with how states want to be perceived and 
viewed. To advance the field and better understand why states engage, more specific 
empirical case studies are needed to understand state engagement. The next section starts 
with realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism to begin to try to understand why 
states engage. 
How and Where States Engage in Global Health 
Beyond the question of why states engage, there is also some emergent literature on how 
and where individual states or states in concert engage in global health; however, this is 
much more limited and is often more prescriptive than analytical. These studies sometimes 
reflect IR theory. For example, a 1997 US National Academies Institute of Medicine report in 
the realist tradition argues, “America has a vital and direct stake in the health of people 
around the globe.”115 As US government institutions, universities, think tanks, NGOs and 
foundations played a decisive role in setting the boundaries of early discussions on global 
health, US engagement and policymaking in global health was comparatively more 
developed than other states and at times hegemonic.116 This understanding might also serve 
a more constructivist interpretation of US engagement in global health. Alongside the United 
States, there have been a few other studies of Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) states and their role or potential role in global health.  
For example, a 2011 Lancet study on Japan found that its “engagement with global 
health has not been outstanding relative to its substantial potential, in part because of 
government fragmentation, a weak civil society, and lack of transparency and assessment”, 
but argued and advocated that “Japan is [nevertheless] potentially in a position to become a 
leading advocate for and supporter of global health.”117 A 2014 paper reviewed and assessed 
Italian Development Assistance for health between 2001 and 2012, and called for 
“conceptual revision and deep institutional and managerial reforms” to create a paradigm 
shift for global health in Italy.118 A 2016 Lancet paper reviewed France’s past engagement in 
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global health and argued that “understanding and acknowledging France’s history could help 
strengthen advocacy in favour of universal health coverage and contribute to advancing 
global equity.”119 A 2017 Lancet paper reviewed Germany’s role in global health and found 
the country, “well equipped to become a leader in global health, yet the country needs to 
accept additional financial responsibility for global health, expand its domestic global health 
competencies, reduce fragmentation of global health policy making, and solve major 
incoherencies in its policies both nationally and internationally.”120 A 2018 Lancet article 
reviewed Canada’s engagement in global health, and argued that, “Canada has often aspired 
to be a socially progressive force abroad, using alliance building and collective action to exert 
influence beyond that expected from a country with moderate financial and military 
resources.”121 These Japanese, Italian, French, German and Canadian studies loosely adhere 
to the liberal tradition; however, largely these studies do not build upon IR theory. In fact, 
they largely do not use any sort of standard methodological approach to assess how and 
where states engage.  
Textbox: The Lancet’s Coverage of States in Global Health 
It is worth noting that of the 153 Lancet Series (in January 2019) listed on the journal’s 
website, there have been thirteen broad country series122, namely Brazil (2011), Bangladesh 
(2013), Canada (2018), China (2008), France (2016), Germany (2017), Israel (2017), India 
(2011), Japan (2011), Mexico (2006), Pakistan (2013), South Africa (2009), and USA (2014). 
Two Series (Brazil123 and China124) included comments on these countries’ roles within 
global health; however, only four (Canada, France, Germany and Japan) Series have included 
papers on these countries’ roles within global health. These four papers all take different 
approaches to analysing national engagement in global health, and do not apply any 
consistent analytical methodology. 
  
Alongside these OECD countries, there has also been interest in emerging economies, 
particularly the BRICS states, both as individual states and collectively. One realist review of 
the BRICS’ influence found, “little evidence to support the assertion that the BRICS are 
influencing global health”; however, it also found that “[a]lthough influence was 
predominantly framed by BRICS countries’ material capability, there were examples of 
institutional and ideational influence.”125 In terms of individual states, China has garnered 
the most attention with a review of its health assistance to Africa126, its engagement in global 
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health diplomacy127 and global health governance.128 With a more constructivist lens, others 
have examined Brazil’s engagement as soft power in the creation of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control129, and advocated the potential pathways for South Africa to 
engage more in global health diplomacy based on its history and HIV/AIDS legacy.130 The 
papers reviewing emerging economies also do not use any sort of consistent methodological 
approach to understand how and where states engage. 
This literature begins to explain why and where states engage, but to gain a deeper 
understanding of how states engage in global health, it is necessary to review the literature 
on power in global health. 
Section Two: Power as a Concept and how has it been applied within Global Health? 
As Shiffman recently wrote, “power is exercised everywhere in global health although its 
presence may be more apparent in some instances than others.”131 What is power in global 
health, and how is it exerted? Is exerting power a nation-state hosting an international forum 
to determine global priorities, an international NGO delivering services in a foreign state, an 
influential journal editor writing a commentary or a university producing an assessment of 
burden of diseases? How do states or global health policies like the MDGs or SDGs exert 
power? How can we distinguish between actors and assess their material and non-material 
resources to influence, coerce and/or persuade others in global health? Finally, why do 
actors exercise power and where do they exert power in global health? There is a growing 
recognition of the relevance of these questions for the future of global health. Despite an 
increasing understanding of the relevance of these concerns, analysis and empirical 
investigations of power in global health are nascent, and still evolving. 
But why and how does power matter for the field of global health? What makes power 
analysis helpful, and how can we distinguish which power analysis could contribute from 
existing analysis and existing literature? Development assistance for health (DAH) in 2016 
exceeded $37 billion.132 These investments also influence how low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) invest their domestic resources, which dwarves DAH and is hundreds of 
billions of dollars in additional resources in LMICS, estimated to be at least $840 billion in 
public investments in 2014.133 In spite of these DAH investments, there is a growing sense 
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that “global health” is not working. There is a notion that global health could be improved 
and practiced with better policies, outcomes and impact. The 2014-2015 Ebola crisis 
exemplifies this sense of failure and the need for improvement.  
Despite decades of investment across Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, with Liberia, 
specifically receiving the most per-capita US donor assistance of any country in the world, 
Ebola overwhelmed health systems and governments in all three countries in 2014 and 
2015. The World Health Organization declared a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC) in August 2014, but the region was not declared Ebola free until 2016. 
Ebola killed more than 10,000 across Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone and cost billions. 
Multiple reports criticised WHO and the global health community for numerous failures.134 
More specifically, Ebola exposed the failures of the existing International Health Regulations 
(IHR). Agreed to by 196 states, these regulations aimed to facilitate cooperation amongst 
states to contain outbreaks and avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and 
trade. All three states failed to contain the initially small outbreaks; however, these three 
states were not alone in their inability to respond. According to a report on IHR capacities 
for WHO in 2013, 43 out of 46 African states had completed core IHR capacity assessments, 
but none of them successfully implemented the necessary capacities to contain outbreaks.135 
Moreover, in the wake of unfounded fears about the spread of Ebola, 58 states abrogated 
their IHR obligations and imposed travel restrictions.136   
This sense of ‘failure’ in the case of Ebola and more broadly within global health stems 
from multiple myths and misperceptions. There is a myth that health is largely a technical 
issue which requires inputs to achieve outputs. There is misperception that global health is 
a field in which evidence determines the best policies. There is a misunderstanding that 
health is apolitical. Most fail to appreciate the profound political tensions within global 
health.137 These myths fuel unrealistic expectations and cause confusion. Power analysis 
could be a compelling framework to begin to dispel some of these myths. It could bring 
increased clarity and improve assessments of why and how different actors engage; power 
analysis could also help assess and explain the outcomes of various actors’ engagements in 
global health. To understand global health, it is critical to understand how power is used and 
abused. Power analysis could contribute to a reinterpretation and new understandings 
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within global health. The fields of international relations, political economy138, 
sociology139,140 and philosophy141,142 apply power as a conceptual lens for understanding 
how actors behave and why they engage. Examining power in global health could build on 
this and contribute to developing greater analytical capabilities for the field. 
Power is a central concept in international relations (IR), but its meaning and 
application have been, and remain contested. Scholars disagree about sources of power, the 
role of power and how actors exert power. Indeed, one IR scholar describes the concept of 
power as one of the “most troublesome in the field” and argues that “the number and variety 
of definitions should be an embarrassment to political scientists.”143,144 As another scholar 
argues, the “meaning we choose [for power] determines which relations we consider 
relevant and where we locate political spaces.”145 In other words, how we conceptualize and 
define power itself exerts power and determines how we measure and assess power.   
In the past, scholars saw power defined by state resources like armies or navies and 
populations or territories; in other words, state power was defined by military force. As the 
critical actors, states were the focus of most analysis. Realist thinkers like Morgenthau and 
Waltz saw states competing for power in a world of anarchy. Power was often considered 
the domain of realism, and as other theories tried to distance and differentiate themselves 
from realism, they often avoided and sometimes neglected discussions of power; however, 
the literature on power evolved beyond a reductionist realist approach.146 Theories began 
to consider ‘relational power’. In other words, how actors, primarily but not limited to states, 
individually or in groups, related to each other, affected or influenced others’ behaviour.  
Liberal institutionalist thinkers Keohane and Nye illustrated how international 
regimes, including rules and norms, could create complex ‘interdependence’, changing how 
states interacted with each other and how institutions might be able to limit state power.147 
Similar to later literature on globalisation, Keohane and Nye describe how both international 
monetary policy and the governance of oceans evolved from bilateral or limited multilateral 
interstate discussions to more complex processes with interests being pursued by multiple 
state actors representing one state as well as non-governmental actors engaging within new 
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international organizations’ governance platforms. This theory profiles the new mechanisms 
and concerns states need to consider when exerting power in pursuit of their interests.  
Constructivist theorist Wendt argued that power “cannot be a uniquely realist claim” 
and called for an understanding of “power constituted primarily by ideas and cultural 
context”.148 Constructivists tend to focus on norm development, identity, and ideas. For 
example, Indonesia and Japan might both have developed a vaccine for a health problem, but 
the meaning that the development of the vaccine and the vaccine itself represent likely 
differs in these states. The possession or absence of this resource also affects how both of 
these states would interact and engage with other actors and states. 
These IR theories were largely developed by American political scientists during the 
Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, IR theory evolved away from addressing a bipolar 
world to grappling with a uni- or multipolar world, and other theorists beyond the US also 
became engaged. With increasing recognition and focus on globalisation in the 1990s, 
theorists began to focus on global governance.149 Realist, liberal institutionalist and 
constructivist thinking on power even within this new paradigm of global governance is still 
progressing. For example, in 2014 Naim argued power was disbursing and decaying in The 
End of Power.150 There have also been emerging arguments for considerations of “New 
Power”151 and, or “Sharp Power.”152  This still evolving discussion on power constrains 
scholars’ abilities to analyse and assess how power is exerted and assessed.  
These debates continue, and different approaches in terms of how to exert, frame, 
measure or understand power remain. As Lukes argues, “amongst those who have reflected 
on the matter, there is no agreement about how to define it, how to conceive it, how to study 
it, […] or how to measure it.”153 While there are few conceptual agreements about power, 
there is more consensus on the importance of understanding power and the lack of 
knowledge on how power functions.154 Indeed, power continues to be at the heart of many 
debates within social sciences, and is increasingly viewed as relevant within the field of 
global health.  
This section considers the concept of power by first reviewing popular and widely 
understood frameworks for hard, soft and smart power. Second, it considers Lukes’ “faces of 
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power” framework. This understanding of power broadly overlaps with the most prominent 
IR theories, and evolved piecemeal but broadly in alignment with these theories. Third, it 
considers Barnett and Duvall’s framework which was developed more recently as a broader 
and arguably more coherent approach.. These three different frameworks, approaches and 
discussions are the most often used IR approaches to understand power and are helpful 
when considering and analysing power; however, it is important to remember 
understandings of and exercises of power continue to evolve.  
Hard, soft and smart power 
Whereas Dahl’s famous formulation of hard power is the ability of A to force B to do 
something it would not otherwise do (usually deploying military or economic resources), 
Nye’s conceptualization of soft power attracts or co-opts actors and persuades actors 
without the use of coercive force. Soft power ‘rests on the ability to shape others’ 
preferences.155 Soft power is, in Nye’s words, “not merely the same as influence. After all, 
influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more 
than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important 
part of it”.Error! Bookmark not defined. Nye contrasts soft power as “attraction” as opposed to 
“coercion” or “inducements” and argues that a state’s soft power relies on “its culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home 
and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority).” In global health, Brazil’s influential role in advancing its political values on the 
negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is often cited as an example 
of soft power.156 
More recently, American foreign affairs specialists have argued that to best advance 
interests, actors should seek to combine both hard and soft power to create ‘smart 
power’.157,158 Nossel argues that states could harness smart power through “alliances, 
international institutions, careful diplomacy, and the power of ideals.”Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Nye argues states can “complement […] military and economic might with greater 
investments in […]soft power.”Error! Bookmark not defined. In a special Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power which Nye co-chaired, he and his 
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fellow Commissioners argue that smart power should be considered as "an approach that 
underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, 
partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand […] influence and establish legitimacy 
of […] action."159 For example, one might consider American efforts on HIV/AIDS like the 
President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) advancing American interests in 
strategic states backed up with financial resources as an example of smart power. Another 
example might be the US military’s intervention in Afghanistan or Iraq followed by 
investments in infrastructure.  
In contrast to other frameworks, hard, soft and smart power present a different, more 
popular and easily understood framework for considering power. These types of power are 
often referred to in popular culture and media commentary pieces. While smart and soft 
power could include some covert exertions of power, this (hard, soft and smart) framework 
is primarily concerned with overt forms of power. Broadly speaking, state engagement in 
global health is sometimes seen or considered as part of a soft power approach. For example, 
the United Kingdom’s All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Global Health presented 
evidence in September 2013 to the UK Parliament on how the state could advance its 
interests using global health as soft power.160  
Lukes’ Three Faces of Power 
In 1957, Dahl first published The Concept of Power which famously argued that power is 
defined “in terms of a relation between people” and when A “can get B to do something B 
would not otherwise do.”161 This is one of the most well-known conceptualizations of power, 
and is considered the first face of power, ie the ability of one actor to force another actor to 
do something they initially did not want to do. This face of power is usually associated with 
realist theory and is often equated with military power. The first face of power is considered 
zero-sum with power being exerted “over” another instead of “having power to”. This form 
of power focuses largely on resources also prompts considerations of other potential 
resources beyond military, like financial resources. It also raises the question about how 
resources (and which resources) can be translated into outcomes or effects. For this face of 
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power, one might consider an actor like the World Bank using the threat of withholding loans 
to coerce a country into pursuing specific health reforms.  
The second face of power is considered agenda-setting; this also sometimes known 
as “non-decision making” as actors can exclude some issues from even being considered. As 
Bachrach and Baratz argue, powerful actors can control an agenda limiting or controlling 
which issues are or are not on the agenda by determining who sits at the table.162 This is the 
ability of actors “to create or reinforce barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts.” Actors 
are managing, perhaps even manipulating, processes, institutional set-ups or so-called 
international regimes to their own favour and limiting the decision space for choices. A 
critical question here is the tension between actors, primarily states, and these international 
regimes. How much are states able to control and manage these regimes, and or how much 
independence do these international regimes exert on their own? An ongoing example could 
be how an influential actor like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation uses public relations 
and communications firms (this practice is not limited to the Gates Foundation within global 
health as NGOs and others also do this) to help shape and influence media (including social 
media) campaigns to determine which issues are considered and which issues are not 
considered in public debate and discourse; this contributes to the prioritization of policy 
issues and the eventual deployment of resources.  
The third face of power is the ability to control an actor’s thoughts or shape their 
preferences. Lukes argues, “‘the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such 
conflict from arising in the first place.”163 For example, one actor might be able to influence 
another actor’s initial interests without the other actor even realizing this thus anticipating 
and avoiding any potential conflicts before they even arise. In global health, this could be 
done by controlling how issues are conceptualized or considered. For example, the Global 
Burden of Disease analysis is an effective way of producing a tool for conceptualizing health 
challenges which shapes, and in some cases might control, how policymakers prioritize their 
efforts, develop policy and invest in relevant interventions. 
These three faces of power could be summarized as overt, covert or latent forms of 
power. While the link between these faces of power and theory is not perfect, some scholars 
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also associate the first face of power with realism, the second face with liberalism or 
institutionalism and the third face with constructivism.164 Of course there are some overlaps 
between and across these faces, but these different approaches evolved broadly at the same 
time as international relations theories evolved and are generally aligned. The next 
framework builds on Lukes’ but advances the analysis by expanding the framework. 
 
Barnett and Duvall’s framework 
Global governance scholars Barnett and Duvall present a slightly different framework for 
understanding power, which is helpful for understanding how states negotiate policy 
processes.165 They define power “as the production, in and through social relations, of effects 
that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate.”166 Their 
framework presents a coherent and integrated approach arguably helping scholars move 
beyond the idea that multiple concepts are competing, and instead see connections and 
intersections across approaches. They also contend that their framework “does not map 
precisely onto different theories of international relations” and thus, “help[s] scholars move 
away from perpetual rivalry in disciplinary "ism" wars and toward dialogue across 
theoretical perspectives.”165  This approach helps identify and codify different ways in which 
different actors engage and exert power, illustrating possible exertions of power that are 
overlooked by other frameworks.  
The Barnett and Duvall framework differentiates between specific and diffuse 
relations as well as direct and indirect forms of power (included in the table below)—
namely, compulsory (direct power, such as use of military or legislative force), institutional 
(indirect power, such as how international institutions are designed to favour one actor over 
another), structural (the overall constitution or framework of actor and their roles) or 
productive (control over the possession and distribution of resources) power.  
 
Table 1: Barnett and Duvall’s 2x2 framework for understanding power165 
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For global health, one could think of a donor agency using the possibility of funding 
in a poor state with limited resources to exert compulsory power; for example, one could 
think about a wealthy state like the US or the UK using the possibility of donor support to 
encourage a low-income state to consider privatizing parts of its health system. For 
institutional power, one could consider a well-positioned state leveraging a multilateral 
agency to exert institutional power; for example, one could think about a country like Japan 
using an institution like the World Bank or the World Health Organisation to advance its 
interests. For structural power, one could imagine a prestigious university, NGO or private-
sector actor positioning its staff as experts to exert structural power by virtue of their 
position; for example, in the wake of the Ebola crisis in West Africa, a number of civil society 
organisations and management consultancies seconded and embedded staff within 
governments in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to provide technical guidance and support. 
Finally, for productive power, one could imagine a UN agency or a private-sector actor 
advancing and promoting a particular agenda or approach to addressing health challenges 
as an exertion of productive power; for example, researchers at the University of Washington 
in the US work on the global burden of disease (GBD), and this approach to analysing health 
exerts power by shaping understanding and contributing to prioritization of health 
challenges. 
A key insight by Barnett and Duvall is that they understand power as a relationship. 
Barnett and Duvall’s framework provides a broad taxonomy for analysing power This 
framework provides a coherent way of thinking about the different ways in which actors, 
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particularly state actors, could exert power, and how these different exertions might interact 
negating or amplifying efforts. One could think about compulsory power as material power, 
and structural, institutional and productive power as various forms of non-material power. 
Differentiating between these different forms of power, as explained above, enables closer 
analysis and illustrates ways in which actors engage and exert their interests. It also presents 
opportunities for comparing and contrasting how different actors use competing forms of 
power in diverse settings and contexts.  
Yet one limitation of Barnett and Duvall’s framework is that it does not address 
relative power, ie how one form of power compares to another or how one exertion of power 
compares to another exertion of power. While the framework can help identify different 
exertions of power, it is not easily able to distinguish between different instances of exerting 
power. Moreover, the framework is not able to assess or judge persuasion, ie how persuasive 
one argument might be in comparison with another.  
   
Power within Global Health Literature 
There is an increasing recognition of, and attention given to, the concept of power in global 
health, but discussions remain embryonic. As Erasmus and Gilson argued in 2008 “power, a 
concept at the heart of the health policy process, is surprisingly rarely explicitly considered 
in the health policy […] literature.”167 Since they wrote this, the field has slowly evolved. 
Similar to how power evolved in IR theory, power in international and then global health 
was initially primarily associated with states and material resources like financing or 
medical equipment or drugs. When power was considered, in the past it was taken for 
granted that wealthy states like the United States or the United Kingdom simply dominated 
the policy agenda using their monetary resources. Indeed, as one recent study concluded, 
“money is […] a very important source of power” in global health.168 In other words, the 
prevailing understanding of power in global health is that rich states exert power through 
their material resources.  
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Inspired by some liberal and especially constructivist thinking; however, this 
understanding is being challenged and is evolving within the field of global health. Following 
discussions of globalisation and global governance, some scholars argue that the state is 
becoming “hollowed out” by globalisation169, that a proliferation of new global health actors 
are fragmenting the global health governance landscape to an extent that states no longer 
held power over policymaking.170 Accompanying this is an increasing recognition of and 
understanding of epistemic communities in global health, ie how ideas, approaches expertise 
and networks serve as potential sources of power shaping the allocation of resources and 
shifting policy within global health. Scholars now argue that “[g]lobal health policy-making 
is an arena of contested interests, power and ideas, shaped by the interaction of 
coalitions.”171 
For example, Harmer showcased how “discourse justified, legitimised, communicated 
and coordinated ideas about the practice of global health partnerships.”172 McDougall 
examined how maternal and child health gained attention and resources in the MDG-era 
recognizing the role of networks and concluding that “how ideas are constructed, portrayed 
and positioned by actors within given contexts” plays a critical role.”173 Shearer and others 
looked at institutions, interests, ideas and networks on health policy changes in Burkina 
Faso.174 In another example, Storeng and Mishra sought “to discern the genealogy of the idea 
of health systems within international health, and help explain the changing and varied 
meanings of the term within public health policy, research and practice, across a wide variety 
of geographical settings, cutting across global and local levels.”175 More recently, showcasing 
how global health networks could affect and shape policy, scholars collected case-studies 
examining and comparing health issues in pairs, namely tobacco use and alcohol harm, 
maternal and neonatal mortality, early childhood development and surgically-treatable 
conditions as well as tuberculosis and pneumonia.176 This literature has contributed to a 
growing awareness of the politicization of evidence in policymaking177, an understanding of 
how underlying power imbalances influence the prioritization of health issues, and a deeper 
recognition of which solutions are adopted or ignored.  
While appreciating both new actors, as well as the growing importance of epistemic 
communities in global health, is important, analysis predicting the decline of states within 
  
 
48 
 
global governance may be over-stated.34 States’ roles, resources and abilities are evolving, 
but states appear to remain dominant and decisive actors in global health. State power to 
shape policy and determine priorities with global health remains unparalleled. Obviously, 
the magnitude of these changes varies by state, but these changes are not necessarily tied to 
growth or shifts in material resources. What is changing, however, is how states use and 
deploy non-material resources to shape the agenda and exert their power. In other words, 
states are “transforming” in response to globalisation. States can (and increasingly do) 
recognize how epistemic communities exert power, and states can seek to leverage these 
communities to serve and advance their interests. State actors can sponsor these 
communities providing financial resources or access to policymakers where epistemic 
communities can then exert influence. For example, both the Australian and Canadian 
governments support tobacco control researchers by providing research financing which is 
aligned with their national efforts to advance tobacco control. Scholars have also recognized 
how an emerging economy like Thailand plays an outsized role in global health178, 
particularly at the intersection of emerging issues like trade and health.179 More recently, 
scholars note how China appears to be increasing its engagement in global health using it as 
a tool to achieve its foreign policy goals,180 or wonder how the US election of President 
Trump will change American global health policy and how other states will change their 
policies in response.181  
Scholars have also considered emerging economies, like the BRICS, and sought to 
understand how they exert their influence. In this case, scholars suggest that “[a]lthough 
influence was predominantly framed by states’ material capability, there were [also] 
examples of institutional and ideational influence.182 In the same way scholars’ 
understandings of power evolved from a focus on material to non-material resources, states’ 
understanding and its abilities to exert power and influence are evolving from using material 
resources to more sophisticated approaches using non-material resources as they increase 
their experience within global health.  
 
Literature Review on Power in Global Health 
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For the purpose of this chapter, the author conducted a literature review using the search 
terms “Global Health” and “Power” in Pubmed. This search returned 1,016 results in June 
2017. After adding a filter to limit the search results to references since 2000, 962 references 
remained. After reviewing these results for relevance (removing the majority of references 
referring to statistical “power” or other non-relevant article like those concerned with 
“power plants”), roughly 100 articles remained. This search was repeated for the period 
between June 2017 and January 2019 with additional articles being added to the discussion 
below. 
Within these remaining articles, first, many are recent commentaries or comments 
exploring power and the field of global health in response to Shiffman’s seminal article, 
Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health.123 Second, there are some 
global and national policy articles which explicitly use or consider power as a framework for 
analysis; however, these studies are limited in number and are not consistent in their 
approaches or methodologies. The remaining articles are commentaries or editorials 
referring to power broadly. This search did not include journals which are not indexed, for 
example Global Health Governance or the Journal of Health Diplomacy (instead, these journals 
archives were reviewed separately). 
In 2014, drawing on Dahl, Barnett and Duvall, and Bourdieu, Shiffman illustrated the 
importance of power for global health using three potential case studies (the role of the 
Lancet, the role of the Institute of Health Metrics (IHME) and the negotiation of the post-
2015 development agenda). Shiffman argued in favour of more exploration and deeper 
analysis on how epistemic and normative as well as productive and structural forms of 
power shape global health. This article spurred a flurry of responses and further comments, 
particularly in the International Journal of Health Policy and Management (IJHPM).  
Hanefeld and Walt recommended applying Bourdieu’s theory of different capitals 
(namely, cultural capital, economic capital, social capital and symbolic capital) to better 
understand sources of power in global health.183 Engebretsen and Heggen responded noting 
the productive power of language and concepts that shape discourse, including global 
health.184 Bump highlighted a legitimacy deficit in existing global health institutions.185 
Rushton called for “social scientists interested in the global politics of health to be reflexive 
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about our own exercise of structural and productive power and the fact that researching 
global health politics is itself a political undertaking.”186 Benatar called for a whole “new 
framing perspective for global health that could reshape our thinking and actions.”187 Horton 
summarized stating, “power matters in global health.”188 He continued, “[h]ow certain issues 
in global health get attention, and which issues are prioritised and deprioritised (and why); 
how decisions are made, according to what criteria, and by whom; how actions are 
implemented and accounted for, and by which institutions; and how those invested with the 
power to make decisions are selected and rewarded should all be a much greater subject of 
scrutiny.”  
Shiffman’s commentary and the ensuing discussions generated attention and new 
interest in power within global health. For example, Ooms highlighted how considering 
norms, politics and power in global health are based on shared normative premises, which 
the field of global health lacks given the diversity of academic backgrounds involved.189 More 
recently Sheikh and others argued that “[g]lobal [h]ealth practices must actively span and 
disrupt boundaries of geography, geopolitics and constituency, some of which are rooted in 
imbalances of power and resources.”190 This growing interest in power was also reflected 
during the 2016 Health Systems Research Symposium in Vancouver, Canada, where power 
served as a conference subtheme, “engaging power and politics in promoting health and 
public value.”191  
This recent attention to power also builds on a handful of past articles which used 
power as a framework for analysis at the global level. For example, Lee used soft power to 
analyse Brazil’s influential role in the negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control.192 Kevany argued that global health is itself potentially a reflection of a smart power 
approach.193 Smith examined the implications of the increasing power of economic 
organizations for global health governance.194 Buse and Harmer applied Lukes’ three faces 
of power to examine the politics of public-private partnerships.195 In 2014, Buse and Hawkes 
briefly invoked Lukes’ three faces of power to consider the negotiation of the post-2015 
development goals.196 More recently (and after the completion of this literature review), 
Lima and Galea applied Lukes’ to analyse corporate influence on health at the macrosocial 
level.197 These few studies generally reflect upon or refer to power in global health using one 
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of the various theories mentioned above and are innovative in that they draw upon the 
concept of power; however, they do not justify their choice of a specific framework. Beyond 
a few applications of Lukes, they also generally do not use the same frameworks. They 
neither compare or differentiate between frameworks nor discuss any potential limitations 
of a given framework. They also do not include any empirical studies.  
Alongside these few global level studies, there is a small but increasing number of 
studies using power explicitly as a framework to analyse national health policy processes. 
Dalglish and colleagues consider political authority, financial resources and technical 
expertise to examine how power dynamics affected child mortality policy in Niger.198 
Dalglish and colleagues also analyse medical power in two case studies in Niger and India.199 
Koduah and colleagues apply Mintzberg’s five general sources of power (control of a 
resource, a technical skill, or a body of knowledge; authority by virtue of one's legal and 
structural position; and access to those who can rely on the other four sources of power) to 
examine how and why Ghana’s maternal health policies evolved between 2002 and 2012.200 
Mwisongo and colleagues use Arts and Tatenhove’s conceptual framework on power 
(relational, dispositional and structural) to analyse how power featured in some African 
countries during health policy dialogues.201 Lehmann and Gilson apply VeneKlasen and 
Miller’s framework (power over, power with, power to and power within) to analyse how 
actors exerted power in a South African community health program.202 Fischer and 
Strandberg-Larsen examine power as influence using Kingdon’s stream theory to investigate 
how donors and government actors engaged on health policy in Tanzania.203 Barasa and 
colleagues combine Lang’s actor interface analysis model with VeneKlasen and Miller to 
analyse power and actor relations on priority setting and resource allocations in hospitals in 
Kenya.204 Gilson reviewed and synthesized a number of articles looking at the role of 
frontline health workers in exerting discretionary power in implementing health policies.205 
Taken together these studies begin to illustrate how actors can exert power to 
advance their interests in national health policymaking. These different studies generally 
adopted and applied one power framework or extrapolated on an existing framework. Aside 
from one of the studies (Mwisongo), all of the studies focused on one country and did not 
compare across countries. Other than the two papers which drew upon the VeneKlasen and 
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Miller framework (Lehmann and Gilson as well as Barasa and colleagues), each of the papers 
applied a different framework and broadly did not rely on common literature for 
understanding or contextualizing their power methodology. In other words, there was no 
common framework for studying power at the national level as each study drew upon 
different fields of academic literature. After the completion of this literature review and 
building on an interactive consultation during the Vancouver Health Systems Research 
Symposium, Sriram and colleagues published, “10 best resources on power in health policy 
and systems in low- and middle-income countries.”206 While this study is largely focused on 
power in health systems, it also confirms that the majority of literature on power is focused 
on the national level, with a growing discussion on conceptual issues, but limited research 
on power at the global level. 
Conclusion:  How might international relations and power analysis contribute to 
understanding Global Health? 
While there are some early attempts to better understand and assess why states engage in 
global health, knowledge andunderstanding of how and where states engage remains limited 
and is still emerging. For why states engage, the 2006 Oslo Declaration provided catalytic 
encouragement and detailed why states should engage more in the nascent field of global 
health diplomacy. These state actors, along with global health academics and advocates, 
encouraged other states to engage more. Simultaneously, scholars began to delineate the 
various reasons and motivations to both encourage, justify and explain subsequent state 
actions.  
While there is limited application of international relations theories, there are now 
some initial suggested frameworks for assessing why states might engage. Nevertheless, 
these studies and understandings of why states engage will need to be applied on a case-by-
case basis depending on the country considered. To understand why state actors are 
engaging in global health policymaking, constructivism is an essential international relations 
theory. Constructivist theory focuses on issues like identity, norms and framing and these 
approaches can help illuminate why and how state actors engage in global health 
policymaking.  
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In terms of where states engage, the studies reviewed above describe OECD states 
participating actively in the G7 and G20 processes, through the Bretton Woods institutions 
and UN system as well as through their own bilateral mechanisms and relationships. The 
BRICS and other emerging countries have their own BRICS Summits, but generally tend to 
engage more through UN institutions, particularly through the World Health Organisation’s 
World Health Assembly. BRICS and other emerging economies also engage through other 
institutions or fora like the WTO which are generally less used by OECD countries to engage 
in global health policymaking. They also engage within their own sub-regions. 
For considering how states engage, however, the few studies of both OECD and 
emerging states’ engagement in global health, remain early assessments. These studies 
rarely draw on IR theory or power frameworks, but sometimes implicitly align with IR 
theories.2 They do not use established power methodologies or frameworks to assess how 
states engage in global health, and thus it is difficult to compare the studies and/or compare 
how states engage. These early studies provide situational and contextual backgrounds of 
how global health fits within states’ foreign policy traditions, but they are broadly more 
descriptive and prescriptive than analytical. At times, some even appear to be designed more 
as advocacy pieces (instead of analysis) and appear to be seeking to nudge state actors to 
improve the implementation of their global health policies or strategies. For understanding 
how state engage, power analysis, specifically applying Barnett and Duvall’s framework, 
could be helpful.  
For the nascent literature applying power in global health, the overall number of 
studies using power explicitly is limited. There are more analyses examining power within 
national health policy processes than at the global level policy level. Nevertheless, the 
combined low number of case studies limits the ability to compare and contrast different 
methodologies for applying power for analysis. At the global level, the emerging discussion 
 
2 It should be noted, however, that there have been discussions within global health which use or apply IR theory; however, this is applied more broadly on 
the field, or particularly to health security issues, and less specifically to understand state engagement. For example, McInnes and Lee apply a constructivist 
approach to understand how global health has been socially created, shaped in theory and practice by particular interests and normative frameworks by 
examining the interactions of foreign policy and health diplomacy, health and the global political economy, global health governance and global health 
security. McInnes, Colin, and Kelley Lee. Global Health and International Relations. 1 edition. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2012. In another example, 
Rushton and Williams argue that “global health policy” is grounded in the “deep core” of neoliberalism. Rushton, Simon, and Owain David Williams. “Frames, 
Paradigms and Power: Global Health Policy-Making under Neoliberalism.” Global Society 26, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 147–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2012.656266. 
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of power is building on previous work analysing agenda setting, largely building on 
Kingdon’s model. For example, Shiffman examines why and how a number of issues within 
global health gained priority and attention within global health.207,208,209 There is also an 
increasing recognition of the importance of framing within health policy, which could be 
helpful.210,211  
Despite an emergent interest and some studies of power on national health 
policymaking building on foundational work by Walt212, the role of power in determining 
global health policy remains underappreciated, seldom studied and little understood. This is 
especially significant as many of the global level policy processes have increasingly 
recognized implications for national health systems.213 Moreover, many often consider 
health policy processes as shaped and determined by evidence-based approaches instead of 
a recognizing health as a profoundly political space in which priorities and policies are 
contested and ideas, networks, expertise and information are deployed to advance 
competing approaches. As Topp recently wrote, “[w]e must […] be conscious of the power of 
discourse to influence the way we articulate and act our priorities.”214 While some health 
scholars have explored how power is expressed and exercised, or have touched upon power 
in examining agenda-setting, power is rarely explicitly used as a framework for analysis at 
the global level in health policy processes. 
One important exception to this shortage of studies of power at the global level is a 
2012 book, Global Tobacco Control: Power, Policy, Governance and Transfer, analysing global 
tobacco control policies. Cairney, Studlar and Mamudu apply Lukes’ second face of power to 
showcase how the tobacco industry kept tobacco control off the agenda and ensured “non-
decision making”, ie that there was little discussion about tobacco control at the global and 
national level.215 Applying a power framework to understand how the private sector engages 
in health appears like an obvious policy area in which power analysis could help illuminate 
how actors shape policy. Despite not using power as a framework explicitly, other studies 
have showcased how various industries have exerted tremendous ideational and productive 
power restraining public health actions.216,217,218 More recently, evidence surfaced about 
how Coca Cola219, the alcohol industry220 and other interest groups like those supporting 
sugar221 have shaped research and media in an effort to influence public discourse.  
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In some ways, it is easy to see some of these negative influences and exertions of 
power within global health; however, Lee challenges the global health community and asks 
how, “might [we] go further and ask how structural or productive power might be harnessed 
to serve, rather than obfuscate, global health efforts?”222 To do this, it seems it would be 
important to have a deeper and broader understanding of how actors engage and exert 
power. More specifically, Shiffman calls for scholars to “examine how [power] works in 
practice, with a view to specifying more clearly what constitutes its legitimate use, how to 
ensure those who wield it are held accountable, and how best to leverage it to achieve 
common aims surrounding equity and improved population health.”223 This then raises the 
question: how could power be used for future global health analysis? The next chapter will 
apply power analysis to review how state actors exerted power and engaged in the process 
to create the Millennium Development Goals.  
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Chapter Three 
How States Exerted Power to Create the Millennium Development 
Goals and How this Shaped the Global Health Agenda: Lessons for 
the Sustainable Development Goals and the Future of Global Health3 
 
Key Points: 
• From 2000, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided the 
framework for global development efforts transforming the field now known as 
global health. The MDGs both reflected and contributed to shaping a normative global 
health agenda.  
• In the field of global health, the role of the state is largely considered to have 
diminished; however, this paper reasserts states as actors in the conceptualisation 
and institutionalisation of the MDGs, and illustrates how states exerted power and 
engaged in the MDG process. States not only sanctioned the MDGs through their heads 
of states endorsing the Millennium Declaration, but also acted more subtly behind the 
scenes supporting, enabling, and/or leveraging other actors, institutions and 
processes to conceptualise and legitimize the MDGs.  
• Appreciating the MDGs' role in the conceptualisation of global health is particularly 
relevant given the transition to the MDGs' successor, the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). The SDGs' influence, impact and importance remains to be seen; 
however, to understand the future of global health and how actors, particularly states, 
can engage to shape the field, a deeper sense of the MDGs' legacy and how actors 
engaged in the past is helpful. 
 
Introduction 
From 2000-2015, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided the framework 
for global development efforts. The MDGs shaped billions of dollars of investment, and 
impacted the lives of many. Advocates contend they invigorated institutions, stimulated 
research communities, inspired civil society movements and galvanized politicians and 
citizens.224 Scholars argue the MDGs represented a new ‘super norm’ dominating the global 
development agenda.225 Three out of the eight goals related directly to health and the other 
 
3 Much of this chapter was published as Marten, Robert. “How States Exerted Power to Create the Millennium Development Goals and 
How This Shaped the Global Health Agenda: Lessons for the Sustainable Development Goals and the Future of Global Health.” Global 
Public Health, April 26, 2018, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2018.1468474. This is also included in Annex III. 
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five goals focused on critical determinants of health. The MDGs’ influence was pivotal to 
creating a normative global health agenda, which largely continues to shape the global health 
agenda today. Appreciating the MDGs’ role and legacy in the conceptualization of global 
health is particularly relevant as the world transitions from the MDGs to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs’ influence, impact and importance remains to be seen; 
however, to understand global health now and in the future and assess how actors, like 
states, can engage to shape the field, a deeper sense of the MDGs’ origins and of how actors 
engaged in the past is instructive. 
Defining and determining what is and what is not considered part of the global health 
agenda remains disputed. There is no single global health agenda.226,227 Yet how global health 
is defined and understood shapes which health challenges are considered.228,229 The 
definition impacts the design of how funds are raised and eventually disbursed. It influences 
discourse and how policymakers consider issues. It determines the education of students 
and future policymakers. The global health agenda can also contribute to the creation of new 
global health institutions like the Global Fund or GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance. In other words, 
the conceptualization of global health exerts power by determining the global health agenda. 
As recently argued, ‘power is exercised everywhere in global health although its presence 
may be more apparent in some instances than others’.230 
While the tremendous normative power of the MDGs is increasingly recognized, there 
is limited analysis considering the explicit role of state actors within the process to create 
the MDGs. Existing literature highlights the important role of civil society and non-
governmental actors231, “norm champions”225 and “well-placed individuals within the UN” 
232; however, to better identify both the origins and future of global health as a field of policy 
action, it is necessary to reconsider how state actors engaged in this process to create the 
MDGs. What were state actors’ roles in the policymaking process to create the MDGs? Why 
and how did state actors engage to shape and influence the process?  
Despite broad recognition of the MDGs’ and their role in development, their 
relationship to the rise of the field of global health is less explicitly acknowledged. Part of 
this could be the tension between the normative aspiration of global health to transcend 
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states and national borders with the reality of the MDGs and global health institutions still 
operating within an UN-state system. This could help explain why seminal articles assessing 
the transition from international to global health do not even mention the MDGs.233 This is 
somewhat paradoxical given that the MDGs had a strong health focus and that the emergence 
of global health in the late 1990s and early 2000s broadly coincided with the United Nations’ 
(UN) Millennium Declaration. The MDGs also built on previous advocacy efforts. For 
example, MDG 4 on child mortality built on the experience of the child-survival revolution in 
the 1990s.234 
The MDGs also matter for global health as issues not included within the MDG agenda, 
like non-communicable diseases (NCDs), received reduced interest, attention and resources 
within the field of global health. Conversely issues included in the MDGs, like HIV/AIDS, 
gained disproportionate and distortionary attention possibly displacing other health 
spending.235 Some experts argued that the quantification of the MDGs and their targets led 
to “simplification, reification and abstraction” which contributed to redefining some of the 
priorities.236 By 2014, roughly $23 billion out of a total of $36 billion of Development 
Assistance for Health (DAH) was directed towards MDGs Four, Five, and Six whereas only 
$611 million was directed towards NCDs.237 Moreover, since 1990 DAH associated with the 
MDGs increased more than any other areas.238 While this was not necessarily the case for 
every goal and target within the MDGs, it was the case that if a health challenge was not an 
MDG goal or target, it was more difficult to raise support and awareness for this issue in the 
MDG era. For example, anticipating this situation, former UNAIDS Director Peter Piot fiercely 
advocated for HIV/AIDS to be included in the MDGs.239   
At their inception, the MDGs caused rigorous debate amongst academics, civil society 
and policymakers around the world with one early critic calling them a “Major Distraction 
Gimmick” 240 forced upon developing countries by the triad of the United States, Europe and 
Japan.241 Yet these early critiques were eventually forgotten or ignored considering the 
power of the MDGs’ supporters, and as the MDGs became more entrenched as development 
policy. Indeed, a recent review242 found that “only 15 percent of MDG-related publications 
expressed concerns with the MDGs and only one-third of these discussed intrinsic 
limitations. From this narrower literature, the review considers MDGs’ limitations in terms 
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of the development process 243, structure243, content244 as well as implementation and 
enforcement.245  
Despite these critiques, an early Millennium Project report declared, that the MDGs 
were “the most broadly supported, comprehensive, and specific poverty reduction targets 
the world has ever established.”246  A UN MDGs final report defined them as the “most 
successful anti-poverty movement in history.”247 The MDGs reflected a departure from the 
1980s Washington consensus development to a more people-centred or human 
development in the 1990s expressed during a series of UN conferences on development 
issues.248 As experts noted the MDGs arguably “created a new narrative of international 
development centred on global poverty” with the MDGs “the legitimized framework for 
defining what this means” and the “reference point around which international debates 
about development revolve.”240 
More specifically within global health, the MDGs remained contested. The MDGs 
represent the apex of an extremely “vertical” (focused on specific diseases, like HIV/AIDS or 
malaria as opposed to a horizontal approach focused on health systems) approach to health 
interventions. The three health-specific MDGs focused on a small number of vertical 
interventions to combat specific diseases and maternal and child mortality as the most 
effective approach to improve health. In 2008, analysts highlighted “[t]he potentially 
destructive polarization” between vertical and horizontal approaches.249 The Maximizing 
Positive Synergies initiative (detailed in Section Two below) helped diffuse this tension 
leading to greater attention to health systems and a more integrated approach within health. 
But the MDGs remained the dominant policy doctrine. In fact, it appears the MDGs dominated 
the agenda so much so that they even eventually contributed towards a more horizontal 
approach. One analysis found that “critical factors behind the recent burst of attention [to 
health systems] include fears among global health actors that health systems problems 
threaten the achievement of the health-related MDGs.”250 (Of course, defining health systems 
and how to best strengthen them to help achieve the MDGs is also heavily disputed. Health 
systems frameworks are strongly shaped by their authors.251) Within global health, the 
MDGs shaped priorities and investments. The MDGs both reflected an emerging definition of 
global health, and contributed to advancing this conceptualization. They exerted power and 
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facilitated by the UN and civil society partners were enacted through and within nation 
states. 
The role of power as a concept and framework for assessing how global health policy 
is determined is often overlooked. As Erasmus and Gilson argued, ‘power, a concept at the 
heart of the health policy process, is surprisingly rarely explicitly considered in the health 
policy implementation literature.’252 Frameworks for understanding power remain 
contested and empirical evidence for applying these frameworks is often lacking. Given the 
importance of the MDGs in shaping the global health agenda, understanding how states 
engaged to create the MDGs could help illustrate how actors exert power in global health and 
hence inform how actors both engaged in the conceptualization of the SDGs and might 
engage with their implementation shaping the future of global health. 
Based on published literature and unpublished policy materials, this chapter focuses 
on reconsidering the role of state actors as critical actors in both the conceptualization and 
institutionalization of the MDGs. While state engagement in the recent SDG process was 
more visible and legible, some states, contrary to common perceptions, were also critical 
actors in the creation of the MDGs. State actors within global health are sometimes 
overshadowed by the attention given to the proliferation of new actors, like public-private 
partnerships, civil society organizations or philanthropies.253 In the case of the MDGs, state 
actors not only sanctioned the MDGs through head of states endorsing the Millennium 
Declaration, but also acted more subtly behind the scenes supporting, enabling (sometimes 
by not blocking), and/or leveraging other actors, institutions and processes to conceptualize 
the MDGs. 
This chapter considers why and how state actors exerted power and engaged in the 
MDG process, and describes the context for the case-studies on Japan and Indonesia. This 
chapter starts by presenting an overview of different potential frameworks for analysing the 
role of states in the creation of the MDGs, and selects the Barnett and Duvall framework 
(considering compulsory, productive, structural and institutional power) for analysis.254 
Second, this chapter applies this framework describing and analysing how states exerted 
power in the creation and institutionalization of the MDGs (and emergence of the SDGs) in 
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three distinct phases (2000-2005; 2005-2010; and 2010-2015) in relation to the emergence 
of the field of global health. Finally, it considers and discusses the implications of this analysis 
for the recent transition from the MDGs to the SDGS, and what this might mean for the 
implementation of the SDGs and the future of global health.  
 
Section One: Background on power analysis for global health 
Power is a central concept in social sciences, but its meaning and application is heavily 
contested. Scholars disagree about sources of power, the role of power and how actors exert 
power. Indeed, one international relations scholar describes the concept of power as one of 
the ‘most troublesome in the field’ and argues that ‘the number and variety of definitions 
should be an embarrassment to political scientists.’255 Traditionally scholars have seen 
power conceptually defined by an actor or state resources like armies or navies and 
populations or territories. But in the second half of the twentieth century, this approach 
evolved to consider ‘relational power’, in other words, how actors, individually or in groups, 
related to each other and affected or influenced others’ behaviour. Beyond this, many 
debates and different approaches in terms of how to exert, frame, measure or understand 
power remain. Yet there is a consensus on the importance of understanding power and the 
lack of knowledge on how power functions.256 There is a similar, but slightly less mature, 
state of affairs in the global health literature. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, there is an increasing recognition of the concept of 
power in global health, but discussions are still nascent.257 Similar to international relations, 
power in health remains associated with possession of or access to material resources like 
financing or medical equipment or drugs; however, there is an emergent recognition of 
ideas258, networks259, expertise and information260 as potential sources of power. This is 
critical for global health as many consider health a policy process dictated by technical 
choices instead of recognizing health as a profoundly political space in which various 
priorities and policies are fiercely contested and ideas, networks, expertise and information 
are deployed to advance competing approaches.257 
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From the international relations literature, there are a few different frameworks for 
understanding how power is exerted, which could be considered for global health. One of the 
simplest and perhaps most intuitive ways to illustrate how power is exerted is to compare 
hard and soft forms of power. Robert Dahl’s famous formulation of hard power is the ability 
of A to force B to do something it would not otherwise do (usually deploying military or 
economic resources). Joseph Nye’s conceptualization of soft power attracts or co-opts actors 
and persuades actors without the use of coercive force. In global health, Brazil’s influential 
role in advancing its political values on the negotiation of the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control is often cited as an example of soft power.261 Others argued that to best 
advance interests, actors should seek to combine both hard and soft power to create smart 
power.262 For example, one could consider American efforts on HIV/AIDS like PEPFAR 
advancing American interests in geopolitically strategic countries backed up with financial 
resources as an example of smart power. 
 Anotherframework from sociology is Lukes’ three faces of power.263 The first face of 
power is the ability of one actor to force another actor to do something they initially did not 
want to do, ie hard power. The second face of power is considered agenda setting and 
framing; powerful actors can control the agenda and determine who sits at the table and 
which issues are considered to be or not be on the agenda.264 The third face of power is the 
ability to control an actor’s thoughts. For example, one actor might be able to shape another 
actor’s initial interests. These three faces of power could be summarized as overt, covert or 
latent forms of power. This three faces of power framework was briefly applied to examine 
the process to create the SDGs.265 While the hard, soft, smart power framework is helpful for 
examining state actions at the international level, Lukes’ faces of power is most helpful for 
assessing the negotiation of policy processes as the framework illustrates how actors can 
shape the agenda by putting or removing issues from consideration (the second face of 
power) and/or controlling the terms or framework for conceptualizing issues (the third face 
of power).  
Building on Lukes, global governance scholars Barnett and Duvall present a broader 
framework for understanding power, which is insightful for understanding how states 
negotiate policy processes. They consider power to be about relationships, and define it ‘as 
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the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors 
to determine their circumstances and fate.’266 They differentiate between four forms of 
power—compulsory power (such as use of military or economic force), institutional power 
(such as how international institutions are designed to favour one actor over another), 
structural power (the overall constitution or framework of actor and their roles) or 
productive power (control over the possession and distribution of resources).254For global 
health, one could think of a donor using funding to exert compulsory power; a well-
positioned state leveraging a multilateral agency to exert institutional power; a prestigious 
university or NGO positioning its staff as experts to provide technical policy support as 
exerting structural power; and a UN agency or a private-sector actor advancing and 
promoting a particular agenda or approach to addressing health challenges as an exertion of 
productive power.   
Given the breadth of Barnett and Duvall’s framework to distinguish between different 
forms of power, particularly to identify and illuminate ways in which power is exerted in 
ways usually unseen or unrecognized, the next section below applies this framework to 
analyse and illustrate state engagement in the creation of the MDGs. 
 
Section Two: State Power and the creation of the MDGs 
Phase One 2000-2005: Conceptualization and Campaign 
One year after the unanimous endorsement of the 2000 Millennium Declaration 
during the Millennium Summit with 149 heads of states and governments (the largest ever 
such gathering), United Nations’ Secretary General Kofi Annan submitted a report to the 
General Assembly entitled, a Roadmap towards the Implementation of the Millennium 
Declaration.267This report was adopted by the General Assembly, and recommended it be 
considered a ‘useful guide’ for operationalizing the Declaration. An annex to this report 
included the framework for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): eight goals, 
eighteen targets and forty-eight indicators. This MDG resolution, based on the Declaration 
approved and endorsed by heads of states and governments, would ultimately be leveraged 
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by the United Kingdom and other OECD states to exert tremendous compulsory, structural, 
institutional and productive power.  
Recognizing the role of states in shaping policy is not to dismiss the role of message 
and norm entrepreneurs as well as elite technocrats highlighted elsewhere.225 Instead it is 
meant to reconsider these individuals’ roles as enabled by states exerting structural, 
institutional and productive power. For example, three of the Security Council’s five 
permanent five seats are held by OECD-member states, the United States, France and the 
United Kingdom. These states have veto or structural power over the appointment of the 
Secretary-General, and thus have influence over the Secretary-General’s office; a similar 
situation is true for other UN agencies and other parts of UN institutions. States use this 
structural power to install their nationals into key positions shaping policies within these 
institutions and establishing critical personal connections. States also leverage institutional 
power through the OECD and World Bank as well as the UN. 
Following the Millennium Declaration and in coordination with the World Bank and 
OECD, a United Nations’ interagency expert group (IAEG) both reflected institutional power 
and exerted productive power. Co-chaired by a special adviser in the Secretary General’s 
office (Michael Doyle) and director (Jan Vandemoortele) in the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and with participants from both the Bank and the OECD, this group, 
sanctioned by OECD states, led the process to draft what became the eight MDGs.225 The 
Goals were taken almost verbatim from the Millennium Declaration, which helped to 
legitimize them as the Declaration had been approved by Heads of State. The eight MDGs 
consolidated and built upon the so-called International Development Goals (IDGs) created at 
the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In fact, 
MDGs 1 through 7 were extremely similar to the IDGs. The biggest difference between the 
IDGs and the MDGs was Goal 8 on partnership, which was the result of political consultation 
and compromise following the Millennium Declaration, most notably between the G77 
Member States who believed the Goal did not go far enough and the United States which 
believed it went too far.224  
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The IDGs came from a working group of national Ministers of Development which met 
in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD to produce a 1996 report, 
Shaping the 21st Century. This report selectively included goals and language from UN 
conferences in the 1990s. These IDGs were endorsed in June 2000 by the UN, OECD, World 
Bank and the IMF268, but the IDGs’ productive power had little buy-in or support from 
developing countries. In fact, the IDGs engendered deep critique on a number of levels from 
developing countries and civil society. The IDGs had been promoted by the United Kingdom, 
which led an informal group, the so-called Utstein Group, of female Development Ministers 
from the Netherlands, Germany and Norway, which sought to use the IDGs as their 
overarching framework for development and align their aid efforts to leverage their 
impact.269 This would also be an exertion of compulsory power by developed states coercing 
developing states to adopt policy guidance in exchange for development assistance. The 
strong commitment from the United Kingdom was championed by Clare Short, who had 
come to lead DFID as part of the 1997-elected New Labour government.270 As part of a 
broader shift in development thinking and fortuitous timing with the Millennium Summit, 
the UK and the other states’ institutional power within the World Bank and the IMF advanced 
the productive power of the IDGs eventually leveraging the UN to reframe and rebrand the 
IDGs as MDGs through negotiation with the addition of Goal 8 on partnership to overcome 
resistance from developing country states.  
Other than the goal on global partnership, the IDGs were largely the same as the MDGs 
on health except one key difference. Both lists of goals contained maternal and child 
mortality (although they were one goal in the IDGs and two goals in the MDGs), but the IDGs 
included a goal on reproductive health services, whereas the MDGs had a goal on HIV/AIDS. 
The removal or blocking of reproductive rights as part of the MDGs was the result of the so-
called ‘unholy alliance’ between the Vatican and Sudan, along with Libya and Iran, which 
then leveraged the G-77, a large and powerful bloc of countries within the UN General 
Assembly, and also took advantage of a then recently-elected conservative US government 
(the administration of President George W. Bush), which was initially disinterested in the 
MDGs.271 In this case, the Vatican State exploited institutional or structural power, joining 
some members of the G-77, to block a potential MDG on reproductive health. This alliance 
  
 
66 
 
later broke down in 2005, and reproductive health was included as a target for maternal 
health. HIV/AIDS was included as an MDG following vigorous lobbying from HIV/AIDS 
activists led by UNAIDS Director Peter Piot. 
UNDP, newly led by former World Bank Vice President (Mark Malloch Brown), 
spearheaded the development of a strategy to exert institutional power and advocate for 
MDG implementation. These efforts ultimately included a Millennium Project and a 
Millennium Campaign to raise attention, financing and support to advance progress. UNDP 
worked with governments to embed the MDGs within national policy processes and monitor 
progress. The 2002 Monterrey Finance for Development Conference focused on financing 
the MDGs.225 Despite these efforts, national commitment to the MDGs at this point was 
limited, and in the early stages the MDGs provoked robust critiques. 
Hulme272 distinguishes between various schools of critique classifying them as “high 
modernists, who take [the MDGs] at face value and are optimistic that they are a blueprint 
for the transformation of the human condition273; the strategic realists, who don’t believe the 
MDGs are a blueprint for action but believe they are essential to stretch ambitions and 
mobilise political commitment and public support274; the critics, who see them as well-
intentioned but poorly thought through – distracting attention from more appropriate 
targets (or non-targets)275 and more effective policies and actions234; through to the radical 
critics, who view them as a conspiracy obscuring the really important ‘millennial’ questions 
of growing global inequality, alternatives to capitalism and women’s empowerment.240uu 
Despite these early critiques, the commitment of states and the broader UN system 
during this early phase was crucial for establishing the MDGs as the dominant narrative for 
both international development and global health. OECD states ensured this by recalibrating 
and aligning their financial support and leveraging their structural institutional, productive 
power across the UN system. For example, the US Government launched two major funding 
initiatives, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s 
Malaria Initiative (PMI); these initiatives combined with the Global Fund and GAVI to help 
boost development assistance for health in 2000 from $11.6 billion to $33.1 billion in 
2012.276 The MDGs were also supported by the creation of two new public-private 
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partnership institutions, GAVI for immunizations and the Global Fund to Fight HIV, TB and 
Malaria, to accelerate progress and provide financial resources to reinforce the MDGs’ 
productive power.277 
 
Phase Two 2005-2010: Consolidation and Critique 
In 2005 UN Member States met for the World Summit at the UN in New York. With 
strong leadership from the UN Secretariat, the United Kingdom and other developed states, 
the Summit outcome document approved by national leaders continually referenced the 
MDGs and encouraged states to ‘adopt, by 2006, and implement comprehensive national 
development strategies to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and 
objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals’.278 In fact, states endorsed and 
requested the UN system to support the development of MDG-based national development 
strategies and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers at the country level.279 The UK also made 
the MDGs a centrepiece of their hosting the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005. This deepened 
and expanded the productive and institutional power of the MDG agenda amplifying this 
power throughout the UN and international system.  
Following this Summit and the G8 meetings, more UN and international institutions 
became involved in national reporting;the regularity of this reporting also increased. A 
review of twenty-two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—fifteen of which were prepared 
between 2005 and 2007 and one in 2008— highlighted that almost all expressed a 
commitment to the MDGs.280 These initiatives spurred other actions. For example, Malawi in 
2006 started publishing an annual MDGs report.281.282 Commitment to the MDGs continued 
to grow as states like the United Kingdom, and others like Japan, continued to advance the 
MDG approach as a way to consolidate, align and amplify their development investments. In 
2008, governments, foundations, businesses and civil society groups met at the United 
Nations Headquarters in New York for another high-level event. More than $16 billion was 
committed to accelerate progress exerting some compulsory power using the appeal of 
financial assistance to support states towards the MDGs.283  
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 While support for the MDGs during this period expanded, critique of the MDG 
approach also grew. The rise of many emerging economies, particularly in the wake of the 
2008 economic crisis, began to create additional space to question the MDG approach. States 
like Indonesia used their experiences with the MDGs to criticize and improve the process, 
but also to raise their own profile. Experts noted tendencies to focus on targets which were 
comparatively easier to implement or monitor (some have called this the tyranny of 
averages) which led to variable progress and had adverse implications for equity.245 Critics 
called for improvements in national averages ignoring the inverse care law with implications 
for equity.284 Despite raising valid concerns, critique also indirectly reinforced the existing 
productive power of the MDGs. 
During this period, the Global Fund and other so-called global health initiatives 
(GHIs), like the US’ PEPFAR program, provided incredible amounts of resources and 
prioritized attention for HIV/AIDS, an MDG. In fact, the energy, innovation and attention 
from HIV/AIDS has led some to even argue that HIV/AIDS invented global health.285 Some 
defined global health as ‘an area for study, research, and practice that places a priority on 
improving health and achieving equity in health for all people worldwide.’286 Others argued 
that global health was simply “a foreign policy instrument of hyper-rich nations.”287 But 
more realistically, global health was, as one academic argued, ‘more a bunch of problems 
than a discipline.’288 The problems of global health in this period were predominantly the 
‘vertical’ MDG health issues of child and maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria.  
One MDG critic argued that, “the MDG phenomenon carries the potential for 
distorting meaningful intellectual and research agendas, and could function as the catalyst 
and vehicle for a fundamental realignment of the political economy of development at the 
global level.”244This was accurate for global health. Experts noted that the MDGs were 
distorting priorities and spending and would not be achievable without broader, more 
‘horizontal’ investments in national health systems.289 
To consider this, the World Health Organization, with financial support from Italy and 
strong engagement from many states receiving funding from GHIs, which were funding the 
MDGs, convened a collaborative research effort and a high-level dialogue called Maximizing 
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Positive Synergies in 2009. The research consortium convened identified areas for concern, 
and concluded more attention should be devoted to strengthening health systems which 
could also encourage better alignment and integration between GHIs and health systems.290 
One synthesis analysis found positive effects of the MDG approach as, “a rapid scale-up in 
HIV/AIDS service delivery, greater stakeholder participation, and channelling of funds to 
non-governmental stakeholders, mainly NGOs and faith-based bodies” and negative effects 
as “distortion of recipient countries’ national policies, notably through distracting 
governments from coordinated efforts to strengthen health systems and re-verticalization 
of planning, management and monitoring and evaluation systems.”291 
 
Phase Three 2010-2015: Accelerated Implementation, the Final Push and the Emergence of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
This phase started with the 2010 MDG Review Summit. The MDGs’ strong productive 
power was institutionalized throughout the UN and international system, and 
implementation efforts continued. Despite additional pledges of more than $40 billion to 
accelerate progress, the Summit concluded that progress in many countries was ‘patchy’ and 
‘uneven.’292 Focus shifted thereafter to an MDG Acceleration Framework (MAF) to support 
lagging countries to achieve the MDGs in the remaining five years. While discussions began 
to consider the end of the MDGs, UN policymakers focused on accelerating progress towards 
implementation accompanied by additional reviews and analyses as well as a proliferation 
of case studies profiling national best practices and innovations.  
For example, the London International Development Centre and the Lancet 
collaborated on an in-depth Commission reviewing progress in 2010.281 While heralding the 
remarkable success of the MDGs for agenda setting, the Commission noted particular missed 
opportunities for synergies between efforts across education, health and gender sectors. A 
lack of strong ownership by national institutions created challenges. The Commission also 
highlighted that MDGs disregarded and fragmented health systems (Travis et al., 2004), 
ignored changing demographics as well as overlooked emerging health challenges such as 
non-communicable diseases293, mental health or road traffic injuries. 
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  Other analyses showed mixed evidence on how the MDGs affected national 
policymaking. In one survey of 118 countries, eighty-six percent reported that they acted in 
response to the MDGs.294 Another review of national development plans in fifty countries 
showed that thirty-two countries either adapted or localized the MDGs into national 
planning.295 But low and middle-income countries could simply be referencing the MDGs in 
their national development plans to satisfy donor or international ‘norms’ of MDG political 
correctness.296 Indeed, one review suggested that states had two distinct motivations for 
engaging with the MDGs: first, to increase their global visibility and influence (this was 
usually more reflective of middle-income or emerging countries); and second, to receive 
increases in overseas development assistance (ODA).297 In the first case, it could be that 
emerging economies recognized the power of the MDGs, and wanted to use this MDG 
platform to amplify their own power; and in the second case, this reflects some countries’ 
need for financing and thus be able to be “coerced” by the MDGs. Yet even when countries 
integrated MDGs into their policy and planning processes, this did not necessarily lead to 
MDG issues being domestically prioritized or provided with the necessary domestic funding. 
Again, it could be that countries were reacting to the productive, institutional and structural 
power of the MDGs by integrating them into their policy processes.   
While the UN system was determined to prioritize the MDGs, discussions began 
during this phase to consider what would come after the MDGs. Some states, like the United 
Kingdom, were in favour of continuing the MDGs beyond 2015. Other states like Colombia 
argued for the creation of new SDGs to focus more broadly on issues like the environment 
and be universally applicable for all countries. In fact, many states, particularly middle-
income states, wanted to broaden the MDGs to be universally relevant for all countries. An 
editorial in the Lancet in 2012 argued that, “there will be a major strategic shift in global 
health, away from development and towards sustainability” and expressed some concerns 
about how health might fit into the future development agenda.298 
Starting in 2012 in the wake of the Rio+20 conference on Sustainable Development, 
an elaborate UN-led, multi-stakeholder, multi-sectoral process began discussions around a 
process to create a successor framework for the post-2015 era. The ensuing policy process 
was arguably the most inclusive and consultative in United Nations in history. The 
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extraordinary engagement and commitment reflected the MDGs’ tremendous power. State 
actors, from Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as other actors actively championed a 
goal focused on healthy lives (to be able to address health determinants beyond the health 
sector), implicitly aiming to block efforts to position universal health coverage as the goal for 
SDG3. This approach was adopted in the HLP as well as in the report of the Botswana 
consultation, and this alternative approach (focused on having a goal of ensuring healthy 
lives) eventually prevailed and incorporated UHC into the SDG3 framework as one of the 
targets. The final Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework included seventeen 
goals, with one focused on health. For what became the health goal, SDG Three (SDG 3), the 
three most important parts of the process were the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
(HLP), the thematic consultation on health in Botswana and the Open-Working Group (OWG) 
process. 
The HLP, co-chaired by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, President 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom, 
included twenty-seven members and was announced by the Secretary-General in July 
2012.299 In its May 2013 report, the Panel proposed expanding the MDGs to twelve goals and 
consolidating the three MDGs for health into one SDG for health. This one health goal to 
“ensure healthy lives” proposed a focus on continuing the MDGs, but also including an 
unspecific reference to “neglected tropical diseases and priority non-communicable 
diseases” as well as an explicit sexual and reproductive rights target. Neither health systems 
nor universal health coverage (UHC) received much attention within this report; in fact, the 
report was characterised as “weak” by global health critics.300 The approach of having one 
goal for health would eventually prevail; however, the Botswana and OWG processes 
significantly expanded the agenda of the health goal beyond the MDGs.  
The thematic consultation on health (co-convened and managed by the Governments 
of Botswana and Sweden, in collaboration with WHO and UNICEF) was part of nine thematic 
consultations coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2012 
and 2013. The six-month consultative process for health included over 1,500 individuals 
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participating in twelve face-to-face consultations4 in Africa, Asia, South America, North 
America, and Europe; more than 100 papers were submitted for a web-based 
consultation.301 The consultation process culminated with a three-day meeting in Botswana 
in March 2013, and recommended “maximising healthy lives” as the goal, which would, as 
the Task Team for the Global Thematic Consultation on Health argue, include “acceleration 
of progress on the health Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agenda; reduction of the 
burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs); and ensuring universal health coverage 
(UHC) and access.”302 This approach of including the MDGs plus NCDs and UHC ultimately 
prevailed over the HLP recommendations and strongly shaped the Open Working Group 
(OWG) negotiations.  
The OWG met between March 2013 and April 2014. The OWG was originally 
structured to allow thirty countries from the UN’s five regional groups to engage in both 
informal and formal negotiations on potential SDGs; however, there was such overwhelming 
interest and commitment to engage that some countries needed to share their seats in so-
called “troikas”. Thematic discussions happened over thirteen sessions, and health was 
discussed during the fourth session of the OWG in June 2013. This session largely defined 
the eventual SDG 3 for health. Building on the HLP and the Botswana consultation, states 
emphasised the importance of strengthening health systems and moving towards UHC, and 
this was incorporated into the eventual goal as an individual target.303 The OWG’s 
formulation was broadly adopted in the intergovernmental negotiations that followed in 
2014 and 2015, and became SDG 3. The OWG formulation focused on a goal to “ensure 
healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” with nine targets and four 
mechanisms for implementation. SDG 3 builds on the MDGs and includes targets on UHC, 
reproductive health, NCDs as well as pollution and road traffic injuries.  
While there were countless consultations and opportunities to provide input between 
2012-14, UN Member States ensured they had the final decision in the process designing the 
 
4 One of the twelve face-to-face consultations for the thematic consultation on health took place in Indonesia, namely the Beyond 2014 
Global Youth Forum, co-hosted by International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and United Nations’ Family Planning 
Agency (UNFPA), in December 2012. This meeting ended with a declaration focused on “staying healthy, comprehensive education, 
families, youth rights, and wellbeing including sexuality, the right to decent work and leadership and meaningful youth participation.” 
While some Indonesian policymakers were aware of this consultation, it did not seem to influence their engagement in the process.   
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process to follow the OWG process to conclude with intergovernmental negotiations 
between 2014 and 2015 which would give the final approval for the post-2015 agenda. 
These state negotiations were profoundly political and heavily disputed. For health, 
however, these discussions affirmed the conceptualisation of SDG 3 as advocated in the 
Botswana consultation and the OWG discussions. More broadly, the intergovernmental 
negotiations reflected emerging economies recognition of the influence of the MDGs and the 
opportunity to exert their own institutional and productive power through shaping the 
conceptualization of the new agenda. Leveraging their respective structural and productive 
power within the UN system, for example, Brazil’s hosting of the Rio+20 Forum in 2012, 
emerging economies shifted and reframed the discussion on the post-2015 agenda from 
MDGs to SDGs to reflect more closely their own national interests broadening the MDGs to a 
wider and more holistic development agenda. But what are the implications of these three 
phases of experience with the MDGs for the future of the SDGs, and the future of global 
health?  
Summary 
So, in the first phase, developed states held considerable strength in all forms of power. They 
were not only able to create and determine the agenda, but they were also able to use their 
financial and human resources leveraging both their position and networks as compulsory, 
structural and institutional power within the international system to ensure other states 
accepted and adopted their policy guidance. Developed states were also willing to sacrifice 
some of their control when working with the Bretton Woods institutions, the UN and other 
states as they rebranded and reframed their IDGs into MDGs to gain greater legitimacy.  
In the second phase, building on early academic critiques and initial national MDG 
experience, emerging economies began simultaneously to question the MDG approach more 
forcefully, and engage with the MDGs within the UN system; they also recognized and 
responded to the increased focus on global health. On the one hand, this deepened and 
reinforced the productive power of the MDG paradigm, but on the other hand, it also 
showcased the rising and burgeoning structural power of emerging economies to begin to 
contribute to and shape the field of global health. This was part of a broader geopolitical shift 
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of power globally as well as within the still nascent field of global health which began to shift 
away from a heavily ‘verticalized’ approach in the early 2000s to a broader, more horizontal 
approach.304 
The third phase exemplified the productive power of institutionalizing the MDGs as 
the dominant paradigm for global development. There was tremendous interest and 
engagement in what would come after the MDGs as well as how the post-2015 agenda would 
be determined. The focus onwhat would be part of this agenda illustrated the productive 
power of the MDGs. In this phase, the ability and success of developed states to ensure the 
continuation of the MDG paradigm within a new SDG approach reinforced the original MDG 
approach; however, it also signalled emerging economies’ rising institutional and structural 
power as they were able to negotiate for a broadening of the goals to be a more universal 
agenda relevant for every country. The SDG agenda essentially incorporates the MDGs and 
expands this agenda to include new goals related to environmental sustainability, labour and 
governance. In other words, developed states were able to maintain their focus on MDGs and 
institutionalize them within the SDGs, but the emerging economies were also able to broaden 
the MDGs into the SDGs.  
But what does this mean for the broader SDGs and the development agenda, as well 
as for the more specific global health agenda? What does the MDG experience mean for the 
future of the SDG agenda, and the future of global health?  
 
Section Three: Implications for the SDGs and the future of global health 
Given the MDG-established policy processes, the SDGs could continue to be as relevant and 
dominant for the international development agenda as the MDGs were. However, in the same 
way that not all of the MDGs received the same levels of attention and commitment (and 
some of the MDG goals and their indicators were contested and eventually revised in the 
early stages, eg as explained earlier on reproductive health), this is also likely to happen and 
is already happening within the SDGs. For example, the UN’s July 2017 High Level Political 
Forum (HLPF) on SDGs focused on reviewing only some selected thematic goals (1-no 
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poverty; 2-zero hunger; 3-good health and well-being; 5-gender equality; 9-industry, 
innovation and infrastructure; 14-life below water; and 17-partnerships for the goals). At 
the HPLF, countries reported in voluntary national reviews (VNRs), some countries also only 
selectively reported on goals meaning that they “cherry-picked” which goals to report on and 
which to ignore in their reporting. Instead of implementing all 17 goals as intended, it is 
possible and likely that states will determine an informal prioritisation of the SDGs through 
their financial investments and policies as also happened with the MDGs.  
A more pressing question, however, regards the role of the SDGs for global health: 
what will the SDGs mean for global health? Will the SDGs be as central and formative for the 
future of global health as the MDGs were? In other words, will the SDGs matter for global 
health as much as or more than the MDGs did, especially as low- and middle-income states 
engaged in the process to conceptualize them? Or will the future of global health better be 
debated and defined elsewhere? Given the centrality of health to the MDGs (3/8 Goals) 
compared to the SDGs (1/17), it seems unlikely that health will remain as central to the 
sustainable development agenda, and thus, unlikely that the SDGs will remain as central to 
the future of the global health agenda. Yet in the conceptualisation of SDG 3, global health 
actors engaged heavily as if the SDGs would remain central to the future of the global health 
agenda. The ongoing implementation and interpretation of SDG 3 for health in the future of 
global health continues to be contested.  
In May 2017 the Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO) was 
directly elected by states; the new DG is clearly in favour of a focus on the SDGs with a slight 
shift in the interpretation of SDG3 on health as he stated in July 2017 at the High-Level 
Political Forum: “I regard universal health coverage as WHO’s top priority. […] Universal 
health coverage is included in the Sustainable Development Agenda. Indeed, it is the 
centrepiece of the Sustainable Development Goal health targets”.305 However, two recently 
established global health initiatives, one the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness 
Innovations (CEPI) started with $460 million from the governments of Germany, Japan and 
Norway, plus the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Wellcome Trust, and another 
“Resolve” focused on heart disease and stroke as well as disease outbreaks started with $225 
million dollars from Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, and  
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the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, make little reference to the Sustainable 
Development Goals in their mission statements or aims. These new funding 
mechanisms could be rebranded or co-opted by the UN system at a later stage; 
however, for now, they seem to indicate a potential move away from the SDGs as the 
leitmotiv of global health. This being said, it has been acknowledged that the SDGs 
imply a dramatic paradigm shift within global health306, and it could be that this transition is 
still ongoing. Apropos there are already some efforts to reconceptualize global health as 
planetary health more in line with sustainable development and the SDG agenda.307 
Regardless of the relationship with the SDGs, the exact future shape, direction and priorities 
of global health are continuing to evolve, and remain to be seen.  
  
Conclusion 
This analysis demonstrates the value of using power as a framework to understand and 
assess actors’, particularly states, roles in global health. Better understanding how power is 
exerted and deployed could help improve how actors engage, and identify key determinants 
of comparatively more ‘successful’ or ‘effective’ efforts in global health; a deeper knowledge 
of what determines better policy efforts could also enhance policy processes and lead to 
better governance mechanisms.308 This could transform states’ abilities to negotiate global 
health policies ultimately improving and saving lives. It might also mean other actors 
increase their attempts to leverage states’ influence.  
This analysis and the transition from the MDGs to the SDGs also has implications for 
how power is exerted at the UN and shapes the development and global health agenda. 
Compulsory power has become less relevant over time (as development assistance is less 
critical), the exertion of structural and institutional power is becoming more contested (as 
emerging economies begin to demand some restructuring of the system) and productive 
power is becoming perhaps the most important and relevant form of power, especially for 
global health. In between 2000-2015, developed states started by dominating the policy 
process, but by the end, emerging economy states were able to contest developed states’ 
previously unchecked structural and institutional power. They contested the agenda in the 
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negotiation of the post-2015 agenda and thus, the future exertion of productive power. But 
what does this mean for future policy making efforts, and what are the implications of this 
analysis? 
First, the MDG experience showcases the potential for states to leverage structural 
and institutional power to exert productive power for policymaking within the UN system. 
Given the geopolitical changes in the last decade, this could mean negotiations where states 
can exert institutional and productive power will now become more contested, and 
potentially gridlocked resulting in broad or watered-down agreements. The contestation of 
the SDGs could represent this. The negotiated process lasted around three years and 
produced 17 goals and 169 indicators. If this is the case, it is possible that the UN’s productive 
power could become challenged, or less important. It could be that states could position new 
or alternative actors to the UN, which are better aligned to their interests, to create 
productive power, and seek new policy fora in which they might be better positioned to exert 
institutional and structural power. Alternatively, it could be that this greater contestation, 
even with eventual compromise, could lead to more committed national buy-in and 
engagement for new policies and processes. The SDGs could be a litmus test for helping to 
understand and assess the productive power and influence of UN policymaking.  
In the case of creating and institutionalizing the MDGs, states exerting institutional 
and structural power seemed to work best in alliances with other states as well as non-state 
actors. Even comparatively less structurally or institutionally powerful states belong to one 
grouping or another within the UN system, eg the African Union or the G-77, which offers 
states increased possibilities for exerting some institutional or structural power within the 
UN system. This empowers states to leverage these relationships and abilities to engage on 
and create new mechanisms which have the potential to exert productive power. The MDGs 
created new norms around international development and global health exerting 
tremendous productive power. States played a critical role in creating and shaping this 
productive power, and this story could offer insights to other states seeking to leverage 
national power to create or institutionalize new norms in global health policymaking 
through the United Nations. One potential lesson based on this experience could be that 
states do not need to make huge financial investments to exert compulsory power, but rather 
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need to consider how wield institutional, structural and productive power more effectively 
and strategically. 
Second, this analysis illustrates the enduring importance and centrality of state 
engagement in global health policymaking. Without states, the MDGs and SDGs would not 
exist, or would look substantially different. While there is understandable excitement and 
interest in the role of new non-state actor engagement, the role of states within global health 
remains underappreciated253 and overlooked.309 Since 2000, the role of states in 
determining and managing health has changed and evolved. Globalization increased 
transnational actors’ abilities to shape and challenge how states spend, raise and allocate 
resources for health.310 Despite being responsible for health, states continue to see 
challenges to their prior monopoly over health governance and regulation.311 The MDGs 
themselves reflect some of these tensions. At one level, the MDGs are a challenge to states’ 
authority to manage and determine their own health priorities. The MDGs were largely 
crafted by developed states for low- and middle-income states. At another level, they reflect 
states’ continued authority as all states endorsed the MDGs at the General Assembly and 
ultimately participated in rethinking and reframing the MDGs into SDGs. Some of these 
challenges to states are state-sponsored or state-endorsed as states defer some level of 
sovereignty empowering international institutions or non-state actors to challenge their 
sovereignty. Despite continuing changes in their roles and challenges to their authority, 
states remain the predominant and decisive actors in global health policymaking.  
Third, the example of the MDGs also highlights the importance of legitimacy for 
policymaking in global health. While developed states likely could have continued with their 
IDGs at the turn of the century, they recognized the value of legitimacy in transitioning them 
through the Bretton Woods institutions and reframing them within the UN policy process in 
negotiation with other states, thus trading some level of control for greater legitimacy. As 
part of this, the United Nations, a state-based institution, is generally perceived to be the 
most legitimate forum for establishing and determining health policies and priorities. The 
question now is will this legitimacy still be valued highly enough to justify the likely increases 
in political contestation. In other words, will states, recognizing the potential limits to their 
institutional and structural power at the UN, now seek to exert productive power in other 
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policy fora like the G-7 or the G-20? Until now, the United Nations as a policy forum and the 
MDGs as a UN mechanism played an integral part in contributing to define and shape the 
field of global health. While it is clear that states will continue to be critical actors shaping 
the field of global health, the role of SDGs in defining the future of global health is, for now, 
unclear.  
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Chapter Four  
Research Objective, Research Framework, Case Selection, 
Methodology and Ethics 
 
Key Points: 
• Showcasing how states or other actors exert power or seek to exert power does not 
necessarily mean that power is always dominant, decisive, or successful; however, 
simply illustrating how power affects or shapes processes and policies could be a 
useful start to a discussion on how to improve and enhance both processes and 
policies within global health ultimately making them both more equitable and 
effective. 
• This interpretive policy analysis combines literature and policy document reviews 
with semi-structured, in-depth qualitative interviews with policymakers aims to 
analyse how the post-2015 development agenda for health (what eventually became 
Sustainable Development Goal Three, SDG3) was conceptualized, and why, how and 
where states engaged and exerted power in this process from 2012-2015 exploring 
national motivations for why states engage in global health using international 
relations theories, and testing a framework for power analysis to analyse how states 
engaged in the process to create the SDGs with case-studies on Japan and Indonesia.  
 
Introduction 
As described in the previous chapters, globalisation continues to transform international 
relations, global governance and global health. Global health remains a profoundly contested 
field. Because of the rise of new actors as well as changes in technology, mechanisms and 
processes, states are updating and refining how they interact, and how they engage explicitly 
and implicitly in global health. This matters for why, how and where states engage in global 
health. Without recognizing this, future understandings of global health will remain limited. 
State actors play and continue to play a critical role in conceptualizing global health. States’ 
roles, both explicit and implicit, deserve further study to understand why they engage 
(meaning motives and objectives), how they engage (meaning their approaches and tools), 
and where they engage (which fora and policy processes). These are important, unresolved 
questions in the existing literature. A deeper appreciation for how, why, how and where state 
actors engage in global health could contribute to building a more robust understanding of 
the field of global health.  
Ultimately to answer these questions and advance the field, it is important to 
recalibrate efforts within global health and conduct empirical research which explicitly 
focuses on the role of state actors and applies rigorous theoretical frameworks like those 
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considering international relations and those focused on power. Using Held and colleague’s 
framework outlined in the previous chapter, instead of a sceptical or transformationalist 
perspective, the global health literature tends to view the role of the state within global 
health from a hyperglobalist perspective (meaning largely observing the decline of states) . 
Based on the literature review in the previous chapter, there are some possible models for 
understanding why states engage in global health; however, for assessing how and where 
they engage, the discussion is less mature. Going forward, empirical studies starting from a 
transformationalist perspective – recognizing how globalisation is transforming how states 
engage and project power – and combining this with existing international relations 
theories, particularly constructivism, to understand why states engage and Barnett and 
Duvall’s approach to power analysis to understand how states engage in global health could 
advance the field. 
Showcasing how states or other actors exert power or seek to exert power does not 
necessarily mean that they are always dominant, decisive, or successful. It also does not 
mean that these efforts necessarily need to be counterbalanced or addressed; however, 
simply illustrating how power affects or shapes processes and policies could be a useful start 
to a discussion on how to improve and enhance both processes and policies within global 
health ultimately making them both more equitable and effective. 
Using power as a framework is a natural evolution of existing analytical tools within 
global health. Greater analysis of power is essential to understanding why certain ‘technical’ 
solutions in global health continue to fail and why others succeed. Gaining more knowledge 
on how and where actors engage (meaning which fora or policy processes), and the 
relationship between the two, is helpful to the study of process and policy.  A rigorous 
analysis focused on how and where states as actors exert power in global health will 
contribute to deeper, more nuanced understanding of global health. This research aims to 
re-affirm the role of state actors in global health, and contribute to the growing literature on 
how actors exert power in global health policymaking. This chapter presents an overview of 
this study’s research objectives, the research framework, case selection and justification, 
methodology and ethics,  
 
Research Objectives 
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Building on the first three chapters, this research aims to analyse how the post-2015 
development agenda for health (what eventually became Sustainable Development Goal 
Three, SDG3) was conceptualized, and why, how and where states engaged and exerted 
power in this process from 2012-2015. Chapter Three reviewed the experience of the SDGs’ 
predecessor development framework, the Millennium Development Goals, and details their 
tremendous influence and power within the field of global health. Given the MDG experience, 
it is reasonable to consider that the SDGs might be equally important in terms of defining 
and influencing the current and future practice and study of global health; at least, this is part 
of the reason that many countries and other actors engaged so deeply in the process to 
conceptualize and negotiate the SDGs: policymakers believed and continue to believe that 
the SDGs will be at least as influential as the MDGs.  
Accordingly, this empirical research explores national motivations for why, how and 
where states engage in global health using international relations theory, and analyses their 
power applying Barnett and Duvall’s framework for power. This research also illuminates 
insights into ideational factors or non-material efforts which might be useful in achieving 
results in global health. This could contribute to understanding how process can determine 
outcomes and how outcomes impact future global health processes. 
The empirical work is a comparative case-study of Japan and Indonesia.  These 
countries were selected as most appropriate based on specific criteria. The criteria used for 
identifying and selecting the county case-studies was: engagement in the post-2015, SDG 
process; existing research and analysis on the state’s engagement in global health; practical 
feasibility in terms of language and access. A more detailed justification for the selection of 
Indonesia and Japan is described below after the research framework. 
This research addresses three research questions (RQs), namely understanding why 
and how states engage in global health (diplomacy) (RQ1 and RQ2), and then examining the 
process to conceptualize and create the SDGs (RQ3), with several associated sub-questions.  
These are outlined below. 
 (RQ1): Why do states engage in global health, and particularly why did states engage 
in the conceptualization and negotiation of the post-2015, SDG agenda? What are the factors 
for assessing the determinants of why a state engages in a given global health policy process? 
Do states seek to influence global health agenda setting for altruistic reasons, or to advance 
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their own interests? In other words, what are states “really” pursuing? Is global health a tool 
to advance other interests? What do states seek to achieve and what constitutes success?  
 (RQ2): How did states engage, ie: exert power, in global health, and particularly in 
shaping the SDGs? How do states construct national global health (diplomacy) efforts or more 
broadly a global health policy or strategy, ie: who are the relevant actors within governments 
(ministries, agencies and parastatals) and beyond states (NGOs, international institutions, 
other governments) and how do they engage in the process? What is the relationship 
between these actors, ie: what drives them to engage, and what are their relevant capacities 
and limitations? Which of these actors are considered most powerful, and according to which 
measures of power? What are the lessons for others seeking to influence and exert power in 
global health, and what does this mean for the future of global health? What are the 
implications of the SDGs, in terms of who drives agendas and how, for global health 
governance?  
(RQ3): What was the SDG process, and how did this shape why and how states, 
specifically Indonesia and Japan, engaged, and what did it matter? How does the process and 
the conceptualization of (global) health within the SDGs compare to the MDGs? What was 
the context and process for the creation of the SDGs? Why and how did states engage? Did 
the design of the process shape (benefit or limit) how and why certain states or actors 
engaged?  
 
Research Framework 
To understand why states engage (RQ1), it is useful to start with the international theories 
of realism, liberalism and constructivism. These theories could be helpful for exploring why 
states have engaged in the past and might engage in the future. These theories might also be 
useful in considering how to motivate states to engage more. They might even help explain 
or predict future motivations. The case-studies in this research will apply constructivist 
theory to better understand why both Japan and Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 process 
for health. This approach for assessing why states engaged is compelling as state actors 
within both Japan and Indonesia contested and constructed their motivations. 
Constructivism considers how identities, norms and framings are understood and affect 
state interests (and state behaviour) and how these meanings are developed, change and 
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evolve. Identities, norms and framings influence how states develop and create their policies 
and their strategies to exert power within the field of global health. This approach is helpful 
to understand why both Japan and Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 process. 
To understand how states engage in global health (RQ2), a broad framework to help 
capture and illuminate the breadth of approaches, strategies and/or resources which any 
given state might try to use could be a place to start. At this early stage, a clear consensus on 
frameworks is unlikely. Instead, it remains necessary to explore different approaches 
experimenting with and testing different frameworks for understanding power within global 
health. Recognizing the shortage of social scientists working in global health, empirical 
studies at both the global and national level to advance the field are possible and needed. 
This would make it possible to compare and contrast these approaches and begin to assess 
when and where which approaches work best for assessing various actors across policy 
processes. This research will apply Barnett and Duvall’s framework to start examining 
institutional, productive and structural exertions of power to illuminate the myriad ways in 
which a state expresses power seeking to advance its national interests. (Given the focus on 
material power or compulsory power, this thesis will focus on non-material forms of power, 
and thus analyse institutional, productive and structural exertions of power.) 
This research conducts two comparative country case-studies of Japan and Indonesia 
to answer why states engaged in the creation of the health SDG3 (RQ1). These case studies 
apply constructivism to examine why both Japan and Indonesia engaged in global health. To 
understand how states engaged in the creation of SDG3, Barnett and Duvall’s power 
framework will be applied in the table below to compare efforts to exert power to influence 
and shape the process. Applying this framework enables a rigorous exploration and helps 
illuminate how these states engaged and exerted power to advance their interests 
throughout the process. 
 
How state engages 
using institutional 
power? 
How state engages 
using structural 
power? 
How state engages using 
productive power? 
Indonesia    
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Japan    
 
Both case studies will examine why and how each country engaged in the overall post-2015, 
SDG process (RQ3).  This is to not only understand “what happened”, but to understand why 
“what happened” happened, and assess “what explains what happened.”312 To examine 
process and power in the creation of the SDGs, the Walt and Gilson policy triangle framework 
model of the policymaking process313 is applied, and is focused on the agenda-setting and 
policy formulation part of the policy process, and with particular attention to ideas, 
institutions and interests to understand the process, and examine the role state actors played 
throughout the process.314  
Country Case Study Selection: Indonesia and Japan  
Both Indonesia and Japan are individually compelling case-studies. The study of states as 
actors within global health is nascent. In a global health world largely dominated by 
Anglophone research institutions and publications, state actors from Japan and Indonesia 
have not received sufficient rigorous, analytical attention. Japan represents an established, 
but relatively understudied OECD state seeking to maintain and continue projecting its 
power. Indonesia represents an emerging, little-studied state seeking to exert greater 
influence and power globally. While research sometimes examines how powerful states 
engage (like the United States or United Kingdom), there are few studies of comparatively 
less powerful states’ engagement. Studying these experiences presents an opportunity to 
showcase how states engage, which could provide insights for how state actors engage in 
global health and lessons for other states seeking to enhance their engagement. But 
examining these states together also presents an opportunity to compare and contrast 
experiences. Analysing why and how these two states engaged in comparison could highlight 
differences in motivations for engaging as well as varied approaches in attempting to shape 
the process and outcomes. 
Both Japan and Indonesia committed to engaging in the post-2015 process, but both 
states also experienced elections and changes in governments within the period of the post-
2015 process (for more on this, see the policy timelines for each country in Chapters Five 
  
 
86 
 
and Six). Comparing and contrasting these experience highlights how states adopt different 
approaches or engage with varying levels of resources and or interest in various fora. Both 
governments interpreted the evolving process differently and developed different strategies 
to engage. For example, Indonesia engaged early in the process by putting President 
Yudhoyono forward as one of the co-chairs of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
in 2012. Japan, on the other hand, in 2012 and 2013 attempted to convene an unofficial 
“contact” group of countries and actors to informally discuss the post-2015 agenda. Do these 
different engagements represent strategic decisions taken in regard to the post-2015 
process in these countries, or are they more broadly representative of domestic political 
processes?  
For understanding why states engage in global health, and why states engaged in the 
post-2015 agenda, both Japan and Indonesia highlight interesting and contrasting 
perspectives as detailed and discussed in Chapter Five and Six. Various motivations play a 
role in explaining why each state engaged in the process. In the case of Japan, an influential 
parliamentarian and global health champion saw the post-2015 SDG process as an 
opportunity to project Japan’s vision for global health focused on universal health coverage 
(UHC) by leveraging Japan’s voice and influence through international institutions and 
platforms. In Indonesia, former President Yudhoyono was committed to projecting 
Indonesia’s interests regionally and globally. For his role as the Co-Chair of the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel on Post-2015, he used both technocrats from within the existing 
government bureaucracy as well as more entrepreneurial and ambitious technocrats which 
he had newly brought into the government to showcase Indonesia’s experience and amplify 
its influence within the UN system. In these efforts to influence and shape what became the 
SDGs, both states exerted productive, institutional and structural power according to Barnett 
and Duvall’s framework.  
The small table below outlines key differences and similarities between Indonesia 
and Japan.  
 Similarities Differences 
Japan • Committed to 
engaging in the post-
2015 process 
• An understudied 
OECD state 
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• Experienced changes 
in government  
between 2012-2015 
• Engaged through a 
more informal 
mechanism with the 
contact group 
• Engaged as provider 
of assistance 
Indonesia • Committed to 
engaging in the post-
2015 process 
• Experienced changes 
in government 
between 2012-2015 
• An emerging, little-
studied state 
• Engaged with the 
President as the Co-
Chair of the High-
Level Panel 
• Engaged as 
transitioning 
recipient of 
assistance 
 
Case-Study Selection: Indonesia  
When the MDGs were conceived in the late 1990s, Indonesia largely received policy guidance 
from international institutions. Yet within fifteen years, Indonesia became a policy leader for 
other countries within the region and beyond. This is true across the policy spectrum, but 
particularly for health. In fact, The Lancet proclaimed 2013 “Indonesia’s Year for Global 
Health Diplomacy.”315 In this year, the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY), was appointed, along with British Prime Minister Cameron and Liberian President 
Sirleaf, to co-chair the UN Secretary General’s High Level Post-2015 panel; the Indonesian 
Health Minister Mboi also took over as chair of the Global Fund, and the country hosted two 
high-level health conferences.  
Indonesia is notorious for refusing to share samples of the H5N1 virus with WHO 
during the avian flu pandemic in 2007 and 2008. While accused of threatening global health 
security, the country’s action exposed challenging questions of access, equity and 
transparency.316 This action signalled that Indonesia was not afraid to challenge existing 
international norms. Indonesia’s actions created a crisis, and a special WHO working group 
facilitated the creation of a global framework for sharing influenza virus strains alongside a 
system for improving the flow of pandemic vaccine and medications in 2011. This is a 
textbook case in the intersection of global health and global governance and is widely 
referenced as exemplifying the new challenges of global health diplomacy. The fact that 
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Indonesia pushed the international community on an issue of health security reflected a 
confident and assertive foreign policy from an emerging economy. More recently in 2012, 
Indonesia issued compulsory licensing which enables the generic manufacturing of drugs 
still under patent for HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B. This experience was also largely determined 
by domestic political exigencies.  
This experience informed Indonesia’s engagement in the Foreign Policy and Global 
Health (FPGH) Initiative facilitated by WHO and launched by Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
from Brazil, Indonesia, France, Norway, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand in 2007.317 This 
group of seven countries continues to meet annually and coordinate its efforts in both New 
York and Geneva. Indonesia also chaired this group in 2013. Indonesia’s leadership in the 
virus-sharing crisis and as a founding member of the Foreign Policy and Global Health group 
both created interest internally and positioned the country for a more prominent role 
externally in global health. A foreign Ambassador in Jakarta recently stated, “Indonesia feels 
its time has come [and] wants to be taken seriously as international players. They are 
reaching out aggressively to take a bigger role.”318  
While Indonesia has engaged actively in global health, during Yudhoyono’s tenure as 
President (2004-2014), the Government’s engagement in global health appears to reflect a 
broader commitment to advance Indonesia’s foreign policy efforts and project its leadership 
within the region and globally. President Jokowi’s term (2014-now) has been much more 
domestically focused, and the state’s role in global health has been less engaged. 
 
Case-Study Selection: Japan  
Japan supported the MDGs’ conceptualization and formulation leading up to the Millennium 
Declaration in 2000 both at the OECD, the Bretton Woods institutions and within the United 
Nations. Japan saw the post-2015 process as an opportunity to shape the SDG framework to 
be aligned with efforts to demonstrate its influence, enhance its interests and foreign policy 
goals, export its own model or vision for health through universal health coverage as well as 
amplify future investments through a recently revitalized JICA.319 Following his re-election 
in December 2012, as Prime Minister Abe wrote, “Japan is at a crossroads—in 2012, we were 
asked whether Japan was determined to continue to be a tier-one nation. Now I am ready to 
give a firm answer: of course we are.”320  
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An article in an influential 2011 Lancet Series on Japan argues that the country has 
failed to meet its significant potential to influence and shape global health.321 Japan’s 
engagement is low, and leadership weak. The authors attribute this to a combination of 
limited civil society, government fragmentation and a weak commitment to monitoring and 
evaluation. They suggest Japan should increase its financial resources, establish a high-level 
global health committee, promote NGOs and develop global health leadership.  
The authors particularly emphasize increasing financial resources for global health. 
They detail how development assistance for health (DAH) has decreased since 2000 and the 
Millennium Declaration; in fact, Japan is the only country in the OECD to sustain declines in 
DAH. To explain this, the authors point to Japan’s stagnating economy. Yet this explanation 
seems insufficient. Despite an overall decrease in ODA, one might expect DAH within ODA to 
increase; however, this did not happen. Japan does not have deep experience in focusing on 
health as part its overseas development assistance (ODA).322 Traditionally, Japan’s ODA 
concentrated on large-scale infrastructure projects (which would include hospitals) and 
peacebuilding efforts.323 It was only in 1998 when the Japanese Government endorsed a 
focus on “human security” did health and other social issues like education begin to play a 
much more prominent role in Japanese strategy.  
This focus on social factors coincided with Japan’s engagement in conceptualizing the 
MDGs, and a broader recognition of the health sector’s contributions to development. Yet 
while all of the other OECD countries expanded support for health, Japan reduced its support 
after 2000.321 The government faced more sustained challenges than most other OECD 
countries; however, it would seem unlikely that the economic crisis would be the only factor 
which contributed to Japan decreasing its DAH. In the early 2000s, Japan lacked both 
committed political leadership to health along with a devoted civil society advocates and 
policy experts. More broadly, a focus on the challenging economic situation seems to 
exaggerate the role of material, or financial resources, contribute to global health. For 
example, the government could also cultivate Japanese thought-leadership by promoting its 
own international experts. Chapter Five details how Japan’s role within global health evolved 
and was transformed after the 2008 G8 Summit. 
Most literature ignores Japan’s role in conceptualizing the MDGs, and also overlooks 
how after 2000, the MDG’s broader focus on health began to influence how Japan’s ODA. For 
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example, reviewing Japan’s annual ODA White Papers between 2002 and 2013 shows a 
steady increase in attention to the MDGs. The MDGs applied international pressure to Japan, 
and contributed to creating a constituency for global health in Japan.  
For the post-2015 agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, Japan engaged 
early despite some political uncertainties. The Government convened a so-called “Post-MDGs 
Contact Group” (CG) in December 2011, which held a series of quarterly meetings 
throughout 2012. The CG, convened and chaired by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
included “participants from about 20 countries, as well as major international organizations, 
foundations, research institutions and NGOs exchange views and ideas informally, free from 
their official positions.” While this effort did not seem to influence the Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel, it did raise attention to the process within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
These efforts would later be subsumed by Japan’s global health diplomacy strategy. 
Shortly after his election in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe released his 
government’s Strategy on Global Health Diplomacy in June 2013 when the government 
hosted its fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V). This 
strategy focuses primarily on universal health coverage (UHC) as a new pathway for global 
health, particularly for developing the SDGs, and positions Japan as both a model and a 
champion for progress. PM Abe accompanied this with a commentary in the Lancet in 
September, declaring that global health required “strong political leadership and that he 
would spare no efforts”; accordingly, he convened a high-level meeting in New York with all 
UN agency heads during the UN General Assembly to discuss.319 Later, in December 2013 
Japan hosted a high-level health forum focused with the World Bank. Japan’s re-engagement 
in global health is part of a more broadly reinvigorated Japanese foreign policy and economic 
policy known as “Abenomics”.  
Japan uses health to achieve foreign policy goals and uses foreign policy to achieve 
health goals. But there has been no rigorous, empirical analysis on Japan’s engagement in the 
SDG process. Research could begin to address this gap in knowledge and provide greater 
insights into Japan’s motivations, actors in global health diplomacy and how a state develops 
and implements strategies. 
 
Methodology 
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This interpretive policy analysis combines literature and policy document reviews (Chapters 
2 and 3) with semi-structured, in-depth qualitative interviews with policymakers involved 
in the conceptualization of the SDGs (Chapters 5-7). For the case-studies on the SDG process 
in Indonesia and Japan (Chapters Five and Six), the research interviewed policymakers 
engaged in New York and Geneva as well as Tokyo and Jakarta.5 It is also the case that some 
relevant diplomats or policymakers have, following the negotiation of the SDGs, changed 
jobs, or been transferred or relocated to other duty stations. When necessary, the researcher 
also interviewed these informants.  
 Interviewees in New York were initially selected based on the researcher’s professional 
experience, supplemented by snowballing, ie: informants were asked for their 
recommendations and suggestions for others to interview, and these suggestions were 
triangulated with the researcher’s doctoral supervisors. The researcher conducted more 
than half of the SDG interviews in New York before conducting interviews in Tokyo and 
Jakarta, which enabled the researcher to triangulate and corroborate any data in New York 
which surfaced during interviews in Tokyo and Jakarta.  
 For the Open Working Group (OWG) in 2014 during negotiations in New York, there 
was a Technical Support team (TST) on health, comprised of technical experts from UN 
agencies, which advised the OWG secretariat on the formulation of the health goal. The 
researcher interviewed members of this support team, members of the OWG secretariat 
(these include national representatives) as well as officials within UNDP, DESA and the UN 
Secretary-General’s office and civil society activists to understand the process, and how 
power and influence were perceived to be exerted within this process. The researcher 
complemented this with interviews in Geneva with both UN technical experts and post-2015 
focal points within UN health agencies.  
 Interviewees in Tokyo and Jakarta were selected starting with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Health as these were the two national ministries most directly 
 
5 The headquarters of the United Nations’ Secretariat in New York was where the MDGs were conceived and conceptualized, 
and the SDGs were negotiated and agreed within the special Open Working Group (OWG) on SDGs in New York. The researcher 
started with interviews in New York. Negotiators worked in close cooperation with their capitals (Tokyo and Jakarta), which is 
why interviews were also conducted in these locations. Given that most health-related negotiations occur in Geneva, where the 
majority of global health institutions are based, many of the most knowledgeable diplomats on health issues are often 
stationed there. These Geneva-based diplomats usually work in close contact with their colleagues in both their capitals, and in 
New York for the SDG discussions. The researcher thus also interviewed some diplomats and policymakers in Geneva. 
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engaged in the negotiation of the post-2015, Sustainable Development Goals. Additional 
interviewees were a mix of policymakers within ministries of foreign affairs, health, finance, 
planning plus other policymakers, academics and members of civil society and/or the 
private sector involved in creating, or influencing the creation of, a national negotiating 
positions selected based on recommendations from interviewees in New York and Geneva, 
and identified in consultation with local institutional partners to ensure reliability, namely 
the University of Nagasaki and Universitas Indonesia. For both Indonesia and Japan, the 
researcher also interviewed country-specific political science or governance experts to gain 
deeper insights into each countries’ socio-political history and to better understand their 
policy and governance processes. 
 The researcher conducted interviews in interviewees’ offices in English. The 
researcher recorded the interviews digitally and transcribed them verbatim for subsequent 
review and analysis. In cases where the interviewees’ office was not possible, a neutral, 
alternative space was identified. If geography was a challenge, interviews were also 
conducted via phone, Skype or Whatsapp. Conducting interviews in English in New York and 
Geneva was not problematic given that English is the effective working language for 
negotiations. Given that most of these interviews were with high-level policymakers in 
Tokyo and Jakarta, English was largely not a challenge.  
 The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with the intention of reaching a 
“saturation” point, or a point at which no new information or themes are observed in the 
data. According to one study, this point is often reached at 12 interviews for a given group 
or topic.324 To ensure saturation, the researcher aimed to interview at least 12 informants at 
the global level and for each of the case study countries. In the end, the researcher 
interviewed 13 high-level policymakers for the global-level post-2015, SDG process in New 
York (as well as London and Geneva), 31 individual policymakers from Japan and 27 
individual policymakers in Indonesia for a total of 71 individuals interviewed between late 
2015 and 2018. An annex includes an anonymized list of the interviews and the dates they 
were conducted. As described above, interviewees and informants were chosen based on 
their engagement and role in negotiating and developing policy for the conceptualization of 
the post-2015, Sustainable Development Goals. At the global level, two respondents were 
government, five from international institutions, five civil society, and one academic. In 
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Japan, of 31 respondents, 13 were from government, 2 from international institutions, 5 from 
civil society, 5 from the private sector and 6 academics. In Indonesia, of 27 informants, 16 
respondents were government, 2 from international institutions, 5 from civil society, 2 from 
the private sector and 2 academics. The researcher used two different sets of interview 
questions based on interview guidelines, developed by the research in consultation with his 
doctoral supervisors and local institutional partners, approved by the LSHTM, Nagasaki and 
Indonesian Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education Institutional Review 
Board (as detailed below). The researcher used one interview guide for SDG policymakers, 
and one for both Japanese and Indonesian policymakers for the SDG process; this is included 
in an annex. The Japanese and Indonesia SDG policymaker interview guidelines were altered 
slightly to apply to their national policy context and included some questions on their 
countries’ MDG experience.   
  For Indonesia, the researcher was able to make two two-week trips (October 2016 and 
March 2017) and two one-week trips (October-November 2017 and March 2018) to Jakarta 
to conduct interviews in 2016, 2017 and 2018, and collaborated with the Universitas 
Indonesia before, during and after the visits. For Japan, the researcher’s institutional partner 
was facilitated through the London School’s partnership with Nagasaki University. The 
researcher made one two-week trip to Japan in May 2016 to conduct interviews, and also 
spent nine months as a Hitachi/Council on Foreign Relations Fellow at the Japan Center for 
International Exchange (JCIE) based in Tokyo, Japan from September 2017 to June 2018. 
 The researcher focused on triangulation (comparing literature reviews of policy 
documents with data from informant interviews), respondent validation (preliminary data 
and analysis was shared with some of the key informants), fair dealing (a wide range of 
respondent perspectives are included) and particular attention is paid to reflexivity 
(detailed below in section on background).325,326The interview questionnaire was developed 
according to the research questions outlined above, and refined with national partners and 
based on the experience of the first few interviews. 
 For interviews in Japan and Indonesia, the researcher was particularly interested in 
identifying understandings of why and how state actors engaged, and the interview guide 
was designed accordingly to solicit this type of information. The researcher also conducted 
two or three interviews with some key informants to validate findings, ie the researcher 
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would recount his understanding of what happened based on ongoing research and ask the 
key informant to affirm or correct the narrative. This process enriched the findings as this 
enabled the researcher to clarify any potential misunderstandings as well as identify and 
interrogate varying accounts of what happened or why what happened between key 
informants.  Upon completion of the interviews, the researcher reviewed the data according 
to the methodological framework outlined above and coded the data to identify and highlight 
key themes using qualitative analysis software Nvivo.  For example, to identify different 
forms of power, the researcher coded the interview transcripts based on institutional, 
structural and productive power to identify examples when actors exerted these different 
forms of power.  
 Based on these case studies on Japan and Indonesia, it will be possible to derive some 
lessons learned; however, these lessons will not be relevant or applicable for all other 
countries as naturally these countries have their own specific historical and political 
economic legacies.   
Ethics 
This research proposal was submitted for ethical review and approved by the Institutional 
Review Board of LSHTM as well as Nagasaki University in Japan and the Ministry of Research, 
Technology and Higher Education in Indonesia. This research posed minimal risks to 
participants, and participation is voluntary. Participants were asked to sign a written 
consent form. The consent form was accompanied by a one-page document providing an 
overview of the research (included in an annex). Participants were informed that their 
participation was not required; they were allowed to opt-out at any point during the course 
of the interview. Participants were also informed that personal identifiers were removed 
from the audio recordings, transcripts, and any possible research outputs.   
Reflections and Background of the Researcher 
As Walt and others argue, “the role of the policy researcher and the importance of reflexivity 
and researcher positionality in the research process” is critical, but “seldom explicitly” 
discussed.312 For positionality, the distinction is usually made between insiders and 
outsiders. In this case, the researcher was a part-time PhD student and an employee of the 
Rockefeller Foundation in New York (and later worked for WHO Sierra Leone), which 
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engaged in the SDG process, and thus, an “insider” in the ongoing SDG process. This might 
have afforded certain advantages in access to some policymakers and some level of 
understanding of the process; however, to mitigate any potential bias, the researcher 
downplayed his status as a Foundation employee when engaging in this research, eg when 
interviewing policymakers, and continually monitored and reflected upon his role in the 
research. While this status as an “insider” or a “funder” could have helped open some doors 
in New York or Geneva, it was not relevant, or at least did not feel relevant in Tokyo or Jakarta 
beyond the initial few interviews. In both Jakarta and Tokyo, the first few key informants 
helped identify other key informants, and usually introduced the researcher to others and 
then these introduced the researcher to others.  As this happened, the researcher continually 
reflected on how discussions and process which happened in New York were perceived from 
and understood in other places like Tokyo and Jakarta, but also Geneva. Key informant 
interviews were a crucial mechanism for doing this, and informants helped rebalance 
potential biases in understanding and analysing the process. This was useful for helping 
understand and interrogate how the field of “global health” is understood in different ways 
in different locations.  
This was also relevant to the researcher’s own positionality. From 2010-2016, the 
researcher spent close to six years engaged in global health policy dialogue as a program 
officer at the Rockefeller Foundation. The researcher worked to support research and policy 
efforts to strengthen health systems and shape the global health agenda to focus on universal 
health coverage (UHC), as well as engaged in the post-2015 process. The researcher 
participated in and observed many high-level global health processes —at the World Health 
Assembly, the opening of the UN General Assembly and/or the World Bank Spring and 
Annual meetings—how various actors with seemingly similar resources, capacities or 
constraints had differential abilities to project power and influence policymaking agendas 
and priorities within global health. But these experiences, along with the researcher’s own 
background as a white, American male in US American, Canadian, German and UK 
universities studying political science, history, public policy and public health also affected 
the researcher’s world view in terms of understanding the field of global health and how 
power is conceptualized and created within this field. This experience and background 
afforded the researcher exposure and access to conversations about power and influence 
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within US and UK academic communities (and within slightly broader communities during 
events like the World Health Assembly or Health System Global Symposia); however, this 
might have also led to certain biases or limitations in understanding of the concept of power 
and influence. To overcome this, the researcher endeavoured to counterbalance this by 
devoting time to understanding the political economy and culture of both Japan and 
Indonesia and coupling this with key informant interviews as well as informal conversations 
and interactions with academics and policymakers in both countries to rebalance any 
potential imbalance or bias. 
 
These experiences led the researcher to consider how different actors engaged in 
different policy processes, and how or where did different actors consider that they were 
exerting power or being influential? For example, why did Thailand seem to have such an 
important voice within the World Health Assembly? Was this simply a one-off, ie the result 
of a particularly charismatic or savvy national delegation or a calculated diplomatic strategy, 
or did Thailand’s outsized voice depend on certain skills or resources, or was it the result of 
investing or providing financial support to WHO? How could one begin to explain and assess 
this? Alongside concerns of accountability, equity and legitimacy, this raised the question of 
how to shape and determine global health policy. How could actors best exert, leverage and 
ultimately develop their power? To consider these questions in a rigorous and 
methodological way, the researcher began this doctoral research on a part-time basis in 
October 2013 and focused on the role of state actors within the then-ongoing process to 
conceptualize and negotiate the post-2015 development agenda.  
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Chapter Five 
Why, How and Where did Japan Engage in the Post-2015, SDG 
Negotiations for Health 
Main Points 
• Japanese policymakers sought to advance Japan’s 2012 Global Health Diplomacy 
(GHD) Strategy through their involvement in the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goal (SDGs) for health. This engagement was constructed as a part of Prime Minister’s 
Abe’s assertive foreign policy to project Japanese influence globally after the so-called 
“Lost Decades” of the 1990s and 2000s. Building upon Japan’s hosting of the 2008 G8 
Summit and the 2011 Japan Lancet Series, Japan’s GHD Strategy focused on universal 
health coverage (UHC). Policymakers constructed a narrative around UHC as a unique 
“Made-in-Japan” experience and a concrete example of human security aligned with 
the Abe administration’s efforts to re-assert diplomatic influence to revitalize and 
stabilize Japan’s economy. Given the importance of the MDGs for global development, 
Japanese policymakers saw the post-2015, SDG process as a critical opportunity to 
advance their focus on UHC and exert greater leadership within global health in line 
with the Abe administration’s broader political and foreign policy goals.  
• Japan’s government exerted productive, institutional and structural power to 
advance Japan’s Global Health Diplomacy Strategy’s focus on UHC in the post-2015 
SDG process, largely outside the formal process. Japan’s government exerted 
structural power through the Prime Minister’s efforts, leveraging development aid 
and allying with other countries; Japan exerted institutional and productive power 
through key global health institutions like the World Bank and the World Health 
Organization. It also deployed structural and productive power hosting several high-
level events both in Tokyo and in New York as well as lower-level briefings and 
seminars on UHC.    
• While Japan did not succeed in having UHC as the overall goal for SDG3, Japan’s 
strategic leveraging of power, largely outside the official post-2015 process, 
contributed to positioning UHC as a global health priority. UHC was considered “a 
success” as it was firmly embedded as a target within SDG3. Moreover, most Japanese 
policymakers viewed Japan’s engagement as a diplomatic success and a reflection of 
Japan’s engagement and commitment to the field of global health.  
• Demonstrating why, how and where Japan engaged and exerted power in the post-
2015 process contributes to reshaping and building a more robust understanding of 
the field of global health and the role of state actors. Japan’s engagement and exertion 
of structural, institutional and productive power has implications for the future of 
global health and possible lessons for other countries. Most importantly, Japan’s 
engagement foreshadows a more contested global health policymaking process, and 
a likely more fragmented global health governance landscape as states create new 
structures or fora to maximize their ability to exert power and influence. 
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Introduction 
Following his re-election in 2012, Prime Minister Abe wrote, “Japan is at a crossroads—in 
2012, we were asked whether Japan was determined to continue to be a tier-one nation. Now 
I am ready to give a firm answer: of course, we are.”327 As global health journalist, Laurie 
Garrett, wrote in 2013, “foreign policy and health diplomacy followers had better pay 
attention: Japan means business.”328 This was correct both literally and figuratively. In 2017, 
Abe was re-elected with a supermajority. Abe’s administration represents a more assertive 
and stable Japan focused on securing national economic interests. The Abe administration’s 
policy agenda has been characterized by some experts as “defying defeat”329 in contrast to 
John Dower’s famous power-war history of Japan, Embracing Defeat.330  
Following WWII, Japan emerged as an economic superpower, and became a close 
American political ally throughout the Cold War and beyond. By the 1960s, it was the world’s 
second largest economy. Many predicted it would become the world’s largest economy331; 
however, in the 1990s and 2000s, Japan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank, real wages 
fell and prices plateaued leading to “stagflation.” The 1990s and 2000s are often considered 
“lost decades”. Nevertheless, Japan remains an economic heavyweight. It is now the world’s 
third-largest economy and has been called a “soft power super power.”332 Japan, unable to 
develop its military power through constitutional limitations, nevertheless seeks “to occupy 
an honoured place in international society.”333 To do this, Japan uses development aid. 
Since the 1960s, development aid or overseas development assistance (ODA) has 
been considered by scholars as one of Japan’s most “consistent and effective” foreign policy 
tools, serving a variety of strategic, diplomatic and economic purposes.334 In fact, Japan’s 
ODA is considered an especially important foreign policy instrument given Japan’s lack of 
military power. By the 1990s, Japan was the world’s largest donor and considered an “aid 
superpower.” Traditionally focused on infrastructure and economic cooperation, in the 
1990s Japan began to engage more in global debates on development policy championing 
the concept of “human security”, which was rooted in Japan’s post-war pacificism. Japan also 
engaged more on social issues in development like health. Japan supported the 
conceptualization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the MDGs’ focus on 
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health. Alongside assisting the MDGs’ creation, Japan hosted the 2000 G8 Summit leading to 
the 2002 founding of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. This effort 
and political commitment to health continued when Japan hosted the 2008 G8 Summit.  
Before this summit, Japanese parliamentarian Keizo Takemi convened a working 
group, with the blessing of then-Prime Minister Fukuda, to prepare policy recommendations 
on health, something Fukuda considered critical to human security.335 What later would 
become known as the Takemi Working Group (TWG) transformed Japan’s engagement in 
global health. The TWG emphasized the importance of health systems and initiated research 
codifying a narrative on the importance of the development of Japan’s health system. It 
socialized an understanding of Japan’s own domestic health gains as a result of its strong 
health system and constructed a narrative in which Japan’s progress towards universal 
health coverage (UHC) was a unique reflection of “Japanese-ness” aligned with the 
government’s focus on human security and desire to project and expand its influence and 
economic interests globally. Given Japan’s world-leading life expectancy, UHC was an issue 
on which, as Prime Minister Abe would argue, Japan could exert “responsible and mature” 
global leadership.320  
To demonstrate its ability to lead and advance UHC as a concept for global health, 
Japan contributed to shaping the global health agenda leveraging its resources and networks 
(through Japanese personnel and personal relationships) with key global health institutions 
like the World Bank and the World Health Organization as well as partnered with other 
countries like France and Thailand to further its agenda. In these efforts, Japan’s government 
advanced its 2013 Global Health Diplomacy Strategy and its focus on UHC to promote 
Japanese interests by exerting productive, institutional and structural power. Japan is a 
compelling case-study for understanding how state actors are engaging in global health as it 
showcases how an OECD country, other than the US or UK, with a long history of providing 
developing aid is advancing its interests and exerting power in global health policymaking.   
 This chapter starts with an overview of Japan’s engagement in the field of 
development assistance and assesses how Japan’s interest in the nascent field of global 
health built on this experience, particularly the experience of engaging in the development 
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debates of the 1990s. This analysis then considers why Japan engaged, applying a 
constructivist approach analysing the social and relational meaning and construction of 
Japan’s position in the post-2015, SDG process. The chapter then details Japan’s specific 
involvement in the negotiation of the post-2015, SDGs and how it exerted power and where 
it engaged in the process. This is followed by a discussion of Japan’s engagement in the post-
2015 SDG process and how it exerted power in the process highlighting Japan’s exertion of 
institutional, structural and productive power within and beyond the post-2015 process.  
(The box below serves as a refresher on Barnett and Duvall’s framework from Chapter Two.) 
Box: Barnett and Duvall’s Power Framework 
Barnett and Duvall’s power framework distinguishes between four different types of power: 
1) compulsory (direct power, such as use of military force); 2) institutional (indirect power, 
such as how international institutions are designed to favour one actor over another); 3) 
structural (the overall constitution or framework of actor and their roles); or 4) productive 
(control over the possession and distribution of resources) power. For global health, one 
could think of a donor agency using the possibility of funding in a poor state with limited 
resources to exert compulsory power; a well-positioned state leveraging a multilateral 
agency to exert institutional power; a prestigious university or NGO positioning its staff as 
experts to provide technical policy support and exert structural power; and a UN agency or 
a private-sector actor advancing and promoting a particular agenda or approach to 
addressing health challenges as an exertion of productive power. This analysis will review 
how Japan exerted institutional, structural and productive power in the post-2015 process.  
Section One 
Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance, Engagement in Global Health and  
Why Japan Engaged in the post-2015 process 
 
Japan’s Engagement in Overseas Development Assistance  
When Japan became the world’s largest ODA donor in the late 1980s, new actors within Japan 
like parliamentarians, the Cabinet Office and civil society became more engaged in both 
managing and scrutinizing Japan’s engagement in development cooperation. Following 
government efforts to “un-tie” aid in the 1980s, the private sector became alienated from the 
aid industry in the 1990s; the private sector would, as scholars have noted, “claim that the 
taxpayers’ money should benefit taxpayers, that is, Japanese firms.”336 While the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP, and Japan’s most important and largely dominant political party) 
and government were sympathetic to these arguments, NGOs offered a different opinion. 
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Civil society groups argued that Japan’s ODA should be more aligned with global public 
goods, or a more broadly defined national interest.339An Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1999 Peer Review Report on Japan development 
efforts called out the Japanese government’s extensive use of loans instead of grants and the 
emphasis of investment in Asia.337 Within Japan, the public and media voiced increasing 
domestic concerns about aid going to China338 and concerns about corruption.339 More 
broadly, in the early 1990s, these various actors highlighted the lack of a coherent policy 
framework or strategy across Japan’s fragmented development architecture. 
In response, Japan’s Cabinet office issued the 1992 Development Charter. The Charter 
explicitly began to consider recipient countries’ military expenditures and trade (including 
weapons of mass destruction) as well as countries’ political and economic systems (including 
respect for basic human rights and freedoms) for prioritising aid investments. The Charter 
was subsequently revised in 2003 and 2015 and became increasingly open about expressing 
Japanese interests. For example, the 2003 Charter states that the objective of Japanese ODA 
is “to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby 
to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.”340 In 1993, Japan also hosted its first 
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) to engage more directly in 
Africa (this would go on to be organized every four years with TICAD VII scheduled for 2019). 
 Following political instability in the 2000s, the (second) Abe administration came to 
power in 2012 introducing policies to stabilize the government, particularly to revitalize the 
economy and bolster security. In Prime Minister Abe’s new National Security Strategy, 
development assistance was referred to as an important means to ensure security. It 
considered aid as an instrument to support Japanese business and advance the 
administration’s economic policy known as “Abenomics.” Accordingly, these new policies 
included another revision of the ODA Charter. It was renamed the “Development 
Cooperation Charter” in 2015 and emphasized development aid as a catalyst for the private 
sector. It emphasized the “national interest” and focused on showing value for the Japanese 
economy. After the “Lost Decades” of the 1990s and 2000s, the Abe administration was keen 
to highlight how its policies benefitted Japanese business interests and thus the average 
Japanese citizen. As part of efforts to revamp development cooperation, the Abe government 
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also released a new policy for global health cooperation.341 The next section reviews Japan’s 
engagement in the emergent field of global health. 
Japan’s Engagement in Global Health from 2000-2015  
A 1999 DAC report assessment found that between 1996-1997 Japan invested roughly three 
percent of its ODA on development assistance for health (DAH), which was “mainly 
concentrated in tertiary and curative health, such as support for hospitals and high 
technology equipment, medical research institutions, high level training, and posting of 
Japanese advisors.”342 By 2014, Japan was still spending around three percent of its ODA on 
health, but a DAC report found, “Japan is increasingly exerting global development 
leadership and influence in selected policy areas, such as health […], where it believes it can 
add value” and continued, “Japan is demonstrating global leadership on universal health 
coverage in concert with other partners.”343 While Japan’s investments in DAH as part of its 
ODA were staying roughly the same, the way in which Japan engaged changed dramatically. 
Despite a lack of conceptual clarity6 and a continued evolution in the understanding of global 
health in Japan, the country has demonstrably increased its global engagement in health 
since 2000. 
 In the early 2000s, Japan’s interest in health came from a growing understanding of 
health as critical to development (eg reports like the World Bank’s 1993 World Development 
Report) and rising political support for health as a priority (eg events like the World Summit 
for Children in 1990 with more than seventy heads of state and close to ninety senior 
government officials). Japan’s interest in global health was also influenced by the US; in July 
1993, the US-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective focused on four 
pillars, the first of which was health and human development.344 Informants highlighted US 
pressure for early Japanese interest and commitments to HIV/AIDS.345 Following Japan’s 
1994, $3 billion commitment to a Global Issues Initiative on Population and AIDS346, Japan 
invited African heads of state to join the 2000 G8 Summit. The Japanese government focused 
discussions on infectious diseases, and launched an Okinawa Infectious Disease Initiative, 
 
6 As described in Chapter One on the concept of global health, key informants in Japan expressed wide variations in conceptual 
understandings of global health from thinking that global health meant Japanese government ministries working with WHO, to others 
who thought global health was a way for Japanese business to increase their profits by gaining access to new markets. 
  
 
103 
 
which contributed to the 2002 creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria.7 
Japan’s engagement in the creation of the Fund has made it a focus of Japanese global health 
funding, and policymakers view it as an important “legacy” of Japan’s 2000 G8 process. High-
level support for global health continued in 2005 when Prime Minister Koizumi announced 
a $5-billion plan to combat infectious disease in Africa (HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, 
Polio, Parasitic Disease and Avian Flu).347 While Japan’s efforts were in line with the growing 
global focus on health, they were still more reflective of an “international health” approach 
to health which largely focused on infectious diseases (explained in Chapter Two). In 2007, 
this changed. 
In the lead up to the 2008 G8 Summit, although Japan’s commitment to health 
continued, its focus shifted. In line with broader global health discussions, Japan’s LDP 
Minister of Foreign Affairs argued that “international efforts in the health sector have largely 
centred on measures against infectious diseases. From now on, it is essential to promote […] 
research and development and strengthening of health systems.”348 This shift towards health 
systems was strongly influenced by Keizo Takemi and his emergent working group. Takemi 
had lost his seat in the Japanese Diet in 2007, where he had served from 1995. (He would 
later be re-elected in December 2012). He then took what he has since called a “sabbatical” 
when he was invited349 to be a fellow at the Harvard School of Public Health between 2007 
and 2009. During his time at Harvard, he attended global health workshops and seminars 
deepening friendships and expanding his network. Takemi particularly worked closely with 
academics Michael Reich349, Marc Roberts and William Hsiao, who spent their careers 
analysing, researching and conceptualising health systems. Given their expertise and 
experience, it was thus unsurprising when Takemi joined them to author an article in March 
2008 arguing in favour of using Japan’s hosting of the G8 Summit to “catalyse global action 
on health, this time with a focus on health systems.”350  
 
7 It is often said that Japan’s tabling of health at the 2000 G8 was the first time the G8 Forum considered health; however, this is not 
accurate. Since 1996, health has been on the agenda of every G8 summit. For more on this, see Kirton JJ, Mannell J. The G8 and global 
health governance. Paper prepared for a conference on Global Health Governance: Past Practice: Future Innovation, sponsored by the 
Centre for International Governance Innovation, the Institute of Population Health, University of Ottawa, the G8 Research Group, Munk 
Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, and Rotary International, Ottawa and Waterloo; Nov 10–12, 2005. 
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Around this same time, Takemi, with Prime Minister Fukuda’s blessing, convened a 
working group to prepare policy recommendations on health, something Fukuda considered 
critical for human security, for Japan’s hosting of the 2008 G8 Summit.8 Supported by a think 
tank, the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), Takemi (previously a central figure 
in supporting the Japanese government’s efforts to develop and advance the concept of 
human security351) convened what would become known as the Takemi Working Group 
(TWG) from across government and included academic, civil society and private sector 
representatives as well as international organizations and academic institutions to develop 
policy recommendations. JCIE, where Takemi is also a Senior Fellow, served and continues 
to serve as the secretariat to this TWG providing institutional continuity and support.352 This 
Takemi Working Group would advocate that health was a compelling way to realize the 
Japanese government’s interest in human security and could represent a concrete focus for 
human security, which was sometimes critiqued for being vague or unclear. Once this 
argument was made, it was also necessary to develop a more specific focus for health, namely 
health systems. 
As might be expected after Takemi’s time at Harvard working with health systems 
experts, the Takemi Working Group report recommended Japan and G8 countries mobilize 
more funding for global health, commit to making their financial commitments more 
sustainable, improve the integration of disease-specific funding with support for health 
systems and apply the concept of human security to global health.353 Following the G8, the 
TWG worked to translate the G8 Summit recommendations into more concrete proposals on 
health systems for further consideration at the Italian 2009 G8 Summit.354 Preliminary 
findings were shared during a high-profile international conference in Tokyo in November 
2008 with global health leaders, and the final report of these efforts was disseminated widely 
in advance of Italy’s G8 Summit. 
Unusually, between the end of 2009 and the end of 2012, Japan was governed by three 
different Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Prime Ministers. During this period, there was 
some policy uncertainty. For example, in September 2010, the then DPJ Foreign Minister 
 
8 This request was the result of a meeting Takemi and the late JCIE President Yamamoto had initiated with the Prime Minister.  
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shared what was supposed to be Japan’s new global health policy for 2011-2015 focused on 
three issues: “maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH); major infectious diseases; and 
contribution to global public health emergencies.”355 This focus, however, was short-lived. 
Following a landslide LDP victory in December 2012, Japan’s global health focus shifted back 
to health systems and UHC. Prime Minister Abe returned to lead Japan’s government (he had 
briefly served as Prime Minister between 2006-2007) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
released the government’s Strategy on Global Health Diplomacy in June 2013 at TICAD V.   
This strategy built on discussions in the Takemi Working Group, which had led to a 
2011 Lancet Series positioning Japan as both a model and champion for progress towards 
UHC. This 2013 Global Health Diplomacy strategy focused primarily on UHC as a new 
“pathway for global health”, particularly for the post-2015 development agenda. Writing in 
the Lancet in 2013, Prime Minister Abe directly referenced the TWG, and declared that global 
health required “strong political leadership and that he would spare no efforts.”327 
Japan and the Millennium Development Goals 
Given Japan’s role as an OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member and the 
world’s largest donor in the 1990s, it closely engaged356 in the discussions leading to the 
creation of the MDGs. In fact, the approach of using the outcome documents of major UN 
conferences as a source for formulating what would eventually become the MDGs originated 
during a meeting held in Tokyo.357 Japanese government officials specifically proposed the 
concept of quantitative targets357 using the major UN conferences declarations from the 
1990s as potential goals. This approach was adopted in the formulation of the International 
Development Goals (IDGs).358 As detailed in Chapter Three, the IDGs eventually evolved 
through negotiations into the MDGs. 
 While Japan’s government was nominally committed to the MDGs, a deeper policy 
and institutional commitment was not immediate. Instead, in the early 2000s, Japan focused 
on promoting the concept of human security, which some considered a competing 
development paradigm to the MDGs. Civil society actors criticized the Japanese government 
for not including a more explicit focus on the MDGs in the revised 2003 Development 
Charter. In response, an official from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) argued that 
  
 
106 
 
while the term MDGs did not appear in the revised Charter, this “does not lessen the 
importance that Japan attaches” to the MDGs; instead, he argued that given some doubts 
about “what the status of the MDGs will be in ten years, […] the charter has deliberately 
avoided that term, while articulating major elements that encompass the MDGs.”359 Despite 
being closely involved in conceptualizing the MDGs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not 
yet convinced the MDGs would become the dominant development framework. As detailed 
in Chapter Three, Japan was not alone in this regard, and in the early 2000s, national 
commitment to the MDGs was uneven across and within countries.  
By 2005, however, Japan’s commitment was more explicit. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affair’s 2005 Medium-Term Policy on ODA stated unequivocally that “the MDGs are goals 
that the international community should work in concert to achieve in order to build a better 
world. Japan will contribute actively to achieving the MDGs, including through the effective 
use of ODA.”360  In 2005, in cooperation with the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank 
and the World Health Organization, Japan’s government hosted a High-Level Forum on the 
Health MDGs in Asia and the Pacific. The meeting affirmed Japan’s commitment and focus on 
the MDGs.   
By 2010 a government review of ODA led to a deepening commitment to the MDGs, 
which was enshrined in Japan’s 2010 ODA White Paper.361 At the 2010 UN Summit on the 
MDGs, Prime Minister Kan announced the “Kan Commitment” for $8.5 billion of assistance 
over five years for the health and education MDGs. After 2010, both the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as well as JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) and other actors continually 
declared Japan’s support for the MDGs. Yet despite the rhetoric of commitment, one study of 
Japan’s ODA in 2012 found that, in fact, “Japan’s foreign aid commitment to achieving the 
MDGs has been partial at best, simultaneously beset by continual budget contraction and 
competing development paradigms and political priorities.”362 Other studies showed more 
broadly that despite rhetorical commitments to the MDGs, donor countries’ ODA allocations 
were not always aligned with the MDGs.363,364 While studies have argued that the MDGs “may 
have played a role in increasing aid”, the overall impact and influence of the MDGs was and 
remains contested.365 
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Yet by 2012 the MDGs’ dominance in terms of steering the international development 
agenda was clear (as discussed in Chapter Three). Scholars proclaimed that the MDGs 
represented a new ‘super norm’ dominating the global development agenda.366 This was also 
understood in Tokyo. In the wake of the 2010 MDG Summit, policymakers and analysts 
began to consider what would come after 2015, or post-2015. Given how influential the 
MDGs were, global policymakers and development advocates, including in Japan, were 
committed to ensuring that their perspective and respective issues were embedded within 
whatever framework followed the MDGs to ensure that they could prioritise their issues and 
advance their interests. For Japanese development policymakers, the post-2015 agenda was 
about the opportunity to amplify their past, existing and future development investments as 
well as influence and shape other donors’ approaches to more closely resemble their own.  
Considering Japan’s role in the creation of the MDGs and its role as one of the world’s 
largest development donors, the post-2015 development agenda discussions represented a 
strategic opportunity to assert Japanese leadership and promote Japan’s influence and 
interests, which included the goal of advancing the concept of human security for Japan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the initial process to define what was then referred to as 
the post-MDG agenda was unclear, policymakers knew Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
would engage early to shape the agenda, and constructed a narrative accordingly to ensure 
that health would be part of these efforts. But before describing and assessing how Japan’s 
government engaged and exerted power, it is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of 
why Japan engaged in the negotiation and conceptualization of the post-2015, SDG process.  
Why Japan Engaged in the Conceptualization and Negotiation of the Post-2015, SDGs 
To understand why (and later how and where) Japan engaged in the conceptualization and 
negotiation of the post-2015 process for health, it is important to understand the 
motivations of Japan’s diplomatic engagements and its ODA policies in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. From the early 1950s, the Japanese government provided funding to Japanese 
companies to deliver goods and services to countries as reparations for WWII and to 
promote what it referred to as “economic cooperation.” These initial efforts focused on 
advancing Japan’s economic revitalization and restoring Japan’s image post-WWII; the 
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Japanese government institutionalised an approach to development cooperation which one 
scholar summarized as focused on “the growth of industrial production and trade in a state-
driven process.”367  
Japan quickly became one of the major international donors. In 1961, it was a 
founding member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). By 1975, the Japanese 
government was a founding member of the G6 Summit for the world’s largest economies. By 
1989, Japan was the world’s largest provider of aid, and considered a “development aid 
superpower.” Despite this growing international clout, during the First Gulf War in Iraq, 
Japan’s government faced a diplomatic crisis of confidence. Given constitutional limitations, 
Japan was unable to commit troops; it instead offered $13 billion in financing. Japan’s most 
important internationally ally, the United States, was displeased; US Secretary of State Baker 
dismissed this offer as “cheque book diplomacy.” This was considered a serious setback in 
Tokyo. As one Japanese scholar observed, this experience is “remembered in Japan with 
bitter national consciousness” as “Japan’s defeat in 1991”.368 This rebuke caused deep 
anxiety in the Japanese government. To respond, the government redoubled diplomatic 
efforts and enhanced global engagement.  
This meant moving beyond just providing development aid to instead engaging in 
broader development debates in the 1990s and early 2000s. For example, Japan’s Ministry 
of Finance funded a 1993 World Bank report, The East Asian Miracle, to explore the 
importance of state capacity in the successes of East and Southeast Asian countries’ 
development. Japan’s government intended this report to challenge the so-called 
“Washington Consensus” approach to international development, and highlight an 
alternative approach more aligned with Japan’s experience and development cooperation 
policies. This was an early example of the Japanese government’s new willingness to contest 
the then-dominant approach to international development and project an alternative “Made-
in-Japan” approach; this was an example of Japan trying to exert institutional power 
leveraging its relationship to the World Bank and productive power through this report. One 
scholar notably characterized this as an intellectual confrontation between the “King Kong 
of 1818 H Street versus the Godzilla of Ginza” in which the World Bank ultimately ignored 
and overcame the pressure from Japan’s Ministry of Finance and instead found “in the East 
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Asian experience a confirmation of its ‘market-friendly’ approach to policy.”369 This 
experience with the World Bank would later influence and shape Japanese policymakers’ 
strategy with the World Bank in advancing Japan’s focus on UHC as another way to leverage 
institutional and productive power.  
Japan also exerted structural power to advance its global policies. The government 
supported a UN Commission on Human Security in 2003. As one scholar argued, “[a]lthough 
the origin of the human security idea and the security thinking it represents does not 
originate in Japan, Japanese officials liked to depict it as ‘Made in Japan.’”370 Despite 
significant support from Japanese Prime Ministers and senior politicians coupled with 
financial support, human security as an approach and concept did not resonate with the 
development community or global policymakers. It was criticized as conceptually unclear371 
and characterized as being vague “hot air.”372 In spite of this critique, Japan remains 
committed to using human security as a concept to guide its ODA, and multiple informants 
referenced the importance of the human security approach as critical to Japan’s foreign 
policy and critical for justifying the Japanese government’s focus on health. While health was 
clearly a tool of foreign policy in Japan, policymakers also recognised that this would be the 
best way to advance and expand Japan’s global health engagement.  
While Japan’s government increasingly engaged to demonstrate it could offer more 
than just a “cheque book”, there was a sense in the 1990s and early 2000s that Japan, 
especially compared to other countries, was not successful at advancing its ideas. As one 
scholar argued, Japan “was not able to come up with the compelling new ideas or to mobilize 
other donors to follow policies initiated by Japan.”356 One Japanese scholar complained, 
“[t]he global debate on development assistance is largely determined by others […] Japan’s 
role is no more than that of a timid co-pilot.”373 This is also aligned with a perception of 
Japanese policy being risk averse and reluctant to exert global leadership. This can be partly 
explained by struggles with English, the global lingua franca for diplomacy. But this does not 
entirely explain Japan’s diplomatic limitations.  
One scholar characterised Japanese foreign policy as being similar to a good defensive 
driver navigating an automobile, continuously seeking to minimize risk while exploiting 
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every opportunity to move forward.374 Another scholar famously called Japan a “reactive 
state” meaning a state unable which, “fails to undertake major independent foreign-policy 
initiatives although it has the power and national incentives to do so [and] responds to 
outside pressure for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely.”375 
This “reactivism” was attributed to Japan’s bureaucratic fragmentation, political factionalism 
and the lack of a strong central executive—all things which Prime Minister’s Abe’s 
administration would seek to change.9   
Despite broader engagement in the 1990s, by the early 2000s, Japan’s prolonged 
recession and large levels of public debt led to shrinking ODA levels as another reflection of 
the “Lost Decades”. Accompanying these economic woes, the 2000s were also a decade of 
political instability; this was particularly the case between 2006 and 2012, which saw 
roughly a different Prime Minister annually as well as a rare period of Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) government between 2009 and 2012. This changed in 2012 when new elections 
brought a strong LDP majority and returned Prime Minister Abe to lead the government.  
While Japanese foreign policy has been traditionally viewed as passive376, 
reactive375or in the words of one Japanese academic, “risk-avoiding and ineffective”377, 
Prime Minister Abe’s administration is trying to reverse this. Abe was determined to reign 
in Japan’s traditionally powerful bureaucracy in the Ministries. Building on efforts started 
during Prime Minister Koizumi’s administration from 2001-2006 and Abe’s immediate 
predecessor during his first term as Prime Minister 2006-2007 (from which he resigned for 
both political reasons and personal health reasons, which made him more sympathetic to 
understand the importance of health according to one informant378), he accelerated 
consolidated efforts to centralize power in his Cabinet office at the start of his second term 
in 2012.  
Abe’s administration is trying to build a more strategic approach for global 
engagement. He aimed to re-assert Japanese leadership globally declaring “Japan is back” by 
 
9 Of course, this point is highly contested within the literature on Japanese policymaking, others have argued that Japan is simply 
sensitive to the US government and that this is a deliberate political choice instead of an inability to do otherwise. For more, see: 
Miyashita, Akitoshi. “Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive Debate.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 4 
(December 1, 1999): 695–731. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00142. 
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1) revitalizing Japan’s global economic position through trade; 2) re-appraising Japan’s 
relations with its Asian neighbours, especially China and South Korea; and 3) reinvigorating 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) to engage far more significantly in multilateral 
diplomacy at the UN and with foreign assistance in Asia and Africa.328As global health 
journalist Laurie Garrett wrote after a meeting with Japan’s Foreign Minister in 2013, “the 
crucial element of that third foreign policy pillar is the promotion of UHC, and diplomacy 
aimed at making UHC the target for the SDGs.” 328 
This framing and narrative of UHC being a key contribution to Japan’s foreign policy 
was constructed and codified in the 2011 Lancet Series on Japan. Bureaucrats in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs adapted this understanding of Japan’s role in global health and aligned it 
with the new Abe administration’s more assertive and robust foreign policy to improve 
Japanese security and create new economic opportunities for Japanese business. With 
Japan’s world-leading life expectancy, focusing on global health could help export Japanese 
approaches and expertise to health within the region and globally. Given the large size of the 
still-largely domestic focused Japanese health industry, Japanese global health engagement 
could also help create or open new markets for Japanese health industries. For example, in 
2013 Japan initiated a strategy within the Prime Minister’s office to bolster its 
pharmaceutical export growth.379 As one senior former Ministry of Health official stated, “by 
engaging more in global health, we could create opportunities for Japanese companies.”380 
According to one senior leader at JICA, who is also advising the Cabinet Office, there 
was also a sense of a geostrategic opening motivating Japan’s engagement in global health; 
there was a perception that the United Kingdom, traditionally considered by Japan as a global 
health power, was becoming less engaged in health. As the informant argued, global health 
could be used as a “weapon or tool of Japanese diplomatic efforts.”381 This informant 
mentioned how the Abe administration could use global health to “soften” Japan’s image. The 
thinking was that some of Abe’s diplomatic efforts were viewed as too militant or aggressive 
and that global health could help reshape, reframe and soften views of Japan, similar to how 
US President used large American investments in the President’s Emergency Program for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to showcase his “compassionate conservatism” in the wake of the Iraq 
War. In other words, Japan could improve its own security by focusing on and using global 
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health.  In this sense, global health was seen and understood as a manifestation or realization 
of the human security concept, and as a tool to advance Japan’s foreign policy interests.  
Constructivists argue that understanding how non-material resources and structures 
shape actors’ identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn, actions. 
In this case, the Abe administration initiated a policy and vision to re-assert Japanese 
diplomatic efforts and exert leadership as a way to support Japan’s foreign policy goals to 
stimulate the economy and improve Japanese security. Japanese politicians, academics and 
bureaucrats constructed a narrative building upon Japan’s world-leading life expectancy and 
efforts to reach UHC as a policy issue which could be aligned with this vision and leveraged 
to exert Japanese leadership in global health. Parliamentarian Keizo Takemi and leading 
academics like Kenji Shibuya along with bureaucrats in the MoFA collaborated to package 
their existing interest in global health and strategically construct a narrative of how global 
health and a focus on UHC (which was “Made in Japan”) was aligned with the Abe 
administration’s foreign policy interests. They adapted this narrative with global health as a 
manifestation of the human security concept to align with Abe’s priorities, and fed it into the 
political process. Abe and other senior members of his administration were interested in 
topics where they could exert and project Japanese influence globally to revitalize the 
Japanese economy, and thus were open to the idea of using global health policymaking.  
The argument and language for why Japan should engage in global health was 
strategically constructed to appeal to the Abe administration building on Japan’s domestic 
experience emphasizing points like “world-leading” and “global leadership”. Japan’s 
superlative life expectancy was a manifestation of these efforts and again highlighted Japan’s 
leadership. As one key informant, someone from a Japanese NGO, stated, “we can sell this 
[UHC] idea as a Japan experience."382 As multiple informants highlighted demonstrating the 
successful construction of this narrative, UHC was something uniquely Japanese and 
reflected “Japanese-ness”, which Japan could export and profile on the global stage. 
Exporting this Japanese “UHC” was also aligned with Abe’s policy of revitalizing and 
stimulating the Japanese economy; Japan’s focus on UHC both nationally and globally would 
help Japan’s economy. This narrative also deliberately drew upon Japan’s political history. 
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For example, during a high-level UHC Summit hosted by the Japanese government 
and the World Bank in Tokyo in December 2013, Deputy Prime Minister (and former Prime 
Minister) Taro Aso stated, that Japan, “has an obligation to promote global health 
cooperation on health,” because of its own UHC history.328 After World War II, with its 
economy and most major cities in shambles, the government made an investment to 
accelerate its post-war recovery. To ensure economic vitality, Japan needed a healthy, 
productive labour force. Aso told the gathering that it was thus a matter of self-interest, even 
the survival of the nation, to pass Japan’s 1958 Universal Insurance Act which put Japan on 
the path towards achieving UHC.  
To buttress the Abe administration’s political case for investing in Japan’s global 
health efforts, it was also necessary to demonstrate domestic Japanese public support. As 
explained above, in the 1990s and 2000s, public support for Japanese ODA plummeted given 
domestic concerns about the economy. Therefore, any potential Japanese government 
administration was sensitive to the optics around new ODA initiatives and how they might 
be perceived or received by the Japanese public. Bureaucrats in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet 
Office accordingly conducted a public survey in 2010, which found that more than 70 percent 
of the Japanese public rated health as the most important priority for the government to 
invest in of all the potential priorities for which development assistance could be provided; 
moreover, 58 percent of Japanese citizens thought that the government should increase its 
health ODA despite economic setbacks, whereas only 28 percent thought that it should be 
reduced.383 Leveraging these results, an article included in the Series on Japan argued, 
“clearly there is a wide gap between what Japan is currently contributing to global health 
and what the Japanese public thinks Japan is capable of contributing. Such overwhelming 
public support represents a viable window of opportunity to enact reform at a time when 
the world so urgently needs greater global health engagement.”384 Japanese policymakers 
used this data to construct a new narrative about why Japan should engage more in global 
health, which was then consolidated in Japan’s June 2013 Global Health Diplomacy Strategy. 
The focus on UHC was also part of a broader shift, for example, the 2008-2009 WHO 
effort on Maximizing Positive Synergies project, toward a focus on health systems 
strengthening and a more “horizontal” approach, particularly following what many 
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considered the excess verticalization of the MDG approach, within the field of global health 
policy and part of continued contestation as described in Chapter One for priorities within 
global health.385,386 Japan’s engagement and leadership both contributed to and inspired this 
global movement for UHC.  
To summarise, why did Japan engage in the post-2015, SDGs process for health? An 
existing group of Japanese politicians, academics and bureaucrats interested in global health 
worked together through an informal working group to construct a narrative about why 
Japan should engage in global health diplomacy and aligned this narrative to contribute to 
the Abe administration’s foreign policy interests, which were focused on security and 
economic interests. This narrative also complemented a domestic and international political 
window of opportunity. Abe’s new government began at the end of 2012, roughly the same 
time as the process to create the post-2015 development agenda began. This window of 
opportunity created the possibility for this narrative constructed about Japan’s experience 
with UHC and its role in global health to be aligned with the Abe Administration’s policy of 
creating new economic opportunities and preserving Japanese security.  
Section Two: 
Analysing How and Where Japan Engaged in the Post-2015, SDG Process 
 
To understand how and where Japan’s government engaged in the conceptualization of the 
post-2015, SDG process for health, this section reviews policymaking in Japan with a focus 
on development assistance and global health. It contextualizes the various actors in the 
policy process and analyses how and where the different actors engaged and exerted power 
in the negotiation and conceptualization of the post-2015, SDG process for health with an 
emphasis on the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s 2013 Global Health Diplomacy Strategy. In 
cooperation with other Japanese government actors, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
exerted institutional, productive and structural power to advance its focus on UHC. As one 
key informant argued, “the government is still by far the strongest [institutional actor on 
global health within Japan].”387 
  Political scientists consider Japan’s policymaking processes to be extremely opaque 
and complex.356Broadly speaking, Japanese policymaking is dominated by three elite groups, 
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which have been called the “Iron Triangle”388: the Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP is the 
political party governing Japan almost exclusively since WWII), the bureaucracy (individuals 
working in government ministries and institutions), and the business elite (which financially 
support Japan’s LDP and other political parties). Policymaking for Japanese ODA is different. 
Until the late 1980s, Japan’s bureaucracy managed and contested ODA with what has been 
characterised as “intense bargaining”389 between three ministries, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, or METI since 2001) 
and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). This changed in the 1990s and 2000s as private 
businesses, politicians, civil society and the media all became more explicitly engaged in 
scrutinizing development aid and using it to advance their own interests.  
For global health policymaking in Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MoHLW) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are the 
most relevant actors. Following the 2008 G8 Summit and the working relationships built 
through the Takemi Working Group, these three ministries starting meeting informally on 
their own to coordinate global health efforts; however, between 2013 and 2015 coordination 
meetings became institutionalized. One Ministry of Foreign Affairs official nevertheless 
characterised these internal government coordination efforts as the “most difficult of all.”390  
While health was a policy priority for Japan in the post-2015, SDG process, key 
informants shared a sense that this was a responsibility for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Since the 2000 G8, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been the most important actor 
for managing the Japanese Government’s engagement in global health. Key informants 
expressed a great deal of respect and admiration for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
ability to practice diplomacy and advance Japan’s Global Health Diplomacy strategy. At times, 
the respect for Japanese bureaucracy expressed by informants and particularly the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs seemed like a blind sense of faith in Japanese diplomats’ effectiveness. 
In 2012, the Ministry created a Global Health Policy Division in the Global Affairs 
Policy Directorate. MoFA manages Japan’s engagement, contributions and personnel with 
UNICEF and UNFPA; in fact, MoFA manages Japan’s relations with all of the UN agencies 
except the WHO and UNAIDS. MoFA also represents Japan in the Global Fund, GAVI and the 
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Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) partnerships, manages Japan’s 
engagement in the G7/G8 and G20 policy processes as well as organizes the TICAD meetings 
and engages in UN processes like the negotiation of the post-2015 SDGs. Several divisions 
across the Ministry of Foreign Affairs share these responsibilities.  
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MoHLW) oversees Japan’s relationship 
with the World Health Organization (although some of Japan’s voluntary special 
contributions come from MoFA budgets) and UNAIDS. The MoFA traditionally dominated 
Japan’s global health policymaking; however, the most recent Minister of Health, Yasuhisa 
Shiozaki391 (who served from 2014 to 2017) began to shift this balance and assert the 
Ministry’s leadership. Multiple key informants echoed what one informant stated, “Shiozaki 
was a very strong person.”392 Minister Shiozaki was a strong Minister for multiple reasons. 
He had a solid position within the LDP party, and had previously served as Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in Koizumi’s Cabinet. This experience in engaging in diplomacy, coupled with 
his time studying at Harvard University and as a US exchange student in high school, made 
Shiozaki more inclined to engage globally; moreover, his command of the English language 
and interpersonal skills made him a natural diplomat. To improve coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shiozaki instituted an exchange of personnel between MoHLW 
and MoFA, which meant that the Director of MoFA’s Global Health Policy Division is now 
someone from the MoHLW, and the Director of the Ministry of Health’s International 
Cooperation Department is from the MoFA. Shiozaki also convened an advisory group, Japan 
Health Care 2035393, led by the academic and former senior WHO official Kenji Shibuya394. 
The study concluded with three recommendations one of which focused on being “a leader 
in global health.” Shiozaki would later argue that, “through active engagement […] and 
leadership of global policy making […], Japan can improve upon its own health care system 
while also contributing to economic growth domestically and globally.”395  
Alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health, Japan’s Ministry 
of Finance manages the relationship with the World Bank, and the regional (Asian and 
African) development banks. Beyond these three ministries, there is JICA, which implements 
technical cooperation projects on health in Asia and Africa and was in the past under the 
jurisdiction of the MoFA; JICA is now officially independent, but maintains strong links with 
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the MoFA. Under the MoHLW, there is the Bureau of International Health Cooperation, 
National Center for Global Health and Medicine (NCGM). Prime Minister Abe has 
strengthened and empowered the Cabinet Office to coordinate between Ministries; in 2015 
in the wake of Ebola, the Cabinet Office became much more active on health. As part of Abe’s 
efforts to bolster Japan’s private sector, the government created the Global Health Innovative 
Technology (GHIT) Fund in 2013 to leverage domestic research and development (R&D) 
capabilities. 
Japan’s government is the overwhelmingly dominant force in Japanese global health 
policymaking; however, there are also academic and research institutions as well as civil 
society and private sector actors engaged in global health. There are a handful of schools of 
public health, and a few global health policy think tanks in Tokyo: the previously-mentioned 
Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), the Health and Global Policy Institute (HGPI) 
and the Institute for Global Health Policy (iGHP) associated with the NCGM. For civil society 
organisations, there is the Africa Japan Forum and Results Japan, both of which focus largely 
on HIV/AIDS and TB, and have semi-regular exchanges with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
since the early 1990s. There is an independent Japanese Organization for International 
Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP). Save the Children also has a small team in Japan; 
however, civil society groups working on global health are relatively limited. CSOs generally 
follow the government’s leadership.  
As one civil society member stated in response to a question about the government’s 
decision to focus on UHC, “No, there was no debate at all. Our position is we support the 
Japanese government’s efforts to promote UHC, so that was Japanese NGOs’ position, and 
first priority.” This statement resonates with the academic literature on Japanese 
policymaking, which considers Japan’s bureaucracy as functioning like a “powerful and 
respected think tank.”396 Japan’s private sector working on health is largely domestically 
focused, and did not engage in discussions related to the post-2015 process. As one key 
informant stated, “the private sector did not have any interest in the discussion" on post-
2015.397 While this continues to evolve, the role of both civil society and the private sector 
in Japan’s global health policymaking process remains weak and limited.384 
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Japan’s June 2013 Global Health Diplomacy Strategy 
In June 2013 the Ministry’s Global Health Policy Division released “Japan’s Strategy on Global 
Health Diplomacy.”398 This strategy reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to a focus on global 
health in its foreign policy and declared its commitment to promote universal health 
coverage (UHC) as the overarching health goal. The strategy grounded Japan’s interest in 
UHC based on its own experience (reflecting what informants considered the need for 
Japan’s international efforts to have some level of “Japanese-ness”) and world-leading life 
expectancy arguing that health “is indispensable to achieve human security.” Japan’s GHD 
Strategy contended that UHC could be an “effective post-2015 development agenda” 
providing an overarching way to achieve the remaining MDG health goals as well as advance 
efforts to strengthen health systems and address NCDs and aging challenges. But it is worth 
considering how or why Japan’s 2013 GHD Strategy focused on UHC.  
The focus of Japan’s Global Health Diplomacy Strategy on UHC originated in the 
Takemi Working Group’s 2011 Lancet Series on Japan. While the Takemi Working Group 
(TWG) described in the previous section started as an ad hoc group in 2007 in preparation 
for the 2008 G8, this group would go on to become an institutionalized, standing committee 
for global health in Japan. The working group included representatives from across the 
government as well as civil society, academia and the private sector meeting quarterly or bi-
monthly as necessary. It continues to exist and is considered Japan’s dominant informal 
process for global health policymaking (and as such was mentioned by almost every single 
informant interviewed). As one key informant stated, “without Professor Keizo Takemi and 
without the ‘Takemi machineries’ Japan probably could not be a global health champion.”392 
 Takemi’s role is critical. His father, Taro Takemi, was a prominent and well-known 
Japanese physician who served as the President of the Japan Medical Association for twenty-
five years (1957-1982) and as the President of the World Medical Association between 1975-
1976. This family connection gives the younger Takemi greater credibility within the health 
community. As an LDP politician, Takemi served as Vice-Minister of Health (in Prime 
Minister Abe’s first cabinet in 2006-2007) as well as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 
1998, where he was an early supporter of the Human Security approach; he thus has links 
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across ministry bureaucracies within the government. Takemi now serves as the Chair of the 
Special Committee on Global Health Strategy within the Policy Research Council of the LDP 
allowing him to influence the LDP position on global health, and thus the government’s policy 
on global health. He thus has structural power, but he also has institutional power as well as 
productive power within Japan. He is a Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International 
Exchange (JCIE), providing him with additional technical and institutional support on global 
health issues. Finally, he remains the chairperson for the TWG, which is now officially known 
as the Executive Committee on Global Health and Human Security.399  
The TWG functioned and continues to function as a forum for information sharing as 
well as a platform to help facilitate coordination and address challenges across and between 
ministries and other actors. It also helped generate and consolidate support for additional 
engagement in global health. The TWG’s initial efforts for the G8 Summit demonstrated what 
Harvard School of Public Health Professor Michael Reich (a close friend and collaborator of 
Takemi’s) and Takemi argued was a “concerted effort by Japan and its partners to enhance 
its substantive contributions to global health policy making, rather than just providing 
financial donations.”354This was a clear effort to move beyond “cheque book diplomacy.” 
Following the G8 Summit, the working group continued to meet and collaborate 
documenting research and analysis in a Special Lancet Series on Japan. Led by Kenji Shibuya, 
Naoki Ikegami and Keizo Takemi, this 2011 Series, “Japan: Universal Health Care at 50 
Years”, was the first time, the journal focused on a high-income country. The Series solidified 
existing links between the TWG and the Lancet providing a platform to continue highlighting 
and promoting Japan’s engagement after the Series. (For example, Prime Minister Abe 
published a short piece when he launched Japan’s Global Health Diplomacy Strategy in 
2013.) The Series also codified a deeper focus on health systems, which was increasingly 
conflated with universal health care or coverage (UHC). (While the terms “care” and 
“coverage” are sometimes used interchangeably, they should not be as they imply rather 
different approaches.) The Series characterized Japan’s efforts towards UHC as a concrete 
example of human security. One of the Series’ commentaries argued that Japan’s 
commitment to UHC is “indicative of the priority that Japan accords to human security.”400 
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This Series represents an incredible example of productive power both within and 
beyond Japan. Within Japan, many key informants mentioned the Series and the impact it 
had in terms of transforming the discussion around global health as well as contributing to 
constructing a narrative about Japan’s future engagement. Several informants mentioned 
how important the Lancet was and highlighted that even Prime Minister Abe knew about the 
Series (according to multiple informants, it is proudly displayed in the PM’s office) and that 
it had shaped and influenced his thinking in terms of Japan’s role in the world. Beyond Japan, 
this Series signalled Japan’s focus on UHC to the global health community and implied that 
Japan would both invest its financial resources in helping countries advance towards UHC as 
well as exert non-material resources and diplomatic efforts into advancing UHC as a priority 
for the global health agenda and the process to define the post-2015 development agenda. 
The Global Health Diplomacy Strategy launched in June 2013 highlighted four actions 
that Japan would take to advance its efforts on UHC. First, the strategy aimed to mainstream 
UHC and “lead the efforts to include the concept of UHC in the post-2015 development 
agenda” meaning positioning UHC as an “exemplary effort to realize human security”, 
collaborating with international organizations and other partners and using high-level 
events like TICAD V. Second, the strategy would steer Japanese ODA and “technologies of 
Japan” towards UHC. Third, Japan would leverage strategic, global partners like WHO, the 
World Bank, the Global Fund and other partners as well as promote public-private 
partnerships along the lines of the 2013 establishment of the GHIT Fund. Fourth, the strategy 
would strengthen human resources for health, meaning advancing and promoting Japanese 
personnel in global health. Japan’s MoFA sought to follow up on these activities within the 
ongoing process to define the post-2015 development agenda between 2013 and 2015.  
As many informants noted, what complicated the implementation of Japan’s GHD 
strategy was that policymakers had an unclear and limited understanding of the post-2015 
process. As many informants noted, the process was messy, unclear and rapidly evolving. 
Moreover, the Strategy’s authors were distant from the continually changing post-2015 
political process in New York. This challenge was not unique to Japan; this was also the case 
for other countries and even troubled UN policymakers within the UN Secretary-General’s 
office and UN agencies. As multiple key informants confirmed, the post-2015 policy process 
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was also seen as a technical discussion, and aside from MoFA and JICA, informants in Tokyo 
had a limited understanding of the technical discussions for the eventual SDG3. While it was 
not entirely clear at the time, as described in Chapter Three, looking at the final formulation 
of the SDGs, the most influential parts of the process were: 1) the Secretary-General’s High-
Level Panel which delivered its report in May 2013; 2) the thematic consultation on health 
hosted by UNICEF and WHO along with Sweden and Botswana in March 2013; and 3) the 
Open Working Group (OWG) between March 2013 and July 2014. To advance the 2013 
Global Health Diplomacy Strategy’s focus on UHC, Japan exerted three forms of power in 
Barnett and Duvall’s framework, namely productive, institutional and structural power, both 
within the post-2015 process and beyond the process.   
 Barnett and Duvall argue that studying “global governance without power looks very 
different from global governance with power. With only slight exaggeration, much of the 
scholarship on global governance proceeds as if power either does not exist or is of minor 
importance."401 The same can be said for global health: much of the scholarship on global 
health proceeds as if power either does not exist or is of minor importance. Instead, the role 
of power and how different actors exert power within the field of global health is critical for 
reinterpreting and gaining a deeper understanding of the field. This analysis aims to 
illuminate how considering power can contribute to reshaping understandings of global 
health policymaking process. The below examines and analyses how and where Japan’s 
government engaged the post-2015 process and how Japan’s government exerted power in 
these different processes.  The box below provides a high-level overview of the timeline for 
how and where Japan engaged.  
 
 
Japan’s Engagement in the Post-2015 Process 
2011/2012: 
Japan’s Ministry 
of Foreign 
Affairs sets up 
2013:  2014: 
September 2014 
Japanese Prime Minister 
holds high-level event at 
2015: 
December Japan 
hosts second 
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“Post-MDG 
Contact Group”  
 
December 2012 
Prime Minister 
Abe re-elected 
with strong 
majority 
 
June Japan Launches 
Global Health Diplomacy 
Strategy Launches 
 
September 2013 Japanese 
Prime Minister holds 
high-level event at the 
opening of the UN General 
Assembly 
 
December Japan 
Convenes High-Level UHC 
Forum in Tokyo 
 
the opening of the UN 
General Assembly 
 
High-Level UHC 
Forum 
The Post 2015 Process 
2013: 
March Botswana Thematic Consultation for 
Health Meeting  
 
May UN High-Level Panel Report Released 
 
June Open Working Group Meeting for 
Health (Sessions last between March 2013 
and April 2014)  
 
 
 
2014: 
 
June (2013) Open 
Working Group Meeting 
for Health (Sessions last 
between March 2013 
and April 2014)  
 
2015:  
From January to 
July Inter-
Governmental 
Negotiations  
 
September 
SDGs Adopted 
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The Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
When Japan launched its GHD Strategy in June 2013, both the UN High Level Panel (HLP) and 
the thematic consultation on health in Botswana were already finished. Japan’s former Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan had joined the HLP as one of the HLP’s twenty-seven members, and his 
engagement was supported by the MoFA. Japan’s selection and engagement in this panel was 
a representation of Japan’s structural power in global affairs given that most countries were 
not represented in the panel. Yet the Japanese government was not able to make a persuasive 
case within the Panel in terms of promoting human security or in terms of UHC. The HLP 
included one mention of human security; for health, the report mentioned UHC, but 
proposed a goal to “Ensure Healthy Lives” with five targets, which were a modest expansion 
of the MDGs but did include sexual and reproductive rights and NCDs.402 While Japan had an 
opportunity to exert power within the HLP, most informants felt that the Panel was 
unsuccessful for Japan as neither human security nor UHC were not strongly reflected in the 
Panel’s final report released in June 2013.   
The Botswana thematic consultation on health 
The thematic consultation on health (co-convened by the Governments of Botswana and 
Sweden, WHO and UNICEF) was part of nine thematic consultations organized by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) starting in 2012. The six-month health 
consultation concluded in a three-day meeting in Botswana in March 2013. This process thus 
also ended before the launch of Japan’s Global Health Diplomacy Strategy. The process 
included over 1,500 individuals participating in thirteen face-to-face consultations in Africa, 
Asia, South America, North America, and Europe; more than 100 papers were submitted for 
a web-based consultation which drew in 150,000 visitors.403 None of the in-person 
consultations took place in Japan, and there was only one submission, out of the more than 
100 papers submitted, from Japan (Japanese academics at the University of Tokyo), which 
argued against the “off-track” designation in the MDG framework.506While US and German 
Ministries submitted papers for consideration, it seems worth noting that no Japanese actor 
submitted to this process. One representative of the Japanese government participated in 
the final meeting in Botswana, but did not have a speaking role in the meeting agenda. With 
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only one representative attending, Japan did not have a strong representation in this meeting 
and thus did not have much opportunity to exert power. Broadly speaking, the Japanese 
government did not actively engage in this Botswana thematic consultation.   
The Open Working Group (OWG) 
Aside from the High-Level Panel and the Botswana thematic health consultation, there was 
also the Open Working Group (OWG). Originally structured to allow thirty countries from 
the UN’s five regional groups to engage in the both informal and formal negotiations on 
potential SDGs, there was so much interest and commitment to engage from countries that 
some countries needed to share their seats in so-called “troikas”. As one of the unique 
countries able to participate in this ad hoc mechanism, Japan was able to exert structural 
power. Japan was grouped together with Iran and Nepal. Between March 2013 and April 
2014, the OWG had thirteen official sessions, which included week-long informal 
consultations and formal negotiations on the different themes. The topic of health was 
considered during the Fourth OWG meeting in June 2013. While for example, Botswana and 
Sweden (along with UNICEF and WHO) hosted a side-event to profile the thematic 
consultation work from the Botswana meeting, Japan did not host any official relevant side 
events on health during this consultation.10 During the session, Japan emphasized the 
importance of realizing UHC and, as reported in a summary of the session, "promoting 
universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights, including family planning and 
sex education; and ageing."404 Japan coordinated its statement with other countries and tried 
to rally support within the OWG for UHC; however, Japan did not heavily invest in this 
process as it believed, like many other developed states did as described in Chapter Three, 
that the OWG negotiations would ultimately not be decisive. In some ways, Japanese 
diplomats, as well as many other policymakers engaged in the process, perceived the OWG 
as a practice round before what they thought would be the decisive intergovernmental 
negotiations later in 2014 and in 2015. As described in Chapter Three, ultimately the OWG 
would become the definitive process for articulating the SDG agenda. 
 
10 It did, however, co-host a side event with the Government of Australia on “Sustainable Development Goals as a Driver for Trans-
disciplinary Research and Education” according to the official programme of OWG side events, June 17-19, 2013.  
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How and Where did Japan engaged beyond the HLP, Botswana and the OWG 
The Japanese government did not robustly engage in the High-Level Panel process, the 
Botswana thematic consultation, or the Open Working Group as outlined above. Where else 
then, and how, did Japan engage in the post-2015 process? How and where did it exert and 
express power?  
Following the launch of its June 2013 Global Health Diplomacy Strategy, Japan’s 
government exerted institutional, productive and structural power in a number of ways. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to exert structural power leveraging by continuing to 
invest between two and four percent of its ODA on DAH.  Japan’s GHD Strategy sought both 
to re-purpose and re-brand this ODA for DAH as support for UHC and highlight this to signal 
Japan’s backing for UHC in the post-2015 process through JICA and other partners. As part 
of Prime Minister Abe’s renewed diplomatic efforts to revitalize Japan’s trade and economic 
relationships in the region and beyond, he vowed to raise the topic of UHC in every official 
foreign visit and bilateral discussions for the duration of his time as Prime Minister.319 Given 
the size of Japan’s economy (the world’s third largest), this sort of high-level attention should 
be considered an exertion of structural power as it would be difficult for many actors or 
institutions to ignore or resist a direct appeal from Japan’s Prime Minister. This direct 
exertion of power also led to indirect forms of power, ie productive and institutional power.  
For example, Prime Minister Abe leveraged structural power convening a high-level 
meeting in New York with all UN agency heads during the opening of the UN General 
Assembly in September 2013, 2014 and 2015 to highlight and profile some Japan-sponsored 
UHC outputs (the results of Japan’s productive power detailed below) developed by the 
World Bank and the WHO. This also could be considered institutional power given Japan’s 
role within these institutions. These exertions of power reverberating within global health 
policymaking as actors could, depending on their audience, point to either the Prime 
Minister’s commitment or the WHO or Bank’s products, to shape and influence policymaking. 
To amplify these efforts, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to exert structural 
power and build diplomatic alliances with other states engaged in the post-2015 process. 
For example, in both Geneva and New York, Japan collaborated with other “like-minded” 
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countries, like France and Thailand, which were committed to promoting UHC as the health 
SDG, to augment their own efforts to advance UHC. Japan allied with these states as they were 
not only supporters of UHC, but they were also members of the Foreign Policy and Global 
Health Group (the so-called Oslo Group including Indonesia, France, South Africa, Norway, 
Senegal, Thailand and Brazil), which Japan sought to leverage thus exerting structural power 
given its broad representation and influence throughout what was perceived to be a still-
evolving multilateral process. 
Even before the GHD Strategy, and early in the post-2015 discussions over the course 
of 2011 and 2012, the Ministry convened an informal “Post-MDGs Contact Group” (CG) as “a 
forum for informal policy dialogue on the development agenda beyond 2015.”405 This was a 
clear effort from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to exert both structural and productive 
power. The CG included “participants from about 20 countries, as well as major international 
organizations, foundations, research institutions and NGOs to exchange views and ideas 
informally, free from their official positions.” By convening and chairing the group, Japan was 
demonstrating its ability to exert structural power. This group held a series of quarterly 
meetings in New York (December 2011), Mexico City (February 2012), Tokyo (May 2012) 
and New York (September 2012). Demonstrating the intention to exert productive power, 
the summary note concluded that for the post-2015 process “four concepts are important: 
human security (i.e. a people-centred approach), equity, sustainable development, and 
resilience.”405 Some participants saw this as an early, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt 
by Japan to use both structural and productive power to advance the “human security” 
approach. Foreshadowing the government’s eventual focus on UHC as an umbrella goal for 
health, the summary note for health found specifically, “that if we compile the health-related 
goals into one goal, those items which will have a comprehensive impact on the progress of 
many health-related issues should be selected as the targets, rather than setting the targets 
according to individual diseases or problems.”  
 Informants also shared the belief that this CG was intended to influence the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel (HLP) on the post-2015 Development Agenda, which had been 
announced in July 2012.406 While Japan’s CG effort did not seem to influence the Secretary-
General’s HLP, it did raise attention to the strategic importance of the process within the 
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government and signal to both the UN Secretariat and other countries that Japan was 
committed to engaging in the conversation about the post-2015 development agenda.  
 To complement this structural power, Japan also drew upon institutional and 
productive power. For example, Japan’s cooperation with Thailand had started even earlier. 
Japanese policymakers and academics previously collaborated with their Thai counterparts 
and participated in the annual Prince Mahidol Award Conference (PMAC) in Bangkok for 
several years. The January 2012 conference focused on UHC, and Japanese policymakers and 
academics leveraged the conference to exert institutional and productive power using the 
conference as an institutional forum to launch the Lancet Series on Japan. This Series served 
as an example of productive power at the conference and beyond. Japanese policymakers 
also convened a series of meetings cultivating an informal network of actors during the 
conference to coordinate and strategize with other like-minded states, institutions, civil 
society organisations and individuals about how to advance Japan’s efforts on UHC within 
the field of global health, including within the post-2015 process and beyond. 
Japan’s government also exerted structural, institutional and productive power 
through its role and position within global health institutions like the World Bank and the 
World Health Organization. The Japanese government exerted institutional and productive 
power through their relationships and financial (plus personnel seconded to) support to the 
World Health Organization and the World Bank. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry 
of Finance sought to leverage both institutions’ abilities to produce knowledge and provide 
normative guidance to countries on health issues. Combining financial support with hands-
on engagement from Japanese policymakers and academics, Japan was able to strongly 
influence the agendas of both of these institutions exerting institutional power to shape 
research products from both institutions, which would ultimately exert productive power. 
(This also represented a learning from the 1993 East Asian Miracle report experience with 
the Bank. This time, Japan’s government deftly ensured that Japanese academics and 
policymakers were deeply engaged in the process, and that the others also engaged were 
friendly to Japan’s perspective.)  
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Based on these outputs, Japan, in cooperation with these institutions, organized and 
hosted a number of informal technical briefings, seminars and workshops on UHC on the side 
lines of the Open Working Group (OWG) and intergovernmental negotiations as well as 
during the opening of the UN General Assembly in New York in September, the World Bank 
Spring Meetings in April in Washington and the World Health Assembly in Geneva between 
2013-2015. In all of these events, both the WHO and the World Bank disseminated research 
and analytical products, much of which had been supported by Japan and or sometimes 
supported by Japanese experts. These research outputs had the potential to exert 
tremendous productive power as many countries looked to both the WHO and the World 
Bank to guide and inform their efforts on health.   
For example, Japan established a Japan-World Bank Partnership Program on UHC 
starting in 2012, which according to the Bank’s website, “supported systematic analyses of 
health policies and programs in eleven countries [in Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, France, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam], with the aim of drawing lessons 
from Japan and other country experiences with UHC, in order to respond to the growing 
demand from low- and middle-income countries for assistance in developing UHC policies 
and strategies.”407 This partnership led to the production of case studies and a World Bank 
report and a high-profile journal article408, seminars and books, all of which were produced 
under the auspices of the World Bank with input from Japanese and international academics. 
These materials created through Japan’s institutional power at the Bank were then leveraged 
into productive power to provide guidance and inspire policy direction for other countries.  
These outputs were then launched and amplified using structural power for example 
during a high-level UHC Forum which the Government of Japan co-hosted with the World 
Bank in Tokyo in December 2013 (this meeting would re-occur in 2015 and 2017). 
Controlling which actors were invited, and the agenda, Japans’ government ensured many 
partner global health institutions and multiple ministers from Asia and Africa attended this 
Forum. Hosting this meeting in Tokyo, Japan exerted structural, institutional and productive 
power ensuring that all discussions of health were viewed under the umbrella of actions or 
interventions accelerating countries’ progress towards UHC and showcasing Japanese-
supported products or outputs which highlighted these efforts.  
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To help advance Japan’s Global Health Diplomacy strategy, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs also sought to engage and leverage structural and productive power through the 
limited number of Japanese civil society organizations and global health academics. For 
example, in late 2012 an ad hoc consortium or network of NGOs called “Beyond MDGs”, 
including the Japan Society for International Development, the Japan Association for 
International Health, the National Center for Global Health and Medicine as well JICA, was 
created and held seminars and workshops every few months in Tokyo in 2013 and 2014. 
While Japanese government policymakers recognised that civil society voices were 
important, they did not devote much time or effort into building or developing these 
relationships. These civil society organisations also engaged with the government, but in the 
words of one key informant involved, “the government didn’t really care about this.”409 
Another informant stated, “we trusted the Government and agreed with their focus on UHC, 
so there was not much to discuss.”410 Some Japanese academics also wrote academic articles 
making the case for human security and UHC in the post-2015 agenda.411 The table below 
showcases the different ways in which Japan exerted power. 
Japanese Government’s Exertion of Power to Influence the Post-2015 Process 
Structural Power • The Prime Minister’s office using bilateral relations 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs convening a SDG 
Contract Group in 2011-2012 as well as high-level 
events (eg the UHC Forum) and lower-level briefings 
Institutional Power • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Health and Finance 
leveraging the World Bank and the World Health 
Organisation to prioritise Japanese priorities within 
these institutions as well as taking advantage of the 
exchange of personnel within these institutions 
Productive Power • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Health and Finance 
leveraging knowledge and technical expertise from 
both the World Bank and the World Health Organisation 
to advance Japanese priorities  
 
In summary, Japan’s government exerted power largely outside the official post-2015 
process for health, and sought to align the SDG3 agenda closely with its own global health 
agenda to amplify its efforts and help advance Japanese foreign policy, namely economic and 
security, interests. Japan primarily used institutional power most successfully given its 
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relationships with the World Bank and the World Health Organisation; however, it was not 
able to wield as much structural power as it might have hoped and its productive power also 
had limited effects in the conceptualisation of the post-2015, SDG agenda for health. The 
following section discusses Japan’s role in the post-2015 process and reflects on the 
implications of Japan’s engagement.  
Section Four: Discussion 
Ultimately Japan was not successful in positioning UHC as the overarching SDG for health as 
outlined in its 2013 Global Health Diplomacy Strategy. Instead, SDG3, the one health goal in 
the seventeen SDGs, aims to “ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages.” 
Despite this, many Japanese institutions and individual policymakers continue to conflate 
SDG3 with UHC. For example, 2018 JICA materials with a timeline on global health 
interventions refer to the past as the MDG era and classify the current era as the “Sustainable 
Development Goals/Universal Health Coverage” era.412 Conflating the SDGs with UHC is not 
unique. As one might expect given the role of the SDGs as the MDGs’ successor and the 
supposed normative guidelines for global development efforts, other actors within the field 
of global health also attempt to position their issue as central to the SDGs and specifically 
SDG3. Yet the conflation of UHC and the SDGs in Japan is persistent and pervasive, and is a 
deliberate attempt to re-interpret, reframe and “construct” an understanding and 
interpretation of SDG3. In fact, in many cases, Japanese informants seemed genuinely 
unaware or unclear about the distinction between SDG3 and UHC.  
Many informants expressed genuine surprise and disbelief about why the Japanese 
position to advance UHC within the post-2015 process was even contested. As one informant 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “we thought we could contribute to the world by 
utilizing our [UHC] expertise."413 This reflects the widespread acceptance by Japanese 
policymakers and bureaucrats of the narrative of UHC as “Made in Japan” and representing 
a unique Japanese contribution as well as a lack of appreciation of the level of contestation 
in global health. Demonstrating a lack of awareness of global health politics and/or an 
admiration for Japan’s government, some key informants seemed sincerely uncomfortable 
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or unable to recognize why UHC might be opposed. This again highlights the enduring 
relevance of constructivism for interpreting and understanding global health policy. 
There was also a critical misinterpretation of the post-2015 process. The view from 
Tokyo for health was focused on policy processes in Geneva. Yet there was a disconnect 
between the post-2015 discussion in Geneva, particularly in deliberations at WHO, and the 
discussion at the UN in New York. Japanese policymakers, somewhat understandably, 
appeared to think that because the World Health Assembly and WHO’s senior leadership 
supported UHC, this would be the health priority for the post-2015 agenda. Yet as one JICA 
official realised, “in Geneva, UHC was one of the very strong agenda but that information was 
not so much connected with the outcome of New York discussions.”414 As detailed in Chapter 
Three, the post-2015 process for health was ultimately determined by Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs in New York, not Ministries of Health in Geneva building from the three processes 
reviewed above (the High-Level Panel, the Botswana thematic consultation and the OWG.) 
Despite these limitations, most Japanese informants did not see Japan’s engagement 
in the post-2015 process as unsuccessful. Indeed, most Japanese policymakers viewed 
Japan’s engagement as a diplomatic success and a reflection of Japan’s commitment to the 
field of global health.  One high-ranking Japanese official at JICA offered a more nuanced view, 
and assessed Japan’s role in the post-2015 process as mixed.415 According to this informant, 
Japan had three goals in its SDG efforts: 1) simplify the SDGs; 2) advance human security; 
and 3) support a few specific issues like UHC (and economic growth and the environment). 
The informant assessed Japan as failing to simplify the SDG conceptual framework and failing 
to advance the conceptual rhetoric of human security; however, this informant contended 
that the spirit of human security as a concept was embodied in the SDGs, and that UHC was 
“a success” as it was firmly embedded as a target within SDG3. This analysis seems fair, and 
a realistic assessment of Japan’s engagement.  
While Japan did not succeed in having UHC as the overall goal for SDG3, Japan’s 
strategic investments, largely outside the official post-2015 process, contributed to 
positioning UHC as a global health priority and anchoring it as an institutional priority at 
both WHO and the World Bank. Japan’s investments in advancing UHC continue to shape the 
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global health agenda beyond the post-2015 negotiations. WHO’s Director-General since 
2017, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, considers UHC WHO’s top priority; the World Bank’s 
health work continues to have a strong focus on UHC. Despite not deeply engaging on health 
in the formal post-2015 process (the processes which ended up being the most influential in 
the ultimate SDG3), Japan’s government still exerted considerable power throughout its 
post-2015, SDG engagement. After analysing why, how and where Japan engaged, three 
important points emerge. (These points are focused on Japan’s engagement; broader 
implications and lessons for how state actors engage in global health policymaking are 
considered in Chapter Seven.) 
First, applying a constructivist analysis for why Japan engaged and a power 
framework for how Japan engaged provides a deeper analytical understanding of Japan’s 
motivations and role in the post-2015 process. It also highlights potential lessons to 
stimulate and improve other countries’ future global health engagement. As previously cited, 
Finnemore argued that, “states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and 
international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that 
world.”51 This was clearly the case in Japan. The Abe administration in Japan actively 
engaged with and responded to one understanding of Japan's government as a "reactivist 
state" as well as perceptions that Japan was underperforming as a soft power leader. Using 
global health diplomacy as one tool, the government sought to reposition itself and continue 
to shift its identity re-asserting and demonstrating an ability to be an international leader. 
As detailed above, Japanese policymakers invested time and resources from largely within 
Japan (but also drew upon expertise from outside the country) in developing and 
constructing a narrative justifying greater Japanese engagement in global health diplomacy 
building on Japan’s human security approach. This was then aligned with, and integrated 
into, a strategy to pursue Japan’s foreign policy, particularly security and economic interests.  
Specifically detailing the benefits to Japan and broadly outlining the links between 
national strategic interests and global health motivated Japan’s leaders in the Prime 
Minister’s office, Parliament and across multiple ministries to prioritize national 
engagement in global health, as well as deepen and amplify their coordination, engagement 
and alignment to further their interests. With this high-level, broad support, Barnett and 
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Duvall’s framework demonstrates and illuminates the different ways in which national 
policymakers can leverage structural, institutional and productive power.  
Second, by detailing and highlighting how and where Japan exerted power, it is 
possible to begin to analyse how Japan engaged and how it might also improve future global 
health efforts. In the 2011 Lancet series, one article assessed Japan’s commitment to global 
health and argued that government fragmentation, weak civil society and a lack of 
monitoring and evaluation hindered Japan’s engagement and rendered it “not […] 
outstanding relative to its substantial potential.”384The article characterized Japan’s 
engagement as low, and its leadership weak. The authors suggested increasing financial 
resources, establishing a high-level global health committee, promoting NGOs and 
developing global health leadership. Since 2011, the government and Japanese policymakers 
have worked, with varying levels of success, to improve the country’s leadership and 
engagement, and some of this was evident in the post-2015 process. For example, during the 
post-2015 process, Japan’s government began to improve its coordination and alignment 
through the Takemi Working Group and instituting a more formal exchange process between 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Health to improve coordination and 
knowledge sharing. While this sort of assessment is useful, this sort of analysis can be 
augmented with Barnett and Duvall’s power framework. 
Applying the power framework, one can classify the different ways in which Japan 
engaged in the post-2015 process, and also begin to identify specific areas of focus for 
improvement in terms of exerting power and leveraging influence. The government had a 
unified approach and focused on its Global Health Diplomacy Strategy to focus on UHC. The 
Japanese government exerted institutional, structural and productive power. To advance its 
Strategy, Japan’s government exerted structural power through the Prime Minister’s efforts, 
leveraging development aid and diplomatic efforts in alliance with other countries; Japan 
exerted institutional and productive power through key global health institutions like the 
World Bank and the World Health Organization. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs leveraged 
structural power by creating a Contact Group, and by hosting a UHC Forum in Tokyo.  It also 
deployed structural and productive power hosting several high-level events in Tokyo, 
Geneva and in New York as well as UHC briefings and seminars. 
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For future efforts, however, the government might consider engaging or working with 
other UN and international institutions and agencies, for example, UNICEF or the OECD. 
Similar to how it facilitated coordination between its own national ministries, it could also 
use its institutional and structural power within these organisations to facilitate better 
cooperation between these different international institutions, for example, WHO and the 
World Bank and others. The government could also improve its efforts by increasing capacity 
in global health as well as continuing to refine and improve its strategic engagement building 
more sustainable support for global health both within and outside the government as well 
as beyond Japan. The government might also think about other ways to improve and amplify 
how it exerts productive power deepening its capacity to exert this type of power cultivating 
and expanding its networks and human capacities.  
This analysis also highlights some limitations of this power framework. Despite 
highlighting why, how and where Japan’s government exerted focused power to advance its 
strategy on UHC, the framework does not consider the soft power, ability or skills of actors 
to persuade. It does not allow for strategic considerations of how or when to engage in the 
policy process. When considering Japan’s soft power in its foreign policy for global health, 
one must consider diplomats’ English language skills, technical expertise and savvy in terms 
of navigating sometimes ambiguous diplomatic processes and procedures. The ability to 
develop and deepen these skills is often constricted by quick rotations and turnovers before 
staff have time to develop their expertise and or cultivate the social capital and networks 
between professionals working in global health. Informants in New York also alluded to a 
sense that Japanese diplomats often appeared reluctant to engage without first “checking 
with Tokyo”. This sense that diplomats were controlled by their capital or unable to manage 
the relationship with their capital vis-à-vis other diplomats and processes appeared to 
sometimes limit the ability of Japanese diplomats to engage. Moreover, sometimes 
shortcoming in these attributes hampered Japanese diplomats’ abilities to wield influence 
and shape policy efforts.  
Third, the role of domestic politics was critical to both determining and 
understanding why and how Japan engaged in the process. Japanese policymakers invested 
resources into ensuring its engagement was strongly aligned with its foreign policy and 
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efforts to advance human security. This case seems to suggest that developing a strategic 
narrative of why a country should engage is possibly a necessary prerequisite for 
engagement. While Takemi and Japanese academics were keen for Japan to engage more on 
global health and constructed a narrative about how this engagement could align with 
Japanese foreign policy, it was only after Prime Minister Abe’s re-election in 2012 and the 
LDP’s return to power that this narrative could be fully aligned with the Abe administration’s 
diplomatic efforts and then implemented. There is definitely a skill to align global health with 
national politics and priorities, but the timing and domestic political opportunity coupled 
with the post-2015 process mattered and influenced how and where Japan engaged. This 
political opportunity also brought additional challenges of contestation.  
Prior to the appointment of former Minister of Health, Shiozaki, Takemi dominated 
discussions within Japan on global health; however, in some ways, Shiozaki’s appointment 
and eventual engagement represented a challenge to Takemi’s dominance of the policy space 
contesting the exclusive focus of Japan’s efforts on UHC. While recognizing the importance 
of UHC, Shiozaki also emphasized the importance of global health security (as opposed to 
UHC), particularly as these issues framed as threats were important to Japanese citizens and 
voters. The Ebola and MERS outbreaks and growing attention to health emergencies, framed 
as part of Japan’s focus on human security, enabled Shiozaki to gain high-level support for 
his efforts and create some political space for himself within the field of global health within 
Japan. Reflecting this shift in priorities, when Prime Minister Abe described his government’s 
three global health priorities in the Lancet in 2015 (two years after writing about his 
government’s Global Health Diplomacy Strategy) for the 2016 G7 and TICAD, he referenced 
Shiozaki’s Japan Health Care 2035 project, and highlighted [in the following order], public 
health emergencies, universal health coverage and Antimicrobial Resistance.416 This slight 
shift in focus within the government reflects this contestation.  
In a recent article in the WHO Bulletin, a combination of Japanese academics and 
policymakers argued that, “the strongest drivers for Japan’s prioritization of UHC appeared 
to be three high-level Japanese champions of global health: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe; 
Yasuhisa Shiozaki, a former Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; and Professor Keizo 
Takemi, a member of the House of Councillors” but also cautioned that too many champions 
  
 
136 
 
and allies could lead to “fragmentation.”417 Alongside fragmentation, there is also risk for 
“crowding out”; in other words, these political champions could support and advocate so 
stridently for global health that they intimidate and prevent other Japanese politicians from 
engaging in the space, and that they dominate the dialogue in a way that alternative 
approaches and perspectives are not considered. 
Conclusion 
This analysis demonstrates the importance of considering how state actors engage in global 
health, and the added value of using power as a framework to help illuminate and assess 
actors’, particularly states’, roles in global health. Better understanding how power is exerted 
and deployed could contribute to improving how actors engage, and identifying key 
determinants of comparatively more ‘successful’ or ‘effective’ efforts in global health; a 
deeper knowledge of what determines better policy efforts could also enhance policy 
processes and lead to better governance mechanisms. Ultimately, this could transform 
states’ abilities to negotiate global health policies, eventually improving and saving lives.11  
Understanding why Japan has engaged is also instructive for anticipating how it might 
engage in the future. As explained in Chapter Three, the relationship between the SDGs and 
the global health agenda remains actively contested. Even today, Japan has been supporting 
the political process behind a 2019 UN High-Level Meeting on UHC and continues to conflate 
the SDGs with UHC. Given Japan’s experience with the human security approach and in the 
post-2015 process, might it be reasonable to expect that it will seek to build on and replicate 
some of this with its continued focus on UHC. For example, this could mean that the Japanese 
government will pursue and possibly fund a UN Commission on UHC similar to the one it 
funded in the early 2000s on human security. 
In conclusion, Japan’s policymakers within the government saw the post-2015 
process as an opportunity to demonstrate Japan’s influence, enhance its economic interests 
and foreign policy goals by exporting its own model or vision for health through UHC. While 
 
11 Of course, having a better understanding of states’ power in global health might also mean other actors, like 
civil society or private sector actors, increase their attempts to leverage states’ influence to advance their 
interests. 
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the government and policymakers identified the post-2015 process as an opportunity, they 
also viewed it as just one process within a broader strategy of influencing and shaping the 
global health agenda. Japan’s growing engagement in global health represents an evolution 
in a still emerging field traditionally defined and dominated by US and UK engagement. Other 
high-income states like Germany are now increasingly engaging in global health, and German 
policymakers and academics have been beginning to look to and study how Japan engages in 
global health as an alternative to the US and the UK to inform and inspire their own 
involvement. One might anticipate other high-income (as well as middle-income) countries 
increasing their engagement and considering Japan for lessons to inform their own 
engagement.  
The case of Japan offers insights into why and how countries might engage in global 
health as well as implications for the future of global health. Growing awareness of Japan’s 
engagement, coupled with US and UK retreat, might also encourage or inspire other high-
income and middle-income countries to engage more in the field of global health with their 
own priorities and approaches. Ultimately, this will likely mean a more contested, and 
possibly fragmented, global health agenda as more states engage and seek to align their 
engagement with their national foreign policies. One insight from this case study is that for 
other high-income countries to justify continued, or even expanded, investments and 
engagement on global health, policymakers will need to devote time and resources to 
developing a strategic narrative to motivate and prioritize national engagement in global 
health. The process for doing so matters, and itself could contribute to generating 
considerable commitment and alignment.  
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Chapter Six 
Why, How and Where did Indonesia Engage in the Post-2015, SDG 
Negotiations for Health 
 
Main Points 
• Between 2000 and 2015, Indonesia shifted from being a recipient of global guidelines 
to a producer of global guidelines on sustainable development. In line with President 
Yudhoyono’s foreign policy goals to project Indonesian leadership and 
“internationalize” Indonesia’s development experience as an emergent middle 
power, policymakers engaged to advance their own domestic interests and project 
Indonesia’s global leadership aspirations in the conceptualization of the post-2015, 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for health. The government was late to 
embrace the MDGs, which were considered irrelevant, although the appointment in 
2010 of a Special Envoy for the MDGs brought greater domestic policy attention. 
• Leveraging President Yudhoyono’s role as co-chair of the UN Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel (HLP) on the post-2015 development agenda, Indonesia’s 
government exerted structural and institutional as well as productive power within 
the HLP process and throughout the broader post-2015, SDG process. The Indonesian 
government leveraged the President’s role as a Co-Chair within and beyond the HLP 
process. The Ministry of Health and Foreign Affairs exerted structural power within 
the Botswana Consultation by presenting in one of the limited sessions. The 
President’s office along with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Health and Planning 
exerted structural and institutional power by engaging actively throughout the OWG 
negotiations unilaterally and with allies as well as through the institution of the G77. 
• Along with a commitment to finishing the MDG agenda for health, Indonesia 
advocated for a focus on universal health coverage (UHC) and non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) to be included in the Sustainable Development Goal for health 
despite tensions between different actors’ interests (reflecting “different 
Indonesias”) and the lack of a single, consistent strategy for the health goal across the 
various actors. When the Sustainable Development Goal for health (SDG3) 
incorporated the MDG agenda and, amongst other issues, a focus on UHC and NCDs, 
Indonesian informants considered their engagement in the post-2015 process 
broadly, and specifically on health, successful. Attributing SDG3, however, to the 
Indonesian government’s efforts would be an exaggeration; instead, Indonesian 
policymakers’ engagement at best contributed broadly to the final conceptualisation.  
• This analysis of Indonesian global health diplomacy demonstrates that global health 
itself is not a high national priority; however, global health issues may gain policy 
prominence and attention when there is an overlap with religious (eg: maternal 
mortality) or political interests (eg: virus sample sharing) and/or there is an 
opportunity to project Indonesian leadership globally (eg: the Oslo Group). While 
President Yudhoyono had an ambitious foreign policy to expand Indonesian influence 
and accelerate economic development, global health was not a part of this strategy. 
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Indonesian state actors’ engagement could presage a more contested global health 
policymaking process, and possibly, a more fragmented global health governance 
landscape as state actors create new structures or fora to maximize their ability to 
exert power and influence. 
 
Introduction  
In 2016, Richard Horton, the editor of the Lancet, argued that, “if you search for the word 
“India” in the title of Lancet publications, you will find 2098 entries. The US: 1287. China: 
841. Indonesia? 33.”418 Indonesia is often overlooked in the global health literature. Since 
2000, Indonesia has undergone a substantial political and economic transformation. When 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were conceptualized in the early 2000s, 
Indonesia was still largely a recipient of global policy guidelines from the United Nations 
(UN) and international institutions. By 2015, however, Indonesia was playing a leading role 
in providing global guidelines helping to create the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
Following independence after World War II, Sukarno, Indonesia’s first President, 
sought a “free and active” foreign policy. His government hosted the inaugural Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) conference in Bandung in 1955. This conference laid the groundwork for 
the establishment of the G-77 in 1964.419 Sukarno’s role in creating the NAM was an early 
attempt to engage and challenge the Cold War binary constellation of countries either in the 
US or the Soviet camp. He sought to position Indonesia in a neutral middle space between 
the US and USSR; however, in a military coup with US support, Suharto, an army general, 
overthrew Sukarno and led Indonesia from 1967-1998.  
Under Suharto, Indonesia became an American ally and his government was 
considered an important bulwark against communism. Accordingly, Indonesia was a top 
recipient of American (and Japanese) Cold War aid. Suharto’s government focused on 
developing Indonesia’s economy, which grew rapidly. Indonesia played an important 
regional role, and was a founder of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
1967. By the 1990s, Indonesia was one of the “Asian Tiger” economies. Yet after fuel price 
increases led to capital flight, currency collapse, and a tripling of the poverty rate420 on top 
of popular unrest during the 1997 economic crisis, Indonesians experienced political 
turmoil. Suharto stepped down in May 1998. After three decades of Suharto’s “New Order” 
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politics, the ensuing political transformation is often referred to as the start of reformasi 
(reformation). 
Following initial political instability, Indonesia emerged as not only a regional 
political leader, but also as a model middle power globally. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also 
known as “SBY”), was elected in 2004 in Indonesia’s first direct Presidential election and re-
elected in 2009. He represented, as one commentator argued, “a triumph of personality, 
image and popular choice over party machine politics.”421 After his election, Yudhoyono 
coordinated a large complex, multiparty coalition, the “United Indonesia Cabinet”, informally 
known as a “Rainbow Cabinet’. Analysts argued that he had a “strong tendency for the 
government to engage in political compromise and prefer[ed] stability over unsettling 
political and economic change.”422  
Despite difficult challenges like the December 2004 Pacific Ocean earthquake and the 
October 2005 Bali terrorist attacks, scholars argued that Yudhoyono became “the symbol of 
Indonesia’s leadership aspirations and role in regional and international affairs with a style 
that is widely recognized as gentle, open, and engaging.”423 While Yudhoyono’s 2009 re-
election was considered by some as a “beauty contest” resting on voters finding him 
“charismatic and wise”424, others simply considered him a savvy politician. Experts 
considered Indonesia’s approach as “low-key” noting “its refusal to speak loud and clear, and 
its tendency to take a balanced position.”422 Others criticized Yudhoyono for overextending 
efforts to showcase Indonesian leadership, going so far as to attempt to mediate the Korean 
peninsula conflict.425 Yudhoyono was continually positioning Indonesia on issues like 
climate change within the G20 Forum, ASEAN, the United Nations (UN) and beyond.  
President Yudhono’s efforts did not go unnoticed. In 2012, only twelve years after the 
MDGs’ creation, he was asked by the UN Secretary General (SG) to help develop the successor 
framework for the MDGs. Yudhoyono, was appointed, along with British Prime Minister 
Cameron and Liberian President Sirleaf, to co-chair the SG’s High-Level Panel (HLP) of 
eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. After his appointment, Yudhoyono 
commented, “Indonesia’s part in this noble task is for the sake of all the peoples in the world”; 
his role as a co-chair exemplified how Indonesia was increasingly recognized as an important 
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global power.426 As analysts argued “Indonesia’s foreign policy and regional and global 
profile have always been based on its ability to harness the country’s normative and moral 
authority.”427 This engagement coincided with a number of global health engagements, and 
contributed to expectations that Indonesia would take on a greater role in global health.  
American global health analysts proclaimed 2013 “Indonesia’s Year for Global Health 
Diplomacy.”428 Indonesia’s Health Minister Nafsiah Mboi became Chair of the Board for the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the country also hosted two high-level 
health conferences: an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) health financing meeting 
and the Fourth Islamic Conference of Health Ministers of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference. This built upon Indonesia’s on-going experience in global health. For example, 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs chaired the Foreign Policy and Global Health (FPGH) 
initiative in 2013, which was founded by Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Brazil, Indonesia, 
France, Norway, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand in 2007.429 This built on Indonesia’s 
experience with the World Health Organization (WHO) during the 2007 avian flu pandemic 
when Indonesia’s notorious actions challenged existing global health virus sharing 
policies.430 
These global health engagements were part of a broader political commitment to 
advance foreign policy and project Indonesian leadership during Yudhoyono’s 
administration (2004-2014). Aligned with its growing global role, these engagements 
positioned the country to exert its voice and occupy a more prominent position within global 
health. As one Ambassador in Jakarta stated, “Indonesia feels its time has come [and it] wants 
to be taken seriously as [an] international player. They are reaching out aggressively to take 
a bigger role.”426International relations experts recognized Indonesia’s exceptional rise 
“exercising normative power and influence.”423Experts noted that Indonesia’s foreign policy 
officials “are proud that many of their efforts have generated new ideas and thinking on 
important regional and global affairs.”427 Accordingly, policymakers, institutions and states 
were expecting Indonesia to exert greater leadership and engagement in global health.  
This chapter starts by contextualizing Indonesia’s relationship with the MDGs and 
engagements in the field of global health within Indonesia’s broader historical political 
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economy and foreign policy efforts. This sets the background to apply constructivism theory 
to analyse why Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 process. After reviewing why Indonesia 
engaged in the post-2015 process using constructivist theory, this analysis will specifically 
examine how and where Indonesia built upon the historical legacies of its foreign policy 
engagement, and exerted institutional, structural and productive power in the post-2015 
process according to Barnett and Duvall’s power framework. (The box below serves as a 
refresher on Barnett and Duvall’s power framework.) This chapter concludes by discussing 
the implications of Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 process and what this might 
mean for future global health policymaking efforts.  
 
Box 1: Barnett and Duvall’s Power Framework and Indonesia 
Barnett and Duvall’s power framework distinguishes between four different types of power: 
1) compulsory (direct power, such as use of military force); 2) institutional (indirect power, 
such as how international institutions are designed to favour one actor over another); 3) 
structural (the overall constitution or framework of actor and their roles); or 4) productive 
(control over the possession and distribution of resources) power. For global health, one 
could think of a donor agency using possible funding in a poor state with limited resources 
to exert compulsory power; a well-positioned state leveraging a multilateral agency to exert 
institutional power; a prestigious university or NGO positioning its staff as experts to provide 
technical policy support and exert structural power; and a UN agency or a private-sector 
actor advancing and promoting a particular agenda or approach to addressing health 
challenges as an exertion of productive power. This analysis will focus on non-material forms 
of power, and consider institutional, structural and productive power. For example, 
Indonesia’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement was an early attempt to exert structural 
power. Founding the G-77 enabled Indonesia to exert institutional power. The SG’s HLP was 
an opportunity for Indonesia to exert productive power by shaping the post-2015 process.  
 
Section One:  
Indonesia’s MDG Experience, and Why Indonesia Engaged in the Post-2015 Process 
 
When the MDGs began in 2001, Indonesia was still in political transition. Given the political 
instability, many informants considered the MDGs generally un- or under-impactful in 
Indonesia in the early 2000s. Although delays in MDG implementation are consistent across 
countries (as described in Chapter Three, MDG momentum mostly started between 2006-
2010), multiple key informants advising President Yudhoyono argued that Indonesia was 
“late” to implement or take the MDGs seriously as a policy agenda.431 These same informants 
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highlighted a lack of political leadership for championing MDG implementation, at least until 
the last phase of the MDGs after 2010. This was particularly important as according to one 
informant, “it takes about five years before the MDGs could be formalized and integrated into 
government policy.”432 Following political uncertainty in the years after Suharto with three 
Presidents in under six years (B.J. Habibie 1998-1999, Abdurrahman Wahid 1999-2001, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri 2001-2004), Yudhoyono was elected in 2004 in Indonesia’s first 
direct Presidential election. He was a former Army general, and previously served in 
Megawati’s Cabinet.  
Multiple informants noted his “technocratic”, almost academic approach to 
government.  In his election campaign in 2004 and re-election in 2009, President Yudhoyono 
defeated Islamic parties continuing Indonesia’s secular albeit conservative government. He 
presided over consistent economic growth providing political stability and continuity for 
government policy development and implementation. From the start of his presidency, 
Yudhoyono sought to exert regional leadership and project Indonesia as a global policy 
leader; this implicitly but not explicitly included global health policy issues. Informants 
indicated Yudhoyono was uninterested in health issues and was more interested in 
promoting economic growth. He was, however keen on promoting Indonesian leadership 
and sharing Indonesian experiences.  
While President Yudhoyono did not mention the MDGs in his early policy speeches, 
he did call for an “immediate implementation of the Monterrey consensus,” which was 
formulated during a landmark meeting in 2002 whereby more than 50 heads of state and the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreed to direct development financing towards the MDGs. He later expanded his 
foreign policy vision describing Indonesia’s strategic outlook as exercising its “foreign policy 
freely in all directions, having a million friends and zero enemies.”433 In 2012, Yudhoyono 
noted “strong economic and democratic fundamentals” informing Indonesia’s various roles 
as a “norm-setter, consensus-builder and advocate for the developing world”.434 Before he 
left office in 2014, Yudhoyono talked about his tenure as a “golden era”.435 In fact, almost 
every key informant in Jakarta mentioned the his deep commitment to global affairs as a 
mechanism to advance Indonesian interests and accelerate economic development.   
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This provided opportunities to project Indonesian perspectives in global health 
diplomacy. When asked about the MDGs, many Indonesian informants broadly equated the 
health MDGs with maternal mortality (even those not specifically working on maternal 
health issues), which was a challenging domestic issue. Indonesian maternal mortality 
increased during the MDGs compared to the 1990 baseline, and measurement was heavily 
contested.436 While the issue gained political prominence in the 1990s, policy attention 
declined after Suharto left office. Health services were decentralized, which weakened the 
Ministry of Health’s ability to address the issue.437 As Minister of Health (2012-2014), 
Nafsiah Mboi argued maternal mortality was related to family planning and sexual and 
reproductive health rights.438 Some analysts contextualize this as part of a wider backsliding 
for women’s health during Yudhoyono’s administration arguing that “his policies […were] 
shaped by religious conservatism and symbolic gestures rather than affirmative action and 
genuine concern for women’s issues.”439 The majority of Indonesia’s citizens are Muslim, and 
these issues are part of a debate over the role of religion. Academics studying Indonesia’s 
abortion policies argue that these challenges are exacerbated by “a macro-political context 
increasingly defined by a polarized Islamic-authoritarian—Western-liberal agenda.”440 This 
debate is part of a broader discussion since Suharto’s fall, sometimes considered an 
Indonesian version of “culture wars”.441  
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York and the 2002 attacks in 
Bali, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed to rebrand the country as the home of 
“Moderate Islam.” While Indonesia’s leaders from Sukarno to Yudhoyono have been broadly 
secular and generally worked to limit the role of Islam in governance and foreign policy442, 
there are a number of Islamic political parties contesting this approach. This tension 
influences Indonesia’s global health policy positions (generally with Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Health being more progressive than the conservative Ministry of Foreign Affairs); in fact, 
multiple informants referenced the influence of Saudi Arabia using Islam to build links with 
the Indonesian government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and advance a 
particularly conservative interpretation of Islam for Indonesia’s international affairs. This, 
of course, also shaped Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 process. 
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Indonesia’s maternal mortality situation remains contested—there are ongoing 
debates over progress on maternal mortality during the MDG period.443 Yet there is a sense 
that because of the backsliding on maternal mortality, the country “got burned” on the MDGs 
and “looked bad” in the global MDG discussions sullying its image as an emerging middle 
power.444 Informants broadly felt Indonesia lagged in MDG progress and that the MDGs did 
not work. One key informant argued that “everyone says that MDG 8 [on partnerships] did 
not work, but as a matter of fact, the whole MDG approach stopped working from 2008 
onwards.”444Furthermore, there was a sense the MDGs were mainly, as one informant 
argued, “a government-to-government kind of agenda” and “very heavily government-
oriented.”445 Moreover, there was a sense the MDGs were not appropriate for Indonesia.  
Indonesia faced, and continues to face, profound health system and environmental 
health challenges. While Indonesia’s decentralization negatively affected maternal mortality 
progress, the economic crisis precipitating Suharto’s resignation highlighted the need for 
health services for the country’s poorest citizens and created political priority for addressing  
the health system.446 It opened up space for policy experimentation and the development of 
multiple models to improve health coverage.447 Following legislation passed in 1999 and 
2004 and supportive court rulings, in 2014 in the midst of the post-2015, SDG process, the 
government launched its National Social Health Insurance Scheme (known as the Jaminan 
Kesehatan Nasional, or JKN) which aimed to provide UHC for all Indonesians, and create the 
world’s largest single-payer system by 2019.448 Despite this commitment, serious political 
and technical challenges remain.449 This perception of MDG policy mismatch for Indonesia’s 
context increased national policymakers’ interest in engaging in the post-2015 processes. 
Moreover, Indonesian agricultural ‘slash-and-burn’ practices to clear land creates recurring 
episodes of smoke and haze, which continue to threaten health in both Indonesia and 
neighbouring countries.450 For example, in 2015, fires led to an estimated 100,000 deaths 
from deadly pollutants and documented increases in respiratory, eye and skin ailments, 
including an additional 500,000 cases of acute respiratory illnesses.451  
Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 process was also informed by some of its 
previous global health experience. One of the most notable experiences in which Indonesia 
exerted leadership was the outspoken way in which its Minister of Health engaged and 
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refused to share samples of the H5N1 virus with the WHO during the avian flu pandemic 
between 2006 and 2008. This incident precipitated what some Western global health 
policymakers considered a global health crisis; ultimately, a special WHO working group 
facilitated the creation of a framework for sharing influenza virus strains alongside a system 
for improving the flow of pandemic vaccine and medications in 2011. In the process, 
Indonesia’s Health Minister Supari (2004-2009) coined the term “viral sovereignty”; 
American policymakers, Richard Holbrooke and Laurie Garrett, worried that Indonesia 
conceptualized a “notion [which] has morphed into a global movement, fuelled by self-
destructive, anti-Western sentiments.”452  
To advance its perspective in this case, Indonesia sought and received support from 
other countries by convening the first Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting for health 
ministers at the World Health Assembly in 2007 and issued a “Bandung Message” with civil 
society groups from around fifty Asian and African countries in June 2007.453 Building on 
and leveraging Indonesia’s historical legacy, this action signalled the government’s 
willingness to leverage structural (using the NAM) and institutional power (using WHO as a 
platform) to challenge existing international norms and contest ongoing policy and practice.  
Supari wrote an article in 2008 arguing that, “[t]he avian influenza case in Indonesia 
has demonstrated once again the unresolved imbalance between the affluent ‘high-tech’ 
countries and poor agriculture-based countries.”454 She continued that,  
“If the world continues to operate in this way, the discrepancies will become 
wider and wider. The poor will become poorer and the rich become richer. It 
is the responsibility of all nations to change this situation. Indonesia believes 
that the world must work in unity against the H5N1 virus infection and other 
diseases, and not taking advantage of the misery of others. The work must be 
conducted side by side with mutual trust, transparency and equity as global 
citizens and professionals, taking into consideration the elements of human 
dignity and solidarity.”  
After invoking her Muslim faith and accusing WHO of colluding with “superpower nations” 
and “rich world pharmaceutical companies” as well as accusing a US Naval Medical Research 
Unit based in Indonesia of espionage, some analysts felt Supari might have “overplayed her 
hand.”455 The Minister’s actions fuelled speculation she was showcasing her ability to defy 
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Western powers to bolster her own domestic political profile before the 2009 elections.455 
(After the elections, she was replaced in the Cabinet; in 2017, she was sentenced to four years 
in prison for accepting bribes during her tenure as Minister.456) This episode highlights the 
centrality of domestic political considerations for global health engagement.  
While accused of threatening global health security, Indonesia’s action exposed 
complicated questions of access, equity and transparency.457 Indonesia’s engagement also 
reflected its traditional exertion of structural and institutional power in its increasingly 
assertive foreign policy. This experience is often cited as a case-study exemplifying the 
challenge of global health security and global health diplomacy. As scholars have noted, 
“Indonesia's actions and the various global actors' responses have complex roots in self-
interest, and domestic and international politics.”458 It also exemplifies how economic issues 
forced the government to act and engage in global health issues. More recently in 2012, in a 
further example of Indonesia’s willingness to challenge global practices based on its 
economic interests, the country issued compulsory licensing, which enables the generic 
manufacturing and production of drugs still under patent, for both HIV/AIDS and hepatitis 
B medicines. 
Beyond these experiences, the most substantial challenge to Indonesia’s health 
system is arguably the NCD epidemic. With more than two-thirds of Indonesian men 
smoking, Indonesia has one of the world’s highest rates of per capita tobacco consumption. 
The Indonesia tobacco industry also has close links to the government. Accordingly, NCDs 
continue to rise as a proportion of the country’s health burden of disease, and efforts to limit 
and control tobacco have achieved limited success.459 Despite NCDs already being the 
world’s leading cause of death and disability at the MDG baseline in 1990460, growing 
consensus on the importance of health systems and a recognition of environmental 
challenges at the time of the MDGs’ formulation, these three issues (NCDs, health systems 
and the environment) were not adopted in the MDG framework. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, these issues became recognised limitations of the MDG framework461; moreover, the 
lack of policy space within the MDGs to consider these issues concerned Indonesian health 
policymakers. 
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Around the same time as the virus sharing episode in the Ministry of Health, 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a founding member of the Foreign Policy and 
Global Health Group. The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, 
South Africa, and Thailand came together in 2007 writing in The Oslo Declaration—global 
health: a pressing foreign policy issue of our time, “health as a foreign policy issue needs a 
stronger strategic focus on the international agenda [… and we will] reinforce health as a key 
element in strategies for development and for fighting poverty, in order to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals.”429 This “Oslo Group” coordinates its global health 
engagement annually proposing a UN Resolution and often issuing communiques at the 
World Health Assembly.462 It is an example of how Indonesia exerts structural power 
through a new, ad hoc grouping which aims to reshape global health diplomacy policy and 
practice. 
Initial assessments from global health analysts reflect both scepticism and excitement 
about this new global health diplomacy grouping.463,464 Indonesia’s participation was largely 
perceived as recognition of the country’s growing role within global health, and its 
willingness to engage in and help create possible new global policy alliances. In 2011, Fidler, 
however, critiqued the Oslo group suggesting that it “does not appear to be a promising 
venue in which to address the increasingly difficult environment health faces within foreign 
policy processes because of fiscal crises in many countries and geopolitical shifts in the 
distribution of power.”465 By 2016, however, Sandberg, Faid and Andresen argued that the 
Oslo Group had proved to be “resilient” and was successfully operating behind the scenes in 
“bridging global arenas” and “supporting negotiation processes.”466 This assessment found, 
“[t]he Initiative’s influence also goes beyond formal negotiation processes. Further examples 
where Initiative members are believed to have played influential roles include the MDG 
Review Summit in 2010.”  
Alongside the virus samples and the Oslo Group, Indonesia engaged in MDG-related 
policy processes at the global level, particularly after 2010, as part of its efforts to project 
Indonesian leadership globally. The Oslo group’s efforts to accelerate progress towards the 
MDGs aligned with one of President Yudhoyono’s domestic political appointments in Jakarta. 
In early 2010 Yudhoyono established a Ministerial or Cabinet-level post for Nila Moeloek as 
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the “President’s Special Envoy for the MDGs” to help coordinate between Indonesia’s 
Ministries of Health, Finance, Education and Environment as well as represent the President 
in national and international-level MDG events. The Special Envoy’s office, according to a 
press release, was intended to “form [a] small but yet effective organization filled with senior 
professionals and volunteers from academy, private sectors, NGO’s, profession organization 
and donor community.”467 In other words, the Special Envoy was to coordinate cross-
government MDG efforts, and demonstrate this progress to the global policy community. 
Moeloek (later appointed Minister of Health in October 2014), hired as her deputy 
Diah Saminarsih (a civil society leader). Moeloek and Saminarsih together hired 
professionals from civil society, the private sector and academic institutions (primarily from 
outside the government). The Special Envoy’s Office also attracted funding from foreign 
governments and philanthropic foundations.468 The Special Envoy’s office engaged 
communications professionals to ensure that “more people understand what MDGs is, how 
to promote that in a more realistic everyday life scenario, and to promote the movement at 
a more grass root level as to avoid unnecessary high-level politics at play.”469 To raise the 
profile of the MDGs, the Special Envoy’s office established an MDG prize and cultivated local 
media. In 2010, the Indonesian government hosted a special ministerial meeting to review 
MDG progress in Asia and the Pacific in Jakarta in August 2010.  
The appointment of the Special MDG Envoy led to greater policy attention and focus 
on the MDGs in Indonesia. This office of the MDG Special Envoy engaged in the initial 
discussions with the UN Secretariat on what would come after the MDGs and participated in 
one of the early global meetings on the post-2015 process, the 2012 Rio+20 meeting. The 
MDG Special Envoy’s office was keen to engage to ensure the post-2015 agenda was relevant 
for Indonesia. The next section analyses why, how and where Indonesia engaged in the post-
2015 process. Before that, it is important to understand some additional political context.  
During the post-2015, SDG process, Indonesia experienced a political shift. President 
Yudhoyono was constitutionally barred from seeking a third term (having been re-elected in 
2009), and in July 2014, Indonesia held a presidential election. Joko Widodo (popularly 
known as Jokowi), previously the mayor of Jakarta, was elected and took office in October 
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2014. The contrast between the two was stark: Yudhoyono was a former member of the 
military and highly technocratic, he was the embodiment of the Indonesian political elite. 
Jokowi was former furniture salesman and the first Indonesian president not to come from 
the military or the political elite. He was a populist. During his time as mayor, he introduced 
a “smart card” to enable poor Jakartans to access health services. In his campaign, Jokowi 
was extremely focused on domestic issues, and committed to expand his focus on health.470  
To understand how Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 process, this historical 
background in political economy is crucial context. To summarize, when the MDGs launched, 
Indonesia’s government was consumed by the post-Suharto transition. With Yudhoyono’s 
election in 2004, the government stabilized yet still faced many challenges. Accordingly, it 
was late to embrace the MDGs, which were considered somewhat irrelevant in Indonesia, 
although the appointment in 2010 of a Special Envoy for the MDGs brought greater domestic 
policy attention. Global health issues largely did not gain policy prominence except when 
there was an overlap with religious (eg: maternal mortality) or political interests (eg: virus 
sample sharing) and/or there was an opportunity to project Indonesian leadership globally 
(eg: the Oslo Group). Building on this, the next section analyses why Indonesia engaged in 
the post-2015 process and how this evolved following the Presidential transition in 2014. 
 
Why Indonesia Engaged in the Post-2015, SDG Process 
To understand and illuminate why Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 process for health, it 
is necessary to contextualize the country’s emergence as a middle power using constructivist 
theory. Indonesia is now the world’s tenth largest economy. Building from the success of the 
BRICs, analysts currently recognize Indonesia amongst many of the acronyms for emerging 
economies, eg MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey)471, CIVET (Colombia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt and Turkey)472 or MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and 
Turkey).473 Indonesia’s size also contributes to Indonesia’s emergence on the global stage. 
With close to 260 million citizens, Indonesia is the world’s fourth largest population, third 
largest democracy and most populous Muslim country. After the 2003 Iraq War, when 
Western countries were looking to promote democracy, particularly in Muslim countries, 
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Indonesia, served as a potential model.474 In 2011, Indonesia’s President argued that 
“Indonesia is no longer ‘a nation in waiting.’ [It] is a nation whose time has come –and we 
are seizing the moment with determination and hard work.”423 Yudhoyono developed and 
pursued a pragmatic, non-aligned foreign policy, and preferred high-profile efforts to project 
Indonesia in the world as an emerging middle power.475 Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 
process in line with its broader foreign policy to project Indonesian interests and power.  
Building on Indonesia’s historical legacy of exerting structural and institutional 
power globally, Yudhoyono argued that he intended not “to re-write the book [for 
Indonesia’s foreign policy], but simply to add more pages to it”; he wanted to empower 
Indonesia to act like a “peacemaker, confidence builder, problem solver and bridge builder 
[…] by projecting Indonesia’s international identity” in the region and beyond.476 President 
Yudhoyono recognized the UN as the “foremost multilateral forum” and called ASEAN the 
“mainstay” of Indonesia’s regional foreign relations. He directed his government to lead the 
ASEAN Community towards greater integration and deeper cooperation. Yudhoyono also 
ensured the Indonesian government was a central actor in the G20 Forum arguing in a 2010 
speech that the G20 “can help reform the world economic architecture and contribute to a 
strong, balanced and sustained global economic growth”; he continued that the G20 could be 
leveraged as a platform to ensure that “the achievements, products, culture and ideas of 
Indonesia […] become part of the dynamics at a global level.”477 Yudhoyono engaged to 
expand opportunities to exert influence and accelerate Indonesia’s economic development.  
 With this background in mind, it is unsurprising that President Yudhoyono would be 
considered as a Co-Chair for the UN High Level Panel in 2012, along with the United 
Kingdom’s Prime Minister Cameron and Liberia’s President Sirleaf. Informants cited a 
number of potential reasons for his engagement: his commitment to global affairs and 
multilateralism, his personal relationship with the Secretary-General forged through his 
annual attendance at the opening of the General Assembly (and other meetings) as well as 
his experience representing Indonesia on the global stage. Whereby the United Kingdom 
represented developed economies and Liberia represented low-income countries, Indonesia 
represented emerging economies and served to bridge the gap between low-income 
countries and developed economies. One key informant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
recognized that “we are in the middle. Indonesia is in the middle, the President is in the 
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middle, and we understood our position.”478 More specifically, Yudhoyono saw his 
participation in this panel as an opportunity to improve the post-2015 agenda based on 
Indonesia’s MDG experience. 
The Indonesian government also recognized the chance to exert structural power to 
shape the post-2015 development agenda to be aligned with Indonesia’s domestic interests. 
As a senior member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted, “of course, the President’s 
schedule is busy, but we knew exactly that by participating in the HLP, we could contribute 
not only to the world, not only to the other fellow members of developing countries, but also 
for us.”479 Policymakers in Jakarta appreciated the implications of the importance of the post-
2015, SDG agenda.  
One senior official at the Ministry of Planning (also known as Bappenas) noted that 
Indonesia engaged in the HLP and beyond so that the government could “align the global 
agenda with our national development agenda so that the development agendas that we are 
implementing and working on in Indonesia could be also the development agenda at the 
global level.”480 As detailed in Chapter Three, the MDGs’ dominance in terms of steering the 
international development agenda was well recognized. Given the MDGs’ influence, 
policymakers and development advocates, including in Indonesia, were committed to 
ensuring their perspective was embedded within the post-2015 agenda. There was a 
realization within the government that shaping the agenda would be useful as they would 
ultimately need to demonstrate progress against what would become the SDGs. An official 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted, “because we knew for sure that the SDGs will 
become the guidance of the global development, and especially for developing countries, 
Indonesia invested great attention into the process. It was high priority and I would say that 
we were very, very actively engaged in the negotiation process.”480 
The team working with the President on the HLP was particularly aware of the 
opportunity and saw it as a chance to “globalize” Indonesia’s experience. Yudhoyono sought 
to “internationalize” Indonesian development experience as a model for sustainable 
development. As one member of the President’s team explained, “I did not, nor did the team 
nor the President, I did not put things forward as an Indonesian agenda. This was humanity’s 
agenda. I went around and kept on sharing snippets of our experience, and I have the luxury 
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wherever I am, in Australia, in Germany, in Denmark or in Norway, to talk about countries' 
contribution, saying, ‘This is not Indonesian agenda. It's your agenda as well.’”481 
While the President’s participation in the HLP was perhaps predictable, the amount 
of global interest in the post-2015 process was not anticipated. Indonesian policymakers 
initially considered the High-Level Panel as just another of many UN high-level panels 
convened. As one key informant from the MDG Envoy’s team noted, “I don't think anyone 
predicted that it would be this big. Everyone knew it would be complicated, but that it was 
so highly publicized or highly, what's the word beyond highly political? It was really a global 
movement. Almost everyone caught the SDG bug.”482 As the key informant continued, 
“everybody understood that there will be something after MDG but I don't think anyone 
predicted or said out loud that it would be so huge.” The Indonesian government’s 
engagement in the post-2015 process was consistent with Indonesia’s foreign policy; 
however, this foreign policy did not include or articulate a clear global health strategy. 
Neither domestic health policy nor global health policy were government priorities.  
Despite the President’s engagement in the HLP, and this broad Indonesian interest in 
the post-2015 process, the Ministry of Health did not participate in the process advancing a 
consistent strategy. Some key informants noted the importance of either universal health 
coverage (UHC) and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) based on Indonesia’s experience; 
others highlighted sexual and reproductive health rights. Yet Indonesia’s Ministry of Health 
did not have a specific narrative for its engagement in the post-2015, SDG process for health; 
Indonesian policymakers broadly did not construct a strategy for the country’s wider 
engagement on health and thus missed some opportunities to exert greater power 
throughout the post-2015 process. There are multiple reasons which could explain this.  
Informants argued that neither the President’s office nor the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs prioritized health within the government’s broader post-2015 engagement. A senior 
official from the Ministry of Health argued that “the President’s team was primarily focused 
on environmental issues and others [within the Cabinet] were focused on their own sectoral 
concerns.”483 Others felt that given the President’s reluctance to engage on health 
domestically, there was little appetite to engage in global health. Others implied that industry 
was intervening with the President to keep health off of the political agenda. (If this is true, 
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it would reflect a strong intervention by the corporate sector exerting structural power to 
shape the agenda.) As one Indonesian academic informant argued, “we always have kind of 
a “lipstick”, meaning just talking. The government uses a lot of “lipstick” but has not followed 
through on health in a serious way.”484 Ultimately in the post-2015 process, Yudhoyono 
focused on the environment as it was understood to be an issue where Indonesia could exert 
global leadership. In comparison, there did not appear to be a cadre of policymakers 
developing a strategy to make this argument for health to the President, or Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for health. Yudhoyono’s lack of interest or commitment to health within the 
High-Level Panel (or within the broader post-2015 process) was itself an exertion or 
reflection of structural power to determine which issues are prioritised for policy attention. 
While health was not a priority for the government, Indonesia’s engagement in the 
HLP, and the President’s personal commitment to multilateralism and international affairs, 
created greater awareness of the process and led to a constituency within the Indonesian 
government committed to engaging in the post-2015 process. As one key informant argued, 
“I think the key aspect in what we can learn from this is that once the President agreed, once 
he expresses his interest, the key is to capitalize on that interest.”485 The President convened 
a special advisory group to coordinate his engagement in the HLP. Following the HLP report’s 
release in May 2013, this group and these actors were committed to leveraging the 
President’s and Indonesia’s engagement to advance their own interests in the OWG.  
During and after the President’s HLP engagement, different actors and institutions 
contested how and where Indonesia should continue to intervene in the process. They used 
the post-2015 process to advance their interests, and this continued through the Presidential 
transition from Yudhoyono to Jokowi. Following his inauguration in October 2014, President 
Jokowi did not actively prevent continued engagement in post-2015 process; however, he 
signalled he would take a different approach to foreign policy, and shift his focus to domestic 
issues. Early in his administration, Jokowi argued"[o]ur [foreign] policy is free and active, 
befriending all countries but [we will put first] those who give the most benefits to the 
[Indonesian] people […] What's the point of having many friends but we only get the 
disadvantages? Many friends should bring many benefits."486 As multiple informants 
highlighted, President Jokowi did not attend the September 2015 opening of the UN General 
Assembly indicating his desire to prioritize domestic issues.487 
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Despite Indonesia’s domestic health challenges, given the country’s increasing 
prominence in global affairs, policymakers anticipated that the country would engage more 
on health in the post-2015 process. In fact, many global health policymakers constructed a 
narrative in which Indonesia would engage more deeply within global health in line with its 
foreign policy efforts. For example, citing President Yudhoyono’s role in the high-level panel, 
a report from a US think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
argued that, “Indonesia’s role in global health has changed dramatically in recent years 
following a brief period of health nationalism in which it stopped sharing bird flu samples 
with the international community and shut down a U.S. naval research station doing research 
on infectious diseases. […] Its leaders “are reaching out aggressively” to snare a bigger role 
in international health diplomacy.”426 
In line with these efforts, Indonesian health policymakers were engaging more in 
global health policy processes, particularly in 2012 and 2013, which was also the beginning 
the post-2015 policy process. Yet there was no overarching strategy or policy guiding their 
engagement. Given President Yudhoyono’s role as a co-chair of the High-Level Panel, 
policymakers afforded Indonesia policy space to engage in the process on health and 
expected Indonesian health policymakers to heavily engage in the post-2015 process. These 
expectations were more unrealised projections than reality. Aside from a few interested 
individuals, there largely was not a group of Indonesian health policymakers heavily engaged 
in the process. There was not a group of policymakers who worked together (or with others 
from outside Indonesia) to construct a strategic policy narrative to convince or motivate 
policymakers on why or how Indonesia should engage in global health and/or for health in 
the post-2015 process. Some policymakers, particularly within the Ministry of Health, had a 
vision of expanding the MDG agenda to include both UHC and NCDs for the SDG agenda, but 
the post-2015 process was not a policy priority for health policymakers nor was health a 
priority for the President’s engagement in the post-2015 process. Moreover, without an 
overarching or coordinated strategy for global health, Indonesia’s engagement on health was 
largely ad hoc and reactive to these requests and opportunities. Indonesia’s engagement did 
not reflect a broader Indonesian strategy for health in the post-2015 process.  
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In summary, constructivist analysis focuses on shared ideas, approaches and values 
and how these can influence political action. Constructivists argue that understanding how 
non-material resources and structures shape actors’ identities is important because 
identities inform interests and policies, which, in turn, shape actions. In this case, President 
Yudhoyono’s administration sought to invoke Indonesia’s historical legacy and enlarge its 
global leadership role to improve its economy and global influence. How Indonesia engaged 
was also shaped by its domestic religious tensions and its economic interests. Integrating 
these interests, Yudhoyono constructed a narrative to build on Indonesia’s historical legacies 
of exerting structural and institutional power expanding Indonesia’s global engagement. 
This narrative, however, was not specifically intended for the post-2015 agenda for health. 
More broadly, health and global health were not an explicit part of this foreign policy 
narrative. Instead, Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 process was a manifestation of 
this foreign policy, and health was implicitly included. The next section specifically analyses 
how and where Indonesia engaged in the post-2015, SDG process. 
Section Two: 
Analysing How and Where Indonesia Engaged in the Post-2015, SDG Process 
 
This section starts with background on the evolution of Indonesia’s policymaking process 
and how this eventually shaped how and where the government engaged in the post-2015 
process for health. More specifically, it contextualizes the various institutions and analyses 
how and where the different actors engaged and exerted power in the policy process (and as 
detailed in Chapter Four), namely: 1) the High-Level Panel (HLP); 2) the Botswana thematic 
consultation on health; and 3) the Open Working Group (OWG). The box below provides a 
high-level overview of the timeline of the post-2015 process, and for how and where 
Indonesia engaged. 
    
 
Indonesia’ Engagement in the Post-2015 Process 
2012: 2014: 
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July UN Secretary General announces High-Level Panel 
of eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda with President Yudhoyono as Co-Chair 
 
 
July Indonesia holds Presidential 
elections: Joko Widodo wins and 
is inaugurated in October 2014 
 
The Post 2015 Process 
2013: 
March Botswana Thematic Consultation for 
Health Meeting  
 
May UN High-Level Panel Report Released 
 
June Open Working Group Meeting for 
Health (Sessions last between March 2013 
and April 2014)  
 
 
 
2014: 
 
June (2013) Open 
Working Group Meeting 
for Health (Sessions last 
between March 2013 
and April 2014)  
 
2015:  
From January to 
July Inter-
Governmental 
Negotiations  
 
September 
SDGs Adopted 
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During the New Order era (1967-1998), Indonesian policymaking was determined by 
Suharto. As one scholar argued, Suharto’s policymaking was similar to that “practised by 
Javanese kings, which was hierarchical and concentric, requiring unconditional respect, 
deference and obedience.”488 According to a former Indonesian Vice President, the country’s 
policymaking was “undisputedly dominated” by “a solid group of mainstream economic 
professionals and bureaucrats, known as the ‘Berkeley mafia’” as many studied together at 
the US University of California’s Berkeley campus.489 Traditionally the Ministry of Planning 
dominated policymaking along with policy monitoring and implementation; it was also 
largely responsible for coordinating with foreign governments and international 
organizations. The Ministry of Planning thus held considerable influence over other 
ministries; however, its influence seemed to fluctuate depending on its minister and their 
relationship with the president.490 This was the also same for other ministries; their role 
largely depended on their Minister’s relationship with President Suharto. This all changed 
once Suharto stepped down in 1998. 
 Yudhoyono sought to reform and modern Indonesia’s bureaucracy. Even shortly after 
the time of the “reformasi”, Indonesian bureaucracy was, according to analysts, considered 
among the lowest quality in the world.491 Civil servant salaries were, for Indonesia, 
comparatively low, and thus despite a few unsuccessful efforts to reform the civil service, 
there was a high level of bureaucratic corruption.490As one analyst argued, “[d]ue to 
weaknesses in training, promotion and compensation, cumbersome reporting requirements, 
and a lack of significant bureaucratic reforms, the public service continues to be ‘widely seen 
as corrupt, bloated, inefficient and either incapable or unwilling [to implement] policies.”492 
Other experts recognised that during Yudhoyono’s reign “policy making has become more 
transparent, more publicly accountable, but also more challenging, more noisy and more 
time consuming.”493 In other words, Indonesian policymaking became more contested with 
ministries now consulting with and considering inputs various sources, particularly civil 
society organisations and the private sector as well as from universities.  
By the time the post-2015 process began in 2012, President Yudhoyono was well into 
his second term as president. Key informants emphasised that Yudhoyono sought to 
accelerate the modernization of Indonesia’s civil service by bringing in new voices from the 
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private sector and civil society. One analyst argued that this was one of Yudhoyono’s 
strengths, namely “his willingness to avoid the totalitarian ‘strongman’ mantle and 
incorporate an eclectic mix of views, for better or for worse.”494  
Yudhoyono’s efforts to reform the bureaucracy was critical as key informants 
consistently identified government actors and institutions as the most important for the 
post-2015 process, namely the President’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as 
both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Planning. (While some informants 
occasionally alluded to other actors, like non-governmental organizations and UN agencies, 
these actors did not play a decisive role and were largely marginal to Indonesia’s position on 
health in the post-2015 process.) These actors were deemed most important as they were 
central to the post-2015 negotiations, meaning these were the actors called upon to engage 
on behalf of Indonesia’s government in the post-2015 process both by President Yudhoyono 
and by the UN Secretariat in New York coordinating the process. The President’s office 
included both the Presidential Work Unit on Monitoring and Controlling Development (in 
Indonesian: Unit Kerja Presiden Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan, or UKP-PPP, 
known as UKP4) as well as the office of the President’s Special Envoy on the MDGs.  
UKP4 was an influential, yet controversial unit established in President Yudhoyono’s 
office following his re-election in 2009 and inspired by former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s “Delivery Unit” model. To lead the Unit, he appointed Kuntoro Mangkusubroto in a 
Cabinet-level post to review Ministers’ performance. Upon joining Yudhoyono’s 
administration, Kuntoro had a strong reputation from the private sector with little tolerance 
for government bureaucracy; he previously managed the government’s efforts to coordinate 
the response to the tsunami in Aceh. Before he accepted his post, Kuntoro petitioned the 
President to appoint his own team and top up their salaries beyond normal civil servant 
wages when necessary.495 As described in a case-study, Kuntoro said prospective candidates 
had to be “of high integrity” meaning “uncorrupted and have no political biases or 
affiliations.”495(This also worked well with Yudhoyono’s own anti-corruption efforts and 
reputation as “Mr Clean.”) Kuntoro himself explained in an interview: “I didn’t want to take 
anyone with bureaucratic experience, because bureaucratic experience is damaging. They 
become so structured and start talking about ‘this procedure, this law, this regulation.’ I 
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didn’t want to hear it. You have a problem, solve that problem.”496 He recruited and 
assembled his team with individuals from the private sector and academia. The background 
of individuals in this unit was in stark contrast to Indonesia’s civil service. 
In comparison, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Planning and Health were staffed 
with career civil servants. According to informants, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was and 
continues to be viewed as one of the most conservative ministries, and the Ministry of Health, 
largely focused on domestic health issues, one of the most bureaucratic ministries. The 
differences between these various ministries and units in President Yudhoyono’s 
administration were notable; one informant referred to them as representing “different 
Indonesias.”497 The ministries like foreign affairs, health or planning were civil servants, 
whereas the new units in the President’s team were staffed from outside the civil service 
with exceptional contracts for atypical credentials and backgrounds (coming from academia, 
civil society or the private sector). These different perspectives caused tensions as these 
actors contested their positions and vied for the President’s support. This tension exposed 
the vulnerability and insecurity of Indonesia’s civil service during Yudhoyono’s 
administration; it also reflected a growing appreciation of the opportunity of the post-2015 
process (and global health policy) as a foreign policy space in which political capital could be 
gained. More immediately, however, it meant that Indonesia policymakers were not able to 
take advantage of this policy window of opportunity to exert greater power within the post-
2015 process on health as they were consumed with contesting their own domestic political 
positions. These tensions hampered coordination efforts between actors, and thus limiting 
Indonesia’s ability to engage in a consistent and coherent way in the post-2015 process for 
health. As described in Chapter Three, this also meant more space for other actors to engage 
instead of Indonesia.  
Exacerbating these tensions, one of the main tasks of the Delivery Team was to review 
and evaluate each of the Ministers and issue public report cards on their performance; these 
evaluations and assessments were rumoured to affect the President’s thinking when it came 
time for Cabinet reshuffles. Complicating their role, staff in both the Delivery Team (UKP4) 
and in the MDG Special Envoy’s office felt that bureaucrats in the more traditional line 
ministries were conservative and ineffective. As Kuntoro himself acknowledged: “I don't 
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respect them [the Cabinet]. Because they just create a lot of problems, because they are 
basically bureaucratic.”498 At the same time, the Ministries did not respect or appreciate the 
new institutions (they considered them amateur interlopers) and the new teams within the 
President’s office felt like the ministries were antiquated (they considered them as “old-
school” conservative bureaucrats). The Ministries within the government resented Kuntoro 
and his UPK4 team as well as Moelek and her team in the MDG Special Envoy’s office. They 
considered the UKP4 team to be something of unwelcome, temporary corporate consultants. 
The traditional ministries considered the MDG’s Special Envoy office to represent and reflect 
civil society perspectives.  
These tensions also had implications for how and where Indonesia eventually 
engaged in the post-2015 process. The Indonesian government did not have a consistent 
strategic approach or narrative for health. The competition between the different actors and 
institutions led to differences in policy positions between the state bureaucracy (the line 
ministries: foreign affairs, health and planning) and the special units within the President’s 
office (the MDG Envoy's office and UKP4). This Indonesian institutional divide aligned with 
the various parts of the post-2015 process with agencies taking the lead in different 
processes, ie: the President’s office led in the Secretary-General’s HLP process; the health 
ministry (and the ministry of foreign affairs) engaged in the post-2015 thematic consultation 
on health; and the ministry of foreign affairs (and the ministries of health and planning) 
managed the OWG and the inter-governmental negotiations. This meant that instead of 
promoting and advancing a consistent, coherent approach, each of these institutions brought 
their own perspectives and emphasised slightly different approaches to health in each of 
these processes. The President’s office was generally uninterested in health, but open to 
supporting reproductive health rights; the Ministry of Health advocated a position of 
building on the MDGs and including NCDs and UHC; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
deferred to the President’s office and the Ministry of Health, however, was slightly reluctant 
to take an outspoken position in support of reproductive health rights.  
The below examines and analyses how and where Indonesia’s government engaged 
in the three parts of the post-2015 processes (the HLP, Botswana and the OWG), and how 
Indonesia’s government exerted power in these different processes. The Indonesian 
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government was not able to exert compulsory power in this process; however, in 
cooperation with other Indonesian government actors, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Health as well as both UKP4 and the office of the Special Envoy in the 
President’s office exerted institutional, productive and structural power to advance their 
interests both within Indonesia and beyond. The analysis below applies Barnett and Duvall’s 
power framework for analysis. 
The High-Level Panel on Post-2015 
Shortly after Yudhoyono was named as one of the Co-Chairs of the High-Level Panel in 2012, 
he created a fifteen-person national committee to coordinate across the government and 
advise his engagement. This committee was led by Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, who led UKP4 
(the Delivery Unit) in the President’s office, and his deputy Heru Prasetyo. This committee 
included cabinet members like the Special Envoy for MDGs, Nila Moeloek, and others like the 
Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Director of Multilateral Affairs, Hasan Kleib, who was also the 
President’s Special Envoy on the SDGs. The committee amongst others included a senior 
advisor to the Minister of Health as well as a senior official from the Planning Ministry. 
Having Kuntoro lead this group signalled the President’s reliance on him to deliver on special 
projects, but it also exacerbated existing tensions between the President’s office and both 
the Ministries of Planning and Foreign Affairs. One informant working in the HLP Secretariat 
argued that Indonesia appeared to have two processes for its inputs to the Panel: one 
political and one technical, which hampered its ability to advance a consistent and coherent 
position.499 Kuntoro’s UKP4 team was leading the technical inputs, and Ambassador Hasan 
Kleib was leading on the political inputs, but both (UKP4 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
were jockeying to influence their President’s inputs as this same informant explained, “when 
the sitting President of Indonesia spoke on the Panel, it was heard.”  
 Multiple informants mentioned that the Ministry of Health did not consistently 
engage within the Committee advising the President on the HLP. Informants shared that the 
MDG Special Envoy’s office seemed more engaged on health issues within the Committee; 
however, these perspectives reflect the tensions between these various government 
agencies and ministries within the Committee. The Ministry of Health was undertaking a 
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major domestic reform trying to push forward its efforts towards UHC. Moreover, the more 
established bureaucracy, like the Ministry of Health, had a clear mandate, whereas the 
Special Envoy’s office was a new agency and was positioning to establish its relevance. This 
viewpoint also reflects the fact that neither the Ministry of Health nor the Special Envoy had 
a consistent perspective on health in the post-2015 process. This did not mean Indonesian 
policymakers were disinterested in the process or in how Indonesia should engage.  
Given Indonesia’s experience with the MDGs, Indonesian policymakers were 
committed to broadening the MDGs’ focus in health. Indonesian policymakers shared a wide 
interest in building on the MDG agenda and adding health systems, NCDs and mental health, 
equity, nutrition and sexual and reproductive rights to the eventual SDG for health; however, 
there was not an agreed upon approach or strategy to focus on a specific challenge. The 
approach and emphasis as one informant argued was “unfocused at best.”500 There also did 
not appear to be a consistent understanding of how the absence of a more coherent approach 
was limiting Indonesia’s ability to advance its position within the process. There was also a 
lack of leadership to advance and position health within this process.  
Nevertheless, the government exerted power throughout the HLP process. The 
President’s attendance in the HLP meetings and direct engagement was a clear example of 
how Indonesia’s government exerted structural power within the HLP. This structural power 
was built into the design and conceptualization of the HLP. As one of the three Co-Chairs, 
Yudhoyono and the Indonesian government had substantial structural power to influence 
and shape the HLP process determining which issues were included for consideration (and 
which issues were not considered). This also meant the possibility of applying productive 
power in shaping and writing the eventual HLP outcome report. While Yudhoyono exerted 
structural power over the process and the HLP report broadly, for example advocating for 
inter-sectoral cooperation and a focus on the environment, the government did not take 
advantage of the opportunity to exert structural or productive power for health in terms of 
engaging in the conceptualization (or writing) of the proposed SDG for health.  
While Indonesian policymakers could have exerted considerable structural and 
eventual productive power for health in the HLP given Yudhoyono’s role as Co-Chair and the 
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government’s role in managing the Panel process and authoring the final report, this largely 
did not happen. Informants highlighted that health was not a priority issue for the 
government within the HLP. Some respondents cited the President’s reluctance to move 
forward on domestic health issues as likely to contribute to a reluctance to push on health at 
the global level. The President and members of the Committee instead placed a greater 
priority for Indonesia’s inputs on environmental issues and exerted structural and 
productive power to ensure these issues were well positioned within the HLP report. 
Environmental issues benefitted from strong leadership within the Indonesian government; 
in contrast, health did not have such leadership.   
Yet the Indonesian government did exert structural power by not engaging in or 
prioritising health. In doing so, the Indonesian government signalled within the HLP that 
health was not necessarily a priority for middle-income or emerging countries, and thus 
ceded the issue to other members of the High-Level Panel more interested in health issues, 
particularly representatives from higher-income and lower-income countries. (This partly 
explains the eventual emphasis on continuing the health MDGs in the HLP’s final report.) 
While some Indonesian health policymakers were interested to engage more deeply on 
health in the HLP, informants shared that they felt the requisite policy space for health was 
not present. Health was not a priority for Yudhoyono or the government’s HLP engagement. 
 Following HLP meetings in Monrovia, London and New York, the HLP convened its 
fourth and final (despite a few smaller discussions afterwards) meeting in Indonesia from 
25-27 March 2013. This was the result of a deliberate Indonesian strategy to host the final 
HLP meeting in Bali (instead of Liberia as originally planned). Informants described how 
they used Bali to attract the HLP Secretariat; they believed they would have greater abilities 
to shape the discussion and exert structural power, eventually leveraging the final report 
and exerting productive power within the broader post-2015 process.   
Following Kuntoro and some of his team members’ experiences managing the Aceh 
tsunami response, there was a sense that the HLP was too focused on governments’ roles, 
and not enough on inter-sectoral collaboration. As one informant argued “international 
organizations like the UN are not prepared to do integrated holistic development. They are 
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very agency-based. Again, that is a repeat of the Aceh experience whereby 24 UN agencies 
tried to help with humanitarian money but did no coordinating amongst themselves.”501 
Using Yudhoyono’s role as a Co-Chair to exert structural power within the Panel to redress 
this perceived imbalance, Indonesia highlighted the importance of going beyond 
governments, for example, ensuring that civil society and youth groups played prominent 
roles in the Bali meeting and had opportunities to elevate their voice within the HLP process. 
Following the final HLP meeting in Bali, Kuntoro dispatched one of his UKP4 staff to 
New York to serve in the small writing team for the final HLP report ensuring Indonesia’s 
priorities were represented and thus exerting productive power within the broader post-
2015 process; however, as discussed earlier, health was not an Indonesian government 
priority.502 The President’s national committee on the HLP formally ended when the final 
report was delivered in May 2013.  
As detailed in Chapter Four, the HLP report included a goal of working towards efforts 
to “ensure healthy lives” with five targets focused on under five deaths, vaccinations, 
maternal mortality, sexual and reproductive rights as well as HIV, tuberculosis and malaria 
plus neglected tropical diseases and “priority non-communicable diseases.”503 But it did not 
refer to environmental health issues, and only referred to UHC in passing stating, “[b]ut in 
addition, we must make steady progress in ensuring Universal Health Coverage and access 
to quality essential health services.”503When asked about the HLP report a senior official 
from the Ministry of Health said, “I was very disappointed with the report –it was an 
extremely political process, everyone wanted their input-- but there were many, many more 
meetings after that.”504 More broadly, the HLP report was contested both within the health 
sector and beyond, and faced challenges upon its delivery as many UN Member States felt 
the HLP process was not open and not transparent, which undermined the legitimacy of the 
report.  
While the mandate for President Yudhoyono’s HLP committee formally ended after 
the report was finalised, the President’s role as a Co-Chair positioned Indonesia globally as 
one of the key states to influence and shape the post-2015 development agenda discussion. 
Within Indonesia, the process of supporting the President for the HLP built key relationships 
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between the Delivery Team (UKP4), the MDG Special Envoy’s office and the Ministry of 
Planning, which would later inform the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s engagement in the Open 
Working Group (2013-2014). This was particularly the case following a perception amongst 
the others that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not fulfilling its role and adequately 
representing the Government’s interests in advancing the HLP report as Indonesia’s primary 
input to the rest of the post-2015 process, especially in the early OWG sessions.  
While this perspective was shared across the President’s Office and the Ministry of 
Planning, this served these actors’ interests as it predicated their deeper engagement and 
involvement in the process to support the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These actors 
coordinated closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and also coordinated with the 
Ministry of Health), but there were continued tensions between actors and confusion over 
mandates. In the OWG and the inter-governmental negotiations, the Ministry of Health was 
involved, but some informants felt it was sometimes eclipsed by the MDG Special Envoy’s 
office. This was, however, not the case for the March 2013 Botswana consultation on health. 
 
The Thematic Consultation on Health in Botswana 
Given Yudhoyono’s critical role in the HLP, the organizers of the Botswana thematic 
consultation on health invited Indonesia’s Minister of Health to have a speaking role in the 
in-person meeting and share her perspective. This empowered the Indonesian government 
to exert structural power through its engagement. As detailed in Chapter Four, the thematic 
consultation on health (co-convened by the Governments of Botswana and Sweden, in 
collaboration with WHO and UNICEF) was part of nine thematic consultations coordinated 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2012 and 2013. The six-month 
consultative process for health included over 1,500 individuals participating in twelve face-
to-face consultations12 in Africa, Asia, South America, North America, and Europe; more than 
100 papers were submitted for a web-based consultation.505  
 
12 One of the twelve face-to-face consultations for the thematic consultation on health took place in Indonesia, namely the Beyond 2014 
Global Youth Forum, co-hosted by International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and United Nations’ Family Planning 
Agency (UNFPA), in December 2012.12 This meeting ended with a declaration focused on “staying healthy, comprehensive education, 
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Out of the more than 100 papers submitted for consideration for this consultation, 
there were no submissions from Indonesia.506 This process was open to any institution or 
actor, and some state actors, for example the German Ministry of Cooperation and 
Development or the US Department of State submitted papers. While the importance of this 
part of the process should not be overstated, no Indonesian institutions contributed. This 
could be because these institutions were unaware of the process, uninterested or not 
sufficiently capacitated to respond. For key informants, there was generally a lack of 
awareness about this opportunity to engage in the process.  
This consultation process culminated with a three-day meeting in Botswana in March 
2013; Indonesia’s Minister of Health, Nafsiah Mboi, along with three advisors and the 
Indonesian Ambassador in South Africa attended the meeting. According to informants in 
attendance, the Minister focused on a vision of expanding the MDG approach to include a 
focus on NCDs and on UHC. But as one informant shared about the Ministry’s overall 
engagement in the post-2015 process, “[Minister Mboi] was pretty calm [about the post-
2015 process]. She didn't push anything hard.”507 Yet, others still sought the Ministry and 
Indonesia’s collaboration. For example, Thailand, advocating for a stronger focus on UHC, 
actively engaged the Indonesian Ministry of Health to support a UHC goal for SDG3; Thailand 
felt that it might be able to leverage Indonesia’s structural power as a Co-Chair of the HLP. 
Indonesia, however, was not seen to be driving efforts to promote such an approach in 
health. 
Despite the opportunity to engage and offer leadership or a vision, Indonesia’s 
Ministry of Health’s engagement was not a strident exertion of structural or potentially 
productive power. Nevertheless, Indonesian policymakers were pleased with the process 
and the outcome as they felt their viewpoints were ultimately included in the outcome 
report. The Botswana consultation recommended maximising healthy lives as the goal, 
which would, as the Task Team for the Global Thematic Consultation on Health argued, 
include “acceleration of progress on the health Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
 
families, youth rights, and wellbeing including sexuality, the right to decent work and leadership and meaningful youth participation.” 
While some Indonesian policymakers were aware of this consultation, it did not seem to influence their engagement in the process.   
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agenda; reduction of the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs); and ensuring 
universal health coverage (UHC) and access.”508 As detailed in Chapter Four, ultimately, this 
approach prevailed over the HLP recommendations and strongly shaped the OWG 
negotiations which would largely define the eventual SDG 3 for health. As an informant from 
the Ministry of Health argued, “there was a lot of support for our ideas.”509 This is correct, 
yet, few participants in the process would identify or associate this position with Indonesia. 
Indonesia contributed to the Botswana outcome, but as this outcome was supported by many 
others, it would be difficult to attribute this outcome to Indonesia’s engagement.  
 
The Open Working Group  
Aside from the High-Level Panel and the Botswana thematic health consultation, there was 
also the Open Working Group (OWG) (between March 2013 and April 2014). In this process, 
Indonesia exerted both structural and institutional power. The OWG was originally 
structured to allow thirty countries from the UN’s five regional groups to engage in both 
informal and formal negotiations on potential SDGs; however, there was such overwhelming 
interest and commitment to engage that some countries needed to share their seats in so-
called “troikas” (three country groupings). Indonesia exerted structural power by being a 
member of the OWG.  
Indonesia was able to participate in the OWG, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
negotiated for Indonesia to be grouped with China and Kazakhstan. While there was an initial 
possibility of Indonesia joining a troika with other ASEAN countries, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs felt its priorities were better served grouped with China; this would also give 
Indonesia an opportunity to exert structural power by leveraging China’s voice in the G-77 
plus China Group, which would complement Indonesia’s own institutional power within the 
G-77. Working with China was also aligned with Indonesia’s broader foreign policy efforts of 
projecting Indonesia’s leadership and role as an emergent middle power. Indonesia, China 
and Kazakhstan rotated their troika chairmanship and according to informants, the 
coordination worked relatively well. As this was a UN multilateral process, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was the lead institution for the Indonesian government. During the OWG 
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negotiations, Foreign Affairs convened informal and formal consultations in Jakarta before 
and between sessions to coordinate and seek input; informants from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs argued that some of the other ministries, including the Ministry of Health, and 
agencies did not take these coordination meetings seriously, attended irregularly and/or 
often did not attend or provide substantial input. Officials in the Ministry of Health, on the 
other hand, suggested that they did not have confidence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and that health was not a priority for the government in the post-2015 process anyways.  
After the publication of the HLP report in May 2013, the President’s Committee’s 
mandate officially ended; however, as mentioned above, the process of working together in 
this Committee created relationships between the Delivery Team (UKP4), the MDG Special 
Envoy’s office and the Ministry of Planning, which arguably informed the Ministry of Foreign 
Affair’s engagement in the OWG. Following the first sessions of the OWG in March, April and 
May 2013, the Delivery Team, the MDG Special Envoy’s office and the Ministry of Planning 
became concerned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not sufficiently engaging, and without 
support, might not sufficiently leverage Indonesia’s contributions to the HLP for the OWG.  
Between March 2013 and April 2014, the OWG had thirteen official sessions, which 
included week-long informal consultations following week-long formal negotiations on the 
different themes. The topic of health was considered during the fourth OWG meeting in June 
2013.13 On behalf of the troika, China, according to a summary of the negotiations, argued in 
a statement that “priority areas for health include decreasing the spread of communicable 
diseases and NCDs, UHC, accessibility to medicine, and reducing maternal and child 
mortality.”510 Informants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared their perspective that the 
health goal was considered relatively uncontroversial as long as it went beyond the MDGs 
(the so-called MDGs+ approach) and included both UHC and NCDs (which informants 
indicated were important for Indonesia domestically and for Indonesian health activists).511  
In other words, because SDG3 on health seemed to be moving in the right direction 
from Jakarta’s view, it was not an issue or area on which Indonesia’s Mission in New York 
 
13 During these consultations, many states and other institutions would organize side-sessions to advance or highlight certain issues or 
perspectives seeking to exert some eventual productive power over the process. Indicative of the lack of commitment to the issue of 
health, Indonesia did not host any relevant side events during this health consultation within the OWG. 
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and/or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt it needed to engage and/or expend political 
capital. During the OWG negotiations, there was also a sense that the post-2015 process was 
ongoing and continuous, and that the OWG was not necessarily the final decision on the post-
2015 framework. Indonesia’s negotiators agreed with the summary statement posted by the 
OWG Co-Chairs which included references to UHC and NCDs.512 
The Indonesian position in the negotiations was considered, according to one 
informant, “quite conservative and safe.”513 Some informants felt that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was reluctant to engage in the process or move beyond or outside the broad 
consensus or beyond the general approach of the High-Level Panel report endorsed by 
President Yudhoyono. As one informant shared “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would 
usually take the safest position.”514 In the end as another informant stated, “actually, the 
health goal was quite easy because it didn't need a lot of complicated negotiations or 
lobbying to be accepted.”515 This perspective seemed to summarize the Ministry’s 
engagement on health. As an Indonesian academic concluded, “Indonesia could do much 
better on health. We engage but we don’t fight hard to make it happen. We participate, but 
we do not go all the way.”516 In the post-2015 process, it seems there was a lack of leadership 
and political space, given that the President was not committed to a focus on health.  
One of the main concerns of the Indonesian delegation during the health negotiations 
was how to address sexual and reproductive rights; this was particularly complicated for 
Indonesia given the tension between cultural values and public health between the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health. To avoid having this issue affect the health goal 
(and possibly limit consensus), the MDG Special Envoy’s office suggested a strategy to 
separate the issue from health and move discussion of sexual and reproductive rights to the 
gender goal (eventual SDG5 on Gender Equality). Working through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, this approach was eventually advocated by the G-77 plus China group, and later 
adopted. This was another example of Indonesia leveraging structural power through its 
position within the OWG and President Yudhoyono’s role as a Co-Chair, and institutional 
power through the G-77. This was a tactic the Indonesian delegation used to amplify their 
efforts in the OWG and later also the inter-governmental negotiations.  
  
 
171 
 
Some informants mentioned using “backchannels” to other governments through 
institutional relationships cultivated during the HLP process. A member of the UKP4 
Delivery Team shared, “[o]nce you say something, and you have your flag in front of you, 
things are different. This is where the first- not the first time, of course, but then I realized 
fairly strongly how life of negotiator in that case is really, really challenging. As a negotiator, 
now it was so clear for me at the time to see what we would term power contestation.”517As 
multiple informants shared, there was a tremendous amount of informal lobbying over 
meals and using WhatsApp in the OWG sessions in New York518; there were multiple 
alliances and topic groups. As one member of Indonesia’s delegation said, “country 
groupings are still very much important at the UN. G-77 and China are one of, I would say, 
the primary “movers” in the UN. You get their support, everything will go smoothly. You do 
not get their support, then it is a big pain.”519 Working with China in the OWG troika was a 
key strategy for Indonesia to exert structural power in the negotiations. 
From Indonesia, the OWG was largely perceived as a governmental process which 
would incorporate and build upon the HLP. The OWG concluded in July 2014, which was 
around the same time as the Indonesian Presidential elections. With Jokowi’s election in July 
2014, the situation began to change after Jokowi’s inauguration in October 2014. While 
President Yudhoyono was committed to the process given his engagement in the HLP and 
commitment to position Indonesia in global affairs, the new Jokowi government was less 
ambitious and less engaged.520 The special units in the President’s office: the MDG Special 
Envoy’s office and the Delivery Team (UKP4) units were abolished; some members of UKP4 
stayed in the President’s office and joined the new administration, and the MDG Special 
Envoy, Nina Moeloek, became Minister of Health. Many informants noticed that Jokowi had 
no plans to attend the opening of the United Nations’ General Assembly, and or engage in 
multilateral affairs at the same level as President Yudhoyono. Analysts correctly predicted 
that as President Jokowi was primarily focused on economic interests520 he would likely 
defer and delegate his foreign policy decisions to his advisers and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.521 
Despite this Presidential transition, Indonesia remained engaged in the process. 
Unencumbered by the need to coordinate with Delivery Team (UKP4) or the Special Envoy’s 
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office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to engage in the inter-governmental 
negotiations and even before the SDGs were officially launched, the Foreign Minister called 
for greater commitments from the G-77 and China to achieving the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development.522 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained committed to the SDG 
process later becoming heavily engaged in the July 2016 SDG High-Level Political Forum and 
proposing Indonesia to serve as one of the Volunteer National Reviews. This table below 
summarises how Indonesia exerted power in the process. 
 
Indonesian Government’s Exertion of Power in the Post-2015 Process 
Structural Power • The President and his office influencing the process for 
the High-Level Panel as well as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and others using the President’s role as a Co-
Chair to amplify its influence through the post-2015 
process 
• The Ministry of Health and Foreign Affairs presenting 
during the Botswana Thematic Consultation on Health 
Institutional Power • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs working through the 
G77 to shape and influence the OWG discussions on 
health 
Productive Power • The President and his office shaping the writing of the 
High-Level Panel report 
  
Beyond the HLP, Botswana and the OWG  
Beyond the HLP, the Botswana thematic consultation and the OWG, there were some other 
processes related to the post-2015 negotiations where Indonesia and other partners 
engaged. Informants from UN agencies, like UNDP, UNICEF and WHO in Jakarta classified 
Indonesia’s commitment and engagement across these various processes as high, and 
comparatively strong. In fact, informants in Jakarta stated that there were countless national 
consultations and meetings between 2012-2014 with one informant referring to a sense of 
“post-2015 euphoria.”523 UN agencies, like UNDP and WHO, and some international NGOs, 
like Save the Children, also facilitated various consultations and workshops serving as 
bridges between Indonesian government actors and civil society to understand and engage 
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in the process. Given President Yudhoyono’s role as a HLP Co-Chair, Indonesia was afforded 
continual special status within the process, and Indonesian policymakers were often invited 
to participate in many of the various global post-2015 meetings and consultations.  
The largest meeting within Indonesia was the UNDP-organized national consultation 
held in August 2013. These consultations were intended to complement the thematic 
consultations like the health meeting in Botswana; however, informants seemed sceptical 
about the relevance of the process and highlighted that they did not feel this consultation 
was taken seriously in New York. Instead they noted that the OWG was much more important 
and influential in terms of shaping the SDG agenda. Informants who had been trying to 
advance their own positions shared how they tried to link their process and inputs directly 
to Indonesia’s negotiating team, specifically noting inputs shared with members of both the 
Special Envoy’s office and the Delivery Team (UKP4) who were liaising with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in New York. (While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was officially leading the 
process, it is clear from informants that both the Special Envoy’s Office and UKP4 engaged 
civil society and academic partners to solicit input and feedback.) Following the High-Level 
Panel Report, however, informants in Jakarta considered the post-2015 process as primarily 
one for governments centred in the OWG and intergovernmental negotiations.   
 
Section Three: Discussion  
Ultimately, Indonesia did not come to the post-2015, SDG negotiations for health with a 
specific strategy or approach. Instead some Indonesian policymakers, particularly in the 
Ministry of Health, engaged with a broad vision: they were largely committed to ensuring 
that the MDG agenda for health was continued and the new SDG agenda built on the MDG 
agenda to include both universal health coverage (UHC) and non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs). In this regard, Indonesia may consider itself successful: SDG3 for health 
incorporated the MDG agenda and includes, amongst other issues, a focus on UHC and NCDs. 
Attributing this, however, to the Indonesian government’s efforts would seem like an 
exaggeration; instead, Indonesian policymakers’ engagement contributed to this outcome 
for health, along with many other actors. The Indonesian government exerted institutional, 
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structural and productive power throughout its engagement in the post-2015, SDG process, 
but its engagement was largely focused on expressions of structural and institutional power. 
Indonesia’s government exerted limited productive power. In analysing why, how and where 
Indonesia engaged, three important points emerge.  
First, the role of domestic politics and timing of political processes in Indonesia were 
crucial for determining (and understanding) why, how and where (as well as when) the 
government engaged in the post-2015, SDG process. President Yudhoyono’s tenure and 
appointment to Co-Chair the HLP was decisive for Indonesia’s engagement, and was a policy 
window. For example, had Indonesia’s Presidential elections occurred in 2012 instead of 
2014, it is difficult to imagine President Jokowi being named as one of the HLP Co-Chairs. 
Moreover, President Jokowi also would not have had the Delivery Unit (UKP4) or the Special 
Envoy for the MDGs team within his office to support his engagement in any HLP process 
(both were established as special initiatives of President Yudhoyono). Yudhoyono was 
committed to both reforming and challenging Indonesia’s civil service, and without his 
leadership, these offices would not have existed.  
Indeed, these efforts were related to President Yudhoyono’s efforts to shift and 
change Indonesia’s political situation at home as well as abroad. He wanted to shift the 
government’s identity re-engaging more robustly globally following Indonesia’s 
transformation. As Klotz and Lynch argued, constructivist theorists consider, "the 
production of discourse through content analysis of specific frames. Then they evaluate the 
impacts of these frames on actions."57 The President’s framed Indonesia’s rising status 
within the region and the world as an opportunity to re-exert leadership globally and 
regionally. The HLP was framed as a tool and mechanism to showcase Indonesia’s 
leadership, and achieve these goals. Without Yudhoyono’s leadership and his co-chairing of 
the HLP, Indonesia would likely have lost some of the opportunities this created beyond the 
HLP in Botswana and in the OWG. On the one hand, this would have meant that the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs would have only had to work with the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Health and together these ministries might have been able to more easily align 
their efforts; on the other hand, this might also have meant that, without any tension or sense 
of competition from the President’s office, the Ministries would not have engaged at the same 
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level or with the same rigour as they ultimately did. While it is always challenging to predict 
what might have happened, it seems safe to say that without the President’s engagement in 
the HLP, the Indonesian government’s engagement in the whole process would have been a 
lower priority and would have been less robust.  
Second, applying a power framework enables a deeper analytical understanding of 
how states, and actors within states, engage in global health policy processes by illuminating 
how and where Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 process; this analysis highlights 
potential implications for the future of global health. Indonesia’s government was able to 
leverage Yudhoyono’s role as an HLP Co-Chair exerting structural power to gain the potential 
to exert institutional and productive power. With emerging economies increasingly engaging 
in global health and exerting structural and institutional power, global health governance, 
similar to global governance, could become more diffuse with states and other actors 
seeking, and sometimes creating, new policymaking fora, where they can more easily or ably 
exert power. For example, one might expect the Indonesian government to amplify its 
engagement in the Oslo group and/or to consider including global health as a focus in new 
partnerships, like the 2013-initiated “MIKTA” grouping, between Mexico, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Turkey and Australia.524 Expanding to accommodate inputs from emerging 
economies, the global health agenda will likely shift and become broader as ultimately 
happened with the SDG for health. In this sense, the SDG3 might also represent the basis for 
a wider future global health agenda.  
More broadly, this likely portends a more contested global health policy and, possibly, 
a more fragmented global health governance landscape, as states vary the institutions where 
they focus their efforts and the fora in which they engage. Barnett and Duvall’s power 
framework helps to illuminate the different ways in which the Indonesian government 
engaged and contributes to classifying the various ways states (and other actors) engage in 
global health beyond the most obvious ways of exerting compulsory power or offering 
financial assistance to advance national interests. It also highlights some of the different 
ways in which states can move beyond material power, and exert structural, institutional or 
productive power. It also showcases a concrete example of how states are influencing policy 
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and practice within global health. Identifying these practices could inspire some reflection 
and consideration as states seek to improve and expand their global health engagement.   
Third, by identifying how and where the Indonesian government engaged in the post-
2015 process, one can begin to codify, assess and evaluate this engagement. Understanding 
these efforts to advance Indonesia’s approach, one can also begin to consider how the 
Indonesian government might build and develop the capacity to improve its future strategic 
engagement. The analysis above highlighted some challenges for the Indonesian government 
when exerting both institutional and productive power. What steps might the government 
take to enhance its future capacity, or how might the government prepare for its next 
engagements in global health policy processes? For institutional power, as mentioned above, 
it seems reasonable to expect that the Indonesian government will continue to expand its 
engagement in existing global health initiatives and create new initiatives when and where 
possible. Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to explore new ways and 
emerging fora in which the country can engage diplomatically; other institutions and actors 
beyond Indonesia will also likely look to the country to continue to expand its engagement. 
Accruing additional institutional (and structural) power appears a likely consequence of 
Indonesia’s growing economic and diplomatic importance both regionally and globally. 
Accompanying this structural and institutional power creates additional opportunities to 
exert productive power. Yet when it came to realising the potential of these opportunities in 
the post-2015 process, the government did not always have a coherent, coordinated strategy 
ready to implement or a consistent narrative it could present to advance the government’s 
approach and take advantage of these increasing opportunities to exert productive power. 
With growing institutional and structural power, the question of how the country will 
capitalize on these new opportunities emerges.  
In the mid-nineteen-fifties, the American novelist Richard Wright argued that 
“Indonesia has taken power away from the Dutch, but she does not know how to use it.”525 
Indonesia eventually used this power in the 1960s to contribute to re-shaping the 
international order. Building from the accrual of structural or institutional power now, 
particularly in the ASEAN region, it seems reasonable to expect that there could be more 
openings for Indonesia to exercise power in global health, and perhaps continue to reshape 
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it as it did in the case of the discussion on virus sample sharing. While Indonesia is already 
exerting structural and institutional power, it is still developing its ability to exert productive 
power. How Indonesia exerts this new power exactly remains to be seen.  
To exercise greater productive power will require both technical expertise in health, 
political skills and global partnerships. It requires awareness and capacity in global health 
as well as a commitment to refine and improve Indonesia’s strategic engagement and build 
more sustainable support for global health both within and outside the government. Not 
unrelated to these challenges is the need for much greater alignment across government 
ministries and agencies (as well as incorporating feedback and input from civil society, 
academia and the private sector) as well as coordination with global partners. As detailed 
above, the lack of a coherent approach in Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 process 
was evident. Had the different ministries and agencies within the government invested their 
efforts in aligning and coordinating their efforts to come up with one strategy instead of 
contesting the other actors’ abilities to engage, Indonesia’s government might have had 
greater success within the process. Recognising and understanding this need is a necessary 
first step; however, this requires both political leadership and space to engage on health, 
both which were missing during Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 process. The need 
to deepen coordination and alignment between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Health is also critical. Indonesia’s experience also offers lessons for other 
countries (this will be considered in Chapter Seven).  
 
Conclusion 
This case study on Indonesia’s engagement in the SDG3 negotiations has implications for 
assessing how power is exerted in global health policymaking. It also showcases how 
emerging economies and middle states might seek to shape or reshape the global health 
agenda in the future. In the past, global health policy analysis largely focused on material 
resources. Policy analysis is evolving and beginning to study how and where nonmaterial 
forms of power shape global health priorities. At the same time as there is a shift towards a 
deeper understanding of nonmaterial power, there is also an ongoing evolution in practice. 
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As this case study on Indonesia shows, state actors engage across the “power spectrum” and 
exert different forms of power from compulsory to productive power. It appears that states 
start their engagement by spending resources. As they engage more, they begin to refine and 
develop their capabilities to influence and shape the policy space beyond crude forms of 
compulsory power. They begin to cultivate opportunities to exert structural and institutional 
forms of power. This then evolves with opportunities to exert productive power. Of course, 
these different forms of power are not exclusive. As Barnett and Duvall argued, they are 
"operating simultaneously, intersecting with and reflecting off of each other."526  
This new way of understanding how state actors engage presents opportunities to 
consider how states can affect and shape priorities in global health. For emerging economies 
like Indonesia, compulsory power is unlikely to be a primary expression of power in global 
health. Indonesia is much more likely to build on its historical legacy of foreign policy 
engagement leveraging both structural and institutional power. Exerting structural and 
institutional power are increasingly possible for emerging economies and middle country 
powers with experiences similar to Indonesia. This could herald the beginning of expanding 
engagement in global health as part of emerging economies’ foreign policy efforts. As 
emerging economies begin to demand some restructuring of the existing system and are 
increasingly able to contest the previously unchecked structural and institutional power of 
developed states, this engagement might portend a more contested global health governance 
landscape. This could mean future gridlock in existing global health policy fora and might 
spur increased global health policy fragmentation as emerging economies continue to 
contest and exert structural power. Given that this will likely lead to a more fragmented 
global health agenda, the capacity, skills and ability of different actors to exert productive 
and nonmaterial power are going to become even more important.  
But this case study on Indonesia also highlights the limitations of state actors’ abilities 
to engage in and exert power in global health policymaking. As detailed above, Indonesian 
state actors struggled domestically to align their efforts around a coherent approach. They 
would have had multiple opportunities to advance an approach; however, government 
actors were unable to agree on one strategic approach. This case study highlights the 
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continued dominance of state actors within domestic global health policymaking. Other than 
state actors in Indonesia, there were few domestic non-state actors engaged in global health.  
 More broadly, this analysis demonstrates the added value of using power as a 
framework to help illuminate and assess actors’, particularly states’, roles in global health. 
Better understanding how power is exerted and deployed could contribute to improving 
how actors engage, and identifying key determinants of comparatively more ‘successful’ or 
‘effective’ efforts in global health; a deeper knowledge of what determines better policy 
efforts could also enhance policy processes and lead to better governance mechanisms.  
For example, having reviewed this process, the Indonesian government might seek to 
reconsider and reform its engagement in global health starting by ensuring coordination 
between its Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Health. Indonesia could also consider reviewing 
other countries’ engagement and strategies for global health; for example, some countries, 
like Japan, have developed explicit Global Health Strategies, or have appointed Ambassadors 
for Global Health. This might also help Indonesia overcome the lack of coordination and 
leadership within its government on global health issues. A more strategic reconsideration 
of how states engage in global health could transform states’ abilities to negotiate global 
health policies, eventually improving and saving lives. Of course, having a better 
understanding of states’ power in global health might also mean other actors, like civil 
society or private sector actors, increase their attempts to leverage states’ influence to 
advance their interests. This is a possibility; however, as states expand their knowledge, they 
might also gain knowledge of how to improve their position vis-à-vis other commercial or 
civil society actors. For the future, it could be that state actors able to partner with (or 
orchestrate a combination of) both domestic and global non-state actors will be more 
successful. Indeed, state actors able to leverage or harness non-state actors’ capabilities 
might be an important attribute of more ‘successful’ actors. 
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Chapter Seven  
Comparing and Contrasting Japan and Indonesia’s Engagement in 
the Post-2015, Sustainable Development Goals Process: 
Implications for the Future of Global Health Policymaking 
 
Main Points:  
• Global health policy engagement serves as a policy tool to advance domestic political 
interests. Both Japan and Indonesia engage in global health, and specifically engaged 
in the post-2015 process for health, as part of their broader foreign policy efforts. 
These efforts primarily served domestic political interests and should be understood 
within their respective political settings as part of national foreign policy efforts.  
• Why a state actor engages in global health has implications for how and where states 
engage. This motivation animates a country’s engagement and shapes its 
commitment as well as the level and distribution of resources from state actors to 
achieve these objectives. How a government engages in global health should be 
contextualised and framed within a government’s broader foreign policy and 
diplomatic priorities.  
• National narratives constructed to justify greater state engagement in global health 
policymaking, and the process to create these strategies, are critical. For these 
processes, the role of individual policymakers (meaning their leadership, their 
strategy and their involvement of both national and international partners) in 
developing these narratives have implications for the implementation of these 
strategies. The processes to construct these narratives shape state actors’ capabilities 
to engage and contribute to determine how these narratives are implemented. 
• How state policymakers and institutions construct global health narratives has 
profound implications for how and where states exert power and engage in the policy 
and practice of global health. For example, how different state institutions, 
particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health, collaborate and 
coordinate their engagement is critical to determine states’ abilities to exert power 
and where they engage in global health.  
• While how contextualised the global health strategy is within, or aligned with, a 
national foreign policy and how understood and coordinated it is within and across a 
government is important, the way it is implemented and asserted is also crucial. It is 
necessary to consider strategy, or how strategic states are when they engage in global 
health, and exert power. 
• As states deepen their engagement in global health and the field becomes more 
contested, states will need to think more carefully and strategically about how they 
engage and exert power. As states’ understandings of, and experience in, engaging in 
global health mature, states will likely expand their ability to exert non-material 
forms of power. For example, state actors able to harness the knowledge and 
experience of non-state actors will likely able to amplify their influence. 
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Introduction  
The case-studies on Japan (Chapter Five) and Indonesia (Chapter Six) analyse these states’ 
engagement in the field of global health, and specifically their engagement in the 
conceptualisation of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goal for health (SDG3). 
Highlighting how state actors exert power to influence and shape global health, they 
contribute to a deeper understanding of global health policymaking. These case-studies 
contribute to a better understanding of why, how and where states engage in global health 
and demonstrate the critical role of states within global health policymaking. Applying 
constructivism to understand why Japan and Indonesia engaged in the post-2015 process, 
and using Barnett and Duvall’s power framework to analyse how and where states engaged, 
these case-studies demonstrate the resilient value of state engagement in the field of global 
health. A more nuanced understanding of why, how and where states engage contributes to 
an expanding analysis illuminating how power is exerted in global health; in turn, an explicit 
recognition of how power works can help improve global health policy and analysis.  
There is a complex combination of strategic factors advanced by domestic and global 
actors both within and beyond states shaping why actors engage in global health 
policymaking. Analysts have used different frameworks to classify various rationales 
motivating state engagement. For example, Stuckler and McKee consider global health to be 
motivated by foreign policy, security, charity, investment and/or public health 
considerations.527 Kickbusch identifies security, economic and social justice concerns to be 
the primary motivations linking health to foreign policy.528 Dhillon and Karan most recently 
argue that actors’ motivations can be grouped into three overarching rationales: “ensuring 
health security, promoting economic and political development, and achieving health equity 
as a universal human right.”529 While achieving health equity as a universal human right 
might motivate practitioners (and likely motivated some policymakers in both Japan and 
Indonesia), the other two rationales -- focused on health security as well as economic and 
political development -- were decisive objectives motivating both Japanese and Indonesian 
governments to engage in the conceptualization of the post-2015 development agenda for 
health as well as within the broader global health agenda.  
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Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Japan and Indonesia played a decisive role in 
determining why, how and where each state engaged in global health policymaking, as global 
health was understood as part of each country’s foreign policy. Interests and political policy 
goals were dominant; global health was considered within the context of Japan and 
Indonesia’s broader foreign policy goals. Indeed, Japanese policymakers deliberately 
constructed a narrative to position global health as aligned with the country’s security, 
economic and political goals. Japanese policymakers were committed to and interested in 
using global health policymaking to advance Japanese foreign policy interests and serve 
domestic political interests. Policymakers built upon Japan’s hosting of the 2008 G8 Summit 
and the 2011 Japan Lancet Series. Policymakers constructed a narrative to animate the 
country’s engagement leveraging its world’s highest life expectancy justifying its focus on 
universal health coverage (UHC) and aligning this with an emphasis on human security 
within the context of an assertive new government’s geopolitical and economic interests.  
In Indonesia, the government used and amplified the President’s role as a Co-Chair 
within and beyond the High-Level Panel (HLP) process to advance its broader foreign policy 
goals of extending Indonesian influence and raising the country’s profile to accelerate 
economic development. Yet domestic political contestation limited Indonesian state 
engagement in the SDG for health discussions. Nevertheless, along with a commitment to 
finishing the MDG agenda for health, Indonesian government policymakers focused on using 
the SDG3 discussions to advance domestic health priorities; this meant advocating for health 
systems moving towards UHC and improving efforts to address non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs). In both cases, why Japan and Indonesia engaged also influenced how they exerted 
power and where they engaged. 
 As argued in Chapter Two, state actors historically engaged in tropical medicine and 
international health activities primarily by providing financial resources. In the era of global 
health, financial resources are still important and their role in shaping global health 
discourse and the global health agenda cannot be ignored. Yet development assistance for 
health (DAH) at the global level is beginning to plateau (at around $36.9 billion in 2016); in 
the meantime, domestic spending on low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) on health is 
growing and dwarves DAH (estimated at $840 billion in 2014).530 DAH is still important in 
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terms of driving the global health agenda and thereby shaping domestic spending; however, 
expanding domestic spending in LMICS as well as growing interest in some emerging 
economies to contest the global agenda are challenging the previous centrality of DAH for 
determining global health priorities.530Given this changing situation, there are increasing 
opportunities for nonmaterial resources to shape global health policy priorities, and some 
states are embracing the use of nonmaterial resources to influence global health policy.  
These case-studies demonstrate how states are using nonmaterial resources to exert 
power and are likely to continue to cultivate and develop their influence, shaping global 
health policy and priorities. These case-studies apply Barnett and Duvall’s framework for 
understanding power, and focus on three out of their four different types of power: 1) 
institutional (indirect power, such as how international institutions are designed to favour 
one actor over another); 2) structural (the overall constitution or framework of actor and 
their roles); and 3) productive (control over the possession and distribution of resources) 
power. For global health, one could think of a well-positioned state leveraging a multilateral 
agency to exert institutional power; a prestigious university or NGO positioning its staff as 
experts to provide technical policy support and exert structural power; and a UN agency or 
a private-sector actor advancing and promoting a particular agenda or approach to 
addressing health challenges as an exertion of productive power. 
Both Japan and Indonesia exerted structural, institutional and productive power to 
advance their interests and further their policy goals. The growing role of nonmaterial 
resources will shape and influence how actors participate as well as where actors engage in 
global health policymaking. For future global health policy making, nonmaterial resources 
will likely play an important, and expanding, role.  
In terms of where both Japanese and Indonesian actors engaged, the Japanese 
government engaged largely beyond the post-2015 process exerting considerable 
institutional, structural and productive power to influence and shape the post-2015 agenda 
for health. The case-study on Indonesia highlights the motivations for why the Indonesian 
government engaged largely within the post-2015 process (meaning with the High-Level 
Panel, the Botswana thematic consultation on health and the Open Working Group 
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negotiations) exerting structural, institutional and productive power. Indonesian 
policymakers were strongly committed to health; however, unlike their Japanese 
counterparts, they were unwilling, or perhaps unable, to create a narrative which captured 
high-level political attention and justified high-level commitment and support for global 
health. As shown in these two cases studies, why states engage has implications for how and 
where states engage; at the same time, how and where states engage also shapes the 
construction of national motivation narratives. These factors are complex and inter-related. 
As detailed in Chapter One, globalisation continues to transform international 
relations, global governance and global health. Globalisation, along with shifts in geopolitics, 
is causing states to adapt why, how and where they engage each other as well as interact 
with other actors in global health. State engagement in global health exerts power shaping 
the conceptualisation of global health with implications for policy and practice. These case-
studies contribute to building a more robust understanding of why and how state actors 
engage in global health. Reflecting on the international relations theory of constructivism, 
first, this chapter first reviews and contrasts why both Japan and Indonesia engaged. Second, 
reflecting on Barnett and Duvall’s framework of power, this chapter explores how and where 
both Japan and Indonesia engaged and exerted power. Third, this chapter considers the 
implications of this analysis for future global health analysis and policymaking.  
Section One: Why both Japan and Indonesia Engaged 
Using constructivist analysis, this section reviews and assesses why both Japan and 
Indonesia participated in the post-2015 SDG3 process, and compares and contrasts these 
states’ engagement. There are three points worth noting and considering for better 
understanding why states engage in global health policymaking.  
First, in both case-studies, global health policy engagement (as part of national 
foreign policy efforts) served as a policy tool to advance domestic political interests. Both 
Japan and Indonesia engage in global health, and specifically engaged in the post-2015 
process for health, as part of their broader foreign policy efforts. These efforts served 
domestic political interests. In both cases, engaging in global health was used as a tool to 
advance each state’s wider foreign policy and strategic interests; these broader foreign 
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policy efforts are largely determined by domestic political interests. Governments used 
global health policy to achieve domestic aims: in the case of the post-2015 process, both 
Japan and Indonesia developed narratives (Japan explicitly; Indonesia implicitly) 
highlighting the importance and success of the MDGs and identifying the new process to 
create their successor framework as critical for international development and global health, 
and thus necessary for domestic political goals to project national interests globally. Japan 
focused on promoting human security, and Indonesia was interested in projecting an image 
of an emerging, middle economy. Since the 1990s, Japan had actively been contesting the 
focus of global development policies. In contrast, Indonesia had initially contested the 
international order in the 1960s, but then became a recipient of global development policies, 
including the MDGs, until the late 2000s.  
Constructivist analysis focuses on how actors’ identities, ideas and interests are 
socially constructed through interaction with other actors. Given the prohibition of a military 
in its post-World War II Constitution, Japan’s political system is anchored in pacificism. 
Policymakers sought to identify other, non-military ways to express and advance Japanese 
interests. Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has been one of the primary ways 
in which Japan engages and exerts influence. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, politicians 
and policymakers sought to reconceptualize Japan’s ODA under the umbrella of an effort to 
promote the concept of “human security.” Responding to critique of this concept, 
policymakers advanced health as a concrete way to promote human security, which became 
a leading principle of Japanese foreign policy. Following the 2008 G8 Summit in Toyako, 
Hokkaido, health became increasingly important both in its own right as a policy agenda for 
Japan, but also as a way to further Japan’s promotion of human security.  
In advance of the 2008 G8 Summit and with the support of Japan’s Prime Minister at 
the time, Keizo Takemi, a Japanese politician and policy entrepreneur, initiated a policy 
process to develop policy recommendations for Japan and the (then) G8’s engagement in 
global health. Building on inputs from global and domestic policymakers, this process 
focused on strengthening health systems. An informal working group evolved and developed 
a special Lancet Series on Japan; the process for this Series built on the focus on health 
systems and constructed a narrative focused on advancing the concept of universal health 
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coverage (UHC). This process coincided with a political window of opportunity with a new 
Japanese administration in 2012, which was committed to asserting Japanese leadership and 
advancing Japanese interests globally. Policymakers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then 
adapted this constructed narrative to animate its focus on human security and shape its 2013 
Global Health Diplomacy Strategy. With cross-government support, including from the Prime 
Minister, this plan aligned efforts to advance UHC. Ultimately, policymakers invested 
resources in a process which helped construct a narrative focused on UHC shaping how and 
where Japan could engage in global health, including the post-2015, SDG agenda for health. 
For Indonesia, a country which had been a MDG “policy recipient” in the early 2000s, 
the opportunity to engage in the conceptualisation and creation of the post-2015, SDG 
agenda, with President Yudhoyono co-chairing the HLP, built upon the country’s proud 
legacy of bold international leadership starting from the Bandung Conference in 1955. 
Drawing upon multiple institutions within the Indonesian government to inform the 
government’s engagement in the HLP, Yudhoyono highlighted his pluralistic ambitions to 
reform Indonesian government bureaucracy. Yudhoyono’s engagement in the HLP also 
reflected his aspirations to project Indonesian leadership and “internationalize” Indonesia’s 
experience affirming the country’s emergence as a middle power. It was important for his 
government to lead, and to be seen in this position globally by a domestic audience. 
Outside Indonesia, particularly in the US and the UK, there was great anticipation and 
expectation that Indonesia would increasingly engage on global health issues. Inside 
Indonesia; however, the reality was slightly different. Policymakers were more interested in 
advancing domestic health reforms. Once the President committed to serving as a Co-Chair 
for the HLP, Indonesian policymakers sought to take advantage of his role as Co-Chair to 
advance their interests and consolidate their domestic political positions. Policymakers 
assessed the President’s engagement as an opportunity to solidify their institutional 
interests within a rapidly evolving and shifting political environment by actively contesting 
how and where the President and the government should engage in the process across 
sectors, including health.  
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Unlike in Japan, however, there was not an ongoing, wider policy dialogue across 
Indonesia’s government on global health. Instead, the government’s engagement in health 
appeared more opportunistic. This is a key point of comparison between Japan and 
Indonesia. Both Indonesia’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Health had a number of 
prominent engagements in the global health policy space which served Indonesia’s foreign 
policy aims; however, these were not part of a broader strategy. While there was a coherent 
foreign policy to project Indonesia as a regional (and global) emergent power, there was not 
an Indonesian global health strategy aligned with this national foreign policy. Policymakers 
advancing these global health engagements viewed them as an opportunity to advance their 
domestic positions, but these engagements were not part of an overall effort to mobilize, and 
then leverage, deeper Indonesian commitment to global health. Despite anticipation, or even 
expectations, from external observers, these engagements, like Indonesia’s role in the 
Foreign Policy and Global Health Group, were not part of a wider, integrated strategy. The 
need for (and/or potential benefits from) coordinating these efforts did not seem to be 
necessary to key informants in Jakarta.  
On the contrary, given the tension between different domestic actors’ interests, 
Indonesian policymakers did not attempt to create an overall global health narrative. 
Policymakers in the Ministry of Health were fully committed to and engaged in their own 
domestic reform efforts, and did not necessarily see the value of global engagement for their 
domestic objectives. Moreover, Indonesian policymakers were sceptical that they would be 
able to cultivate or develop the necessary political support from the President’s office for 
strident global health engagement. Accordingly, policymakers were unable to agree upon a 
consistent strategy for Indonesia’s engagement on SDG3. Instead, policymakers advanced 
discreet issues and contributed to an emergent consensus on SDG3 (which ultimately 
succeeded) aiming to incorporate the MDG agenda with a focus on UHC and NCDs along with 
other health issues. In sum, Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 discussions for health 
goal were driven by the President’s foreign policy efforts. His appointment as Co-Chair of the 
High-Level Panel ensured that Indonesia had a prominent role throughout the process; 
however, he was not convinced or interested in leveraging this opportunity for health. 
Nevertheless, his role as a Co-Chair afforded and created opportunities for Indonesian health 
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policymakers to engage and advance their perspectives as part of the global discourse and 
contestation around the eventual SDG3 for health. 
In Japan, policymakers built on the country’s growing exertion of soft power, 
identifying a policy space, namely global health, which could help promote Japanese political 
interests, advance Japan’s foreign policy concept of human security and further Japanese 
economic interests. Building on Japan’s prior engagements exerting power to shape global 
development policies, policymakers constructed a political narrative which ensured high-
level political attention and commitment to global health, including engaging in the process 
to conceptualize and create the post-2015 SDG3 agenda. In Indonesia, policymakers were 
less interested in global health, and more interested in projecting Indonesia as an emergent 
middle power, advancing the Indonesian experience globally as well as their individual and 
institutional perspectives; policymakers used the opportunity of the post-2015 SDG3 agenda 
to advance these interests. For Indonesia, it was important to have a seat at the table and to 
be seen sitting at the table. Both of these cases demonstrate how global health engagement 
is shaped by domestic political exigencies, and considered a foreign policy issue. This is 
something policymakers should keep in mind when considering how to improve their ability 
to engage in global health policymaking. These cases also reflect the potential value (as well 
as the perceived cost) of developing a global health narrative. While most countries will 
likely not invest the same amount of time or resources as Japan did into its process to develop 
a global health strategy, other countries might consider replicating this experience to be 
ready with a narrative and strategy as possible political opportunities might arise to advance 
their position.  
Second, these cases highlight how narratives justifying greater state engagement in 
global health policymaking, and the process to create these strategies, are critical. For these 
processes, the role of individual policymakers and their leadership in creating these 
narratives also matters. In Indonesia, there was not an explicit policy process to develop a 
global health diplomacy strategy; there also was not an explicit process to develop a 
narrative or strategy to engage on health in the post-2015 SDG process; moreover, there was 
not an individual leader empowered or able to steward a process like this. Implicitly what 
happened was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs engaged with both the Ministry of Health 
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and the Delivery Unit (UKP4) in the President’s Office which deferred to the office of the 
President’s Special Envoy on MDGs when questions around health surfaced in the post-2015 
process. There was never a systematic effort to develop a more coordinated, comprehensive 
approach between and across these institutions.  
In contrast, Japan had an explicit, ongoing policy dialogue on global health starting in 
2007, led by Takemi, which evolved into a more robust and strategic discussion on how the 
country should engage globally. As personal health issues had contributed to shortening his 
first administration, Japan’s Prime Minister was also sympathetic to health issues and 
quickly grasped the opportunities to expand opportunities for Japanese health and medical 
industries.  This led to an explicit Japanese Global Health Diplomacy Strategy in 2013 which 
identified the post-2015 process as an important target. While an explicit strategy or 
narrative does not guarantee success, it undoubtedly helps align different domestic policy 
actors, and can attract high-level political support. In this sense, Japan was better positioned 
for its engagement than Indonesia. It had an explicit strategy and narrative motivating its 
engagement; this helped motivate and justify broader engagement across state actors. Japan 
also had politicians, like Takemi and Shiozaki (along with the Prime Minister), as described 
in Chapter Five, uniquely positioned to play this role and exert this leadership.  
Third, these cases illustrate why a country engages has implications for how and 
where states engage. This motivation can animate a country’s engagement, and shape its 
commitment as well as the level and distribution of resources from state actors to achieve 
these objectives. In Japan’s case, the GHD Strategy served to align actors across the 
government and coordinate efforts ultimately improving how and where it engaged; in 
Indonesia, in contrast, the lack of a strategy or compelling narrative on why the government 
should engage undermined the government’s ability to engage and limited how and where it 
engaged in the process. Appreciating states’ motivations are helpful to understand why 
states engage in global health, but does not alone explain state engagement in global health.  
More broadly, this analysis documents how constructivist analysis is essential to 
understand why state states engage in global health. In fact, both cases showcase how critical 
the construction of a narrative, and the process to do so, is to motivate and shape state 
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engagement in global health. While a realist perspective might justifiably highlight 
Indonesia’s interest in projecting national interests globally, and a liberal perspective could 
emphasize how Japan is integrated into international institutions, neither of these 
perspectives would identify the nuance which explains why each state engaged (and how 
actors engaged within the state to make this case) as well as how and where each state 
engaged globally.  
These two case-studies also highlight the importance and the limits of individual 
leadership to motivate state engagement in global health. Parliamentarian Takemi, Minister 
of Health Shiozaki and Prime Minister Abe all wanted Japan to engage more deeply, and 
ideally lead, in global health; their leadership and commitment coupled with the Japanese 
bureaucracy, international partnerships and technical capacity enabled Japan to exert 
considerable power. Whereas in Indonesia, there was strong commitment and leadership 
from President Yudhoyono in projecting Indonesia’s global engagement; however, there was 
a reluctance or an absence of interest in engaging in global health. Indonesia state 
institutions might have had comparatively fewer international partnerships than Japan; but 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy did have the technical capacity to engage. The difference was likely 
the political space and leadership. Japan’s leadership was committed to engaging and leading 
in global health. Building on its unique history and presidential commitment to foreign policy 
issues, Indonesia’s leadership was committed to engaging globally, but was less committed 
to engaging in global health. Building on this comparison of why both Japan and Indonesia 
engaged, this next section reviews how and where these states engaged in the process. 
 
Section Two: How and Where both Japan and Indonesia Engaged 
National motivations shaped and continue to shape Japan and Indonesia’s global health 
engagement; more specifically, their motivation defined how and where each state engaged 
in the post-2015 process for SDG3, the goal for health. After reviewing how and where each 
exerted power according to Barnett and Duvall’s framework (considering structural, 
institutional and productive power) in the previous chapters, three points emerge for states 
considering engaging in global health diplomacy and policymaking.  
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First, how a government engages in global health should be contextualised within a 
government’s broader foreign policy and diplomatic priorities. This is about framing, or what 
McInnes et al define as how an “issue is presented in such a way as to tie it into a broader set 
of ideas about the world, or ‘socially constructed reality’, and through this gain influence and 
policy purchase.”531 As McInnes and colleagues argue, “actors often deliberately (and in 
many cases strategically) use frames as a tool of persuasion, deploying them to call attention 
to an issue, influence other actors’ perceptions of their own interests and convince them of 
the legitimacy/appropriateness of the advocate’s preferred policy response.”531 How 
national policymakers frame their government’s engagement in global health is critical to a 
state’s ability to engage and exert power. The construction of a narrative to motivate 
engagement was an explicit process in Japan, but happened more implicitly, if at all, in 
Indonesia. 
In Japan, policymakers jointly developed a compelling framing for Japan to engage in 
global health across the government; this worked to inspire policymakers’ engagement and 
to align different actors across the Japanese government. In Indonesia, this sort of policy 
dialogue did not exist. Policymakers were still contesting which institutions should be 
engaged and how as well as what Indonesia’s contribution should be. Policymakers were not 
able to recognize the need to create a process to develop such a shared perspective.  
Second, how different state institutions, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Health, collaborate and coordinate their engagement is critical to 
determine states’ abilities to exert power and where they engage in global health. It seems 
reasonable to contend that the more understood or embedded a global health strategy is 
across actors within a government policy process, the stronger broad engagement might be, 
and the more power a state might be able to exert. This also raises a broader point about 
power within global health. It is not finite. It is not necessarily dependent on financial 
resources. On the contrary, as these cases show, state actors’ power to influence and shape 
global health can be developed through international partnerships and technical knowledge. 
State actors can cultivate and expand their ability to influence global health policymaking 
through combining their ability to exert power with strategic engagement. This naturally 
affects where, meaning the policy fora in which, states engage.  
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In Japan’s case, the rationale for its engagement was understood across state 
institutions. Japanese policymakers interested in global health successfully constructed a 
compelling case framing why and how the Japanese government should engage on health. 
The Japanese government was interested in projecting Japanese leadership and 
demonstrating the global relevance of Japan’s experience with UHC. To ensure coordination, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health exchanged and rotated personnel 
working on global health between the two institutions to help align their policies and build 
trust between the two state institutions. Moreover, there were regular, formal coordination 
meetings between these two ministries along with the Ministry of Finance as well as informal 
meetings across government institutions to share updates on Japan’s engagement in global 
health policy, and opportunities to promote UHC. As the focus on UHC was aligned with 
Japan’s broader foreign policy, Japan’s Global Health Diplomacy Strategy was not just about 
engaging within the post-2015 process, but this strategy motivated wider engagement 
beyond14 the process.  
In comparison, Indonesia’s government largely engaged within the post-2015 
process. It was keen to serve, and be seen serving, in a leading position (eg: President 
Yudhoyono’s role as Co-Chair in the HLP), consistent with its interest in projecting 
Indonesian leadership and an image of the country as an emerging economy; however, it did 
not have a specific approach or focus for its efforts on health. Instead, the Indonesian 
government focused its efforts on other issues. Like Prime Minister Abe in Japan, President 
Yudhoyono was looking for issues where Indonesia could lead and have global impact as this 
was important for his domestic audience. Ultimately for Indonesia, however, health did not 
appear to be, or there was not an active effort to construct a rationale for health to be, an 
issue on which Indonesia could lead globally.  
 
14 This happened for several reasons. First, by the time Japan’s GHD Strategy was launched in June 2013, the post-2015 process was well advanced 
with the main inputs from the Botswana consultation (April 2013), the HLP (completed in May 2013) and the OWG (which commenced in March 2013 
and had its meeting on health in June 2013) already complete. Japanese policymakers were nevertheless keen to advance and project their 
commitment for UHC, and so had to look elsewhere to find and create opportunities to advance their commitment to UHC. Second, while the post-2015 
process was well underway, there was a sense that Japan’s government could nevertheless still exert influence and power over the evolving post-2015 
process in alternative ways, for example through its relationships with the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the World Bank, which were both 
engaged in the process. Third, Japanese policymakers, like many others, questioned where or not the official post-2015 SDG policy process would 
evolve along the lines originally intended, especially given the circuitous evolution of the MDGs and other global policy processes. Many policymakers 
considered the possibility that another side process might eventually come to derail or overshadow the process. More broadly, the relevance of the 
SDGs for the broader global health agenda was uncertain. As argued in Chapter Four, while the MDGs were central to the prevailing global health 
agenda, the importance of the SDGs for the future global health agenda was (and still remain) somewhat unclear. Like they did in the early days of the 
MDGs, Japanese policymakers were hedging their investments in the SDG process. 
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This raises questions of leadership. In Japan, the government was led by Prime 
Minister Abe who was determined to exert leadership globally; in Japan, there were also 
policymakers ready and able to make the case on how the country could and should lead on 
global health. In Indonesia, there was a President committed to and interested in exerting 
leadership globally; however, there was not a leader or group of leaders within the health 
sector in Indonesia able to make the case for how health might fit into this. This had 
implications for how each Japan and Indonesia engaged and exerted power. In Japan, the 
Prime Minister’s leadership created political space and a window of opportunity for Japanese 
politicians, policymakers and academics to engage, and thereby also gain domestic political 
capital with the Prime Minister. Whereas in Indonesia, President Yudhoyono was committed 
to lead globally, but his commitment for global health engagement was less palpable. This 
meant policymakers had less political space and fewer incentives to engage in global health 
policymaking which offered little political capital, especially when there were seemingly 
more pressing domestic demands on policymakers’ time.  
Japanese policymakers leveraged the government’s diplomatic influence, ultimately 
exerting complementary productive, institutional and structural power to advance the 
government’s GHD Strategy’s focus on UHC (as detailed in the table below). The government 
exerted structural power through the Prime Minister’s office, using development aid and 
alliances taking advantage of Japan’s position as the world’s third largest economy in its 
direct, bilateral diplomatic relationships with other countries. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs exerted structural power directly leveraging Japan’s diplomatic abilities and 
resources by convening an informal SDG-specific contact group comprised of national 
representatives and key policymakers in the early days of the post-2015 process to advance 
human security. Parliamentarians and the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Health 
together coordinated their efforts to exert institutional and productive power indirectly 
leveraging key global health institutions like the World Bank and the World Health 
Organization. Exerting institutional power, Japan strategically used its relationships and 
small amounts of funding in both institutions to ensure and support a focus on UHC.  Japan 
then exerted productive power through the World Bank and WHO; both the Bank and WHO 
convened meetings and released reports and other knowledge products focused on UHC 
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shaping the priorities of other countries. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also deployed 
structural and productive power hosting several high-level events as well as lower-level 
briefings and seminars on UHC again signalling the government’s focus and wielding its role 
as a leading global economy to steer and direct other countries towards a focus on UHC. The 
government leveraged G7 diplomacy as well as its TICAD meetings with African states and 
bilaterally using its JICA development cooperation to exert additional power to advance a 
focus on and prioritisation of UHC within the global health agenda. Japan’s exertion of power 
is summarised in the table below. 
 
Japanese Government’s Exertion of Power to Influence the Post-2015 Process 
Structural Power • The Prime Minister’s office using bilateral relations 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs convening a SDG 
Contract Group in 2011-2012 as well as high-level 
events (eg the UHC Forum) and lower-level briefings in 
Geneva and New York  
Institutional Power • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Health and Finance 
leveraging the World Bank and the World Health 
Organisation to prioritise Japanese priorities within 
these institutions as well as taking advantage of the 
exchange of personnel within these institutions 
Productive Power • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Health and Finance 
leveraging knowledge and technical expertise from 
both the World Bank and the World Health Organisation 
to advance Japanese priorities  
 
Whereas Japanese policymakers identified the post-2015 process to advance their 
global health interests, in Indonesia’s case, the situation was the opposite. The post-2015 
process “identified” Indonesia. The UN secretariat chose Indonesia’s experience as 
important and relevant for incorporation into the post-2015 process. Given Indonesia’s 
rising global profile, the UN Secretary-General requested then Indonesian President 
Yudhoyono to serve as one of the three HLP Co-Chairs. In this role, Yudhoyono sought to 
draw upon Indonesian policymakers to reflect and embed Indonesia’s national development 
experience into the Panel’s deliberations and eventual recommendations. In turn, 
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Indonesian policymakers leveraged the President’s role as a Co-Chair within and beyond the 
HLP process.  Yet health was not a high priority for Yudhoyono’s HLP involvement.15 
Despite this challenge, Indonesia’s government exerted structural and institutional as 
well as productive power in the post-2015, SDG process for health (as detailed in the table 
below). The President’s office exerted structural power throughout the HLP process by Co-
Chairing the report. The HLP was an informal group established by the UN Secretary-
General’s office for the post-2015 process, and for Indonesia to be one of the three leaders of 
this Panel and subsequent report was an opportunity to exert structural power controlling 
how the panel was constituted, for example, by determining to host the final consultation in 
Bali. This hosting of the final meeting in Bali, combined with dispatching one of the few 
authors for writing the final report, enabled the Indonesian government to have 
considerable productive power over the report’s content. This was particularly influential as 
the HLP report was one of the first and most substantial contributions within the official 
post-2015 process. While the government exerted power in these instances, it did not exert 
this power within the HLP process on health issues; however, Indonesia’s government did 
engage on health in both Botswana and the OWG. While its position differed from the HLP 
approach, the Ministry of Health and Foreign Affairs exerted structural power within the 
Botswana Thematic Consultation by presenting in one of the limited sessions during the two-
day meeting. The President’s office along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Health and 
Planning exerted structural and institutional power by engaging actively throughout the 
OWG negotiations both unilaterally and multilaterally through its troika with China and 
Kazakhstan as well as through the institution of the G77. More broadly, the government 
exerted structural power via its role in the HLP throughout the wider post-2015, SDG process 
as many sought to engage Indonesia to leverage its role as a Co-Chair. In contrast to Japan, 
Indonesia’s government largely engaged within the official process and did not seek to 
 
15 There are several reasons for this. First and most importantly, there were simply higher priority issues for the Indonesian government, like the 
environment. There was a compelling narrative around why and how Indonesia should engage on the environment, and the government had already 
earned some profile on this issue globally; moreover, the issue of the environment had supporters with links throughout the government to champion the 
issue. Second, President Yudhoyono had been reluctant to move forward with domestic health reforms; in fact, the courts had ruled against him to 
expand domestic health reforms as detailed in Chapter Six. Third, while some Indonesian policymakers had strong ideas on certain health issues (like 
on sexual and reproductive rights or non-communicable diseases), Indonesian health policymakers were struggling to get high-level support for their 
efforts to advance domestic health reforms, and did not yet have a compelling narrative on how to link this to why and how Indonesia should engage in 
global health. 
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engage on health outside the official process. Indonesia’s engagement on health was not part 
of a broader global health strategy. The table below summarises the Indonesian 
Government’s exertion of power in the post-2015 process.  
 
Indonesian Government’s Exertion of Power in the Post-2015 Process 
Structural Power • The President and his office influencing the process for 
the High-Level Panel as well as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and others using the President’s role as a Co-
Chair to amplify its influence through the post-2015 
process 
• The Ministry of Health and Foreign Affairs presenting 
during the Botswana Thematic Consultation on Health 
Institutional Power • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs working through the 
G77 to shape and influence the OWG discussions on 
health 
Productive Power • The President and his office shaping the writing of the 
High-Level Panel report 
 
Reviewing how and where both the Japanese and Indonesian governments engaged 
and exerted power according to Barnett and Duvall’s framework demonstrates the utility of 
identifying the different ways in which states engage in global health. This framework helps 
classify and contrast how states engage. This lays the groundwork for beginning to improve 
abilities to assess, and ultimately improve how states act and engage in global health 
policymaking. Comparing Indonesia and Japan, the Indonesian government exerted less 
power than the Japanese government did. The Indonesian government’s engagement was 
not closely integrated into national foreign policy efforts and was not coordinated across 
ministries. In contrast, support across the Japanese government for the national Global 
Health Diplomacy Strategy enabled the government to exert comparatively considerable 
power. Yet the mere exertion of power, considerable or inconsiderable, does not necessarily 
explain success or failure in achieving global health policy objectives. While applying Barnett 
and Duvall’s power framework illustrates the different ways how and where states engage 
and exert power, it alone does not explain global health policymaking outcomes.  
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Third, as more states begin to expand their engagement in global health and the field 
becomes more contested, states will need to think more carefully and strategically about 
how they engage and exert power. For example, a focus on one form of power will not be 
enough. The importance of coordination and collaboration between state actors within 
states as well as with non-state actors will likely become increasingly necessary, not only to 
exert power within global health, but also to exert power more impactfully, strategically and 
successfully. As these case-studies highlight, the mere exertion of power is not always 
sufficient. While Japanese policymakers were able to exert considerable power to advance a 
focus on UHC across Japanese institutions, they were not able to persuade all global health 
actors of this same approach. In this case, Japanese policymakers successfully exerted power 
domestically, but were not able to replicate this at the global level. It is likely that 
policymakers need to possess different resources to exert power domestically versus 
globally; for example, while certain national policymakers might be able to exert their 
dominance domestically due to their position or their domestic network, this might be more 
difficult at a global level. In Indonesia’s case, policymakers struggled to unite around one 
perspective within Indonesia. In line with its focus on UHC, Japan exerted power across the 
spectrum; on a few different issues, Indonesia exerted structural and institutional power 
(with limited forms of productive power). For neither state, however, was this entirely 
sufficient. It is possible that to improve future global health engagement, states will need to 
deepen their coordination and collaboration between different government institutions as 
well as call upon non-state actors to exert power across the spectrum of power as global 
health is an increasingly prominent part of foreign policy efforts.  
Analysing why, how and where Japan exerted power in the process only tells part of 
the story. As detailed in Chapter Five, the results of Japan’s efforts were broadly successful, 
but there is some room for improvement, according to the government’s own GHD Strategy. 
The GHD strategy called for Japan to lead efforts to include UHC in the post-2015 
development agenda as well as to shift its bilateral assistance towards UHC, collaborate with 
Japan’s global partners (WHO, the World Bank and Global Fund particularly) as well as 
strengthen human resources for global health. On the one hand, Japan’s GHD Strategy was 
successful as the government was indeed a lead actor calling for UHC to be included in the 
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post-2015 agenda; the government exerted considerable power to advance UHC. The 
government also began to shift its bilateral aid towards UHC, collaborate with global 
partners and begin to improve the skills of Japanese global health specialists. On the other 
hand, the Japanese government hoped to position UHC as the overall goal for SDG3 and 
exerted power to achieve this; however, this did not happen. Instead, UHC was included as a 
target for SDG3 and the overall SDG3 goal focused on ensuring healthy lives. Japan did not 
exert its power within the post-2015 process. While Japan’s strategy was launched around 
the same time as some of these processes, the government could have engaged more 
strenuously in this process. Appreciating the exercise of power does illustrate the different, 
sometimes less visible, ways in which actors might engage and seek to advance their 
interests, but to understand more fully how actors engage, one must identify the 
countervailing exertions of power as well as consider the context and how different 
narratives can be more or less persuasive in determining policymaking outcomes. 
As detailed in Chapter Four, there were other states, like Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, as well as other actors actively championing consideration of factors beyond the 
health sector to have a goal focused on healthy lives, implicitly aiming to block Japan’s efforts 
to position UHC as the goal for SDG3. This approach was adopted in the HLP as well as in the 
report of the Botswana consultation, and this alternative approach (focused on having a goal 
of ensuring healthy lives) eventually prevailed and incorporated UHC into the SDG3 
framework as one of the targets. Yet, Japan’s efforts were not without effect. Indeed, UHC is 
now often conflated with the SDGs in global health discourse and is now near the top of the 
global health agenda despite SDG3. Japan’s government continues to prioritise UHC at the G7 
and G20, supports efforts at WHO and the World Bank to help advance progress on UHC and 
promotes UHC as a global health priority. 
Even if Indonesian policymakers had engaged in external or parallel post-2015 
processes, it is not entirely clear which perspective or approach they would have advanced 
as there was not a consistent or coherent narrative which framed Indonesia’s position on 
health in the post-2015 negotiations. In comparison to Japan which was firmly committed to 
a focus on UHC, as explained in Chapter Six, Indonesian policymakers advocated for health 
systems moving towards universal health coverage (UHC) and non-communicable diseases 
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(NCDs), along with a commitment to finishing the MDG agenda for health, to be included in 
the SDG agenda for health. Policymakers focused on UHC and NCDs as they were national 
priorities for Indonesia; however, policymakers did not develop a rationale for why these 
issues were important for Indonesia and other countries and how focusing on this issue 
could be aligned with Indonesia’s broad foreign policy efforts. While Indonesian 
policymakers did exert some power, they did not consistently exert it to advance a coherent 
position or approach for health within the post-2015 agenda. In comparison to the 
government of Japan, Indonesia’s government exerted considerably less power to advance 
its position on health in the post-2015 process. Policymakers focused on UHC and NCDs; 
efforts from Indonesian policymakers were not decisive, but broadly contributed to both 
issues being incorporated into the eventual goal, SDG3. 
 Section Three: Implications for the Future of Global Health Policymaking  
To better understand global health, it is critical to appreciate actors’ motivations and identify 
why, how and where different actors engage and exert power. Combining constructivism to 
explore how states create narratives justifying their engagement with a power framework 
to illustrate how and where state actors engage showcases how state actors define and shape 
policymaking. This section summarises this discussion by considering three broader 
implications from these case-studies on state engagement for the future of global health. 
First, how state policymakers and institutions construct global health narratives has 
profound implications for how and where states exert power and engage in the policy and 
practice of global health. (It also has implications for how state actors assess the “success” of 
their engagements; this will be considered more in the next and final chapter.) As 
documented in Chapter Five, Japanese policymakers have varying levels of understanding of 
the field of global health. Given that a number of Japanese policymakers, largely from the 
Ministry of Health or Finance, served or continue to serve in senior roles working for the 
World Health Organisation or the World Bank, there is almost a continuous exchange of staff 
between the Japanese government and these institutions. This engagement, and their 
subsequent knowledge, personal networks and understanding of global health policy, is 
another way in which Japan exerts power. The government exerts structural and 
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institutional power using its role as a funder of these institutions to influence who these 
institutions hire; it then uses these individuals to exert institutional and productive power 
over the agenda and knowledge products of these institutions. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs cultivates these relationships and actively seeks to send more Japanese nationals to 
serve in these institutions as well as other UN agencies and global health partnerships. (The 
Ministry of Health also supports its staff to study at institutions like the Harvard School of 
Public Health, or the London School.) Japan is seeking to expand these efforts, and this 
rotation of Japanese government bureaucrats with international institutions contributes to 
a deepening appreciation for how and where Japanese policymakers and institutions can 
engage in the field of global health.  
This experience also influences how Japanese policymakers consider global health 
issues, and ultimately shapes the government’s ability to exert power. For example, this close 
relationship to WHO most likely contributed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinking that 
WHO’s influence would be stronger within the SDG3 process, and that the government could 
rely on WHO to make the case for UHC. These relationships also likely influence the issues 
Japanese policymakers consider as “global health” issues. For example, Japanese 
policymakers generally consider MDG-health challenges as well as UHC, amongst others, as 
part of the global health agenda; however, they do not often consider issues like climate 
change or tobacco control as global health challenges. In other words, these relationships 
can sometimes distort Japanese policymakers’ understandings of global health, and these 
relationships can sometimes serve as a crutch in place of a strategy. 
As detailed in Chapter Six, Indonesian policymakers, on the other hand, have a 
comparatively limited exposure to, and understanding of, the field of global health policy as 
it is currently practiced. With a few notable exceptions, few Indonesian policymakers have 
served in senior roles in existing global health governance institutions. Indonesian experts 
and policymakers sometimes engage in health discussions within the ASEAN region; 
however, more global engagements are comparatively limited. Despite this, Indonesia is 
actively increasing its international engagement through a mix of engaging in and with 
existing institutions (like WHO), and sometimes creating new policy fora (like the Foreign 
Policy and Global Health Group). Indeed, the Indonesian government is actively trying to 
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create and cultivate new opportunities to engage; at the same time, these efforts sometimes 
appear ad hoc and uncoordinated. This raises the issue of the importance of moving beyond 
contestation and towards coordination between institutions. In Indonesia’s case given the 
changes in the broader political system, ministries and government agencies appeared to be 
strongly contesting their institutional position during the period of the post-2015 process 
whereas Japan’s government was moving towards a more coordinated approach aligning its 
efforts between the Ministries of Foreign Policy, Health and Finance.  
Moreover, this engagement in global health also occurred during an evolving 
geopolitical shift. While key informants in Japan perceived the United States and United 
Kingdom to be retreating from engagement in global health policymaking; key informants in 
Indonesia noted the importance of both these states as key reference points for Indonesian 
diplomacy.532 Traditionally, the US and UK have dominated global health policymaking; 
however, recent domestic political trends in both these countries has signalled the 
possibility of reduced engagement. This has created policy space and motivated Japanese 
policymakers to seek to take advantage of what they perceive as a policy window to engage 
and advance their interests in global health policy; Indonesian policymakers, on the other 
hand, see their engagement as part of Indonesia’s rise in global engagement. 
Second, as state understanding of, and experience in, engaging in global health 
mature, states actors can expand their ability to exert nonmaterial forms of power. State 
actors able to harness the knowledge and experience of non-state actors can augment their 
impact and influence in global health policymaking. This has many potential implications for 
how state (and non-state) actors engage and exert power within global health. There is 
possibly a transition or evolution in understanding of global health which coincides with the 
ability and skill to engage and exert more sophisticated forms of power. More specifically, 
state engagement could evolve as states come to better understand global health 
policymaking from exerting structural and institutional power to productive power.  
While financial or material resources are still important and play an important role 
in determining global health priorities and policies, states no longer need to make multi-
million-dollar investments to successfully engage. States can leverage much smaller 
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amounts, and amplify this with strategic engagement and coordinated exertions of power in 
global health. States can develop the knowledge and understanding of global health to exert 
more power, and thus expand their ability to influence the field and practice of global health.  
There is a spectrum of power with more experienced (and powerful) actors able to exert 
power across a spectrum, and less powerful states focusing more on one power form, or 
some combination of structural or institutional power. In both cases studies, state 
engagement in global health remains largely dominated by government institutions 
primarily led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Health with relatively 
limited input from non-state actors, like civil society, the private sector or academia.  
In Japan’s case, in the beginning of its engagement in global health in the early 2000s, 
the government largely exerted power through providing financial support, but as its 
engagement deepened, its exertion of nonmaterial power evolved. Japan expanded its 
engagement to exert structural and institutional as well as productive power, including in 
the post-2015 process. In Indonesia’s case, the government is still emerging on the global 
stage and is at a comparatively earlier point than Japan, as it is still navigating how it engages 
in global health. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government was able to exert high levels of 
structural and institutional power, but only exerted limited expressions of productive 
power; thus, while Indonesia was in a position to exert influence over the content of SDG3, it 
did not shape the goal as much as might have been expected.  
 The transition from structural and institutional power to productive power is also 
likely indicative of better coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Health as well as other state actors and non-state actors. As Barnett and Duvall 
argued, different forms of power are not exclusive and often work together. It is possible that 
different forms of power are most powerful or most impactful when combined, or rather that 
actors have most power where they can use different forms of power together. For example, 
a Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be able to create opportunities to exert structural and 
institutional power; however, this is could be improved and substantiated with technical 
inputs (possible forms of productive power) from the Ministry of Health (and possibly 
others). Given its likely deeper knowledge of global health policy, a Ministry of Health would 
likely be in a better position to exert productive power; however, this would be best 
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leveraged with opportunities to exert structural and institutional power. In Japan’s case, 
coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Health notably improved around 
the time of the GHD Strategy; there were also mechanisms to solicit input from non-state 
actors like universities, think tanks and civil society. This enabled Japan to combine its 
structural and institutional power with productive power and exert considerable influence 
in the deliberations on SDG3. In Indonesia, coordination between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Health and the President’s office in this same period was challenging. 
While the President’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were able to create 
opportunities for the government to exert structural and institutional power, a lack of 
coordination with the Ministry of Health and other actors limited the exertion of productive 
power, and thus Indonesia’s overall exertion of power and influence in the conceptualization 
of SDG3.  
Third, it is necessary to consider strategy, or how strategic states are when they 
engage in global health, and exert power. While how contextualised a global health strategy 
is within or aligned with a national foreign policy and how understood and coordinated it is 
within and across a government, the way it is implemented and asserted is also important. 
This is also about aligning a strategy with state capacity and resources. Aside from exerting 
power, the implementation of national strategies matter, particularly in relation to what 
Rushton and Williams referred to as ideas (ie how persuasive these are and/or how they are 
framed), agency (ie which actor or which state is advocating which position) and structure 
(ie the existing global health governance architecture).533  
In other words, a state actor could exert tremendous amount of power and still not 
get exactly the outcome it desired (like Japan focused on making UHC the overarching focus 
of SDG3 instead of a target as it is now); another actor could exert little power and get the 
outcome it desired (like Indonesia expressing an interest that both UHC and NCDs be 
incorporated along with the MDGs into the new SDG3). Whereas some Indonesian 
policymakers advocated to incorporate UHC and NCDs along with the DGs into the new SDG3, 
this was not a concerted government effort with consistent and deliberate exertions of 
power to this effect; moreover, Indonesian policymakers’ voices were one amongst many in 
the global discourse on SDG3.  
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In contrast, Japanese policymakers had an aligned government policy of why, how 
and where it would exert power to advance a focus on UHC. While Japanese policymakers 
were some of the most strident actors globally positioning UHC for SDG3 and engaging 
heavily in efforts to advance UHC in the global discourse, Japanese efforts largely overlooked 
the official post-2015 process. This was a strategic decision. Japanese policymakers engaged 
outside the official process knowing that they could and would have more control over these 
types of engagement, which would then be easier to showcase domestically.  
It is challenging to quantify or assess how “strategic” a state is when implementing a 
global health diplomacy policy. Considering these broader issues of the links between power, 
ideas, agency and structure; however, one could start by reviewing the goals in national 
global health strategies or similar policy documents, and comparing these with national 
resources in terms of global partnerships and technical capacity. 
 
Conclusion 
Global health is an increasingly important part of national foreign policy. Globalisation is 
changing how states interact and engage, explicitly and implicitly, in global health. This 
matters for why, how and where states engage in and exert power in global health. As these 
case-studies on Japan and Indonesia demonstrate, states continue to play a critical role in 
conceptualizing and defining global health through their engagement. Power analysis helps 
create a better understanding of how actors create, manage and exploit disparities in power 
to serve their interests in global policymaking processes. A more robust understanding of 
how to exert power also presents states with the ability to improve how they engage in the 
field, and potentially bring a more balanced, equitable approach to determining global health 
priorities. Simultaneously, there are risks that non-state actors, including commercial and 
philanthropic actors, also expand their understanding of how power is exerted and thus 
improve their ability to shape and sometimes distort global health policy. In fact, this is 
already happening with commercial actors acting to exert their power, for example, with 
regard to efforts to regulate the determinants of non-communicable diseases.534  
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 These case-studies focused on the conceptualisation and negotiation of the SDGs, the 
successor to the MDGs. The post-2015 process clearly highlights some of the challenges of 
multi-level and multi-sectoral governance for health. As the global health policy agenda 
expands beyond the focus of the MDGs, the position of health within the broader global 
sustainable development agenda will become more relevant and critical. Indeed, as the 
global health policy agenda increasingly considers broader issues like the commercial 
determinants of health and/or planetary health, policymaking will certainly become more 
contested. The more contested the policymaking is, the more important it is to have a deeper 
and clearer understanding of how actors will likely seek to exert their power. This also 
means that analysis could begin to anticipate and predict how or where different state, and 
non-state, actors might intervene or engage. 
A deeper understanding of both why and how states engage and exert power brings 
a more nuanced and structured framework to assess how actors build alliances and influence 
others seeking to advance their interests and achieve their goals ultimately affecting and 
shaping global health policies. An analysis of power also helps identify previously 
unrecognized ways in which actors engage. Illuminating these efforts and showing how 
different actors shape policymaking could accelerate efforts to compare and assess different 
strategies, and ultimately improve how actors engage. 
The capacity, skills and ability of different national actors to coordinate their efforts 
and exert power across the power spectrum is increasingly important as states seek to 
improve and increase the impact of their engagement. As global health policy has been 
traditionally dominated by technocrats coming from a biomedical tradition, these new 
challenges will require the consideration of new skills, including but not limited to expertise 
like that found in political science and/or political lobbying. This also then shapes who can 
participate and engage, and privileges which actors can engage how and where. 
Globalisation will likely continue to transform global health. To accommodate 
increased inputs from both developed economies and emerging economies, the global health 
agenda will likely become broader and less focused to accommodate deeper and growing 
state engagement. This portends a more contested global health policy, and possibly, a more 
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fragmented global health governance and global governance for health landscape. This then 
also means new challenges for international institutions like the United Nations to continue 
to fulfil their mandate and maintain their relevance as a policy forum for states (and other 
actors) to set and agree upon global health priorities and policies. The next and final Chapter 
Eight begins to consider some of these questions.  
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusion and Implications for Future Research 
 
Main Points  
• Given states’ abilities (and limitations) to exert power and shape priorities, global 
health policy analysis and literature requires a much more nuanced understanding of 
the role of state actors. Constructivism is essential for understanding why states 
engage in global health. Global health policy analysis would also benefit from more 
research and analysis using a power framework. Applying analytical frameworks 
focused on power to global health helps deepen understanding and insight into how, 
where and when different state (and non-state actors) coordinate, collaborate and 
contest policy priorities. 
• The increasingly global nature of health diplomacy and policymaking means that 
state actors will have to engage more deeply with other institutions within and 
beyond their borders. Building on partnerships, state actors can also cultivate 
relationships with national and international academic institutions as well as policy 
research institutes to develop their technical knowledge and professional networks. 
These relationships not only facilitate the sharing of expertise, but also serve to 
cultivate potential allies for future efforts. State actors seeking to engage more should 
invest in developing their own health policy leaders who have both technical 
expertise and abilities to operate globally.  
• States actors should consider creating explicitly consultative processes to develop 
global health strategies aligned with existing foreign policies. A more inclusive 
process (both domestically and globally) can facilitate support for greater 
engagement across state actors from the highest levels and across bureaucracies to 
ensure commitment for implementation. 
• There is clearly an uneven playing field across state actors, both between and within 
states, in how they are able to engage and advance their interests in global health. For 
example, whilst Prime Minister Abe was supportive of Japanese efforts to engage in 
global health, Indonesia’s President was not interested in global health engagement. 
The support of a high-level leader can be transformational; if not always immediately 
available, it can also be strategically cultivated. The absence of this support, however, 
can be a significant barrier to advancing global health issues. With it, however, states 
can exert institutional, structural and productive forms of non-material power. 
• States’ abilities to orchestrate actors, including non-state actors, is critical for their 
ability to exert power and influence the global health agenda. Indeed, it is possible 
that the most successful states are those able not only to align state actors, but those 
also able to cultivate and harness the interests and energies of non-state actors. 
 
 
Introduction 
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Despite a relative diminution of state actors within global health literature in recent years, 
this analysis supports the argument that states remain critical actors in global health. Their 
interactions – why and how states engage and exert power explicitly and implicitly – shape 
key processes in global health, including the conceptualisation and negotiation of the post-
2015, Sustainable Development Goal for health (SDG3). For example, governments in Japan 
and Indonesia played a decisive role in determining how their states engaged in 
conceptualizing SDG3. However, as a sub-field of international relations, global health is 
comparatively new (roughly emerging in the last twenty-five years). To better and more 
deeply understand global health, there is a need to better appreciate state actors in global 
health explicitly. Continuing to overlook state actors’ role could limit future global health 
analysis. State actors’ roles, explicit and implicit, deserve greater attention to understand 
why they engage (meaning motives and objectives), how they engage (meaning their 
approaches and tools), and where they engage (which fora and policy processes). 
As explored in the preceding chapters, considering why, how and where state actors 
engage using a combination of constructivism theory and power analysis provides fresh 
insights into global health and contributes to deeper, more nuanced understandings of global 
health politics, policy and practice. This thesis tested a framework applying constructivism 
to understand why states engage and applied power analysis to assess how and where states 
engage in the negotiation of global health policies. This research focused on examining why 
and how state actors engaged in the negotiation of SDG3, particularly why, how and where 
Japan and Indonesia developed their respective strategies, engaged in and exerted power in 
the process.  
From the early 2000s, the government of Japan deepened its engagement in global 
health as part of its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Japan, as an OECD country, had 
previously been involved in the creation of the MDGs. Leveraging its position within the G7 
and its relationships with both the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO), 
Japan’s government sought to play a similar role in the creation of the SDGs. Japanese 
policymakers focused on universal health coverage (UHC) as part of the Japanese 
Government’s 2013 Global Health Diplomacy Strategy, which was aligned with Prime 
Minister’s “Abenomics” economy policy and revitalized global diplomatic engagement.535  
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In the early 2000s, Indonesia was largely a recipient of the MDGs’ influence; however, 
by July 2012, recognising Indonesia’s rising global influence and status as an emerging 
economy, the United Nations’ Secretary-General asked Indonesia’s President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono to co-chair the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel (HLP) of eminent 
persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. President Yudhoyono established a high-
level national committee to advise him. Building on Indonesia’s MDG experience and as part 
of the President’s broader efforts to reposition the country as both a regional and global 
“middle” power, the President, this committee and the HLP’s report, following a final meeting 
in Bali, largely defined Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015, SDG process. 
 This final Chapter starts with this study’s Research Questions, and reflects on these 
in Section One. This section reviews both constructivism and power analysis individually and 
combined as a potential framework for studying how states engage in global health. This 
chapter then builds on this to consider how state actors in both Japan and Indonesia engaged 
and achieved varying levels of success in Section Two as well as what lessons this might hold 
for states and other actors engaging in global health diplomacy. Finally, Section Three  
considers implications for future research.  
 
Section One: 
Reflecting on Research Questions and a Framework for Studying State Actors 
 
This section starts by reviewing each of the Research Questions and the findings from this 
research, and considers the utility of constructivism and Barnett and Duvall’s power 
framework for analysing how states engage in global health. This analysis was structured 
around three research questions (RQs).  
The first research question (RQ1) is: Why do states engage in global health, and 
particularly why did states engage in the conceptualisation and negotiation of the post-2015, 
SDG agenda? This includes additional sub-questions. What are the factors for assessing the 
determinants of why a state engages in a given global health policy process? Do states seek 
to influence global health agenda setting for altruistic reasons, or to advance their own 
interests? In other words, what are states “really” pursuing? Is global health a tool to advance 
other interests? What do states seek to achieve and what constitutes successful actions? 
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States engaging in global health are driven by domestic policy objectives. In both 
Japan and Indonesia, policymakers engaged in global health to advance foreign policy 
interests as defined by domestic politics. In both states, personal leadership played a critical 
role, and global health engagement largely served (and was limited by) domestic political 
interests and constraints. States construct a narrative guiding their engagement in global 
health, based on their history and other political and strategic considerations – and this 
narrative determines where and how countries engage. At the same time, there were clear 
differences between these states, and how they engaged. For example, Japan’s engagement 
was carefully constructed and largely aligned across state actors; Japanese actors proactively 
sought opportunities to advance their perspective. In contrast, Indonesia’s government’s 
engagement was more responsive to specific opportunities, and was not coordinated or 
aligned.  
In Japan, parliamentarians like Keizo Takemi and Yasuhisa Shiozaki collaborated 
across the government through an explicit process to construct a narrative about why and 
how the Japanese government’s global health engagement should be aligned with broader 
national policy goals. Japan’s engagement in global health was a part of Prime Minister Abe’s 
foreign policy efforts to revitalize and expand industry’s access to international markets. 
Japanese policymakers constructed and advanced an understanding of UHC which would 
expand Japanese global diplomatic influence and create new economic opportunities for 
Japanese industry in line with the government’s efforts to revitalize Japan’s economy 
(popularly known as “Abenomics”).  
Japan’s global health policy was also a concrete representation of the government’s 
efforts to advance the concept of human security. Japan did not engage in global health and 
the post-2015 process (solely) to advance altruistic interests, but instead Japanese 
policymakers used global health as a tool to exert national interests as constructed by 
Japanese policymakers. As the Abe administration adopted a more assertive foreign policy, 
global health diplomacy served to help soften Japan’s image, particularly with China and 
Korea. The government advanced universal health coverage (UHC), a concept constructed as 
“Made in Japan”, at the heart of the global health agenda to ensure that UHC was the health 
sector goal for the post-2015 agenda.  
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In Indonesia, President Yudhoyono positioned his country as a global middle power 
and a critical international partner essential to multilateral and global diplomacy. Global 
health was not part of President Yudhoyono’s ambitious foreign policy to project Indonesia’s 
development experience, expand Indonesian influence and accelerate economic 
development. Global health did not figure as a prominent part of Yudhoyono’s domestic or 
global agenda except when it interfaced with religious or political interests and/or there was 
an opportunity to project Indonesian leadership globally. In the case of the post-2015 
process, Yudhoyono’s role as Co-Chair of the High-Level Panel created opportunities for 
Indonesian actors to engage in global health policymaking. Yet these opportunities were 
largely unrealised as Indonesian government policymakers did not have an explicit process 
to develop a global health strategy. Instead, this happened implicitly, and in an 
uncoordinated manner with different state actors contesting how they should engage. High-
level political transitions also complicated Indonesian policymaking. 
Yudhoyono’s successor, President Joko Widowo, took office in October 2014 and 
prioritised domestic policymaking over global efforts. In his Presidential campaign, he 
committed to a focus on domestic health reforms; however, since he came into office, his 
priorities shifted to national infrastructure and accelerating economic development. These 
priorities have not allowed much policy space for considering global health policy. 
Policymakers have yet to begin to construct a narrative on why and how Indonesia can 
improve and expand its engagement in global health. Advancing domestic efforts on health 
systems reform, NCD control or planetary health concerns might enable, but are not 
necessary for, future Indonesia policymakers to construct a compelling narrative for greater 
global health engagement.  
As detailed in the previous chapters, applying constructivism to understand why 
Japan and Indonesia engaged illustrates insights into how state actors participate in global 
health policymaking. Both cases showcase how critical the process of (and role of 
policymakers in) constructing a strategy and compelling narrative is to how state actors 
exert power. For global health analysis, advocacy and policy, this is a crucial point and 
highlights the value of constructivism as a theory for understanding and advancing global 
health policymaking. For example, as described in Chapter Two, Four Lancet Country Series, 
including the Series on Japan, included articles on these states’ roles in global health. While 
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each of these papers attempt to construct a rationale for why and how these states could 
expand their engagement in global health, these articles do not use a common framework for 
analysis to examine national motivations. These Series also have varying levels of 
engagement with ongoing policy processes. In the future, analysts and researchers might 
examine Japan’s experience to understand how policymakers and academics were able to 
link their analysis with policy processes and embed them into national foreign policy efforts.  
The second research question (RQ2) is: How did states engage, ie: exert power, in 
global health, and particularly in shaping the SDGs? This includes the following sub-questions. 
How do states construct national global health diplomacy efforts or more broadly a global 
health policy or strategy, ie: who are the relevant actors within governments (ministries, 
agencies and parastatals) and beyond states (NGOs, international institutions, other 
governments) and how do they engage? What is the relationship between these actors, ie: 
what drives them to engage, and what are their relevant capacities and limitations? Which 
of these actors are considered most powerful, and according to which measures of power? 
What are the lessons for others seeking to influence and exert power in global health, and 
what does this mean for the future of global health? What are the implications of the SDGs, 
in terms of who drives agendas and how, for global health governance?  
State actors dominated the policy process for each country’s respective national 
engagement in the conceptualization of SDG3. These case studies detail how Japan’s and 
Indonesia’s global health engagement was determined by actors within these states’ 
respective governments. Driven to engage by domestic national interests, state actors 
construct global health strategies implicitly or explicitly, largely in line with their national 
foreign policies. State actors are preeminent given their position, their authority and 
legitimacy as well as their networks and technical expertise. (This highlights the importance 
of state actors, but also exposes their limitations.)  
National Ministries of Foreign Affairs engage in global health diplomacy policy 
processes as they view health, at least in Japan’s case viewed health, as a policy space where 
they can exert leadership and advance national foreign policy priorities. Japan’s government 
had an explicit strategy to engage; Indonesia’s government had an implicit strategy. While 
NGOs, international institutions and other governments might be considered or consulted 
on global health policy issues, the primary and decisive actors are state actors. These state 
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actors are not always unitary actors; indeed, they are often negotiating and contesting their 
relative positions amongst other state actors (the relationship between Ministries of Health 
and Ministries of Foreign Affairs are particularly critical), and in regard to a head of state. 
(The next section will consider lessons for others seeking to exert power in global health.) 
As showcased throughout the post-2015, SDG process, state actors expressed and 
exerted differing levels of power through their various global health engagements. 
Illustrating how state actors exert power enables analysis to classify the different ways they 
engage, and facilitates greater comparison and assessment of success and failure. (The 
specific question of success will be considered in the next section.) The post-2015, SDG 
process signalled emerging economies’ rising institutional and structural power as they 
were able to negotiate and ensure a widening of the agenda relevant for all countries. (The 
SDG agenda essentially incorporates the MDGs and expands it to include new goals related 
to environmental sustainability, labour and governance amongst others.) The compromise 
was that while emerging economies were able to broaden the agenda, OECD states were able 
to institutionalise the MDGs within the SDGs (integrating all three MDG health goals into 
SDG3 targets). This new SDG agenda is yet another reflection of the growing and continued 
contestation of international and global policies between OECD countries and emerging 
economies.  
Emerging economies are expanding their foreign policy efforts to include global 
health diplomacy. Given shifts in geopolitics and the emerging economies’ growing influence, 
it seems reasonable to expect that more states will exert power and contest global health 
policymaking. These states might also seek to shift policymaking venues to fora, structures 
and institutions more favourable to their own ability to exert power. This seems likely to 
fragment and widen the global health agenda. It could also create opportunities for existing 
institutions like the WHO to affirm its policy agenda setting role; however, it could also 
expose new risks as emerging economies position new fora as alternative policymaking 
spaces for global health and challenge existing policy processes. 
The third and final research question is: Where do states engage in global health, 
specifically where, how and why did states engage in the process to create SDG 3 for health? 
This includes the following sub-questions. How does the process and the conceptualisation 
of (global) health within the SDGs compare to the MDGs? What was the context and process 
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for the creation of the SDGs? Why and how did states engage? Did the design of the process 
shape (benefit or limit) how and why certain states or actors engaged?  
States engage in global health in places (when and) where they can exert power and 
advance their efforts to further domestic interests. Japan proactively engages in global health 
as it sees it as a policy space in which it can exert leadership, and thus advance its foreign 
policy; to do this, it engages in institutions, policy fora, or structures where it can maximise 
its power to advance these interests. Indonesia reactively engages in global health largely 
when religious or political interests intersect, or there is an opportunity to project 
Indonesian leadership globally. Given Yudhoyono’s role as a Co-Chair of the post-2015 High-
Level Panel, Indonesia’s government closely engaged within the official process; in 
comparison, Japan engaged in the negotiation and contestation of the Sustainable 
Development Goal for health largely outside or beyond the official process. Whereas Japan’s 
government focused on the health goal with an explicit global health strategy, health was not 
a priority for Indonesia. Indonesia had competing narratives on how it should engage; 
however, this was not explicitly articulated, and there was not a widely shared or endorsed 
understanding of how Indonesia should engage.  
As detailed in Chapter Four, the shift in the process from the MDGs to conceptualise 
the SDGs was profound. Given the geopolitical changes in the last decade, more states can 
exert institutional and productive power increasingly contesting global policies, potentially 
leading to broader and potentially weaker agreements. State actors, like others, recognised 
the critical role the MDGs played in determining global development policy priorities and 
norms, and thus were committed to engaging in the creation of the successor framework. 
Indeed, these states insisted that they would have the final say over the SDG agenda.  
The experience of the MDGs showcased the potential for states to leverage structural 
and institutional power to exert productive power for policymaking within the UN system.  
The process to conceptualise the MDGs was top-down and closed-door; in contrast, the 
process to create the SDGs was deliberately designed to be bottom up and open-door. The 
process facilitated and ensured state actors engaged, at least to varying degrees. Indonesia 
was eager to engage when it was in a leadership position as Co-Chair of the High-Level Panel, 
but Indonesian state actors were less able and willing to engage when this was not the case 
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in the SDG process. Japanese state actors, on the other hand, sought to shift the SDG 
policymaking venue to other spaces where it was better able to exert its own power. 
 The SDG process was also deliberately designed such that states (primarily 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs) would be responsible for finalizing, effectively determining, the 
agenda. While this change to the process made it appear more democratic and perhaps also 
more legitimate, this might also have implications for implementation. It is too early to 
compare and assess the SDG framework’s implementation with the MDG framework’s 
implementation; however, the SDG framework is a much broader agenda. Compared to the 
eight MDGs, the post-2015 process negotiated, which lasted more than three years, produced 
17 goals and 169 indicators. Despite there only being one health goal in the SDGs compared 
to the three health goals in the MDGs, the health goal (SDG 3), represents a significant 
widening of the health agenda compared to the MDGs. 
SDG3 incorporates and builds upon the MDGs (Targets 3.1-3.3). Additionally, SDG 3 
includes addressing NCDs (Target 3.4) along with drugs and alcohol (3.5), halving the 
number of deaths and injuries from road traffic injuries (3.6), ensuring access to sexual and 
reproductive health care services (3.7) and achieving universal health coverage (3.8) as well 
as reducing the number of deaths and illness from pollution (3.9). SDG 3 also includes four 
“means of implementation” on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (3.A), 
support for research and development for neglected diseases (3.B), improvements in the 
financing and recruitment of human resources for health (3.C) and strengthening the 
implementation of the International Health Regulations (3.D). 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, combining constructivism with Barnett 
and Duvall’s power framework provides a possible framework for more deeply analysing 
and understanding why, how and where state actors engage in global health. Having applied 
this framework to both Japan and Indonesia, this next section will reflect upon what this 
analysis might mean for considering global health diplomacy “success” and more broadly 
what lessons this might entail for other state actors seeking to expand their engagement. 
 
Section Two:  
Success and Lessons for State Actors and Others in Global Health Diplomacy 
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Researchers and policymakers alike have long wondered what constitutes success in global 
health diplomacy.536 In the case of both Japan and Indonesia, policymakers in both countries 
largely considered their engagement on health in the post-2015 agenda successful. As 
detailed in the previous chapters, Japan’s government supported engaging at the highest 
levels on global health. In fact, Prime Minister Abe detailed his commitment to Japan’s Global 
Health Diplomacy strategy in a commentary in the Lancet.537  
The Japanese government’s engagement was comparatively robust (at least 
compared with Indonesia) in terms of having an explicit global health diplomacy strategy, 
and dedicated personnel within the Japanese bureaucracy who could leverage resources 
across the Japanese government. For some global health advocates, this might already 
constitute success. While the government did not achieve all of its goals, particularly in terms 
of making UHC the overall goal for SDG3, the Japanese government did exert considerable 
power to ensure that UHC was an individual target within SDG3 and was more broadly 
prioritised within the global health policy agenda. It is notable that despite Japan’s 
considerable resources and focused exertion of power, UHC was ultimately not the overall 
goal for SDG3 as Japan desired, but instead one of the nine SDG3 targets. This shortcoming 
underlines the limitations of one state’s engagement in global health. Nevertheless, Japan’s 
efforts were identified and recognised amongst key informants and policymakers engaged 
in the post-2015 process. Indeed, Japan’s consistent efforts to engage and exert power to 
position and support a focus on UHC were widely respected and understood. Subsequently, 
the Japanese government broadly considered its engagement successful.   
 In contrast, Indonesia’s engagement in the post-2015 process was dominated by 
President Yudhoyono’s role as the Co-Chair of the High-Level Panel, but did not include much 
political support or space to engage on health issues. The Indonesian government did not 
advance a consistent position on health issues; as detailed in Chapter Six, Indonesian state 
actors, when they engaged, advanced different positions without a coherent approach 
coordinated amongst state actors. For Indonesia, success was being at the table, and being 
seen at the table; the specific position or approach was less important. Despite an 
opportunity to engage and offer leadership or a vision, Indonesia’s government did not exert 
much power to shape the eventual SDG3. While Indonesia’s Ministry of Health supported a 
focus on continuing the MDGs, controlling NCDs and emphasising strengthening health 
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systems towards UHC, this position was not stridently advanced and did not enjoy support 
across government actors. Indonesia’s President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not 
equally or strongly support this position on health. While the position was largely adopted 
in the eventual SDG3, few, if any, participants in the process would identify or associate this 
position with Indonesia’s government. Indonesia contributed to this outcome, but this 
position was supported by many others. Indonesia’s contributions on health were not widely 
recognised. It would be difficult to attribute this outcome to Indonesia’s engagement; indeed, 
it is likely this outcome would have occurred without Indonesia’s engagement.   
 Studying how both Japan and Indonesia engaged in this process makes it possible to 
begin to compare and contrast their engagements to reflect upon what constitutes successful 
engagement in global health diplomacy. Indonesia’s Ministry of Health obtained its goals 
with little resources, but its likely contribution was minimal and is therefore not recognised 
as such. In contrast, Japan’s government invested comparatively more resources and did not 
fully achieve its goals, but received considerable recognition for its efforts. These 
governments had different objectives for their engagement, and thus cannot be assessed in 
the same way; yet, both actors consider their engagements successful. 
Based on both Japan and Indonesia’s engagement, future successful global health 
diplomacy could be predicated on a mix of constructing high-level political support and a 
compelling narrative for engagement aligned with the state’s existing foreign policy which 
generates support across state actors and coordination and cooperation between state 
actors. This might also generate a certain amount of recognition from other actors within the 
policy space. Of course, achieving objectives like shaping and setting the global health agenda 
would also seem like an obvious hallmark of success; however, this does not always appear 
entirely necessary for an effort to be considered successful amongst state actors.   
Beyond assessing success, this analysis reinforces the enduring importance and 
centrality of state actors in global health policymaking. This analysis also demonstrates how 
beyond financial investments, state actors can exert power in global health and shape global 
health policies and practices for example leveraging an institution like the World Health 
Organisation or the World Bank. State actor engagement and power are central forces 
shaping global health. To expand and improve state actors’ ability to exert such power, 
governments might consider reflecting upon how they can cultivate and improve their ability 
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to wield institutional, structural and productive power more effectively and strategically. Yet 
these case studies also highlight the limitations of state actors’ engagement. They showcase 
how state actors also might not be able to achieve their objectives.  
Since 2000, the role of states in determining and managing health has changed and 
evolved in response to both globalisation and geopolitical shifts. Without state actors’ 
engagement, the MDGs and SDGs would look substantially different; in fact, these 
frameworks would not exist as no other actor could enact and implement them. Indeed, state 
actors cannot be ignored or diminished as they are critical for understanding and 
implementing global health policymaking. While the MDGs were critical to shaping the global 
health agenda, the role and influence of the SDGs is not yet known. Based on these case-
studies, there are some lessons for states seeking to engage more deeply in global health 
diplomacy. 
First, as state actors engage more deeply in global health diplomacy and 
policymaking, they should build partnerships and links with other institutions within and 
beyond their state. These links are not only a way to share experiences and expertise, but 
can also serve to cultivate potential partners and allies for future engagement. For example, 
Japan’s links and collaboration with Thai partners was useful in terms of both leveraging the 
Prince Mahidol Award Conference as a venue to exert influence as well as using Thailand’s 
membership in the Foreign Policy and Global Health Grouping (the “Oslo Group”). These 
sorts of links can also help create institutional and professional networks which can also 
later be helpful as state actors expand their engagement in global health policymaking.   
Second, state actors seeking to engage more should seek to develop global health 
policy leaders, and their technical expertise and capacity. Indeed, as some Indonesian 
policymakers recently wrote, “growing interest in a more prominent role [in global health 
diplomacy], however, needs to be accompanied with the necessary capacity in health 
diplomacy.”538 Building on partnerships with other actors, state actors can also cultivate 
relationships with academic institutions as well as policy research institutes both within and 
beyond their countries to develop their personnel’s technical knowledge. This knowledge 
and these relationships can also contribute towards creating a wider network of experience 
and expertise which can be useful when and as countries deepen their engagement.  
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Third, states actors should consider creating consultative processes to develop global 
health strategies aligned with existing foreign policies. A more inclusive process can also 
facilitate support for greater engagement across state actors and ensure commitment for 
eventual strategy implementation. While this analysis only focused on two case-studies, it 
would seem reasonable to extrapolate based on Japan’s experience that global health 
strategies embedded into existing foreign policy efforts would likely have better chances of 
being adopted and understood across state actors. As detailed in Chapter Five, Japanese 
policymakers, in close consultation with domestic and international partners, constructed a 
narrative aligning Japan’s nascent global health strategy within Japan’s foreign policy efforts. 
Aligning how state actors should engage within national foreign policies would not only 
make them more legible for state actors (beyond foreign ministries), but also make them 
more easily understood by other global health diplomats, and thus possibly more easily 
advanced.  
   
Section Three: 
Implications for Future Research 
Based on these considerations, this section reviews the implications of these case-studies on 
Japan and Indonesia for future global health research. 
First, there needs to be a much more explicit acknowledgment and recognition by 
researchers of the role of state actors given their abilities (and limitations) to exert power 
and shape priorities within global health policymaking. For example, recent changes in 
American politics have exposed the tremendous and dramatic power US government actors 
have to affect and influence global health policy. The politicization of policy approaches or 
interventions policymakers believed were long established have been questioned and 
undermined; for example, American interventions in the 2018 World Health Assembly539 or 
the WHO Independent NCD Commission.540 In the current geopolitical environment, state 
actors are more visibly exerting their power and making unilateral policy decisions, or 
perhaps analysts are simply recognising this behaviour more clearly now given some of the 
ongoing shifts in geopolitics. Commentators have warned about the collapse of the Western 
order and multilateralism.541  
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While some commentators have expressed concern about US disengagement from 
global health policymaking, other state actors, like Japan, have been increasing and 
amplifying their engagement. These recent current events (and the surprised reactions to 
them) exemplify and showcase how the power of state actors to influence global health is 
often overlooked. These case-studies highlight why and how other state actors, beyond the 
most powerful, are actively contesting global health policymaking. To better understand 
these dynamics and deepen understanding of policymaking in global health, more attention 
needs to be given to why and how state actors are engaging. These case studies contribute 
to rebalancing and recognising state actors in global health policy literature.  
Second, there is clearly an uneven playing field across state actors, both between and 
within states, in how they are able to engage and advance their interests in global health. 
While Prime Minister Abe was supportive of efforts to engage in global health, Indonesia’s 
President was not interested in global health. President Yudhoyono signalled his disinterest 
within the Cabinet and with other policymakers, which effectively stifled any potential 
deeper engagement or strategy development. In contrast, Japanese policymakers had 
prepared for, and possibly contributed to, creating this policy window of opportunity. 
Indonesian policymakers made no such plans. While the diverging resources of Japan and 
Indonesia to contribute development assistance for health (DAH) is obvious and 
recognisable, the divergent abilities of these two governments to exert non-material power 
and influence within global health is also noteworthy. Building on this research, future 
research might consider continuing to compare and contrast state actors, and advance 
conceptual thinking about how to assess state actors’ contributions, which will contribute to 
a more robust understanding of global health policymaking. This is not only necessary for 
improving these processes, ideally making them more equitable, but also ultimately could 
and should improve health outcomes.  
 Third, global health policy analysis could benefit from more research and analysis 
using a power framework. Applying power frameworks to global health help illustrate, and 
sometimes unveil, how different state and non-state actors engage to shape and shift policy 
priority setting. Recognising the ways in which actors exert power might also contribute to 
making global health analysis more rigorous and robust. Identifying these influences does 
not necessarily equate to curbing these exertions of power; however, illuminating them 
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might help begin a discussion about how to improve governance mechanisms and/or 
possibly enhance the legitimacy of global health policymaking. This being said, there are also 
limitations. Simply showcasing how actors exert power does not on its own explain decision 
and policymaking. This analysis applied Barnett and Duvall’s framework; however as 
discussed in Chapter Two, there are multiple possible frameworks, and future research could 
consider mixing and matching different frameworks. Recognising the limitations of power 
frameworks, it is also necessary to consider power contestation, ie how to distinguish 
between varying levels of power and the resolution of power conflicts.  
 
Conclusion 
Illustrating and understanding how different actors exert power is critical for future global 
health policy analysis. It is also critical for designing effective strategies and ultimately 
improving global health policymaking.  Acknowledging and appreciating financial resources 
will remain important for understanding global health; however, this research, contributes 
to a growing body of research documenting how nonmaterial factors shape the field. Yet 
simply highlighting these examples of power in global health policy and practice is not 
enough. Describing, assessing and interrogating how actors are using nonmaterial factors to 
contest global health priorities is necessary for a deeper and more nuanced analysis of global 
health, and is a starting point for enhancing future engagement and eventually improving 
health outcomes.  
For example, the contrast between Japan and Indonesia in their ability to engage is 
stark. Despite having different objectives from the Indonesians, Japanese state actors and 
policymakers were able to leverage a legacy of experience engaging in global development 
discussions to advance their perspective. Building on the capacity of the Japanese 
bureaucracy, Japanese state actors drew upon individual and institutional networks, 
technical knowledge and global partnerships to help advance their efforts. In contrast, 
despite great interest and support for engagement in the post-2015 process, Indonesian 
actors were not able to wield the same depth of knowledge and relationships to engage. 
Beyond political support and material factors, there remains an uneven playing field 
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between actors engaging in global health policymaking and imbalances in how priorities are 
determined and established. 
Moreover, both Japan and Indonesia struggled to engage with non-state actors. While 
the Japanese government had more domestic institutions to work with, and attempted to 
engage them, the Indonesian landscape was comparatively limited. In both Japan and 
Indonesia, the government had limited ability to engage with and develop relationships and 
alliances with domestic non-state actors; in both cases, this limited these states’ abilities to 
engage and advance their efforts. Future research, perhaps building on the nascent research 
on global health research networks542, might consider additional comparative work to assess 
state actor engagement (including framing and developing global health narratives) as well 
as how state actors might interact, leverage and collaborate with research networks and 
other non-state actors. 
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Annex One: Interview Guides for New York as well as Tokyo and 
Jakarta, Consent Form and Information Sheet 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NEW YORK (AND LONDON AND GENEVA) INTERVIEWS 
Introduction 
Hello, my name is Robert Marten.  I am a part-time research degree student with the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). I know your time is valuable and I’m grateful you are taking the time to speak 
with me today. 
I'm conducting a study on how countries exert power and influence in global health by examining the post-
2015 development process. This research will analyze how and why states (specifically Japan or Indonesia) 
exerted influence in the conceptualization of the Sustainable Development Goals for health, with a specific 
empirical focus on power and process. My research will focus on understanding why and how the health SDGs 
were developed as well as states’ roles in their conceptualization. Studying the process to establish the health 
SDGs will contribute to broader knowledge, and provide a better understanding for future global health policy 
efforts. This could be useful to enhance global health governance and global governance for health making 
prospective processes more inclusive, equitable and responsive to health needs, ultimately improving and 
saving lives. 
I am hoping to talk with you for no more than an hour. There are no correct ‘answers’ – I am just seeking your 
views, experience and opinions. Please talk to me freely and frankly and let me know if there are any issues I 
bring up which you do not want to discuss. I will not be attributing your statements to you by name, but will 
use your official designation and type of institution (eg. Ministry of Health, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National 
Health Research Institute, International Institution, Non-Governmental Organization, etc.). You can also let me 
know if there is another way I should cite your statements in my reports and publications. 
Please let me know if you have any questions. Once I address those, we’ll get started. 
 
Participant Information Could you tell us/me about your work experience? 
1. Organization___________________________ 
2.   Position____________________   3. Department ___________________________ 
5.   No of years in current position_________ 6. Date of Interview ______________________________ 
BACKGROUND/WARM-UP 
1. Can you outline your understanding of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the 
process to create them? How does this relate to the Millennium Development Goals?  
 
2. What’s your view on the Sustainable Development Goals? What are their major strengths and 
major weaknesses?  
 
3. How important was health? Why? 
 
THE PROCESS and CONTEXT OF THE SDGs (plus POWER) 
 
4. What was the general context for the process to create and conceptualize the SDGs  
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5. How was your institution involved in this process? What was your role, and engagement in the 
creation of the SDG process? 
 
6. What role did the process and experience to establish the Millennium Development Goals play in 
the design of the creation of the Sustainable Development Goals?  
 
7. What do you see as global governance related to health? Which are the key institutions and how 
do they relate? How do the Sustainable Development Goals fit into this global governance?   
 
8. How impactful do you think the SDGs will be?  
 
9. Which actors were important in both designing the process, and then the process itself? Why? Who 
was most powerful? Why and on what basis would you consider these actors as particularly 
powerful? What do you understand “power” to mean? 
 
10. How important were states in the process? 
 
WHY DID STATES ENGAGE? 
11. What was the nature or form of national engagement in the SDG process? Why did it take that 
form?  
 
12. Did the design of the process benefit certain states or actors? Did states engage? Ie: what were 
states “really” pursuing?  
 
HOW DID STATES ENGAGE? 
13. How did states engage, ie: exert power and influence, in shaping this process and these goals? For 
example, did states use enticements to encourage other states to support their positions? Did 
states use international institutions to support their interests? Did states leverage policy 
entrepreneurs and policy research?   
 
14. Who were the relevant actors aside from states? (b) Which government actors (ministries or 
agencies) are/were involved? (c) Which NGOs? Think tanks? Or universities? Others? 
 
ADDITIONAL ACTORS 
15. Which other (international) institutions, actors or individuals are involved how? 
 
16. Is there a difference amongst actors within and beyond states? 
 
FINALIZING THE SDGs 
17. How was the health goal formulated, and where did the health goal fit into the broader framework? 
 
18. Are you content with the outcome? With the process? Do you consider it successful? 
 
19. Do you think you would have achieved a different, or a better outcome if the process would have 
been different? 
CONCLUSION 
20. Is there anything else you would like to add about the issues we have discussed and your role? 
 
21. Are there any other people either within or outside your organization with whom it would be 
beneficial for me to speak? Would you be willing to be contacted again if I need to clarify 
anything in the future? 
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Thank you very much for participating in this interview.  It takes time to participate in these surveys 
and I very much appreciate your valuable time.  
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR TOKYO AND JAKARTA 
Introduction 
Hello, my name is Robert Marten.  I am a part-time research degree student with the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) (and Nagasaki University /or/ the University of Indonesia). I know your time 
is valuable and I’m grateful you are taking the time to speak with me today. 
I'm conducting a study on how countries exert power and influence in global health by examining the post-
2015 development process. This research will analyze how and why states (specifically Japan or Indonesia) 
exerted influence in the conceptualization of the Sustainable Development Goals for health, with a specific 
empirical focus on power and process. My research will focus on understanding why and how the health SDGs 
were developed as well as states’ roles in their conceptualization. Studying the process to  establish the health 
SDGs will contribute to broader knowledge, and provide a better understanding for future global health policy 
efforts. This could be useful to enhance global health governance and global governance for health making 
prospective processes more inclusive, equitable and responsive to health needs, ultimately improving and 
saving lives. 
I am hoping to talk with you for no more than an hour. There are no correct ‘answers’ – I am just seeking your 
views, experience and opinions. Please talk to me freely and frankly and let me know if there are any issues I 
bring up which you do not want to discuss. I will not be attributing your statements to you by name, but will 
use your official designation and type of institution (eg. Ministry of Health, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National 
Health Research Institute, International Institution, Non-Governmental Organization, etc.). You can also let me 
know if there is another way I should cite your statements in my reports and publications. 
Please let me know if you have any questions. Once I address those, we’ll get started. 
Participant Information Could you tell us/me about your work experience? 
1.  Organization ___________________________ 
2.   Position____________________   3. Department ___________________________ 
4.   No of years in current position_________ 5. Date of Interview ______________________________ 
BACKGROUND/WARM-UP 
6. Can you outline your understanding of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the process 
to create them? How does this relate to the Millennium Development Goals?  
 
7. What’s your view on the Sustainable Development Goals? What are their major strengths and 
major weaknesses?  
 
THE PROCESS and CONTEXT OF THE SDGs (plus POWER) 
8. What was the general context for the process to create and conceptualize the SDGs, and how is this 
seen from your country?  
 
9. How was your country, and your institution specifically, involved in this process? What was your 
role, and engagement in the creation of the SDG process? 
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10. What role did the process and experience to establish the Millennium Development Goals play in 
the design of the creation of the Sustainable Development Goals?  
 
11. What do you see as global governance related to health? Which are the key institutions and how 
do they relate? How do the Sustainable Development Goals fit into this global governance?   
 
12. How will the SDGs impact your country? Did the design of the SDG process benefit your country? 
Do you think the SDGs will benefit your country moving forward? If so, how? If not, why not? 
 
13. Which actors were important in both designing the process, and then the process itself? Why? Who 
was most powerful? Why and on what basis would you consider these actors as particularly 
powerful? What do you understand “power” to mean? 
 
WHY DID STATES ENGAGE? 
14. What was the nature or form of [your country’s] engagement in the SDG process? Why did it take 
that form? Do you think there should have been another or different form of engagement?   
 
15. (Why) Did your state engage? Ie: what was it “really” pursuing? Was your country engaging for its 
own interests? Was your country engaging to support international institutions? Was your country 
engaging to support the idea and creation of the SDGs? 
 
HOW DID STATES ENGAGE? And WHICH ACTORS? 
16. How did your state engage, ie: exert power and influence, in shaping this process and these goals? 
For example, did your state use enticements to encourage other states to support their positions? 
Did your state use international institutions to support their interests? Did your state leverage 
policy entrepreneurs and policy research?   
 
17. Who were the relevant actors within your state? (b) Which government actors (ministries or 
agencies) are involved? (c) Which NGOs? Think tanks? Or universities?  
 
18. Who were the relevant actors beyond or outside your state? (b) Which government actors 
(ministries or agencies) are involved? (c) Which NGOs? Think tanks? Or universities? Is there a 
difference amongst actors within and beyond states? 
 
19. Were there other actors you haven’t mentioned which were involved? Which other (international) 
institutions, actors or individuals are involved how? 
 
FINALIZING THE SDGs 
20. What was your country’s position on health within the SDGs, and how does this compare to the 
final framework? Where does the health goal fit into the broader framework? 
 
21. Are you content with the outcome? With the process? Do you consider it successful? (And on what 
basis do you consider this “successful”? Do you think you would have achieved a different, or a 
better outcome if the process would have been different? 
 
CONCLUSION 
22. Is there anything else you would like to add about the issues we have discussed? 
 
23. Are there any other people either within or outside your organization with whom it would be 
beneficial for me to speak? Would you be willing to be contacted again if I need to clarify 
anything in the future? 
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Thank you very much for participating in this interview.  It takes time to participate in these surveys 
and I greatly appreciate your valuable time.  
 
 
 
Information for Participants 
Study Title: 
The Sustainable Development Goals: Understanding why and how states exert power and 
influence in global health 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
This study is examining how countries exert power and influence in global health, and the post-
2015 development process. This research will analyse how and why states, specifically Japan and 
Indonesia, exerted influence in the conceptualization of the health SDGs, with a specific empirical 
focus on power and process. This research will focus on understanding why and how the health 
SDGs were developed as well as states’ roles in the SDGs’ conceptualization. Studying the process to 
establish the health SDGs will contribute to broader knowledge, and provide a better understanding 
for engaging in future global health policy processes. This could be useful to enhance global health 
governance and global governance for health making prospective processes more inclusive, 
equitable and responsive to health needs, ultimately improving and saving lives.  
 
2. Why have I been chosen? 
You are being invited to take part in this research project because your engagement and experience 
in shaping, influencing, or supporting the development of the post-2015 development agenda for 
health will help illuminate the process and provide valuable insights for this study. 
 
3. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you if you want to join the study. I will describe the study and go through this information 
sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving a reason. Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You 
will make the choice about whether you will participate or not.  
 
4. What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be interviewed for roughly one hour. Once this study is finished, I will share draft sections 
of materials which include any direct quotations for your approval. I will also share my final 
published results. This is a qualitative research project that will use interpretive methods including 
analysis of documents as well as in-depth semi-structured interviews with those participating.  
 
5. What do I have to do? 
Please talk to me freely and frankly and let me know if there are any issues I bring up which you do 
not want to discuss. There are no correct or incorrect answers.  
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6. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There is a risk that you may share some personal or confidential information by chance, or that you 
may feel uncomfortable talking about some of the topics in this study. However, I do not wish for 
this to happen. You do not have to answer any question or take part in the survey if you feel the 
question(s) are too personal or if talking about them makes you uncomfortable. 
 
7. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits available to you through taking part in this study, but your 
participation is likely to contribute to a better understanding of global health governance and 
global governance for health making prospective development agenda-setting processes more 
inclusive, equitable and responsive to health needs, ultimately improving and saving lives 
 
8.   Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Yes.  All information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential.   
 
9.   What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You do not have to participate in this research if you do not wish to do so. If you withdraw from the 
study, I will destroy all data collected from you. 
 
10.  What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The knowledge collected in this study will be published. 
 
11.  Who has reviewed the study?  
This study was given a favourable ethical opinion by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine’s Research Ethics Committee. 
 
12.  Contact Details 
If you have any questions, you can ask me now or later. If you have questions later, please feel free 
to contact:  
 
Robert Marten, +1-347-439-3578 or Robert.Marten@lshtm.ac.uk 
c/o the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
15-17 Tavistock Place, London, WC1H 9SH 
United Kingdom 
 
You will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form to keep. 
 
Thank you for considering taking the time to read this sheet. 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
 
Full Title of Project:  
The Sustainable Development Goals: 
Understanding why and how states 
exert power and influence in global 
health 
 
 
Name of Principal Investigator: Robert Marten 
 Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the participant information sheet dated ......….. 
(version .........) for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the information, 
ask questions and have had these answered fully. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Name of Participant  
(printed) 
 
 
 Signature  Date 
Principal Investigator 
 
 Signature  Date 
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Annex Two: Lists of Interviews in New York (and Geneva and 
London) as well as Tokyo and Jakarta 
 
New York (plus London and Geneva) Interviews 
12 Interviews with 13 individuals 
 
1. Two NGO Officials (November 18, 2015) 
2. NGO Official (December 3, 2015) 
3. Senior Academic (December 4, 2015) 
4. UNICEF Official and member of the post-2015 Task Team (December 10, 2015) 
5. WHO Official and member of post-2015 Task Team (December 15, 2015) 
6. Senior National Ambassador of Key Country in OWG (December 15, 2015) 
7. National Counselor Officer of major country engaged in the process (May 16, 2017) 
8. Senior UNDP Official (May 17, 2017) 
9. Senior UNDP Official (July 20, 2017) 
10. Senior UNICEF Official (July 7, 2016) 
11. Senior NGO Representative (July 8, 2016) 
12. Senior Official in the HLP Process (May 22, 2018) 
 
Tokyo Interviews 
29 Interviews with 32 Individuals 
1. Official at Japanese Mission in UNHQ (in New York) (December 17, 2015) 
2. NGO Official (May 6, 2016) 
3. Senior Academic and Adviser to the Government (May 6, 2016) 
4. Senior NGO Official (May 9, 2016) 
5. Three Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 11, 2016) 
6. Private Sector Representative (May 11, 2016) 
7. Senior Academic and Adviser to the Government (May 12, 2016) 
8. JICA Official (May 12, 2016) 
9. NGO Representative (October 6, 2017) 
10. JICA Official (October 6) 
11. NGO Representative (October 10, 2017) 
12. Academic Researcher (October 19, 2017) 
13. Senior Official at JICA (October 20, 2017) 
14. Private Sector individual, former Ministry of Finance (October 20, 2017) 
15. Senior WHO Official (October 27, 2017) 
16. Academic (November 7, 2017) 
17. Private Sector Representative and former senior JICA official (November 16, 2017) 
18. Senior Academic (November 17, 2017) 
19. Senior Academic (November 20, 2017)  
20. JICA Official (November 21, 2017) 
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21. Private Sector Representative and former Senior WHO Official (November 22, 2017) 
22. Politician and former Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 11, 2017 and March 15, 
2018) 
23. Two Officials in the Ministry of Finance (February 5, 2018) 
24. Official in the Ministry of Finance (February 6, 2018) 
25. Official in the MoHLW (March 1, 2018) 
26. NGO Representative (March 6, 2018) 
27. Senior Official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 16, 2018) 
28. Politician and former MoHLW (May 17, 2018) 
29. Senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs (July 18, 2018) 
Jakarta Interviews 
23 Interviews with 27 Individuals 
 
Interviews Completed in October 2016  
1. Senior Academic (10/3/2016) 
2. Three officials from the Ministry of Health (10/4/2016) 
3. Senior Official in the Ministry of Health (10/5/2016) 
4. Former Staff Member in President’s Special Envoy on MDGs office (10/5/2016) 
5. Health Official within the Office of the Vice President (10/6/2016) 
6. State Official, Formerly with the Delivery Unit (10/11/2016) 
7. Two Officials from the Ministry of National Planning (BAPPENAS) (10/13/2016) 
8. Civil Society Representative (10/13/2016) 
9. Senior Official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (10/13/2016) 
 
Interviews conducted in early March 2017  
10. Former Staff Member in President’s Special Envoy on MDGs office (10/5/2016)  
11. United Nations Development Program Staff (3/2/2017) 
12. Official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3/2/2017) 
13. Private Sector Representative, Former Member of the President’s Delivery Unit 
(3/3/2017) 
14. NGO Representative (3/3/2017)  
15. NGO Representative (3/6/2017) 
 
Interviews Conducted in November 2017  
16. United Nations Development Program Staff (31/10/2017)  
17. Private Sector Representative, Former Member of the President’s Delivery Unit 
(31/10/2017) 
18. Two Senior Members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31/10/2017) 
19. NGO Representative (1/11/2017) 
20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official (2/11/2017) 
 
Interviews Conducted in March 2018 
21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official (March 29, 2018) 
22. Former Ministry of Health Senior Official (March 31, 2018) 
23. Former Senior Ministry of Health Official (July 25, 2018) 
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Annex Three: Published Articles, as part of, or related to this Thesis 
 
These follow after the endnotes. 
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1 
 Power: The nexus of global health diplomacy?  ROBERT MARTEN*, JOHANNA HANEFELD**, RICHARD SMITH*** 
  Earlier this year the US government established a new Office of Global Health Diplomacy.  Following a number of other countries, the Japanese Prime Minister recently launched his country’s Global Health Diplomacy strategy. Commentaries in the Lancet, in the WHO Bulletin, and even the launch of this journal, confirm global health diplomacy as an issue of growing relevance and importance (see Jaffe, 2013; Seiff, 2013; Abe, 2013; Kickbusch & Kokeny, 2013). Yet three critical, and interlinked, research questions remain to be understood. First, what exactly is global health diplomacy, and how should it be defined? Second, how can we measure or assess global health diplomacy effectiveness? Third, what are the key determinants of ‘successful’ or ‘effective’ global health diplomacy? These questions, and the interface between them, should be the core focus of this journal. We suggest that the concept of power links all of these questions, and is critical to understanding and assessing global health diplomacy.   A definition for global health diplomacy has been much discussed and debated. Definitions range from normative, “an emerging field that addresses the dual goals of improving global health and bettering international relations” (Adams et al., 2008), or “winning hearts and minds of people in poor countries by exporting medical care, expertise and personnel to help those who need it most” (Fauci, 2007) to a more technical, “multi-level, multi-actor negotiation processes that shape and manage the global policy environment for health” (Kickbusch et al., 2008). Scholars have classified different types of global health diplomacy; one such analysis found three categories of global health diplomacy: 1) core or formal diplomacy between or amongst countries (e.g. the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control); 2) multi-stakeholder diplomacy between and amongst state, non-state and multilateral actors (e.g. the Global Fund or the GAVI Alliance); and 3) non-official interactions between state representatives (e.g. personnel from the American Center for Disease Control (CDC) health serving outside the United States) (Katz et al., 2011).  The Global Health Diplomacy Network (GHD.Net), a group of academics and practitioners, recently suggested that GHD be defined as “the policy-shaping processes through which states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state actors negotiate responses to health challenges or utilize health concepts or mechanisms in policy-shaping and negotiation strategies to achieve other political, economic, or social objectives” (GHD.Net, 2009). Although not perfect, this definition seeks to explicitly balance the utilization of health to achieve foreign policy goals and the utilization of foreign policy to achieve health goals.  Of course, what it does not do is indicate the likely imbalance in power that results in the former application being perhaps more prevalent than the latter at present. In both cases, however, global health diplomacy may be thought of as the “software” that enables the dynamic processes of negotiation to occur between various levels of actors and institutions (the “hardware” of global health diplomacy). These diplomatic policy processes are clearly 
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about different aspects of power like attraction, persuasion, coercion and compulsion (Smith, 2010), and about overt, covert and latent power (Lukes, 2005). Regardless of the exact definition, power is a critical underlying feature of global health diplomacy. Defining global health diplomacy, or forms of it, depends on actors’ relative power, and the type of power observed or deployed.   Understanding how we can measure or assess global health diplomacy effectiveness necessarily depends on the intended goal of the efforts and type of power. Is global health diplomacy about getting A to do what B wants (by whatever means necessary) or is it about getting A to come to the realization that it wants the same as B (and change its respective values or norms)?  Each approach will be based on different forms, or dimensions, of power. For example, this could be compulsory (direct power, such as use of military or legislative force), institutional (indirect power, such as how international institutions are designed to favour one actor over another), structural (the overall constitution or framework of actor and their roles- this is a form of ideological power) or productive (control over the possession and distribution of resources, or economic) power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005), or hard or soft power – there are different ways of assessing and analyzing power, and these could be adapted according to the specific context. Assessing power could be a method to measure global health diplomacy. For example, when country X proclaims a certain objective in their global health strategy, the concept of power can be used to analyze their relative ability, be it successful or not, to reach this diplomatic objective.   Assessing the relative importance of various forms of power could help identify the key determinants of ‘successful’ or ‘effective” global health diplomacy. For example, one could argue that deploying coercive power is more tenuous and subject to change if relations evolve, whereas changing values or norms is a more long-term and sustainable approach. If country X is looking for a yes or no vote on an issue, using hard power might be more effective; however, if country X is promoting a new approach to financing health systems, a soft approach might be more impactful. Depending on the goal, for example, deploying hard or soft power could thus be a determinant or a mechanism of global health diplomacy.   To understand global health diplomacy, studying the dynamic relationships, policies and processes between actors and institutions is necessary; to understand these interactions, power is the critical unit to study to help assess and understand how countries influence global health policy. This could contribute to developing a conceptual framework to better understand why certain health diplomacy efforts succeed or fail. Designing such a framework is critical for improving global governance and global health governance. Better and deeper knowledge of what determines this effectiveness will create more inclusive and equitable governance mechanisms, which will be more responsive to health needs globally and ultimately improve and save lives.   
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Commission on Global 
Governance for Health: 
what about power?
The Lancet—University of Oslo 
Commission on Global Governance 
for Health (Feb 15, p 630)1  articulates 
the various global non-health sector 
influences on health—namely, the 
global political determinants of 
health. The recognition of these 
eﬀ ects is not new, but articulating a 
compelling way to refer to them is a 
useful contribution and will help to 
shape the future research agenda. 
The Commission highlights the way 
in which some actors are able to exert 
disproportionate levels of influence 
to serve their interests. We commend 
the Commission for identifying these 
serious power disparities in global 
governance, and illustrating their 
profound implications for health. The 
Commission has provoked attention 
to these political realities and created 
an important discussion. Yet the 
Commission’s recommendations, as 
the companion Youth Commission2 
noted, “are likely to be influenced 
by the same diverging interests and 
power asymmetries described by 
the Commission”. We would like to 
propose a possible path forward.
To tackle the global political 
determinants of health, there is ﬁ rst 
a need for more rigorous analysis 
of how national, international, and 
institutional actors shape and inﬂ uence 
the global political determinants of 
health. The Commission refers to 
power, but it does not consider the 
need to better understand empirically 
how power is expressed in global 
health governance. The fields of 
international relations, sociology, and 
philosophy, however, do apply power 
as a conceptual lens for understanding 
how actors behave. While global health 
scholars led by Gill Walt3 have explored 
how power is expressed and exercised, 
power could be particularly useful 
to understand the global political 
determinants of health. 
There are a number of analytical 
frames to better understand or 
investigate power. Robert Dahl4 
proposed power as decision making 
(ie, A forcing B to do A’s choice against 
B’s will). Peter Bachrach and Morton 
Baratz5 argued for the importance of 
non-decision making (A conﬁ nes B’s 
spectrum of possible choices); this 
has also been called the mobilisation 
of bias. Steven Lukes6 considered 
power as thought control (ie, A 
makes B want A’s choice). Together 
these three approaches to assess 
power, be it overt, covert, or latent, 
present one possible framework. 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall7 
presented another frame based on 
four approaches to power—namely, 
compulsory, institutional, structural, 
and productive forms.
These frameworks, or a mix of 
them, could be a useful place to 
begin. A greater and more explicit 
focus on power as a tool for analysis 
of global political determinants of 
health can help to illuminate how 
actors create and exploit disparities 
to serve their interests. Crucially, a 
better understanding of power, which 
is especially important with the rise 
of non-health and non-state bodies’ 
influence over the global policy 
environment within which health 
systems must navigate, will allow for 
the design of policies and processes to 
redress disparities. 
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A platform for a 
Framework Convention 
on Global Health
The right to health provides the 
foundation to accelerate recent global 
health gains, extend them to the most 
excluded populations, and fortify them 
against threats beyond the health 
sector. Yet states often fail to meet their 
obligations. And the national focus can 
diminish eﬀ ectiveness because solutions 
require global cooperation, from shared 
ﬁ nancing and capacity building to global 
norms and accountability.1
An innovative global health treaty—a 
Framework Convention on Global 
Health—could establish a right to 
health for the 21st century. The binding 
power of law would enhance the 
ability of civil society advocates to hold 
governments accountable through 
courts, parliaments, and the media, 
while creative incentives and sanctions 
would encourage compliance. Through 
international law, the Framework 
Convention on Global Health would 
ensure respect for the right to health 
within other legal regimes, such as 
trade, investment, and intellectual 
property—aspects of which might 
otherwise undermine this right.
A treaty could establish the legal 
framework to achieve the grand 
convergence in global health envisioned 
by the Lancet Commission on Investing 
in Health.2 A Framework Convention 
on Global Health could chart the path 
towards true global health convergence, 
both among countries and within them, 
demanding the full gamut of actions to 
close domestic and international health 
inequalities that leave poorer and 
marginalised populations dying earlier 
than the well-oﬀ .
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Global Health Warning: Definitions Wield Power
Comment on “Navigating Between Stealth Advocacy and Unconscious Dogmatism: The 
Challenge of Researching the Norms, Politics and Power of Global Health”
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Abstract
Gorik Ooms recently made a strong case for considering the centrality of normative premises to analyzing and 
understanding the underappreciated importance of the nexus of politics, power and process in global health. 
This critical commentary raises serious questions for the practice and study of global health and global health 
governance. First and foremost, this commentary underlines the importance of the question of what is global 
health, and why as well as how does this definition matter? This refocuses discussion on the importance of 
definitions and how they wield power. It also re-affirms the necessity of a deeper analysis and understanding of 
power and how it affects and shapes the practice of global health.
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In this journal, Gorik Ooms recently made a strong case for considering the centrality of normative premises to analyzing and understanding the underappreciated 
importance of the nexus of politics, power and process in 
global health.1 Here and elsewhere,2 he argues that if global 
health scholars continue to avoid acknowledging and debating 
normative notions, they “not only mislead each other,” but 
risk limiting the evolution and maturation of the field of 
global health. Ooms recognizes that while public health at 
the national level is usually predicated on the norm that it 
is the state’s responsibility for improving health, there is no 
such equivalent norm for global health. This lack of a unified 
narrative normative framework at best limits the evolution of 
global health as a field and at worst endangers the coherence 
and maturation of the field.
Building on Ooms, there are numerous normative narratives 
within global health which compete to capture policy-makers’ 
attention and resources. Consider the recent example of the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa to illustrate what this means 
and why it matters. Some advocates within global health call 
and have been calling for using burden of disease analysis to 
be used for setting priorities, but as Grepin recently noted, 
“if burden of disease metrics are the only criterion that 
should be used to set resource allocation priorities, then, 
according to this logic it was perfectly acceptable that the 
world invested so little in epidemic preparedness, such as 
Ebola.”3 Given the impact of the outbreak, this now appears 
questionable. Other actors within global health advocate 
adherence to the International Health Regulations for 
determining which health challenges constitute priorities in 
terms of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(PHEIC); however, as Yach et al recently described, “the 
current framing of health security focuses almost entirely 
on infectious diseases” and largely overlooks other threats to 
global health like non-communicable disease (NCD).4 The 
case of HIV/AIDS also offers a few different examples with 
advocates arguing alternatively that HIV/AIDS was a security 
threat, a looming economic disaster or a challenge to human 
rights and law. In these examples, as Ooms warns, actors 
and advocates avoid stating their normative values and risk 
serving as “stealth advocates” overstating their case. But what 
does this mean, why does it matter and how does it limit the 
maturation of global health as a field?
Ooms’ commentary raises critical questions for the practice 
and study of global health and global health governance. First 
and foremost, this underlines the centrality of the question 
of what is global health, and why or how does this definition 
matter? This refocuses discussion on the importance of 
definitions and how they wield power. It also re-affirms the 
necessity of a deeper analysis and understanding of power 
and how it affects and shapes the practice of global health. 
What Is Global Health and Why Does It Matter?
Defining and determining what is and what is not considered 
global health remains contested. Global health was coined 
partly in response to globalization and the rise of the field 
of global governance, which explicitly identified the rise of 
other actors alongside or beyond the state. Whereas public 
health acknowledges the state as a dominant actor, global 
health recognizes the rise of other actors like international 
institutions, civil society and the private sector affecting 
health and health policies transcending states. Yet in reality, 
the practice of global health often focuses on health in poor 
countries in Africa and Asia, and still represents more of a 
continuation of the field of international health.5 The field 
of global health rarely addresses the interconnected nature 
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of truly “global” health challenges between and across 
continents. As Frenk et al argue, “the notion of global health 
fails itself to capture the essence of globalization [and there is 
a real] need to globalise the concept of global health.” Largely 
influenced and shaped by the HIV/AIDS emergency,6 the 
current field of global health is, as Kleinman argued, “more 
a bunch of problems than a discipline.”7 Lacking a clear 
definition limits research, which inhibits understanding as 
well as the possibility of improving health.
While an agreement on a single definition of global health 
remains contested and elusive, there is a growing consensus 
around the importance of why and how a definition matters.8,9 
It matters for which issues are and are not considered, which 
issues receive funding and accordingly which issues are 
studied and addressed. How global health is understood 
influences which health challenges are addressed, the design 
of  how funds are raised and allocated, the public discourse and 
how policy-makers consider issues, the education of students 
as well as the creation of institutions.10 The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) conceived around the same time 
as the emergence of the term global health illustrate this.
In 2000, the United Nations (UN) agreed upon the Millennium 
Declaration in 2000 from which the MDGs were conceived. 
MDGs Four, Five, and Six (Reduce Child Mortality, Improve 
Maternal Health and Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other 
diseases) determined the health challenges addressed, shaped 
how funds were raised and spent, enabled new policies, 
created public awareness and influenced the design of, 
amongst other institutions, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria as well as the GAVI Alliance for 
Vaccines. The MDGs both shaped the conceptualization 
of global health, and reflect the representation of a 2001 
normative global health agenda. In fact, the MDGs became 
the overarching framework for global development efforts and 
are “arguably the most politically important pact ever made 
for international development.”11,12 Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 
argue the MDGs represent a new “super-norm.”11,13 The MDGs 
both reflected an emerging conceptualization of global health, 
and contributed to advancing this conceptualization. Indeed, 
even in 2014, roughly $23 billion out of a total of $36 billion 
of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) was directed 
towards MDGs Four, Five, and Six whereas only $611 million 
was directed towards NCDs. While the spending of DAH is 
one way to exert influence, this conceptualization of global 
health in line with the MDGs, a new normative framework 
to end poverty, also shapes and determines which issues and 
challenges are considered and researched. In other words, 
normative views and frameworks can exert power, and as 
Shiffmann cogently argues, “power is exercised everywhere in 
global health although its presence may be more apparent in 
some instances than others.”14
Understanding Power and How It Affects Global Health
The role of politics and power in determining policy are often 
underappreciated and underutilized. As Ooms’ commentary 
as well as others in this journal demonstrate, there is a 
need for a much deeper and more nuanced understanding 
of power in global health. As Erasmus and Gilson argue, 
“power, a concept at the heart of the health policy process, is 
surprisingly rarely explicitly considered in the health policy 
implementation literature.”15 Who has and exerts power, and 
how? What are the resources of power? The most obvious 
resource in global health are financial or material resources, 
but there are also other resources and ways to express power. 
To better understand how power is exerted, there is a need 
to identify and develop methodologies for assessing power in 
global health.
Global governance scholars Barnett and Duvall present a 
useful framework for understanding power, which they 
define “as the production, in and through social relations, of 
effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate.”16 They differentiate between specific 
and diffuse relations as well as direct and indirect forms of 
power—namely, compulsory (direct power, such as use of 
military or legislative force), institutional (indirect power, 
such as how international institutions are designed to favor 
one actor over another), structural (the overall constitution 
or framework of actor and their roles) or productive (control 
over the possession and distribution of resources) power.17 
Beyond methodologies, there is a need for a number of 
case studies to illustrate how different actors – institutions, 
states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private 
sector organizations, and networks – use and exert power to 
establish authority and legitimacy in global health. One of the 
classic examples is the role of the tobacco industry in exerting 
power to manipulate global health policy, but more recently, 
evidence of other private sector actors, like Coca Cola, have 
come under greater scrutiny for their efforts to fund research 
and shape public discussions. But there are many other 
examples that are less prominent and less well-understood. 
For example, consider the role of various NGOs working 
across Africa—these often work on behalf of the foreign 
governments or wealthy individuals advising governments and 
delivering health services, or the role of states like Germany 
or Japan using the G7 to shape new priorities for global health 
spending. Alternatively, institutions like the World Bank 
try to shape and influence discussions around responding 
to the Ebola crisis and reforming global health governance. 
Having a more robust understanding of how power is exerted 
also enables a discussion to consider effectiveness. While 
there are some frameworks that examine agenda-setting in 
global health,18 there is not yet an established methodology 
or framework to assess and measure effectiveness in exerting 
power to influence and shape global health policy.
Of course, understanding the importance of the definition 
of global health and how it exerts power requires some 
reflection on who is practicing global health and how. While 
some argue that “global health is usually more inclusive of 
social sciences than public health or international health” it 
will require much greater efforts to ensure that global health is 
truly multi-disciplinary. How might this happen? How could 
we accelerate the evolution and maturation of global health? 
This question should be at the top of the agenda in academic 
centers of excellence and the leading journals in global health.
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State Support: A Prerequisite for Global Health Network 
Effectiveness
Comment on “Four Challenges that Global Health Networks Face”
Robert Marten*, Richard D. Smith
Abstract
Shiffman recently summarized lessons for network effectiveness from an impressive collection of case-studies. 
However, in common with most global health governance analysis in recent years, Shiffman underplays the 
important role of states in these global networks. As the body which decides and signs international agreements, 
often provides the resourcing, and is responsible for implementing initiatives all contributing to the prioritization 
of certain issues over others, state recognition and support is a prerequisite to enabling and determining global 
health networks’ success. The role of states deserves greater attention, analysis and consideration. We reflect 
upon the underappreciated role of the state within the current discourse on global health. We present the 
tobacco case study to illustrate the decisive role of states in determining progress for global health networks, 
and highlight how states use a legitimacy loop to gain legitimacy from and provide legitimacy to global health 
networks. Moving forward in assessing global health networks’ effectiveness, further investigating state support 
as a determinant of success will be critical. Understanding how global health networks and states interact and 
evolve to shape and support their respective interests should be a focus for future research. 
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Introduction
Shiffman recently summarized lessons for network 
effectiveness from an impressive collection of case-studies 
across tobacco use and alcohol harm, maternal and neonatal 
mortality, early childhood development and surgically-
treatable conditions as well as tuberculosis and pneumonia.1 
The networks involved in these areas, and their effectiveness, 
matter as they contribute to the shaping and framing of 
areas competing for attention and resources in global 
health. Recognizing that their effectiveness is determined 
by strategic decisions and contextual factors, including 
historical legacies, current political environments and 
specific issue characteristics, Shiffman argues persuasively 
how these networks are likely to achieve better results when 
they construct compelling framings and build broad strategic 
coalitions.2 Based on this analysis, Shiffman suggests more 
generally that networks face four challenges in generating 
attention and resources: problem definition; positioning; 
coalition-building; and governance. 
However, in common with most recent global health 
governance analysis, Shiffman underplays the important role 
of states in these global networks in his analysis. Shiffman 
argues, “The spread of these [global health] networks 
represents a transformation in the way global health is 
governed: from a system largely dominated by hierarchical 
forms of organization—particularly nation-states and inter-
state organizations—to one also characterized by horizontal 
networking and growing participation of non-state actors.” 
Our commentary questions the basis of this assertion, and 
poses the question if, instead states’ roles might simply be 
evolving. As the body which negotiates and signs international 
agreements, (often) provides the resourcing, and is responsible 
for implementing and prioritizing initiatives, state recognition 
and support is a prerequisite to enabling and determining 
global health networks’ success. The role of states deserves 
greater attention, analysis and consideration, particularly 
when considering new or emerging actors like networks. In 
this response, we first contextualize the underappreciated 
role of the state within the current conceptualization and 
discourse on global health. Second, we use the tobacco case 
study to showcase the decisive role of states in determining 
progress for global health networks. Third, we highlight 
how states use a legitimacy loop to gain legitimacy from and 
provide legitimacy to global health networks.
The Underappreciated Role of States Within Global Health
Discussions of globalization and global governance continue 
to grapple primarily with the evolving role of non-state actors 
in a rapidly changing world.3 Definitions remain contested, 
but global governance generally focuses on the management 
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of challenges previously considered within the domain of a 
sovereign state, and are now considered unmanageable by 
single or multiple states.4 Global governance and global health 
share a focus on transnational issues and a need to go beyond 
the state to address new challenges. Globalization, and the 
accompanying proliferation of new actors, changed and 
challenged the role of states within global health governance. 
During the 2002 SARS situation, for example, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) assumed and asserted authority 
over individual states, supporting the perception of major a 
change in what Fidler called “Westphalian public health.”5 This 
decline of the state and rise of an assertive WHO secretariat 
supported by global civil society and transnational media 
networks resonated with scholars seeking to understand a 
growing shift away from the state. Indeed, some argued that 
the state was becoming “hollowed out” by globalization6 
and that the global health governance landscape was so 
fragmented that states no longer held power over policy-
making.7 However, reports of the ‘death’ of states within 
global health governance may be ‘greatly exaggerated.’8 While 
recognizing the rise of new actors and partnerships, the state 
remains a dominant and decisive actor in global health.
For example, in the SARS case, states did not contest WHO’s 
assumption of broader powers as SARS containment served 
their interests; if it had not and threatened their interests, 
they could have blocked or ignored WHO. For example, just 
a few years later in 2007, Indonesia did just this. Indonesia 
refused to share avian influenza samples with the global 
community.9 More recently in the wake of Ebola, 58 states 
party to the apparently legally binding International Health 
Regulations (IHR) disregarded their commitments imposing 
travel restrictions.10 
There is no doubt that globalization challenges states to 
evolve. But rather than simply decline, states continue to 
adapt and respond. States no longer solely reflect national 
preferences, but instead accommodate both national and 
international policy demands.11 Recent political shifts in 
the United States and Europe reveal one response to the 
disenfranchisement felt at national levels from globalization 
(and the need to accommodate international policy demands) 
and reflect an attempt to reassert sovereign power. Different 
ideologies and approaches dictate various state responses to 
the new reality, but what is clear is that the state is aiming to 
retain a dominant position, even as it continues to respond 
to increasing influence and engagement from business, civil 
society and international institutions.
The Tobacco Global Health Network
Tobacco, as presented in the global health network case study, 
exemplifies the challenges globalization posed to states trying 
to protect their citizens’ health.12 The international tobacco 
industry capitalized on changes in technology and trade 
liberalization to target emerging markets and expand their 
business in states with less effective tobacco control.13 States 
responded with the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC).12 The process to start the FCTC only 
began once state representatives attending the World Health 
Assembly approved the process to begin with a resolution.14 
States like Canada were strong supporters.15 Other states 
such as Brazil16 and Thailand,17 which had made domestic 
progress combatting tobacco, viewed the FCTC process as 
an opportunity to exert soft-power leadership and expand 
their influence both deepening the consolidation of their own 
domestic progress against tobacco, and also inspiring other 
states. 
States not only empowered WHO to move forward to 
negotiate a FCTC, but states also funded and directed WHO 
in the 1990s to provide resources to facilitate the creation 
of a civil society alliance to co-ordinate non-governmental 
organization (NGO) participation in negotiations to ensure 
the FCTC agreement was approved. States used their ability 
to direct and fund WHO to support NGOs and research 
networks creating a global health network to achieve 
their interests in achieving a treaty. In May 2003, WHO’s 
192 member states approved this treaty which entered 
international law in February 2005. This treaty challenged 
and shifted state sovereignty, but these changes were state-
initiated, state-sponsored, state-approved and state-ratified. 
Researchers, advocates and policy-makers acting within this 
network were crucial, but they were also supported, enabled 
and ultimately sanctioned by states. The FCTC should also 
serve as reminder of the continued primacy of the state as 
an actor within global health. More recently, global tobacco 
companies have sought to challenge states’ ability to enact 
plain package labelling using international trade agreements; 
however, states have prevailed, against much of the global 
health communities’ concern and predictions. 
The Legitimacy Loop Between States and Global Health 
Networks
The importance of state support for global health networks 
is also related to legitimacy, where states and global health 
networks each use the other to legitimize and amplify efforts; 
establishing a ‘legitimacy loop.’ For example, during the FCTC 
process, states supported and sanctioned networks as they 
served their interests, legitimizing their efforts and advancing 
their positions, as NGOs could take approaches states could 
not. In other words, states used global health networks 
as a tool to shift other states’ positions, and legitimize the 
continued dominance of the state-centric system. 
More recently, the conceptualization of the post-2015 
development agenda showcases this policy loop. Starting 
in 2011 and 2012, states determined and established a 
United Nations’ process whereby states determined the 
final framework. To legitimize the effort, this process 
accommodated and included countless consultations with 
many non-state actors, but this was at the discretion of states 
and the shape of the consultations controlled by states. States 
still negotiated and determined the outcome framework. Yet 
during both the FCTC and post-2015 negotiations, global 
health networks sought to foster relationships with states to 
leverage states to legitimize their positions and advance their 
interests; this was both welcomed and facilitated by states. 
Conclusion
Shiffman provides a valuable service in highlighting the 
importance of global health networks and how they can be 
improved. Adding to this foundation, it is critical to recognize 
the decisive role states play. Moving forward in assessing 
global health networks’ effectiveness, identifying and further 
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investigating state support as a determinant of success will 
be critical. Some scholars have argued that global health still 
needs to be further “globalized.”18 Current trends, however, 
like the recent change to the WHO’s Director-General election 
process giving all states an equal vote, seem to reflect the 
opposite: a re-assertion of state power within global health. 
The question, in the shifting international environment, 
is how will this continue to evolve? Will states continue to 
sanction global health networks to advance their interests 
and fill governance gaps? Will states continue adapting and 
facilitating innovation within global health capitalizing on 
new ways to generate ideas, pool resources and enable more 
shared decision-making processes?19 Or will states seek to re-
assert their role more forcefully, re-consolidating their power 
and reversing some changes over the last twenty years?
Of course, states are not unitary actors. State actions and 
decisions are heavily contested and determined by a number 
of other national and international non-state actors, global 
institutions, as well as other states. Analyzing what drives 
states to commit, prioritize, invest and implement agreements 
is the critical issue. Understanding how global health 
networks and states interact and evolve to shape and support 
their respective interests should be a focus for future research. 
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ABSTRACT
Since 2000, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided the
framework for global development efforts transforming the field now
known as global health. The MDGs both reflected and contributed to
shaping a normative global health agenda. In the field of global health,
the role of the state is largely considered to have diminished; however,
this paper reasserts states as actors in the conceptualisation and
institutionalisation of the MDGs, and illustrates how states exerted
power and engaged in the MDG process. States not only sanctioned the
MDGs through their heads of states endorsing the Millennium
Declaration, but also acted more subtly behind the scenes supporting,
enabling, and/or leveraging other actors, institutions and processes to
conceptualise and legitimize the MDGs. Appreciating the MDGs’ role in
the conceptualisation of global health is particularly relevant as the
world transitions to the MDGs’ successor, the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). The SDGs’ influence, impact and importance remains to be
seen; however, to understand the future of global health and how
actors, particularly states, can engage to shape the field, a deeper sense
of the MDGs’ legacy and how actors engaged in the past is helpful.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 11 April 2017
Accepted 13 April 2018
KEYWORDS
Power; Millennium
Development Goals; global
health; global health
governance; global health
policy
Introduction
From 2000–2015, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided the framework for
global development efforts. The MDGs shaped billions of dollars of investment, and impacted the
lives of many. Advocates contend they invigorated institutions, stimulated research communities,
inspired civil society movements and galvanised politicians and citizens (McArthur, 2013). Scholars
argue the MDGs represented a new ‘super norm’ dominating the global development agenda
(Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011). Three out of the eight goals related directly to health and the
other five goals focused on critical determinants of health. The MDGs’ influence was pivotal to creat-
ing a normative global health agenda, which largely continues to shape the global health agenda
today. Appreciating the MDGs’ role and legacy in the conceptualisation of global health is particu-
larly relevant as the world transitions from the MDGs to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The SDGs’ influence, impact and importance remains to be seen; however, to understand global
health now and in the future and assess how actors, like states, can engage to shape the field, a deeper
sense of the MDGs’ origins and of how actors engaged in the past is instructive.
Defining and determining what is and what is not considered part of the global health agenda
remains disputed. There is no single global health agenda (Fried et al., 2010; McInnes & Lee,
2012). Yet how global health is defined and understood shapes which health challenges are
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considered (Frenk, Gómez-Dantés, & Moon, 2014). The definition impacts the design of how funds
are raised and eventually disbursed. It influences discourse and how policymakers consider issues. It
determines the education of students and future policymakers. The global health agenda can also
contribute to the creation of new global health institutions like the Global Fund or GAVI, the Vac-
cine Alliance. In other words, the conceptualisation of global health exerts power by determining the
global health agenda. As recently argued, ‘power is exercised everywhere in global health although its
presence may be more apparent in some instances than others’ (Shiffman, 2014).
While the tremendous normative power of the MDGs is increasingly recognised, there is limited
analysis considering the explicit role of sovereign states as actors within the process to create the
MDGs. Existing literature highlights the important role of civil society and non-governmental actors
(Brinkerhoff, Smith, & Teegen, 2007), ‘norm champions’ (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011) and ‘well-
placed individuals within the UN’ (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017); however, to better
identify both the origins and future of global health as a field of policy action, it is necessary to recon-
sider how state actors engaged in this process to create the MDGs. What were states’ roles in the
policymaking process to create the MDGs? Why and how did states engage to shape and influence
the process?
Despite broad recognition of the MDGs’ and their role in development, their relationship to
the rise of the field of global health is less explicitly acknowledged. Part of this could be the ten-
sion between the normative aspiration of global health to transcend states and national borders
with the reality of the MDGs and global health institutions still operating within an UN-state
system. This could help explain why seminal articles assessing the transition from international
to global health do not even mention the MDGs (Brown, Cueto, & Fee, 2006). This is somewhat
paradoxical given that the MDGs had a strong health focus and that the emergence of global
health in the late 1990s and early 2000s broadly coincided with the United Nations’ (UN) Mil-
lennium Declaration. The MDGs also built on previous advocacy efforts. For example, MDG 4
on child mortality built on the experience of the child-survival revolution in the 1990s (Díaz-
Martínez & Gibbons, 2014).
The MDGs also matter for global health as issues not included within the MDG agenda, like non-
communicable diseases (NCDs), received reduced interest, attention and resources within the field of
global health. Conversely issues included in the MDGs, like HIV/AIDS, gained disproportionate and
distortionary attention possibly displacing other health spending (Shiffman, 2008). Some experts
argued that the quantification of the MDGs and their targets led to ‘simplification, reification and
abstraction’ which contributed to redefining some of the priorities (Fukuda-Parr, Yamin, & Green-
stein, 2014). By 2014, roughly $23 billion out of a total of $36 billion of Development Assistance for
Health (DAH) was directed towards MDGs Four, Five, and Six whereas only $611 million was
directed towards NCDs (Dieleman, Murray, & Haakenstad, 2015). Moreover, since 1990 DAH
associated with the MDGs increased more than any other areas (Dieleman et al., 2016). While
this was not necessarily the case for every goal and target within the MDGs, it was the case that if
a health challenge was not a MDG goal or target, it was more difficult to raise support and awareness
for this issue in the MDG era. Anticipating this situation, former UNAIDS Director Peter Piot fier-
cely advocated for HIV/AIDS to be included in the MDGs (Piot, 2013).
At their inception, the MDGs caused rigorous debate amongst academics, civil society and policy-
makers around the world with one early critic calling them a ‘Major Distraction Gimmick’ (Antro-
bus, 2005) being forced upon developing countries by the triad of the United States, Europe and
Japan (Samin, 2006). Yet these early critiques were eventually forgotten or ignored considering
the power of the MDGs’ supporters, and as the MDGs became more entrenched as development pol-
icy. Indeed, a recent review (Fehling, Nelson, & Venkatapuram, 2013) found that ‘only 15 percent of
MDG-related publications expressed concerns with the MDGs and only one-third of these discussed
intrinsic limitations.’ From this more narrow literature, the review considers MDGs’ limitations in
terms of the development process (Samin, 2006), structure (Saith, 2006), content (Easterly, 2008) as
well as implementation and enforcement (AbouZahr & Boerma, 2010).
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Despite these critiques, an early Millennium Project report declared, that the MDGS were ‘the
most broadly supported, comprehensive, and specific poverty reduction targets the world has ever
established’(UNMillennium Project, 2005). A UNMDGs final report defined them as the ‘most suc-
cessful anti-poverty movement in history’ (United Nations, 2015). The MDGs reflected a departure
from the 1980s Washington consensus development to a more people-centred or human develop-
ment in the 1990s expressed during a series of UN conferences on development issues (Wilkinson
& Hulme, 2012). As experts noted the MDGs arguably ‘created a new narrative of international
development centred on global poverty’ with the MDGs ‘the legitimised framework for defining
what this means’ and the ‘reference point around which international debates about development
revolve’ (Wilkinson & Hulme, 2012).
More specifically within global health, the MDGs remained contested. The MDGs represent the
apex of an extremely ‘vertical’ (focused on specific diseases, like HIV/AIDS or malaria as opposed to
a horizontal approach focused on health systems) approach to health interventions. The three
health-specific MDGs focused on a small number of vertical interventions to combat specific diseases
and maternal and child mortality as the most effective approach to improve health. In 2008, analysts
highlighted ‘[t]he potentially destructive polarisation’ between vertical and horizontal approaches
(Ooms, Van Damme, Baker, Zeitz, & Schrecker, 2008). The Maximizing Positive Synergies initiative
(detailed in Section Two below) helped diffuse this tension leading to greater attention to health sys-
tems and a more integrated approach within health. But the MDGs remained the dominant policy
doctrine. In fact, it appears the MDGs dominated the agenda so much so that they even eventually
contributed towards a more horizontal approach. One analysis found that ‘critical factors behind the
recent burst of attention [to health systems] include fears among global health actors that health sys-
tems problems threaten the achievement of the health-related MDGs’ (Hafner & Shiffman, 2013).1
Within global health, the MDGs shaped priorities and investments. The MDGs both reflected an
emerging definition of global health, and contributed to advancing this conceptualisation. They
exerted power and facilitated by the UN and civil society partners were enacted through and within
nation states.
The role of power as a concept and framework for assessing how global health policy is deter-
mined is often overlooked. As Erasmus and Gilson argued, ‘power, a concept at the heart of the
health policy process, is surprisingly rarely explicitly considered in the health policy implementation
literature’ (Erasmus & Gilson, 2008). Frameworks for understanding power remain contested and
empirical evidence for applying these frameworks is often lacking. Given the importance of the
MDGs in shaping the global health agenda, understanding how states engaged to create the
MDGs could help illustrate how actors exert power in global health and hence inform how actors
both engaged in the conceptualisation of the SDGs and might engage with their implementation
shaping the future of global health.
Based on published literature and unpublished policy materials, this paper focuses on reconsider-
ing the role of states as critical actors in both the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of the
MDGs. While state engagement in the recent SDG process was more visible and legible, some states,
contrary to common perceptions, were also critical actors in the creation of the MDGs. States as
actors within global health are sometimes overshadowed by the attention given to the proliferation
of new actors, like public-private partnerships, civil society organisations or philanthropies (Ricci,
2009). In the case of the MDGs, states not only sanctioned the MDGs through head of states endor-
sing the Millennium Declaration, but also acted more subtly behind the scenes supporting, enabling
(sometimes by not blocking), and/or leveraging other actors, institutions and processes to concep-
tualise the MDGs.
This paper considers why and how states exerted power and engaged in the MDG process. This
paper starts by presenting an overview of different potential frameworks for analyzing the role of
states in the creation of the MDGs, and selects the Barnett and Duvall framework (considering com-
pulsory, productive, structural and institutional power) for analysis (Barnett & Duvall, 2005a).
Second, this paper applies this framework describing and analyzing how states exerted power in
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the creation and institutionalisation of the MDGs in three distinct phases (2000–2005; 2005–2010;
and 2010–2015) in relation to the emergence of the field of global health. Finally, it considers and
discusses the implications of this analysis for the recent transition from the MDGs to the SDGS,
and what this might mean for the implementation of the SDGs and the future of global health.
Section one: power as a new framework for understanding global health
Power is a central concept in social sciences, but its meaning and application is heavily contested.
Scholars disagree about sources of power, the role of power and how actors exert power. Indeed,
one international relations scholar describes the concept of power as one of the ‘most troublesome
in the field’ and argues that ‘the number and variety of definitions should be an embarrassment to
political scientists’ (Gilpin, 1975, 1983). Traditionally scholars have seen power conceptually defined
by an actor or state resources like armies or navies and populations or territories. But in the second
half of the twentieth century, this approach evolved to consider ‘relational power’, in other words,
how actors, individually or in groups, related to each other and affected or influenced others’ behav-
iour. Beyond this, many debates and different approaches in terms of how to exert, frame, measure or
understand power remain. Yet there is a consensus on the importance of understanding power and
the lack of knowledge on how power functions (Baldwin, 2016). There is a similar, but slightly less
mature, state of affairs in the global health literature.
There is an increasing recognition of the concept of power in global health, but discussions are
still nascent (Shiffman, 2014). Similar to international relations, power in health remains associated
with possession of or access to material resources like financing or medical equipment or drugs; how-
ever, there is an emergent recognition of ideas (McDougall, 2016), networks (Shiffman, 2016), exper-
tise and information (Shearer, Abelson, Kouyaté, Lavis, & Walt, 2016) as potential sources of power.
This is critical for global health as many consider health a policy process dictated by technical choices
instead of recognising health as a profoundly political space in which various priorities and policies
are fiercely contested and ideas, networks, expertise and information are deployed to advance com-
peting approaches (Shiffman, 2014).
From the international relations literature, there are a few different frameworks for understanding
how power is exerted, which could be considered for global health. One of the simplest and perhaps
most intuitive ways to illustrate how power is exerted is to compare hard and soft forms of power.
Robert Dahl’s famous formulation of hard power is the ability of A to force B to do something it
would not otherwise do (usually deploying military or economic resources), and Joseph Nye’s con-
ceptualisation of soft power attracts or co-opts actors and persuades actors without the use of coer-
cive force. In global health, Brazil’s influential role in advancing its political values on the negotiation
of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is often cited as an example of soft power (Lee,
Chagas, & Novotny, 2010). More recently, others argued that to best advance interests, actors should
seek to combine both hard and soft power to create smart power (Nossel, 2004). For example, one
could consider American efforts on HIV/AIDS like PEPFAR advancing American interests in geo-
politically strategic countries backed up with financial resources as an example of smart power.
A similar framework from sociology is Lukes’ three faces of power (Lukes, 2004). The first face of
power is the ability of one actor to force another actor to do something they initially did not want to
do, ie hard power. The second face of power is considered agenda setting and framing; powerful
actors can control the agenda and determine who sits at the table and which issues are considered
to be or not be on the agenda (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). The third face of power is the ability to
control an actor’s thoughts. For example, one actor might be able to shape another actor’s initial
interests. These three faces of power could be summarised as overt, covert or latent forms of
power. This three faces of power framework was briefly applied recently to examine the process
to create the SDGs (Buse & Hawkes, 2014). While the hard, soft, smart power framework is helpful
for examining state actions at the international level, Lukes’ faces of power is most helpful for asses-
sing the negotiation of policy processes as the framework illustrates how actors can shape the agenda
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by putting or removing issues from consideration (the second face of power) and/or controlling the
terms or framework for conceptualising issues (the third face of power).
Building on Lukes, global governance scholars Barnett and Duvall present a broader framework
for understanding power, which is insightful for understanding how states negotiate policy pro-
cesses. They consider power to be about relationships, and define it ‘as the production, in and
through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances
and fate’ (Barnett & Duvall, 2005b). They differentiate between four forms of power—compulsory
power (such as use of military or economic force), institutional power (such as how international
institutions are designed to favour one actor over another), structural power (the overall constitution
or framework of actor and their roles) or productive power (control over the possession and distri-
bution of resources) (Barnett & Duvall, 2005a). For global health, one could think of a donor using
funding to exert compulsory power; a well-positioned state leveraging a multilateral agency to exert
institutional power; a prestigious university or NGO positioning its staff as experts to provide tech-
nical policy support as exerting structural power; and a UN agency or a private-sector actor advan-
cing and promoting a particular agenda or approach to addressing health challenges as an exertion of
productive power.
Given the breadth of Barnett and Duvall’s framework to distinguish between different forms of
power, particularly to identify and illuminate ways in which power is exerted in ways usually unseen
or unrecognised, the next section below applies this framework to analyze and illustrate state engage-
ment in the creation of the MDGs.
Section two: state power and the creation of the MDGs
Phase one 2000–2005: conceptualization and campaign
One year after the unanimous endorsement of the 2000 Millennium Declaration during the Millen-
nium Summit with 149 heads of states and governments (the largest ever such gathering), UN Sec-
retary General Kofi Annan submitted a report to the General Assembly entitled, a Roadmap towards
the Implementation of the Millennium Declaration (UN Secretary-General, 2001). This report was
adopted by the General Assembly, and recommended it be considered a ‘useful guide’ for operatio-
nalising the Declaration. An annex to this report included the framework for the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs): eight goals, eighteen targets and forty-eight indicators. This MDG
resolution, based on the Declaration approved and endorsed by heads of states and governments,
would ultimately be leveraged by the United Kingdom and other OECD states to exert tremendous
compulsory, structural, institutional and productive power.
Recognising the role of states in shaping policy is not to dismiss the role of message and norm
entrepreneurs as well as elite technocrats highlighted elsewhere (Hulme & Fukuda-Parr, 2009).
Instead it is meant to reconsider these individuals’ roles as enabled by states exerting structural, insti-
tutional and productive power. For example, three of the Security Council’s five permanent five seats
are held by OECD-member states, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. These states
have veto or structural power over the appointment of the Secretary-General, and thus have influ-
ence over the Secretary-General’s office; a similar situation is true for other UN agencies and other
parts of UN institutions. States use this structural power to install their nationals into key positions
shaping policies within these institutions and establishing critical personal connections. States also
leverage institutional power through the OECD and World Bank as well as the UN.
Following the Millennium Declaration and in coordination with the World Bank and OECD, a
United Nations’ interagency expert group (IAEG) both reflected institutional power and exerted pro-
ductive power. Co-chaired by a special adviser in the Secretary General’s office (Michael Doyle) and
director (Jan Vandemoortele) in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and with
participants from both the Bank and the OECD, this group, sanctioned by OECD states, led the pro-
cess to draft what became the eight MDGs (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011). The Goals were taken
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almost verbatim from the Millennium Declaration, which helped to legitimize them as the Declara-
tion had been approved by Heads of State. The eight MDGs consolidated and built upon the so-
called International Development Goals (IDGs) created at the Paris-based Organization for Econ-
omic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In fact, MDGs 1 through 7 were extremely similar
to the IDGs. The biggest difference between the IDGs and the MDGs was Goal 8 on partnership,
which was the result of political consultation and compromise following the Millennium Declara-
tion, most notably between the G77 Member States who believed the Goal did not go far enough
and the United States which believed it went too far (McArthur, 2014).
The IDGs came from a working group of national Ministers of Development which met in the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD to produce a 1996 report, Shaping the
21st Century. This report selectively included goals and language from UN conferences in the
1990s. These IDGs were endorsed in June 2000 by the UN, OECD, World Bank and the IMF (A Bet-
ter World for All, 2000), but the IDGs’ productive power had little buy-in or support from develop-
ing countries. In fact, the IDGs engendered deep critique on a number of levels from developing
countries and civil society. The IDGs had been promoted by the United Kingdom, which led an
informal group, the so-called Utstein Group, of female Development Ministers from the Nether-
lands, Germany and Norway, which sought to use the IDGs as their overarching framework for
development and align their aid efforts to leverage their impact (Hulme, 2009). This would also
be an exertion of compulsory power by developed states coercing developing states to adopt policy
guidance in exchange for development assistance. The strong commitment from the United King-
dom was championed by Clare Short, who had recently come to lead DFID as part of the 1997-
elected New Labour government (Hulme, 2007). As part of a broader shift in development thinking
and fortuitous timing with the Millennium Summit, the UK and the other states’ institutional power
within the World Bank and the IMF advanced the productive power of the IDGs eventually lever-
aging the UN to reframe and rebrand the IDGs as MDGs through negotiation with the addition of
Goal 8 on partnership to overcome resistance from developing country states.
Other than the goal on global partnership, the IDGs were largely the same as the MDGs on health
except one key difference. Both lists of goals contained maternal and child mortality (although they
were one goal in the IDGs and two goals in the MDGs), but the IDGs included a goal on reproductive
health services, whereas the MDGs had a goal on HIV/AIDS. The removal or blocking of reproduc-
tive rights as part of the MDGs was the result of the so-called ‘unholy alliance’ between the Vatican
and Sudan, along with Libya and Iran, which then leveraged the G-77, a large and powerful bloc of
countries within the UN General Assembly, and also took advantage of a recently-elected conserva-
tive US government (the administration of President George W. Bush), which was initially disinter-
ested in the MDGs (Hulme, 2010). In this case, the Vatican State exploited institutional or structural
power, joining some members of the G-77, to block a potential MDG on reproductive health. This
alliance later broke down in 2005, and reproductive health was included as a target for maternal
health. HIV/AIDS was included as a MDG following vigorous lobbying from HIV/AIDS activists
led by UNAIDS Director Peter Piot.
UNDP, newly led by former World Bank Vice President (Mark Malloch Brown), spearheaded the
development of a strategy to exert institutional power and advocate for MDG implementation. These
efforts ultimately included a Millennium Project and a Millennium Campaign to raise attention,
financing and support to advance progress. UNDP worked with governments to embed the
MDGs within national policy processes and monitor progress. The 2002 Monterrey Finance for
Development Conference focused on financing the MDGs (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011). Despite
these efforts, national commitment to the MDGs at this point was limited, and in the early stages
the MDGs provoked robust critiques.
Hulme (2009) distinguishes between various schools of critique classifying them as
high modernists, who take [the MDGs] at face value and are optimistic that they are a blueprint for the trans-
formation of the human condition (Sachs & McArthur, 2005); the strategic realists, who don’t believe the
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MDGs are a blueprint for action but believe they are essential to stretch ambitions and mobilise political com-
mitment and public support (Fukuda-Parr, 2008); the critics, who see them as well-intentioned but poorly
thought through – distracting attention from more appropriate targets (or non-targets) and more effective pol-
icies and actions (Clemens, Kenny, & Moss, 2007; Easterly, 2006); through to the radical critics, who view them
as a conspiracy obscuring the really important ‘millennial’ questions of growing global inequality, alternatives
to capitalism and women’s empowerment (Antrobus, 2003; Eyben, 2006).
Despite these early critiques, the commitment of states and the broader UN system during this early
phase was crucial for establishing the MDGs as the dominant narrative for both international devel-
opment and global health. OECD states ensured this by recalibrating and aligning their ﬁnancial
support and leveraging their structural institutional, productive power across the UN system. For
example, the US Government launched two major funding initiatives, the President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI); these initiatives com-
bined with the Global Fund and GAVI to help boost development assistance for health in 2000 from
$11.6 billion to $33.1 billion in 2012 (Murray, 2015). The MDGs were also supported by the creation
of two new public-private partnership institutions, GAVI for immunizations and the Global Fund to
Fight HIV, TB and Malaria, to accelerate progress and provide ﬁnancial resources to reinforce the
MDGs’ productive power (Hanefeld, 2014; Storeng, 2014).
Phase two 2005–2010: consolidation and critique
In 2005 UN Member States met for the World Summit at the UN in New York. With strong leader-
ship from the UN Secretariat, the United Kingdom and other developed states, the Summit outcome
document approved by national leaders continually referenced the MDGs and encouraged states to
‘adopt, by 2006, and implement comprehensive national development strategies to achieve the inter-
nationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals’
(United Nations, 2005). In fact, states endorsed and requested the UN system to support the devel-
opment of MDG-based national development strategies and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers at
the country level (Pizarro, 2013). The UK also made the MDGs a centerpiece of their hosting the
G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005. This deepened and expanded the productive and institutional
power of the MDG agenda amplifying this power within the UN and international system.
Following this Summit and the G8 meetings, more UN and international institutions became
involved in national reporting and the regularity of this reporting increased. A review of twenty-
two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—fifteen of which were prepared between 2005 and 2007
and one in 2008— highlighted that almost all of them expressed a commitment to the MDGs
(Fukuda-Parr, 2010). These initiatives spurred other actions. For example, Malawi in 2006 started
publishing an annual MDGs report (Waage et al., 2010).2 Commitment to the MDGs continued
to grow as states like the United Kingdom, and others like Japan, continued to advance the MDG
approach as a way to consolidate, align and amplify their development investments. In 2008, govern-
ments, foundations, businesses and civil society groups met at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York for another high-level event. More than $16 billion was committed to accelerate progress
exerting some compulsory power using the appeal of financial assistance to support states towards
the MDGs.
While support for the MDGs during this period expanded, critique of the MDG approach also
grew. The rise of many emerging economies, particularly in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis,
began to create additional space to question the MDG approach. States like Indonesia used their
experiences with the MDGs to criticise and improve the process, but also to raise their own profile.
Experts noted tendencies to focus on targets which were comparatively easier to implement or moni-
tor (some have called this the tyranny of averages) which led to variable progress and had adverse
implications for equity. Critics called for improvements in national averages ignoring the inverse
care law with implications for equity (Gwatkin, 2005). Despite raising valid concerns, critique
also indirectly reinforced the existing productive power of the MDGs.
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During this period, the Global Fund and other so-called global health initiatives (GHIs), like the
US’ PEPFAR programme, provided incredible amounts of resources and prioritised attention for
HIV/AIDS, a MDG. In fact, the energy, innovation and attention from HIV/AIDS has led some
to even argue that HIV/AIDS invented global health (Brandt, 2013). Some defined global health
as ‘an area for study, research, and practice that places a priority on improving health and achieving
equity in health for all people worldwide’ (Koplan et al., 2009). Others argued that global health was
simply ‘a foreign policy instrument of hyper-rich nations’ (Horton, 2014). But more realistically, glo-
bal health was, as one academic argued, ‘more a bunch of problems than a discipline’ (Kleinman,
2010). The problems of global health in this period were predominantly the ‘vertical’ MDG health
issues of child and maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria.
One MDG critic argued that, ‘the MDG phenomenon carries the potential for distorting mean-
ingful intellectual and research agendas, and could function as the catalyst and vehicle for a funda-
mental realignment of the political economy of development at the global level’ (Saith, 2006). This
was accurate for global health. Experts noted that the MDGs were distorting priorities and spending
and would not be achievable without broader, more ‘horizontal’ investments in national health sys-
tems (Travis et al., 2004).
To consider this, the World Health Organization, with financial support from Italy and strong
engagement from many states receiving funding from GHIs, which were funding the MDGs, con-
vened a collaborative research effort and a high-level dialogue called Maximizing Positive Synergies
in 2009. The research consortium convened identified areas for concern, and concluded more atten-
tion should be devoted to strengthening health systems which could also encourage better alignment
and integration between GHIs and health systems (World Health Organization Maximizing Positive
Synergies Collaborative Group et al., 2009). One synthesis analysis found positive effects of the MDG
approach as, ‘a rapid scale-up in HIV/AIDS service delivery, greater stakeholder participation, and
channeling of funds to non-governmental stakeholders, mainly NGOs and faith-based bodies’ and
negative effects as ‘distortion of recipient countries’ national policies, notably through distracting
governments from coordinated efforts to strengthen health systems and re-verticalization of plan-
ning, management and monitoring and evaluation systems’ (Biesma et al., 2009).
Phase three 2010–2015: accelerated implementation and the final push
This phase started with the 2010 MDG Review Summit. The MDGs’ strong productive power was
institutionalised throughout the UN and international system, and implementation efforts contin-
ued. Despite additional pledges of more than $40 billion to accelerate progress, the Summit con-
cluded that progress in many countries was ‘patchy’ and ‘uneven’ (United Nations, 2010). Focus
shifted thereafter to a MDG Acceleration Framework (MAF) to support lagging countries to achieve
the MDGs in the remaining five years. While discussions began to consider the end of the MDGs,
UN policymakers focused on accelerating progress towards implementation accompanied by
additional reviews and analyses as well as a proliferation of case studies profiling national best prac-
tices and innovations.
For example, the London International Development Centre and the Lancet collaborated on an
in-depth Commission reviewing progress in 2010 (Waage et al., 2010). While heralding the remark-
able success of the MDGs for agenda setting, the Commission noted particular missed opportunities
for synergies between efforts across education, health and gender sectors. A lack of strong ownership
by national institutions also created challenges. The Commission also highlighted that MDGs disre-
garded and fragmented health systems (Travis et al., 2004), ignored changing demographics as well
as overlooked emerging health challenges such as non-communicable diseases (Alleyne et al., 2013),
mental health or road traffic injuries.
Other analyses showed mixed evidence on how the MDGs affected national policymaking. In one
survey of 118 countries, eighty-six percent reported that they acted in response to the MDGs (United
Nations Development Group, 2005). Another review of national development plans in fifty countries
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showed that thirty-two countries either adapted or localised the MDGs into national planning
(Seyedsayamdost, 2014). But low and middle-income countries could simply be referencing the
MDGs in their national development plans to satisfy donor or international ‘norms’ of MDG politi-
cal correctness (Fukuda-Parr, 2008). Indeed, one review suggested that states had two distinct motiv-
ations for engaging with the MDGs: first, to increase their global visibility and influence (this was
usually more reflective of middle-income or emerging countries); and second, to receive increases
in overseas development assistance (ODA) (Sarwar, 2015). In the first case, it could be that emerging
economies recognised the power of the MDGs, and wanted to use this MDG platform to amplify
their own power; and in the second case, this reflects some countries’ need for financing and thus
be able to be ‘coerced’ by the MDGs. Yet even when countries integrated MDGs into their policy
and planning processes, this did not necessarily lead to MDG issues being domestically prioritised
or provided with the necessary domestic funding. Again, it could be that countries were reacting
to the productive, institutional and structural power of the MDGs by integrating them into their pol-
icy processes.
While the UN system was determined to prioritise the MDGs, discussions began during this
phase to consider what would come after the MDGs. Some states, like the United Kingdom, were
in favour of continuing the MDGs beyond 2015. Other states like Colombia argued for the creation
of new SDGs which would focus more on broader issues including the environment and be univer-
sally applicable for all countries. In fact, many states, particularly middle-income states, wanted to
broaden the MDGs to be universally relevant for all countries. Starting in 2012 in the wake of the
Rio + 20 conference, an elaborate UN-led, multi-stakeholder, multi-sectoral process began discus-
sions around a process to create a successor framework for the post-2015 era. The ensuing policy
process was arguably the most inclusive and consultative in United Nations in history, and the extra-
ordinary engagement and commitment reflected the MDGs’ tremendous power.
While there were countless consultations and opportunities to provide input between 2012–14,
UN Member States ensured they had the final decision in the process designing it to conclude
with intergovernmental negotiations between 2014 and 2015 which would give the final approval
for the post-2015 agenda. These state negotiations were profoundly political and heavily disputed.
This reflected emerging economies recognition of the influence of the MDGs and the opportunity
to exert their own institutional and productive power through shaping the conceptualisation of
the new agenda. Leveraging their respective structural and productive power within the UN system,
for example, Brazil’s hosting of the Rio + 20 Forum in 2012, emerging economies shifted and
reframed the discussion on the post-2015 agenda from MDGs to SDGs to reflect more closely
their own national interests broadening the MDGs to a wider and more holistic development agenda.
But what are the implications of these three phases of experience with the MDGs for the SDGs, and
the future of global health?
Section three: implications for the SDGs and the future of global health
Before considering the implications, it is useful to summarise and review how states engaged and
exerted power. In the first phase, developed states held considerable strength in all forms of
power. They were not only able to create and determine the agenda, but they were also able to
use their financial and human resources leveraging both their position and networks as compulsory,
structural and institutional power within the international system to ensure other states accepted and
adopted their policy guidance. Developed states were also willing to sacrifice some of their control
when working with the Bretton Woods institutions, the UN and other states as they rebranded and
reframed their IDGs into MDGs to gain greater legitimacy.
In the second phase, building on early academic critics and their initial experiences, emerging
economies began simultaneously to question the MDG approach more forcefully, and engage
with the MDGs within the UN system; they also recognised and responded to the increased focus
on global health. On the one hand, this deepened and reinforced the productive power of the
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MDG paradigm, but on the other hand, it also showcased the rising and burgeoning structural power
of emerging economies to begin to contribute to and shape the field of global health. This was part of
a broader geopolitical shift of power globally as well as within the still nascent field of global health
which began to shift away from a heavily ‘verticalized’ approach in the early 2000s to a broader, more
horizontal approach (Bärnighausen, Bloom, & Humair, 2011).
The third phase exemplified the productive power of institutionalising the MDGs as the dominant
paradigm for global development. There was tremendous interest and engagement in what would
come after the MDGs, how the post-2015 agenda would be determined and what would be part
of it illustrated the productive power of the MDGs. In this phase, the ability and success of developed
states to ensure the continuation of the MDG paradigm within the beginning of a new SDG approach
reinforced the original MDG approach; however, it also signaled emerging economies’ rising insti-
tutional and structural power as they were able to negotiate for a broadening of the goals to be a more
universal agenda relevant for every country. The SDG agenda essentially incorporates the MDGs and
expands this agenda to include new goals related to environmental sustainability, labour and govern-
ance. In other words, developed states were able to maintain their focus on MDGs and institutiona-
lise them within the SDGs, but the emerging economies were also able to broaden the MDGs into the
SDGs.
But what does this mean for the broader SDGs and the development agenda, as well as for the
more specific global health agenda? What does the MDG experience mean for the future of the
SDG agenda? Given the MDG-established policy processes, the SDGs could likely continue to be
as relevant and dominant for the international development agenda as the MDGs were. However,
in the same way that not all of the MDGs received the same levels of attention and commitment
(and some of the MDG goals and their indicators were contested and eventually revised in the
early stages, eg as explained earlier on reproductive health), this is also likely to happen and is already
happening within the SDGs. For example, during the UN’s July 2017 High Level Political Forum
(HLPF) on SDGs focused on reviewing select thematic goals (1-no poverty; 2-zero hunger; 3-
good health and well-being; 5-gender equality; 9-industry, innovation and infrastructure; 14-life
below water; and 17-partnerships for the goals). At the HPLF, countries reported in voluntary
national reviews (VNRs), some countries also only selectively reported on goals meaning that
they ‘cherry-picked’ which goals to report on and which to ignore in their reporting. Instead of
implementing them in whole as they were designed, it is possible and likely that states will determine
an informal ranking of the SDGs through their financial investments and policy priorities as also
happened with the MDGs.
A more pressing question, however, regards the role of the SDGs for global health: what will the
SDGs mean for global health? Will the SDGs be as central and formative for the future of global
health as the MDGs were? In other words, will the SDGs matter for global health as much as or
more than the MDGs did, especially as low and middle-income states engaged in the process to con-
ceptualise them? Or will the future of global health better be debated and defined elsewhere? Given
the centrality of health to the MDGs (3/8 Goals) compared to the SDGs (1/17), it seems unlikely that
health will remain as central to the sustainable development agenda, and thus, unlikely that the SDGs
will remain as central to the future of the global health agenda. But the interpretation of Goal 3 on
health for the future of global health continues to be contested.
The recently directly-elected-by-states Director-General of the World Health Organization
(WHO), is clearly in favour of a focus on the SDGs with a slight shift in the interpretation of
SDG 3 on health as he stated in July 2017 at the High Level Political Forum: ‘I regard universal health
coverage as WHO’s top priority. […] Universal health coverage is included in the Sustainable Devel-
opment Agenda. Indeed, it is the centrepiece of the Sustainable Development Goal health targets’
(Ghebreyesus, 2017). However, two recently established global health initiatives, one the Coalition
for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) started with $460 million from the governments
of Germany, Japan and Norway, plus the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Wellcome
Trust, and another ‘Resolve’ focused on heart disease and stroke as well as disease outbreaks started
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with $225 million dollars from Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, and the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, make little reference to the Sustainable Development Goals in
their mission statements or aims. These new funding mechanisms could be rebranded or co-opted by
the UN system at a later stage; however, for now, they seem to indicate a potential move away from
the SDGs as the leitmotiv of global health. This being said, it has been acknowledged that the SDGs
imply a dramatic paradigm shift within global health (Buse & Hawkes, 2015), and it could be that
this transition is still ongoing. Apropos there are already some efforts to reconceptualize global
health as planetary health more in line with sustainable development and the SDG agenda (Whitmee
et al., 2015). Regardless of the relationship with the SDGs, the exact future shape, direction and pri-
orities of global health are continuing to evolve, and remain to be seen.
Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates the value of using power as a framework to understand and assess actors’,
particularly states, roles in global health. Better understanding how power is exerted and deployed
could help improve how actors engage, and identify key determinants of comparatively more ‘suc-
cessful’ or ‘effective’ efforts in global health; a deeper knowledge of what determines better policy
efforts could also enhance policy processes and lead to better governance mechanisms (Marten,
2015). This could transform states’ abilities to negotiate global health policies ultimately improving
and saving lives. It might also mean other actors increase their attempts to leverage states’ influence.
This analysis and the transition from the MDGs to the SDGs also has implications for how power
is exerted at the UN and shapes the development and global health agenda. Compulsory power has
become less relevant over time (as development assistance became less critical), the exertion of struc-
tural and institutional power are becoming more contested (as emerging economies begin to demand
some restructuring of the system) and productive power is becoming perhaps the most important
and relevant form of power, especially for global health. In between 2000–2015, developed states
started by dominating the policy process, but by the end, emerging economy states were able to con-
test the previously unchecked structural and institutional power of developed states. They contested
the agenda in the negotiation of the post-2015 agenda and thus, the future exertion of productive
power. But what does this mean for future policy making efforts, and what are the implications of
this analysis?
First, the experience of the MDGs showcases the potential for states to leverage structural and
institutional power to exert productive power for policymaking within the UN system. Given the
geopolitical changes in the last decade, this could mean negotiations where states can exert insti-
tutional and productive power will now become more contested, and potentially gridlocked resulting
in broad or watered-down agreements. The contestation of the SDGs could represent this. The nego-
tiated process lasted around three years and produced 17 goals and 169 indicators. If this is the case,
it is possible that the UN’s productive power could become challenged, or less important. It could be
that states could position new or alternative actors to the UN, which are better aligned to their inter-
ests, to create productive power, and seek new policy fora in which they might be better positioned to
exert institutional and structural power. Alternatively, it could be that this greater contestation, even
with eventual compromise, could lead to more committed national buy-in and engagement for new
policies and processes. The SDGs could be a litmus test for helping to understand and assess the pro-
ductive power and influence of UN policymaking.
In the case of creating and institutionalising the MDGs, states exerting institutional and structural
power seemed to work best in alliances with other states as well as non-state actors. Even compara-
tively less structurally or institutionally powerful states belong to one grouping or another within the
UN system, eg the African Union or the G-77, which offers states increased possibilities for exerting
some institutional or structural power within the UN system. This empowers states to leverage these
relationships and abilities to engage on and create new mechanisms which have the potential to exert
productive power. The MDGs created new norms around international development and global
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health exerting tremendous productive power. States played a critical role in creating and shaping
this productive power, and this story could offer insights to other states seeking to leverage national
power to create or institutionalise new norms in global health policymaking through the United
Nations. One potential lesson based on this experience could be that states do not need to make
huge financial investments to exert compulsory power, but rather need to consider how wield insti-
tutional, structural and productive power more effectively and strategically.
Second, this analysis illustrates the enduring importance and centrality of state engagement in
global health policymaking. Without states, the MDGs and SDGs would not exist, or would look sub-
stantially different. While there is understandable excitement and interest in the role of new non-
state actor engagement, the role of states within global health remains underappreciated (Ricci,
2009) and overlooked (Marten & Smith, 2017). Since 2000, the role of states in determining and
managing health has changed and evolved. Globalisation increased transnational actors’ abilities
to shape and challenge how states spend, raise and allocate resources for health (Smith & Hanson,
2011). Despite being responsible for health, states continue to see challenges to their prior monopoly
over health governance and regulation (Walt, 1998). The MDGs themselves reflect some of these
tensions. At one level, the MDGs are a challenge to states’ authority to manage and determine
their own health priorities. The MDGs were largely crafted by developed states for low- and
middle-income states. At another level, they reflect states’ continued authority as all states endorsed
the MDGs at the General Assembly and ultimately participated in rethinking and reframing the
MDGs into SDGs. Some of these challenges to states are state-sponsored or state-endorsed as states
defer some level of sovereignty empowering international institutions or non-state actors to chal-
lenge their sovereignty. Despite continuing changes in their roles and challenges to their authority,
states remain the predominant and decisive actors in global health policymaking.
Third, the example of the MDGs also highlights the importance of legitimacy for policymaking in
global health. While developed states likely could have continued with their IDGs at the turn of the
century, they recognised the value of legitimacy in transitioning them through the Bretton Woods
institutions and reframing them within the UN policy process in negotiation with other states,
thus trading some level of control for greater legitimacy. As part of this, the United Nations, a
state-based institution, is generally perceived to be the most legitimate forum for establishing and
determining health policies and priorities. The question now is will this legitimacy still be valued
highly enough to justify the likely increases in political contestation. In other words, will states,
recognising the potential limits to their institutional and structural power at the UN, now seek to
exert productive power in other policy fora like the G-7 or the G-20? Until now, the United Nations
as a policy forum and the MDGs as a UN mechanism played an integral part in contributing to
define and shape the field of global health. While it is clear that states will continue to be critical
actors shaping the field of global health, the role of SDGs in defining the future of global health
is, for now, unclear.
Notes
1. Of course, defining health systems and how to best strengthen them to help achieve the MDGs is also heavily
disputed. Health systems frameworks are influenced by their authors (van Olmen, Marchal, Van Damme,
Kegels, & Hill, 2012) as well as new global health institutions many of which were funded and influenced by
the creation of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Storeng, 2014) in the late 1990s (Birn, 2014) and
their focus on vertical and technocratic approaches to health (McCoy, Kembhavi, Patel, & Luintel, 2009).
2. Eventually by 2013, the UNDP counted more than 400 national MDG reports.
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